Could Hitler have gone south?

[Derleth]

In 1914 the Hohenzollern army was the best in the world. Behind that screaming little defective in Berlin there is nothing of the sort... Yet our military ‘experts’ discuss the waiting phantom. In their imaginations it is perfect in its equipment and invincible in its discipline. Sometimes it is to strike a decisive ‘blow’ through Spain and North Africa and on, or march through the Balkans, march from the Danube to Ankara, to Persia, to India, or ‘crush Russia’, or ‘pour’ over the Brenner into Italy. The weeks pass and the phantom does none of these things-for one excellent reason. It does not exist to that extent. Most of such inadequate guns and munitions as it possessed must have been taken away from it and fooled away in Hitler's silly feints to invade Britain. And its raw jerry-built discipline is wilting under the creeping realisation that the Blitzkrieg is spent, and the war is coming home to roost.The entirety of Hitler's Eastern Campaign was consumed, and wasted, on the Soviet Union. He seemed to have studiously ignored the rich oil fields in Arabia and the ability to deprive the British Empire of same, which would have been a much bigger blow than the abortive Battle of Britian. Could Hitler have marched through a neutral Turkey, made pacts with the anti-French Syria and anti-British Palestine, and ended up with a secure base in Arabia from which to get oil and attack India?

[Alessan]

The entirety of Hitler's Eastern Campaign was consumed, and wasted, on the Soviet Union. He seemed to have studiously ignored the rich oil fields in Arabia and the ability to deprive the British Empire of same, which would have been a much bigger blow than the abortive Battle of Britian. Could Hitler have marched through a neutral Turkey, made pacts with the anti-French Syria and anti-British Palestine, and ended up with a secure base in Arabia from which to get oil and attack India?

First of all, the last thing Turkey wanted was to get involved in the war. They wouldn't have allowed him to pass under any circumstances, and would have fought him tooth and nail if he tried to by force.

As for Syria and Palestine, they were not independent states at the time. Syria was conquered by the British after the fall of France, and Palestine had beena well-established British colony (technically, a Mandate) since 1917. They Germans might have been able to secure a pact with the local populations - although for obvious reasons, roughly a third of the poplulation of Palestine would not have played along - but they'd still have to deal with the hundreds of thousands of British troops in the region...

... which they were trying to do in North Africa, before El-Alamain put a damper on their plans. After all, the ultimate goal of the desert campaign was to reach the Persian Gulf.

[slaphead]

Could Hitler have marched through a neutral Turkey, made pacts with the anti-French Syria and anti-British Palestine, and ended up with a secure base in Arabia from which to get oil and attack India?
Also, it would be pretty well mpossible to do all that with the land logistics infrastructure of the time - unless they'd taken time to build a railway or two as they went along. Hitler wasn't a patient chap, and making strategic moves at a snail's pace doesn't usually work out well.

So without controlling the Eastern Med to allow safe shipping access, not really feasible. Controlling the Eastern Med without taking out Alexandria, similarly not feasible. Hence the Afrika Corps heading for Egypt to do just that, until it got slapped back at El Alamein. Taking the Arabian oil fields is another of those long string of near-impossibilites that are so fun to discuss - it could have been done, theoretically. But not by a loony doing lots of other loony things at the same time.

[Derleth]

Thanks. I thought I was missing something obvious, and now the North African Campaign makes a lot more sense. ("I know! We'll attack Britian and the Soviets!" "But two-front wars are dumb. We lost the last one." "So we attack North Africa! Three fronts! We can't lose!")

[slaphead]

Thanks. I thought I was missing something obvious, and now the North African Campaign makes a lot more sense. ("I know! We'll attack Britian and the Soviets!" "But two-front wars are dumb. We lost the last one." "So we attack North Africa! Three fronts! We can't lose!")
Like I said - loony. Plus, most of the High Command didn't want to go to war to start with, since they thought they would get creamed even worse than last time. Then after running rampant all over central, north and western europe for a year the started to think maybe they really were invincible after all, just like the loony said.
:smack:

[chrisk]

I'll just say that from the thread title, I took 'gone south' a bit more literally, and was expecting it to be about Germany turning against Italy. :D

[Alive At Both Ends]

I'll just say that from the thread title, I took 'gone south' a bit more literally, and was expecting it to be about Germany turning against Italy. :D
And I thought it was about the old chestnut of Hitler surviving the war and going to ground in South America. :D :D

[MarcusF]

As posed in the OP the choice is between attacking the Soviet Union and going for the Middle Eastern oil fields. Put like that I would have said Germany would have had a pretty strong chance of throwing Britain out of North Africa and the Levant and then moving on to Iraq and Persia (the main oil producers in the 1940s).

To Hitler and OKW the North African campaign was a minor side show, with minimal German forces committed to supporting Mussolini and prevent him being defeated and driven out of Lybia. At its maximum the Africa Korps was the equivalent of German three divisions. Hitler had 166 divisions on the Eastern Front for Operation Barbarossa! If any significant fraction of these had been committed to North Africa in 1941 it is difficult to see any way the British and Empire forces could have stopped them - it was a close enough run thing at First Alemein. Not invading Russia would also have freed up the bulk of the Luftwaffe in support with every chance of closing the Mediterranean to the Royal Navy and allowing much easier passage of supplies to the troops in North Africa.

Having said all that there was never any chance Hitler would adopt such a strategy. The attack on the Soviet Union was not about gaining access to oil or any other resource - it was a political act by a loony :D in pursuit of a dream of a German manifest destiny of lebenraum in the East, implemented by a High Command that emphasised process over deliverable reality.

[Dead Cat]

First of all, the last thing Turkey wanted was to get involved in the war. They wouldn't have allowed him to pass under any circumstances, and would have fought him tooth and nail if he tried to by force.These two sentences seem contradictory to me. If they didn't want to get involved in the war, wouldn't they just let the Germans pass through, as long as Germany agreed that they wouldn't occupy the country?

[Alive At Both Ends]

These two sentences seem contradictory to me. If they didn't want to get involved in the war, wouldn't they just let the Germans pass through, as long as Germany agreed that they wouldn't occupy the country?
Germany's agreements didn't count for much. (Hitler also agreed not to attack the Soviet Union.) If I were Turkish I wouldn't trust Hitler as far as I could spit.

[Precambrianmollusc]

I am not sure why you say he ignored the oil rich fields of Arabia, that is pretty much where he was heading.
Back in 1940 the main producing areas were Baku Azerbaijan, Grozny Chechnya, Kirkuk in Northern Iraq and Persia, aka Iran.

The easiest way to get to those places from central Europe is to drive through the Ukraine, into Chechnya and refuel in Grozny, take Baku for a lot of oil, then you are right into Northern Iran and not far from Kirkuk. This is pretty much what a sizable portion of the invading German army tried to do. The other part was engaged in keeping the Russians busy and prevent them interfering with their summer grand tour of the caucuses. Taking this route takes advantages of the infrastructure, roads, rail, food that was in the region.

Turkey and Syria would have been a much harder proposition to get across in 1940, even if you could get in in the first place.

[Dead Cat]

Germany's agreements didn't count for much. (Hitler also agreed not to attack the Soviet Union.) If I were Turkish I wouldn't trust Hitler as far as I could spit.I know that, but my question wasn't about that, it was regarding the contradictory statement. Also, how much of that is hindsight? The Turks couldn't have known that Hitler would renege on an agreement, particularly if it were made early in the war and the carrot was big enough to tempt the Turks.

[Hypnagogic Jerk]

They Germans might have been able to secure a pact with the local populations - although for obvious reasons, roughly a third of the poplulation of Palestine would not have played along - but they'd still have to deal with the hundreds of thousands of British troops in the region...
Of course that's what we'd think, but I remember hearing about right-wing Jewish terrorist groups in Palestine making deals with the Nazis to help fight their common British enemy. You certainly know more about this than me, so is it accurate?

[ralph124c]

Saudi Arabia was not a major oil producer untill the early 1950's. Capture of Egypt (by an augmented german force0 was well within capabilities. Once the British were driven out of Egypt, closure of the Suez canal would have made the British mediterranean fleet's position untenable. I drive by german forces into Iraq would have been very feasible.
A good opportunity wasted, and an easy vistory lost, because hitler never thought startegically.

[Alessan]

These two sentences seem contradictory to me. If they didn't want to get involved in the war, wouldn't they just let the Germans pass through, as long as Germany agreed that they wouldn't occupy the country?


Let me rephrase myself - Turkey would never have willingly involved itself in the war. Letting Germany through would be getting involved , and therefore, Turkey would have refused passage. If Germany had tried to pass through by force, then of course Turkey would have fought back.

You can't just say "I'm letting his forces through, but I'm not part of your war." Not if you don't want the allies to say"Well, then I'm going to bomb your roads, railways and ports, but don't take it personally." As soon as foreign troops set foot on your soil, you're in the game. There are no half measures in WW2.

[Alive At Both Ends]

I know that, but my question wasn't about that, it was regarding the contradictory statement.
I don't think it was a contradictory statement. Turkey didn't want to get involved, but you don't always get what you want. Confronted with German troops trying to cross their territory, they would have no choice any more - they would already be involved, whatever they did.
Also, how much of that is hindsight? The Turks couldn't have known that Hitler would renege on an agreement, particularly if it were made early in the war and the carrot was big enough to tempt the Turks.
Even before the war, Hitler had occupied all of Czechoslovakia after agreeing at Munich to only take the Sudetenland. So I think the Turks would have known what to expect.

[Captain Amazing]

Of course that's what we'd think, but I remember hearing about right-wing Jewish terrorist groups in Palestine making deals with the Nazis to help fight their common British enemy. You certainly know more about this than me, so is it accurate?

You're thinking of Lehi, aka, "the Stern Gang". Stern tried to get German help with the resistance during the war. Stern was also kind of crazy, though, so that has to be taken into account.

[Little Nemo]

Hitler's strategic plans were all based around land - he retained the military mentality of his experience as an infantryman in WWI. He rarely thought about the possibilities of moving through the air or over water. So all that Russian land right next door was too much of a temptation for him to resist.

A southern strategy was possible. The Mediterranean is a big body of water but it has chokepoints. Hitler could have taken Gibraltar and Aden and sealed off both ends. After that he could have mopped up any British forces who were trapped inside. With control of the Mediterranean he could have moved into the Middle East or East Africa.

[Little Nemo]

To Hitler and OKW the North African campaign was a minor side show, with minimal German forces committed to supporting Mussolini and prevent him being defeated and driven out of Lybia. At its maximum the Africa Korps was the equivalent of German three divisions. Hitler had 166 divisions on the Eastern Front for Operation Barbarossa!True. Another comparison is that partisans kept five German divisions tied up in Yugoslavia.

[Cervaise]

I'll just say that from the thread title, I took 'gone south' a bit more literally, and was expecting it to be about Germany turning against Italy. :DI thought it was going to be about Adolf and Eva's sex life.


Okay, I didn't really think that. But it did cross my mind.

[mlees]

At its maximum the Africa Korps was the equivalent of German three divisions. Hitler had 166 divisions on the Eastern Front for Operation Barbarossa!

Could I get clarification... did you mean in '41?

At El Alamein, Rommel had 4 divisions (90th light, 164th light, 15th Pz, 21st Pz) and a brigade (labeled Ramcke Brig on this map: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:2_Battle_of_El_Alamein_001.png ). Were those divisions "short"? (The German Army began to experience manpower issues by '42. Many divisions were at partial strength, and many experienced veterans were shuffled around to form a core cadre in newly created formations.)

Without pinching off the Med as Little Nemo suggests, I think the Italians would have a heck of a hard time supplying the forces in North Africa.

That means a campaign through Spain. While Franco was a fascist, I don't know if he would have sided with Hitler or Churchill if Hitler laid down an ultimatum for troop passage. Hitler would have probably wanted to garrison Spain (and maybe Portugal), and Franco might not like that idea..

That also means a campaign through Turkey to get to the Suez. Turkey's interior was rugged, and I suspect not condusive to the kind of land war Hitler's generals liked to fight.

[John DiFool]

Most of the armchair generals here are ignoring the real reason why such plans probably wouldn't have worked; logisitics. Most wargames give this short shrift (as did both Hitler and Mussolini), but the Italian merchant marine wasn't exactly huge by any stretch, and continued attrition by British planes based on Malta just made things even worse. The Germans only had 3 divisions down there, yes partly because Hitler saw it as a minor sideshow, but mainly because the logistical situation prevented a significant expansion of forces. During El-Alamein (which was a series of battles over several months), it was said that the fuel tanker trucks would burn just as much petrol as they ended up delivering to the front. I don't even want to think about how you are going to supply an army as it attempts to march/drive across the desert sands (which did a good job of eating away at vital mechanical parts) in the direction of Iraq and the Caucasus.

And on top of that the Axis were on a timer (even if they didn't know it), as in August 1942 the Americans will be landing in French West Africa. What's Rommel going to do about his threatened supply lines when he's over in Iraq driving north towards Russia while the Americans drive east into Libya?

[slaphead]

The Mediterranean is a big body of water but it has chokepoints. Hitler could have taken Gibraltar and Aden and sealed off both ends. After that he could have mopped up any British forces who were trapped inside. With control of the Mediterranean he could have moved into the Middle East or East Africa.
Probably easier to take Malta (unless he could get Franco on board) and Alexandria - would have the same effect of making entry to the Med pretty much suicidal for the RN. Either way, once the Med is under control all sorts of strategic options come on the table.
If Das Loon was prepared to stay snuggly with uncle joe, freeing up another 60-100 divisions for beating up on the Brits - well, all sorts of fun ideas would have become viable, such as Sea Lion II or maybe even Meeting Up With The Japanese if he fancied playing at being Alexander and heading for India. Certainly it would have been plenty of force to take down anyone in the EMEA theatre APART from the Russians. If he'd been willing to settle for his agreed bit of Europe, plus all of Africa and most of the Middle East, he might have built a vast totalitarian hell-hole Reich that could have lasted a few generations. Possibly, if he was lucky, and he wasn't a loony.

[Dunderman]

You can't just say "I'm letting his forces through, but I'm not part of your war." Not if you don't want the allies to say"Well, then I'm going to bomb your roads, railways and ports, but don't take it personally." As soon as foreign troops set foot on your soil, you're in the game. There are no half measures in WW2.Not true. Sweden let German forces pass through but stayed out of the war and never got bombed (on purpose, that is).

[ralph124c]

My strategy would be:
1) Capture Cyprus (using paratroops). An air base on Cyprus would make the Royal Navy base at Alexandria untenable.
2) capture Malta: this would be for the Italians, they could probably pull thisoff
3)push Montgomery's Army back; capture Egypt.
Now, the Royal Navy must leave the Med- german dive bombers make the Sea a deathtrap for British ships.
4) The Afrikakorps now can drive into the levant, and capture the Iraqi oil fields.
This would have paid off big time; Stalin may have been sufficiently frightened by this, to sign a treaty with hitler.

[Alessan]

Not true. Sweden let German forces pass through but stayed out of the war and never got bombed (on purpose, that is).

It didn't get bombed because that served the Allies' purposes. Sweden did not stay out of the war - it was just lucky.

[mlees]

Not true. Sweden let German forces pass through but stayed out of the war and never got bombed (on purpose, that is).

Sweden was also a major exporter of metal ores to Germany, one of the few that the Allied blockades couldn't effect. It was one of the major reasons why Germany invaded Norway (to protect those northern ore fields, and the winter shipping routes they took to Germany).

Also, I imagine (but it's really a hunch) that a lot of upper class German's had money and buisness ties with Sweden (as well as Switzerland), as well as a shared cultural heritage.

That does not apply as much to Turkey.

[Dead Cat]

Let me rephrase myself - Turkey would never have willingly involved itself in the war. Letting Germany through would be getting involved , and therefore, Turkey would have refused passage. If Germany had tried to pass through by force, then of course Turkey would have fought back.

You can't just say "I'm letting his forces through, but I'm not part of your war." Not if you don't want the allies to say"Well, then I'm going to bomb your roads, railways and ports, but don't take it personally." As soon as foreign troops set foot on your soil, you're in the game. There are no half measures in WW2.Indeed - thanks for the clarifications.

[Little Nemo]

Probably easier to take Malta (unless he could get Franco on board) and Alexandria - would have the same effect of making entry to the Med pretty much suicidal for the RN. Either way, once the Med is under control all sorts of strategic options come on the table.Malta, Alexandria, and Crete had strategic locations but mostly for the British. Malta, for example, didn't have any value for the Axis that they didn't already gain from Sicily. The only reason for Germany to have taken Malta would have been to deny its use to the British.

But entry to the Mediterranean narrowed down to a ten mile wide passage at Gibraltar and a twenty mile wide Bab-el-Mandeb passage near Aden. In that small an area, good air and naval cover can virtually attack any ship trying to go in or out. So by controlling these two areas, Germany would have controlled all traffic in the Mediterranean (and the Red and Black Seas).

The Suez would have achieved the same purpose for the eastern entry into the Med but it was located in Egypt, an area with a good British garrison. The Bab-el-Mandeb, on the other hand, was under Axis control early in the war. The Italians captured the southern and western side of the passage and had a 6-1 numerical superiority over the British forces in the area. That opportunity should have been exploited. Instead, the Italian advance stopped and the British were able to reinforce and recapture the area.

[Deeg]

The order to begin Barbarossa wasn't as wrong-headed as the disastrous results would indicate. As John DiFool already mentioned, North Africa and the Middle East were difficult to supply. Germany was already getting enough oil from Romania--mainly in Ploesti--and there were oil fields in Russia that might have been of use.

Despite the pact between the two, Germany and Russia were on a collision course; the two leaders hated each other and Stalin had started his own plans for a surprise invasion of Germany. From Germany's view 1941 was a perfect time to invade; Stalin had purged much of his capable generals, Britain was weak, and the US wasn't yet in the picture. Barbarossa was originally scheduled for mid-May; if it had started on time the results might have been very different.

[Dunderman]

It didn't get bombed because that served the Allies' purposes.You made blanket general statements ("You can't just say "I'm letting his forces through, but I'm not part of your war." (...) As soon as foreign troops set foot on your soil, you're in the game. There are no half measures in WW2."), and those are what I responded to.

[MarcusF]

Originally posted by mlees:
Could I get clarification... did you mean in '41?

At El Alamein, Rommel had 4 divisions (90th light, 164th light, 15th Pz, 21st Pz) and a brigade (labeled Ramcke Brig on this map: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:...Alamein_001.png ). Were those divisions "short"? (The German Army began to experience manpower issues by '42. Many divisions were at partial strength, and many experienced veterans were shuffled around to form a core cadre in newly created formations.)My mistake - comes of working from memory while at work ;) 3 or 4 doesn't really effect the argument about the proportion of the German strength that was in Africa as opposed to Eastern Europe.

Originally posted by John DiFool:
Most of the armchair generals here are ignoring the real reason why such plans probably wouldn't have worked; logisitics. Most wargames give this short shrift (as did both Hitler and Mussolini), but the Italian merchant marine wasn't exactly huge by any stretch, and continued attrition by British planes based on Malta just made things even worse.No, not ignoring supply issues. The base assumption is that Hitler stands on the defensive in the East and uses the bulk of his mobile forces in an attempt to drive Britain from the Middle East and capture the Iraqi and Iranian oil fields. With a more effective mobilisation of Western Europe's resources in 1941 a way could have been found to close the Med to the Royal Navy and the RAF (capture Malta, close the Straights, move in more U-boats etc) and to build sufficient shipping to supply a complete German army - even a doubling, 6-8 divisions, of German strength would probably been too much for the British.

Originally posted by John DiFool:
And on top of that the Axis were on a timer (even if they didn't know it), as in August 1942 the Americans will be landing in French West Africa. What's Rommel going to do about his threatened supply lines when he's over in Iraq driving north towards Russia while the Americans drive east into Libya?That's a mighty big assumption. If the British had been defeated in Egypt I can't see any way Roosevelt and Marshall would have agreed to Torch. The American objective was always an early return to Western Europe - it was the British talked them into the African and Mediterranean route. With no British army coming the other way I just can't see it happening. The concentration would have been on a quicker build up of forces in Britain ready for THE invasion.

But again I should say this was never a likely scenario. Hitler had no real interest in destroying the British Empire - he would much rather have reached some sort of settlement (with the British in a subordinate role of course) - his focus was always on the East and the defeat of the Soviet Union. But there again he was the armchair General and a crap strategist - he could never focus on the key objective - destroy the Soviet Union: capture Moscow and make friends with the Ukranians; capture natural resources: head for the Caucuses and the oil; make the Baltic a German lake: drive north for Leningrad; just don't try and do all of them at once.

[slaphead]

Malta, Alexandria, and Crete had strategic locations but mostly for the British. Malta, for example, didn't have any value for the Axis that they didn't already gain from Sicily. The only reason for Germany to have taken Malta would have been to deny its use to the British.

Exactly. Knock Malta out of action and the RN has nowhere to go between Gibraltar and Alexandria, which is a long way in enemy waters and would make any navel venture very risky. It also simplifies supply of the Afrika Corps a great deal by removing any british air presence from the supply lanes. Knock out Alexandria too and the British couldn't do anything in the Eastern Med without steaming all the way from Gibraltar and back again, unless they wanted to try the canal - either of which would be near-suicidal.

Taking Alexandria would involve knocking out all British forces in Egypt, which wouldn't be easy - but then I'm not clear on why the Axis would secure Aden without dealing with Egypt first anyhow - going overland to Aden would seem to be very tricky, and ditto going through Palestine to Iraq, and then all the way round the peninsula by sea. The most (only?) viable way route is straight down the Red Sea. Aden would certainly be an excellent way of blocking any Allied attempts to get back into the area and generally making life miserable for the British (perhaps by letting the IJN use it as a base?), but if I was the Loony-In-Chief I would only go for it if I had plenty of forces left after clearing Mesopotamia and North Africa.

If the British had been defeated in Egypt I can't see any way Roosevelt and Marshall would have agreed to Torch.
I agree - the whole thing would have been a pretty pointless sideshow, and far riskier too. Catching the germans from both sides after they were already on the run with their supply chain disrupted is a whole different prospect from taking them on single-handed and having to push them all the way back across the continent when they have a secure rear but your logistics are coming from the UK and US. How the Vichy and Spaniards would have reacted to a total German victory in the Med is an unknown, but might have come into play too.

1) Capture Cyprus (using paratroops). An air base on Cyprus would make the Royal Navy base at Alexandria untenable.
I'm not sure Cyprus gets you much closer than Crete, and that's not close enough. The Germans weren't able to close down Alexandria from Crete, and they weren't able to close down Malta properly even though it's virtually within spitting distance of Sicily. It may be that they weren't really trying that hard, but you need an awful lot of air power to really shut down an area completely.