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SterlingNorth
11-12-2000, 04:33 AM
I think I'm beginning to feel a little paranoid. All this talk about conspiracies and missing ballots and stolen votes and electionteer scams and negative votes have shaken my faith in the deomcratic process.

There has been much talk about Florida and their use of the antiquated 'punch card ballot. I was amazed that there could still be a state in the union that is using state of the art seventeenth century technology. It would be almost if someone lead me to the voting booth and gave me a quill and told me to write the name of the candidate of my choice and put it in a slotted box.

There has been calls (by me even) as to institute computerized balloting. Use one of those ATM style systems and such. However, what if there is an election in dispute?
When you vote on a computer, all you do is send a temporary electromagnetic 'glitch' through the system. Unlike with a paper ballot, there are no permanant evidence of what that 'glitch' was. Performing a recount is simply running the software over again. Just the trust that the computer manufacturer, or people with the machine before during or after didn't alter the software in any way to help skew the results.
In Volsula County, Florida I believe Al Gore managed to accumulate -16,000 votes.

NEGATIVE 16,000.

This was attributed to a bad memory card. However this underscores how simple it is to contaminate the score if all it is is computer generated.

I was concerned about this before I read about the 1988 primary (http://www.constitution.org/vote/votescam01.htm).

All over the United States of America there are people who listen to the facts about computer voting and then tell horror stories of candidates, who didn't have a prayer before election day, then slip into office by an uncheckable computer vote. Most common is the story of the computer that "breaks down" when one candidate is securely in the lead, and after the computer is "fixed," the losing candidate pulls ahead and wins. The evil feelings left behind by such shenanigans are festering across America.

Among the wickedest recent examples of possible computerized vote fraud, of the sort that has disillusioned millions of Americans, is the 1988 New Hampshire primary that saved George Bush from getting knocked out of the race to the White House.

Was the New Hampshire Primary scenario a modern classic in computerized vote manipulation? Here is the gist of it.

The Bush campaign of 1988, as historians have since recollected it, was filled with CIA-type disinformation operations and deceptions of the sort that America used in Viet Nam, Chile and the Soviet Union. Since George Bush was one of the most admired CIA directors in the history of the organization, this was not so surprising.

Yet George Bush stood to lose the Republican Party nomination if he was beaten by Sen. Robert Dole in the snows of New Hampshire. He had suffered a terrible political wound when Dole won big by a show of hands in an unriggable Iowa caucus. Bush came to New Hampshire with all the earmarks of a loser whom the press had come to identify as a "wimp."

Political observers were downbeat in their observations of Bush's chances in the face of Dole's Iowa momentum. Virtually every television and newspaper poll had Bush losing by up to eight points just hours before the balloting.

Desperate times require desperate measures. Perhaps that's what it required for "steps to be taken," and phone calls to be made. Then came a widely reported promise made by Bush to his campaign manager, Gov. Sununu. It happens that Sununu's computer engineering skills approach "genius" on the tests. If Sununu could "deliver" New Hampshire, and Bush didn't care how and didn't want to know how — then Sununu would become his chief of staff in the White House.

When election day was over the following headline appeared in the Washington Post:

NEW HAMPSHIRE CONFOUNDED MOST POLLSTERS

Voters Were a Step Ahead of Tracking Measurements

By Lloyd Grove
Washington Post Staff Writer

For Vice President Bush and his supporters, Tuesday's 9-percentage-point victory over Sen. Robert J. Dole (R-Kan.) in New Hampshire was a delightful surprise; for Andrew Kohut, it was a horror story.

Kohut is president of the Gallup poll, whose final New Hampshire survey was wrong by 17 points: it had put Dole ahead by 8; Bush won by 9. "I was dismayed," Kohut acknowledged yesterday.

This New Hampshire primary was perhaps the most polled primary election in American history, and in the end, the Republican voters in the state confounded the predictions of nearly every published survey of voter opinion.

Gallup's glaring error and the miscalls of other polling organizations once again raise questions about the accuracy of polls, their use by the media and the impact they have on voters' choices and the public perception of elections. In New Hampshire this year, news organizations' use of "tracking polls" to try to follow the movement of public opinion night after night came to dominate news accounts of the campaigning and the thinking of the campaigns themselves.

Nothing was said in the press about the secretly programmed computer chips inside the "Shouptronic" Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machines in Manchester, the state's largest city.

These 200-pound systems were so easily tampered with that the integrity of the results they gave — and George Bush was the beneficiary of their tallies — will forever be in doubt. Consider these points:

The "Shouptronic" was purchased directly from a company whose owner, Ransom Shoup, had been twice convicted of vote fraud in Philadelphia.
It bristled with telephone lines that made it possible for instructions from the outside to be telephoned into the machine without anyone's dear knowledge.
It completely lacked an "audit trail," an independent record that could be checked in case the machine "broke down" or its results were challenged.
Roy G. Saltman, of the federal Institute for Computer Sciences and Technology, called the Shouptronic "much more risky" than any other computerized tabulation system because "You are fundamentally required to accept the logical operation of the machine, there is no way to do an independent check."

A year later, in June of 1989, Robert J. Naegele, who had investigated all computerized voting systems for New York State, warned: "The DRE (which the Shouptronic was) is still at least a year and possibly two away from what I would consider a marketable product. The hardware problems are relatively minor, but the software problems are conceptual and really major".

A source close to Gov. Sununu insists that Sununu knew from his perspective as a politician, and his expertise as a computer engineer, that the Shouptronic was prime for tampering.

Why the devil am I even more paranoid after reading that? Are their any safeguards in the system. Nationally or locally? Is the software open to public inspection? Or are they protected as trade secrets.

Should I just go to bed? Or is this a legitamite fear?

jmullaney
11-12-2000, 02:26 PM
I'm a software engineer, and believe me when I say going to computers without any paper recording of votes is a terrible idea. Remember last year when the government discovered some hackers had rewritten the firmware at gasoline pumps so they pumps always cheated consumers except those who just happened to buy exactly 10 gallons, because the government used a ten gallon measurement to test that the pumps were being fair? That was an elaborate scam and I'm impressed by the ingenuity of it, but the scam is one almost anyone with a ROM burner, basic coding knowledge, and a little dedicated hacking could do. Heck, we have a coffee machine in my office someone reprogrammed to say "Crunching Frogs" when it should say "Making coffee" and that took the guy under and hour.

I like the SNL take on this last night, to paraphrase: "Yeah, going to computers is a good idea when the elderly can't even figure out how to use a paper ballot. My grandfather is afraid of his answering machine!"

rocking chair
11-12-2000, 09:40 PM
computer voting was heavily used in california. they have 2 memory thingys (a very tech. term) in it, and a print out. one memory thingy goes to the cpu's hard drive, the other memory thingy is a removable cartridge. the removable cartridge is then taken to a counting center to be counted. in case of a recount the ballots may be printed out from both thingys. it is a closed system with no way in with either a keyboard or mouse. the company (sequoia voting systems) that makes the machine stated that they would not design a machine that did not have a print out back up for accuracy. i read about this on abcnews.com. the article was called "u s polling stations run gamut of technology."

The Ryan
11-12-2000, 10:36 PM
It seems like there might be a way to use encryption to secure an electronic vote. This plan would require that everyone that is registered to vote submit a ballot (they wouldn't necessarily have to vote; their ballot could be blank):
1. Once everyone in a precint is registered to vote, the computer generates a key for each voter. This would be the most vulnerable part of the plan, because it must be assured that all the keys are non-trivial (i.e. are actually necessary) without anyone but its voter seeing it. An alternative method would be for each voter to come up with a public and private key, and send the public key to the registar.
2. Each voter creates a ballot from their choices, then encrypts it using their key.
3. All of the encryptred ballots are then made public knowledge. Everyone with a key can calculate, from the list of encrypted ballots, what the total votes for each canidate is, but not how any other particular voter voted.

I don't know enough about encryption to know for sure whether this plan is possible, but it certainly seems feasible.

The Ryan
11-12-2000, 10:42 PM
I know how to spell "candidate". Really, I do.

friedo
11-12-2000, 11:22 PM
Computerized elections can be secure, but only if they are designed competently. Things like one-time-pads and digital signatures could be very useful, and I agree that a hard copy record of the votes should be made. In fact, with a proper encryption and authentication scheme, voter fraud would likely be severely decreased. There are mathematically perfect ways to encrypt things, but encryption does not equal security. A secure system must be so designed from the ground up. I think it's an idea that should get some attention. Chances are there are people Out There designing good systems for this application already.

SterlingNorth
11-14-2000, 09:42 AM
I am bumping this thread. I want prime real estate space on page 1 with all the other election threads!

SterlingNorth
11-22-2000, 01:30 PM
I'm not desperate, yet. I'm just bump this thread to the top, in the event the silliness about this election caused you to maybe overlook this gem. I should probably wait until this insanity is over, but I don't think I'll live that long. I'm already 20!

Great minds think alike1. Someone over at The New Republic was thinking about how a machine can very easily be biased. Ronnie Dugger's article (http://www.tnr.com/120400/dugger120400.html) is here at TNR's online site.

__________________
1. OK, a drunk chimpanzee could have brought this question up. Just let me have my glory. For one minute?

[hijack]
11-24-2000, 09:48 PM
Fraud, as well as inadvertant bias, can affect any process, wheter manual or automatic.

The key is knowing where the bottlenecks are and catching the "information" eddies that a stopped just outside that.

All attention is on the bottleneck, and the eddies are safe havens for errors and fraud.

In one specific case: A bottleneck is when the boxes are returned. They are signed in with sealed tape with many signatures, etc. Then set in the corner, awaiting moving into the counting room. That's the point for a "switcheroo". Pull a box out of the stream and into a broom closet. Double punch all of one candidate's ballots, so they get tossed by whatever method is counting.