So these are the heroes that will step up as we stand down?

[tagos]

Iraq army almost defeated by band of loons (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/30/world/middleeast/30iraq.html?_r=1&ref=world&oref=slogin)

The Army of Heaven is/was apparently a millenarianist cult.

Iraqi forces were surprised and nearly overwhelmed by the ferocity of an obscure renegade militia in a weekend battle near the holy city of Najaf and needed far more help from American forces than previously disclosed, American and Iraqi officials said Monday.

<snip>

“This group had more capabilities than the government,” said Abdul Hussein Abtan, the deputy governor of Najaf Province, at a news conference.

Only a month ago, in an elaborate handover ceremony, the American command transferred security authority over Najaf to the Iraqis. The Americans said at the time that they would remain available to assist the Iraqis in the event of a crisis.

The Iraqis and Americans eventually prevailed in the battle. But the Iraqi security forces’ miscalculations about the group’s strength and intentions raised troubling questions about their ability to recognize and deal with a threat.

The Iraqis initially sent a battalion from their Eighth Army Division, along with police forces, but they were quickly overwhelmed, according to an Iraqi commander at the scene. The battalion began to retreat but was soon surrounded and pinned down, and had to call in American air support to keep the enemy from overrunning its position.

American Apache attack helicopters and F-16s, as well as British fighter jets, flew low over the farms where the enemy had set up its encampments and attacked, dropping 500-pound bombs on the encampments. The Iraqi forces were still unable to advance, and they called in support from both an elite Iraqi unit known as the Scorpion Brigade, which is based to the north in Hilla, and from American ground troops.

Around noon, elements of the American Fourth Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division were dispatched from near Baghdad.

Estimated at about 500 these cultists required the US airpower and ground troops to deal with.

The Army of Heaven (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-iraq29jan29,0,4626909.story?coll=la-home-headlines)

Ali Nomas, an Iraqi security official in Najaf, said the fighters belonged to a group calling itself Heaven's Army, one of several messianic cults that have appeared among Shiites who believe in the imminent return of Imam Mahdi, the last in the line of Shiite saints who disappeared more than 1,000 years ago. Nomas said the information came from interviews with at least 10 detained fighters.

"Everyday someone claims he's the Mahdi," he said.

Nomas said the leader of the hitherto unknown Heaven's Army had told followers that he was a missing son of the Imam Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of the prophet Muhammad. Ali's remains are entombed in Najaf.

"They believe that the Mahdi has called them to fight in Najaf," Nomas said, adding that fighters had converged on the Najaf area from other predominantly Shiite cities in Iraq.

He lamented that Iraq's death and destruction had convinced some Shiites that the end of days was coming.

"There's nothing bizarre left in Iraq anymore," Nomas said in a telephone interview. "We've seen the most incredible things."

How is the 'surge,' which relies on the Iraq army holding what the US clears, going to work if the Iraq army can't deal with a few hundred militia types? The parallels with 'vietnamisation', grow by the hour.

Or maybe - Europe in the middle of the Black Death.

[Bosda Di'Chi of Tricor]

Boy Scouts & goobers.
:smack:

[Sapo]

...the Iraqi security forces’ miscalculations about the group’s strength and intentions raised troubling questions about their ability to recognize and deal with a threat.

I guess they are reaching the level if the US army, then. You can tell they are learning from the masters.

[tomndebb]

Is this a debate or a Pit rant?

Information not provided in the story includes:
Where were Iraqi troops stationed in relation to the battle site? The Iraqis supplied their Scorpion Brigade to help out. Were the U.S. troops, (also at brigade strength), simply closer to the fighting than any other Iraqi units, so it made more sense to send one each of U.S. and Iraqi brigades than to wait an additional few hours to send two Iraqi units?

I suspect that the Iraqis are not yet prepared and that Bush and company are deluding themselves (or lying to us) about eventual turnover, but this isolated battle does not demonstrate that particular point.

[Elendil's Heir]

Boy Scouts & goobers.
:smack:

As a Boy Scout leader (well, Cub Scouts, these days), I deeply resent the comparison. :mad: ;)

[gonzomax]

Of course they are ready. I remember Rice on Meet the Press in 2004 claiming that over 100,000 fully trained Iraqi troops were in the field. So there are many ,many more now. Two weeks training is all it takes.
Nothing isolated about this story. There have been many stories of ill trained or disinterested Iraqi troops.

[BrainGlutton]

The parallels with 'vietnamisation', grow by the hour.

Or maybe - Europe in the middle of the Black Death.

I was thinking, Germany during the 30 Years' War. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/30_years_war) Multi-sided civil war, religious-ethnic-class conflict all mixed together, outbreaks of incomprehensible mass hysteria, bizarre cults springing up everywhere, foreign powers sticking their noses in . . .

[elucidator]

A battalion of Iraqi troops? How many in a battalion? Of the opposing force, how many were armed "combatants" and how many were extraneous personnel (women, children, assorted other shrapnel absorption units)?

When we institute our "clear and hold" strategery in Baghdad, are these the sort of troops that we can expect to run to the aid of our troops if things get nasty? Barring further information of an encouraging nature, this is....less than optimal.

[tomndebb]

A battalion of Iraqi troops? How many in a battalion? Of the opposing force, how many were armed "combatants" and how many were extraneous personnel (women, children, assorted other shrapnel absorption units)?A battalion currently runs to about 800 troops (the size changes over the years) of whom perhaps 80% are actually used for combat instead of support. Of course, that assumes a fully outfitted battalion on the day they are formally sent out. Once they are in the field, casualties, transfers, and other issues can reduce that number, considerably.

If the hostile militia had 500 effectives, entrenched, attacking 400 Iraqi effectives (who may have instructions not to abandon their road-bound vehicles), that could place the Iraqis in a pretty bad situation, particularly if they took casualties in the inital attack, reducing their number of effective troops while tying up other resources to cvare for the wounded.

So why would another two battalions be needed to free them? Because one wants to use overwhelming force to overcome entrenched positions. (Back in the Napoleonic era, an assault on a fortified position was presumed to need a 4:1 ration for success.)

This could have been every bit as much of a display of incompetence as the OP presumes. At this point, however, we do not have sufficient information to make that a clear judgment.

[John Mace]

The other issue in this particular instance was the immediacy of the problem. The group was targeting Sistani at the important Shi'a holy day of Ashura, which is today.

[Der Trihs]

The patriotic, motivated people are either the ones fighting against us, or if they are in the army are probably just there to get the weapons and training they need to fight for their faction; they don't want to actually fight for Iraq, but their faction. I expect a lot of soldiers are there simply because after the way we destroyed their country, they need the food and shelter.

People who have no reason to care about winning make poor soldiers.

[msmith537]

Does anyone remeber a little story a few years back about how the US BATF was overwelmed by a band of loons holed up in a compound in Waco, TX? IIRC, they too had to call in the US Army to help.

Not that I think that the Iraqi army is a premier military force, but it sounds like a lot of people in this thread are also underestimating the capabilities of 500 lunatics armed with modern firepower.

[B. Serum]

The problem with the Iraq military is that they aren't investing enough in national defense. I don't see why they don't just raise their military budget to 426 billion like we do!

Duh!!!!

[Homo Ergaster]

Well, the loonies DID lose, didn't they?
Defending a well-chosen position has always been easier than attacking. We have to be careful not to mix political ideas with battlefield realities.

[tagos]

Well, the loonies DID lose, didn't they?
Defending a well-chosen position has always been easier than attacking. We have to be careful not to mix political ideas with battlefield realities.

They lost because the US airpower got them.

Not the much vaunted Iraqi National Army whose expertise seems to consist entirely of walking into a straight left hook and calling for help.

Which is the point of the OP. The 'surge' is based on the notion that the same 'army' will fight shoulder to shoulder with the few thousand extra US troops and then hold the cleared areas. Without presumably the USAF bombing the cleared area to rubble every time the INA gets into a fight.

The further point is that 500 heavily armed men assembled and dug in around Najaf a month after Iraq was handed the security responsibility for the area. Ponder the implications of that.

Meanwhile Not so much standing up as legging it (http://www.freenewmexican.com/news/56082.html)

Meanwhile, Iraqi officials in troubled Diyala province northeast of Baghdad sacked 1,500 policemen, charging them with absenteeism and fleeing fighting. They also dismissed Baqubah Mayor Khalid Shanjary, for having alleged ties to Sunni Arab rebels. The violent province is riddled with Sunni Arab al-Qaida cell members as well as militiamen affiliated with Shiite cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr.

The debate is: how can the surge possibly succeed if this is the calibre and capability of the INA (and the police so friggin' corrupt, cowardly and disloyal)?

My prediction?

IF the various militias don't just keep their heads down or snipe from the sidelines at fixed positions until the US 'surge' ends (the most likely outcome for the Malaki supporting ones of Sadr) the US/INA forces will, being in combination casualty adverse and poorly trained, low morale and of dubious loyalty, make such use of air stikes and artillery that the level of civilian casualties will just add fuel to the fire.

[FRDE]

If, or rather when, we get out then they will know what they are fighting for.

[tagos]

If, or rather when, we get out then they will know what they are fighting for.

Whatever faction they owe their primary loyalty to.

[elucidator]

http://www.rawstory.com/showarticle.php?src=http%3A%2F%2Fnews.independent.co.uk%2Fworld%2Fmiddle_east%2Farticle2201103.ece

"US 'victory' against cult leader was 'massacre' "

There are growing suspicions in Iraq that the official story of the battle outside Najaf between a messianic Iraqi cult and the Iraqi security forces supported by the US, in which 263 people were killed and 210 wounded, is a fabrication. The heavy casualties may be evidence of an unpremeditated massacre...
Offered without comment.

[tagos]

http://www.rawstory.com/showarticle.php?src=http%3A%2F%2Fnews.independent.co.uk%2Fworld%2Fmiddle_east%2Farticle2201103.ece

"US 'victory' against cult leader was 'massacre' "


Offered without comment.

Priceless. Remind me again who we outsourced INA training to? The Marx Brothers or the Keystone Cops?

[John Mace]

http://www.rawstory.com/showarticle.php?src=http%3A%2F%2Fnews.independent.co.uk%2Fworld%2Fmiddle_east%2Farticle2201103.ece

"US 'victory' against cult leader was 'massacre' "


Offered without comment.
And dismissed with the same amount of comment.

[tagos]

Juan Cole (http://www.juancole.com/) is pretty dismissive (although he begins from an assumption of a planned assault on Najaf).

If we set aside the claims of this group of Hawatimah to be innocent victims and assume that they were Mahdists coming to help with a planned assault on Najaf (empty and unguarded while all the other Shiites converged on Karbala for Ashura), then it would explain a lot. Heavily armed tribesmen could easily have overwhelmed the Iraqi army, if they had RPGs and automatic weapons. They would have the element of surprise, esprit de corps, and probably some would have served in the old Baath army and might well have much more military experience than the green Iraqi army troops thrown against them. Tribesmen are formidable and often outfitted like private armies. And if they were coming to support the Mahdawiyah cultists in the orchards, that explains where the high-powered weapons came from. They so devastated the Iraqi forces that the US had to send troops, tanks and helicopters to rescue the latter.

If we posit an involvement of the Hawatimah from Diwaniyah in the Mahdist uprising at Najaf, it raises the question as to whether they were the "rogue elements" that launched an uprising in Diwaniyah itself in late August, 2006. At the time, this violence was blamed on the Mahdi Army of Muqtada al-Sadr, but spokesmen for Muqtada at the time complained that "rogue elements" not under his control were stirring up trouble there. The Mahdawiyah was founded in 1999 by Abdul Zahra, a young civil engineer from Diwaniyah who had been a follower of Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr (Muqtada's father) but established a group that split off from the Sadrists.

Admittedly, a lot of what I have written is speculative, and I'm open to being corrected by better evidence. (That is the fate of all historians but especially those who try to catch history on the run.) But I think it is pretty easy to resolve the contradictions among the major accounts by assuming that this was a Mahdist uprising aimed at taking Najaf, centered on the coming of the Promised One, to which a group of Hawatimah clans were coming to lend aid. The Hawatimah story of their innocence, as reported in the Sunni press, seems to me to have a lot of holes in it.

[Jophiel]

Juan Cole wrote "Admittedly, a lot of what I have written is speculative, and I'm open to being corrected by better evidence."

He's "open to being corrected"? Back in my day, people who made the arguments were expected to back them up with some sort of evidence. We weren't expected to take them as a valid point until such time as we could disprove their wild conjecture.

[tagos]

Juan Cole wrote "Admittedly, a lot of what I have written is speculative, and I'm open to being corrected by better evidence."

He's "open to being corrected"? Back in my day, people who made the arguments were expected to back them up with some sort of evidence. We weren't expected to take them as a valid point until such time as we could disprove their wild conjecture.

He's applying his considerable expertise to making a preliminary assessment of an incident from conflicting sources. On the one hand you have 'official' sources and on the other various Sunni news sources. Both of which you can't trust as far as you could throw Stonehenge.

So, he inserts a disclaimer. He is expressing willingness to reassess when new evidence appears. What is the problem with that?

What do you propose? We trust the US Govt account? Yea - right.

[tomndebb]

http://www.rawstory.com/showarticle.php?src=http%3A%2F%2Fnews.independent.co.uk%2Fworld%2Fmiddle_east%2Farticle2201103.ece

"US 'victory' against cult leader was 'massacre' "


Offered without comment.Why? The story, as presented, prompts several observations.
The first, obviously, is the nature of the Fog of War.

However, as presented, we have a troop of (reasonably) armed pilgrims running into a checkpoint and a firefight breaking out.
Then we have a wholly separate group of people joining in the firefight while claiming to have called for a ceasefire.
Then we have U.S. air support arriving, in the dark, to finsih off a battle that has been raging for 22 hours.
Then we get a claim that it was a massacre (with the strong implication that it was a deliberate massacre).

Very little in that recounting makes any sense.
If it was a deliberate massacre, why was the Iraqi Scorpon brigade mentioned in other articles only brought in after the fight had been joined. If I were planning a massacre of a group that I would have to presume to be armed, I would amass all the heavy troops and weapons I could at the beginning of the incident.

Similarly, a battle that was joined at 6:00 a.m. Sunday had to have attracted someone's attention by Sunday at noon. Why wait until the following morning to call in U.S. air support?

If the second group was only inadvertantly involved, why dd they not try to retire and make contact with (send a messenger to) Iraqi or American headquarters to call for an end to the fighting rather than stay and shoot while calling for a truce?

Now, I have no idea what really happened. (For example, it might have been a matter of terrain that prevented the one group from withdrawing and we have no information regarding what sort of communications were available to any of the groups to talk to each other. Iraqi and U.S. military would be supposed to have decent radio contact, of course.) I am not going to speculate who the good guys and bad guys are, but the story in the linked article does nothing but raise questions.
As presented, a claim for a deliberate massacre seems out of line.
As presented, a claim that the Iraqi/U.S. forces prevented an attack on a Shi'a shrine are unsupported.
On the other hand, a claim for a clusterfuck seems quite reasonable.

(And, as Cole said, more information--especially on the odd chance that it was accurate--could change my view.)

[XT]

The parallels with 'vietnamisation', grow by the hour.

I have no doubt they do...just like I have no doubt that in the minds of the faithful (the OTHER faithful you understand :)), people really do see Jesus in a piece of toast.



Let me see if I have things right here. We are supposed to judge the over all effectiveness of the Iraqi military based on a battle between forces of near parity (wrt numbers), where the enemy forces were dug in and staged an ambush of the Iraqi force...and this Iraqi force called for air strikes and other support from US forces. A battle where the key pieces of MILITARY data (that we could use to actually evaluate wtf happened there) is missing?

Am I missing some info here? How could we possibly judge the current state of the Iraqi military based on this one incident...of which we don't have all the information of the tactical situation?

When come back, bring debate...and pie.

-XT

[tagos]

I have no doubt they do...just like I have no doubt that in the minds of the faithful (the OTHER faithful you understand :)), people really do see Jesus in a piece of toast.



Let me see if I have things right here. We are supposed to judge the over all effectiveness of the Iraqi military based on a battle between forces of near parity (wrt numbers), where the enemy forces were dug in and staged an ambush of the Iraqi force...and this Iraqi force called for air strikes and other support from US forces. A battle where the key pieces of MILITARY data (that we could use to actually evaluate wtf happened there) is missing?

Am I missing some info here? How could we possibly judge the current state of the Iraqi military based on this one incident...of which we don't have all the information of the tactical situation?

When come back, bring debate...and pie.

-XT


You're missing the fact that it was a battle of choice for the Iraq forces as presented by the original story. That their tactical ineptness in engaging as they did and their consequent inability to deal with the consequences suggest they are not competent, equipped or motivated enough to be relied on.

Among the troubling questions raised is how hundreds of armed men were able to set up such an elaborate encampment, which Iraqi officials said included tunnels, trenches and a series of blockades, only 10 miles northeast of Najaf. After the fight was over, Iraqi officials said they discovered at least two antiaircraft weapons as well as 40 heavy machine guns.

The government knew that the Soldiers of Heaven had set up camp in the area, but officials said they thought they were there to worship together.

Mr. Abtan said the Iraqi forces later decided to move on the group because an informer said Sunday was “zero hour” and the government noticed more men streaming into the area.

“If this operation had succeeded, it would have been a chance of a lifetime for them,” he said.

The Iraqis initially sent a battalion from their Eighth Army Division, along with police forces, but they were quickly overwhelmed, according to an Iraqi commander at the scene. The battalion began to retreat but was soon surrounded and pinned down, and had to call in American air support to keep the enemy from overrunning its position.

Crap intelligence to begin with. The decision to engage. It's all in the OP.

When come back bring willingness to read.

[FRDE]

So, the Iraqis brought in superior fire power
- seems sensible to me

It sounds a bit like Lions versus Christians, with the Iraqis collecting the entrance money.

[tagos]

So, the Iraqis brought in superior fire power
- seems sensible to me

It sounds a bit like Lions versus Christians, with the Iraqis collecting the entrance money.

They bought it in after getting themselves in trouble. After 'they' - the Iraqi Army - on which we are pinning our hopes - got owned by an obscure messianic militia who outgunned them and outfought them. If indeed the INA put up a fight at all before running away and calling for help.

And do you want to address my point about the consequences of such an approach in the hearts and minds environs of Baghdad? Or are you comfortable with a we had to destroy the city to save it approach?

Feeling blase about the prospects of The Surge succeeding with allies and tactics like these?

[FRDE]

I think that they might toughen up if we (UK and USA) got out of the arena.

Personally I reckon that the 'hearts and minds' of Baghdad have long been planning a Saigon like exit, which suits me fine as I've long been planning an Iraqi Kebab House in an obscure bit of Britain ( Iraqi kebabs are mind blowingly good ) and it would amuse me to staff it with GPs and similarly overqualified people.

Actually I am more than half serious - the Kebab side is viable and evacuating Iraq might be the only way of preserving the useful and less obnoxious population.

Heck, it is a mess - have you read 'Rule Britannia' by Daphne Du Maurier ?
Occupation without consent is impossible.

[tagos]

I think that they might toughen up if we (UK and USA) got out of the arena.

Personally I reckon that the 'hearts and minds' of Baghdad have long been planning a Saigon like exit, which suits me fine as I've long been planning an Iraqi Kebab House in an obscure bit of Britain ( Iraqi kebabs are mind blowingly good ) and it would amuse me to staff it with GPs and similarly overqualified people.

Actually I am more than half serious - the Kebab side is viable and evacuating Iraq might be the only way of preserving the useful and less obnoxious population.

Heck, it is a mess - have you read 'Rule Britannia' by Daphne Du Maurier ?
Occupation without consent is impossible.

An influx of high quality kebab shops - now that is something I'd salute if you run it up the pole.

[BrainGlutton]

From George Orwell's 1936 essay, "Shooting an Elephant": (http://www.online-literature.com/orwell/887/)

The Burmese sub-inspector and some Indian constables were waiting for me in the quarter where the elephant had been seen. It was a very poor quarter, a labyrinth of squalid bamboo huts, thatched with palmleaf, winding all over a steep hillside. I remember that it was a cloudy, stuffy morning at the beginning of the rains. We began questioning the people as to where the elephant had gone and, as usual, failed to get any definite information. That is invariably the case in the East; a story always sounds clear enough at a distance, but the nearer you get to the scene of events the vaguer it becomes. Some of the people said that the elephant had gone in one direction, some said that he had gone in another, some professed not even to have heard of any elephant. . . .

[Steve MB]

Juan Cole wrote "Admittedly, a lot of what I have written is speculative, and I'm open to being corrected by better evidence."

He's "open to being corrected"? Back in my day, people who made the arguments were expected to back them up with some sort of evidence. We weren't expected to take them as a valid point until such time as we could disprove their wild conjecture.

"Can you prove that it didn't happen?"
--Criswell

[Bear_Nenno]

The Heaven's Army never should have surrounded them. If they just gave them an avenue of escape, they would have exploited it and ran off. Instead they forced the Iraqis to stand their ground and fight long enough to be reinforced by Allied forces and ultimately prevail.

Good for us, but silly tactical error on their part.

[RickJay]

A battalion currently runs to about 800 troops (the size changes over the years) of whom perhaps 80% are actually used for combat instead of support.
Eighty percent support is a wild exaggeration, and calls into question what your definition of "support" is. A classic battalion of the size you're describing is typically formed of three companies, each of three platoons; an infantry platoon at full strength has at least 24 actual soldiers, giving our theoretical battalion at least 216 infantrymen, and in most cases more. Battalions are relatively homogenized; on a grand scale, like at the division/corps/army level, you'll se e alot of support but they're going to be in support-only units when you get down to the battalion and company levels. Field battalions will be heavy on field personnel.

You also have to consider that a lot of the people we're calling "support" at the battalion level are in fact combat support; at the battalion level you might have machine gun teams, anti-tank teams, or mortar teams, for instance, usually in a combat support platoon or company, who certainly are not paper pushers. Field officers certainly count as fighting men, as do senior NCOs.

I mean, if you're saying 640 out of 800 men in an infantry battalion aren't in a combat role, I'd be fascinated to hear (A) what they're all doing, and (B) how those platoons and sections are filled.

There isn't THAT much administrative overhead at the battalion level.

[tomndebb]

I mean, if you're saying 640 out of 800 men in an infantry battalion aren't in a combat role, I'd be fascinated to hear (A) what they're all doing, and (B) how those platoons and sections are filled.I'm curious how you got from my "80% are actually used for combat instead of support" to your "80% for support."

I'm open to correction on exact numbers, but please do not reverse my figures and then cry "foul!".

[Ryan_Liam]

Sounds like an Ap Bac (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Ap_Bac) moment to me. Only this time, the cult didn't retreat, and Iraqi/Allied forces defeated them.

[BrainGlutton]

http://www.rawstory.com/showarticle.php?src=http%3A%2F%2Fnews.independent.co.uk%2Fworld%2Fmiddle_east%2Farticle2201103.ece

"US 'victory' against cult leader was 'massacre' "


Offered without comment.

Started a new thread (http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=406745) on this possibility.

[AskNott]

Iraq army almost defeated by band of loons (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/30/world/middleeast/30iraq.html?_r=1&ref=world&oref=slogin)

The Army of Heaven is/was apparently a millenarianist cult.
...
"A millenarianist cult?" Sweet Mercy Magruder, we're facing a mob of crazed hatmakers! :eek: Call in the gunships!

[BrainGlutton]

Sounds like an Ap Bac (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Ap_Bac) moment to me. Only this time, the cult didn't retreat, and Iraqi/Allied forces defeated them.

That battle happened at the start of the Vietnam War, Ryan.

[Ryan_Liam]

That battle happened at the start of the Vietnam War, Ryan.

Yes, if you categorise the Vietnam war starting with US troop deployments in Vietnam as the 'start' however, considerable amounts of advisors were in country before 1965.

Vietnamisation primarily failed because the ARVN were prone to avoid risks in pacification, not to mention large amounts of corruption and poor leadership, mix this in with conscription, leads to a force poorly trained and unqualified to fight in battle.

However in Iraq, we have a situation quite different, whilst the ARVN was built for conventional warfare, we've seen a light Iraqi army (suitable for counter-insurgency) (also not conscripted but all volunteer) built up with US for back up support.

These armies aren't equal and never will be, however, what's more important in the long run for Iraq is adequately trained officers and personnel. Calling for backup is not a sign of cowardice. The fact the Iraqis fought them for 22 hours without retreat is a sure sign of some training is working.

(forgive the lateness of the reply, I've had no internet for a month)

[BrainGlutton]

Vietnamisation primarily failed because the ARVN were prone to avoid risks in pacification, not to mention large amounts of corruption and poor leadership, mix this in with conscription, leads to a force poorly trained and unqualified to fight in battle.

However in Iraq, we have a situation quite different, whilst the ARVN was built for conventional warfare, we've seen a light Iraqi army (suitable for counter-insurgency) (also not conscripted but all volunteer) built up with US for back up support.

Perhaps, but the Iraqi army still seems to be cursed with corruption, poor leadership, and a force poorly trained and unqualified to fight.

[Ryan_Liam]

Perhaps, but the Iraqi army still seems to be cursed with corruption, poor leadership, and a force poorly trained and unqualified to fight.

Seems to me alot of officers and Generals in the Iraqi Army come from a well versed military background. As for corruption and poorly trained, what do you expect from decades of military training by the Soviets? When an army lacks NCO's and emphasised an expanded officer corps in order to maintain loyalty, this is bound to have repercussions. At least Coalition efforts have been trying to remedy that.

[BrainGlutton]

As for corruption and poorly trained, what do you expect from decades of military training by the Soviets?

I don't recall Iraq ever having been a Soviet ally.

[tagos]

I don't recall Iraq ever having been a Soviet ally.

But it did get a lot of arms from the USSR and other places. I beleive the air force was trained in soviet military doctrine. None of this is relevant to the beleif that somehow, magically, an Iraq army built around factions, sects and nationalities doesn't have a primary loyalty to them and not the government in Greenzonia.

Loyalty in question (http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/news/special_packages/iraq/16716510.htm)

KIRKUK, Iraq - Lt. Hiwa Raouf Abdul is not supposed to be in Kirkuk. The oil-rich city, which many fear is teetering on the brink of civil war, is off-limits to Kurdish Peshmerga militia members.

And yet, on Tuesday, the slender, 26-year-old Peshmerga officer breezed through one checkpoint after the next on his way into Kirkuk, exchanging waves and salutes with Iraqi army soldiers and policemen as he rode with a truckload of Peshmerga gunmen.

<snip>

But the ease with which a pickup truck carrying seven Peshmerga members, most of them wielding AK-47s, passed into Kirkuk says volumes about the challenge of pacifying flashpoint towns like Kirkuk and, ultimately, Iraq.

When he passed by the Iraqi army checkpoint on the edge of Kirkuk, Abdul looked at the soldiers saluting him and said, "They get their orders from the Iraqi army, but their loyalty is to the Kurds, to us."

As with Shiite militias in Baghdad, the line between militia members and Iraqi security troops in Kirkuk is so thin that it at times doesn't exist. And U.S. plans to build Iraq's security forces - a process that has cost more than $15 billion nationwide - seem to have strengthened militias instead of discouraging them.

The issue of loyalty with Iraqi security forces is proving to be the Achilles' heel of American plans to stabilize the war-torn nation. Without neutral Iraqi soldiers and police, an American withdrawal would almost certainly lead to greater sectarian bloodshed than Iraq is currently experiencing.

The end result will at best be a miltary coup and another murderous strongman we support because he'll be anti-iranian.

To believe that we can wave a magic wand and create a neutral, professional army is just wishful thinking. Note how the iraqi troops for the baghdad surge are

imported Kurds (http://www.voanews.com/english/2007-02-16-voa27.cfm).

Iraq's army is moving more troops into Baghdad as part of the new effort to stop sectarian violence there. The controversial plan includes bringing Iraqi Army units to the capital from the Kurdistan region of northern Iraq. Some critics of the plan oppose adding Kurds to Baghdad's volatile ethnic mix.


And it's not going swimmingly (http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/16502266.htm)

The Iraqi army brigades being sent to the capital are filled with former members of a Kurdish militia, the peshmerga, and most of the soldiers remain loyal to the militia.

Much as Shiite militias have infiltrated the Iraqi security forces across Arab Iraq, the peshmerga fill the ranks of the Iraqi army in the Kurdish region in the north, poised to secure a semi-independent Kurdistan and seize oil-rich Kirkuk and parts of Mosul if Iraq falls apart. One thing they didn't bank on, they said, was being sent into the "fire" of Baghdad.

"The soldiers don't know the Arabic language, the Arab tradition, and they don't have any experience fighting terror," said Anwar Dolani, a former peshmerga commander who leads the brigade that's being transferred to Baghdad from the Kurdish city of Sulaimaniyah.

Dolani called the desertions a "phenomenon" but refused to say how many soldiers have left the army.

"I can't deny that a number of soldiers have deserted the army, and it might increase due to the ferocious military operations in Baghdad," he said.

<snip>

In interviews, however, soldiers in Sulaimaniyah expressed loyalty to their Kurdish brethren, not to Iraq. Many said they'd already deserted, and those who are going to Baghdad said they'd flee if the situation there became too difficult.

"I joined the army to be a soldier in my homeland, among my people. Not to fight for others who I have nothing to do with," said Ameen Kareem, 38, who took a week's leave with other soldiers from his brigade in Irbil and never returned. "I used to fight in the mountains and valleys, not in the streets."

[tagos]

Defence reluctant to share data on Iraq army readiness (http://www.govexec.com/story_page.cfm?articleid=35882&ref=rellink)

The Defense Department has resisted auditors' efforts to obtain data on the military readiness of U.S.-trained Iraqi troops, according to a senior government official.

Comptroller General David M. Walker told audience members at a Government Executive breakfast Wednesday that Defense has not complied with repeated Government Accountability Office requests for evaluations of Iraqi troop preparedness, known as transitional readiness assessments. The Pentagon develops those evaluations for Iraqi and U.S. forces, Walker said, and has a statutory obligation to release them to GAO.

<snip>

Walker said he expected to find some embarrassing information that would account for the battle over obtaining them. "You just can't go by how many people you trained," he said. "Of the people that you've trained, how many are left? To what extent do they have loyalty to the unified government of Iraq? To what extent are they properly equipped? To what extent do they have appropriate support?"

Of course we can't quite rule out the possibility that things are just going so darned well Bush and Defence would just be so gosh embarrassed at all praise good news entails. It would probably be greeted with flowers.

[Ryan_Liam]

I don't recall Iraq ever having been a Soviet ally.

It was in the 1970's but not in the sense of being a satellite, hence why it had a large officer corps and Soviet trained officers to keep the Iraqi army loyal.

But it did get a lot of arms from the USSR and other places. I beleive the air force was trained in soviet military doctrine. None of this is relevant to the beleif that somehow, magically, an Iraq army built around factions, sects and nationalities doesn't have a primary loyalty to them and not the government in Greenzonia.

Same thing happened in Vietnam, units were most loyal to the areas around them, which were called the 'Ruff/Puffs' not to the central government, but ironically were more dedicated than the national army, the ARVN. I'd say the Iraqi Army is primarily not effective enough because it's not done enough to strengthen it's logistics and 'beef up' it's military capability, it's still a work in progres, remember it's only been 3 years or so since we removed the last government.

The end result will at best be a miltary coup and another murderous strongman we support because he'll be anti-iranian.

And who would support this strongman, once removed the instant Iraqis realised he is supported by their 'former occupier?' Why would any strongman put him in the position to be used by the US again?

To believe that we can wave a magic wand and create a neutral, professional army is just wishful thinking. Note how the iraqi troops for the baghdad surge are imported Kurds.

That's strange, considering those 'Kurds' are actually still considered to be part of Iraq, they're still 'Iraqi Kurds' hence the 'imported' is a nice spin.

Look, armies, especially ones which are being rebuilt, take time to become effective. Taking into consideration that we destroyed the last one, and we're rebuilding one which is multi ethnic and confessional, is a long job. I'm happy in the least the Army isn't conscripted, because it would be a hell of an even longer job of getting them into the field.

[FRDE]

The 'Iraqi Kurds' have not really been part of Iraq since 1992 - after that the USA roped them off from Saddam.

Getting them into Baghdad is a bit like importing French troops into London.

I know one of those guys, he cut my hair yesterday, he has been in the UK for five years and is just about to get a British passport. He would quite like to go 'home' but says that it is still very dangerous out there - which I found interesting - I assume that he has good contact. Possibly the Kurds have internal problems, or maybe he comes from a border area.

[tagos]

That's strange, considering those 'Kurds' are actually still considered to be part of Iraq, they're still 'Iraqi Kurds' hence the 'imported' is a nice spin.

Look, armies, especially ones which are being rebuilt, take time to become effective. Taking into consideration that we destroyed the last one, and we're rebuilding one which is multi ethnic and confessional, is a long job. I'm happy in the least the Army isn't conscripted, because it would be a hell of an even longer job of getting them into the field.

No - nice spin in pretending anyone has a primary loyalty to Iraq and not their factions. I've presented evidence but as usual all you respond with is vague hand-waving and specious logic. You may think it clever to play word games but it really isn't.

Why does any strongman get support? Because he controls rewards and punishments. It worked for the USA with Saddam and it would work even easier with a Shia strongman let loose on the Sunni's while we turn a practised blind eye as usual, while shovelling dollars and guns in his direction. This isn't rocket science to figure out you know, not if you have a passing acquaintance with recent history and/or the principles of power and international relations.

And as this is GD and I've provided you with copious cites in this and related threads please support your contentions with cites or don't reply.

[Ryan_Liam]

No - nice spin in pretending anyone has a primary loyalty to Iraq and not their factions.

But those 'factions' are Iraq. Just as much as the UK is 'English Scottish Welsh and Northern Irish' you can't make them go away. The situation in Iraq is difficult because those ethnic/sectarian passions are enflamed at the moment, a lot of history, wars, massacres in the absense of actual political progress between any of them is bound to produce such a situation. The fact that there are groups willing to listen to other sides is a mark of improvement from 'my way or the highway' Politics from the last butcher of Baghdad. There will never be stability, never be peace until the rule of the gun is put back in the box.

I've presented evidence but as usual all you respond with is vague hand-waving and specious logic. You may think it clever to play word games but it really isn't.

What specious logic? You immediately equate withdrawing of UK forces as a 'defeat' because Patrick Cockburn says so, yet you fail to realise is that if we never give up control of Basra to the Iraqis, then what the hell is the point of the venture in the first place? We can't hold it for an unspecified amount of time, nor do we want too, and I said to you in the beginning, that the eventual strategy was to build an Iraqi government and security force able to take over security, no matter how badly they handle it. Even if they fail a few times, we're still their to provide advice, equipment and logistical support to carry them through difficult times.

So it's a circular argument, the British Army withdraws to bases further away, whilst allowing indigenous forces to remain and build up security on it's own, because in the end, it's going to be them doing it. That's what nation building and counter insurgency is. But somehow this is all equated with defeat. Tell me, how are we supposed too, in your mind, to withdraw from Iraq without actually leaving the place, because that's what it sounds like you're saying on here.

Why does any strongman get support? Because he controls rewards and punishments. It worked for the USA with Saddam and it would work even easier with a Shia strongman let loose on the Sunni's while we turn a practised blind eye as usual, while shovelling dollars and guns in his direction.

Then what would be the point of trying to accommodate the Sunnis into the political process if we were just willing to allow the Shias to butcher the lot of them? And why would numerous Anbar Sunni Arab tribes pledge their alleigence to the Government to get rid of Al Queda in Iraq? And why would various Sunnis join the local police forces in that area if it were not in their best interest? And why if we're so concerned about 'shovelling dollars and guns in their direction' concerned about stopping the flow of arms to Shia militias from Iran? And why have numerous Shia leaders tried to make policies on accomodating the Sunnis and countering the militias?

This isn't rocket science to figure out you know, not if you have a passing acquaintance with recent history and/or the principles of power and international relations.

Let's just say I know alot more about Middle Eastern politics, culture and Iraq in general than yourself. 'Might makes right' politics in the Middle East will always be the substitute for stability, never the guarantor.

And as this is GD and I've provided you with copious cites in this and related threads please support your contentions with cites or don't reply.

Who says I have to reply with an equal amount of cites to justify my position? Again, this is the whole premise of your argument.

The 'Iraqi Kurds' have not really been part of Iraq since 1992 - after that the USA roped them off from Saddam.

That's ridiculous arguement as to saying Scots are not part of the UK, because they happen to have their own parliament and football team. Kurds served in the Iraqi Army, served in the administerial part of the Government (yes of Saddam and previous leaders) lived in Baghdad and surrounding areas and even in some cases intermarried with Arabs. But since the Kurds aren't part of Iraq, then they're not part of

Syria

Iran

Turkey

Right? Can't have one rule for one and another for the others. Until they eventually declare independence, they're still officially part of Iraq. And it's political leaders have been wise enough to fall short of actually wanting it, knowing it would completely isolate them.

I know one of those guys, he cut my hair yesterday, he has been in the UK for five years and is just about to get a British passport. He would quite like to go 'home' but says that it is still very dangerous out there - which I found interesting - I assume that he has good contact. Possibly the Kurds have internal problems, or maybe he comes from a border area.

Even though the Northern part is undergoing an economic boom, not to mention is the safest part of the country. He's probably talking about the border areas, and even then it's stretching it.

Look at the pretty pictures.

http://www.michaeltotten.com/