Could Pickett's Charge have succeeded?

[dropzone]

Let's say Ewell hadn't siphoned off some of the artillery and the supply trains were close enough that Longstreet's barrage kept up as planned. I've stood on Cemetery Ridge and that damned cornfield is still a literal mile wide. Could Picket have broken through?

What if Custer had not delayed Stuart? A pincer movement using infantry at the front and cavalry at the rear looks like it would turn the Union lines to chaos. Did Custer win the Battle of Gettysburg?

[Captain Amazing]

Even if Longstreet's barrage kept up as planned, you're still talking about a 3/4 mile charge over flat, open terrain against an entrenched, covered position. I don't think there's any way it could have succeeded.

[dropzone]

But if Stuart had disrupted the defense....

ETA: Cavalry, operating as cavalry, like Stuart's, and not as mounted infantry, can completely freak out infantry, especially if it comes from an unexpected angle.

ETAA: But that field is still awful wide.

[silenus]

No way in hell.

The only rational plan was Longstreet's request to try to flank to the right, past Little Round Top and around the left flank of the Union forces. If they had done that the second day, the Confederates might have had a chance. But once they were repulsed at the Devil's Den and the Peach Orchard (props to my greatx4 grand-uncle), the battle was lost. I don't think a Confederate capture of Little Round Top would have made a difference, either. Pickett's was doomed from the start.

Where would Stuart have attacked? Against Slocum? Sedgwick? By the third day, the Union forces were too deep for an attack by Stuart to have had any effect on Cemetery Ridge.

[FoieGrasIsEvil]

No way in hell.

The only rational plan was Longstreet's request to try to flank to the right, past Little Round Top and around the left flank of the Union forces. If they had done that the second day, the Confederates might have had a chance. But once they were repulsed at the Devil's Den and the Peach Orchard (props to my greatx4 grand-uncle), the battle was lost. I don't think a Confederate capture of Little Round Top would have made a difference, either. Pickett's was doomed from the start.

Where would Stuart have attacked? Against Slocum? Sedgwick? By the third day, the Union forces were too deep for an attack by Stuart to have had any effect on Cemetery Ridge.

I stand in awe of your Confederate War knowledge.

[dropzone]

ETAAA: And they did most of it at a walk. Against cannister and massed rifles the last few hundred yards.

Poor bastards. :(

[silenus]

I stand in awe of your Confederate War knowledge.

Dude, I'm a fucking amateur. Wait until the pros weigh in. :D

[dropzone]

Dude, I'm a fucking amateur. Wait until the pros weigh in. :DThe noobs have no idea what THOSE GUYS are like! I am a mere spark that started the fire and I'll stand back while the pros weigh in, though my high-school visit to the diorama at the battlefield first made me ask, "WTF was Stuart doing back there?"

Note: This isn't trolling. It is sparking a discussion. :D

Grandpa Simpson Anecdote: We were in the cemetery. One of our chaperones remarked at how large and stately the trees were that stood over the graves. I suggested they were well-fertilized. :(

[dropzone]

Another note: Custer has dogged my footsteps all my life, from when he captured Charlottesville in our sesquicentennial pageant to my visit to the Little Bighorn, where I pronounced words similar to those of anybody there who was familiar with the event, "He was fucked."

[VarlosZ]

It's tempting to say that there was no chance, but very unlikely things sometimes happen. By all rights, a true frontal assault on Missionary Ridge should have had no chance to succeed, and wasn't even contemplated by Union commanders at the time -- nonetheless, through its own accidental momentum, the attack routed what should have been an impregnable position. So I suppose it could've happened at Gettysburg, if the Confederates caught enough breaks and the Union hierarchy made enough errors. Call it a 5-10% chance.

Agreed that Stuart's diversion was doomed to irrelevance. By that point the Union forces were, for all intents and purposes, arrayed in a circle -- there was no rear for the cavalry to strike.

[silenus]

Another note: Custer has dogged my footsteps all my life, from when he captured Charlottesville in our sesquicentennial pageant to my visit to the Little Bighorn, where I pronounced words similar to those of anybody there who was familiar with the event, "He was fucked."


Roger that. I remember my last visit to Greasy Grass. As we walked the battlefield, I just kept thinking "Moron. Moron. Moron." Then when we got to the crest of Last Stand Hill, and could see where Gall crossed the river and swept up behind the 7th, the mantra changed to "Poor Sorry Bastards."

[dropzone]

Eldest considered going to the Lutheran college in Gettysburg. I couldn't get past that being Seminary Ridge.

[dropzone]

Roger that. I remember my last visit to Greasy Grass. As we walked the battlefield, I just kept thinking "Moron. Moron. Moron." Then when we got to the crest of Last Stand Hill, and could see where Gall crossed the river and swept up behind the 7th, the mantra changed to "Poor Sorry Bastards."Totally fucked, and I keep Fox's archaeological analysis (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0806129980/ref=pd_lpo_k2_dp_sr_1?pf_rd_p=486539851&pf_rd_s=lpo-top-stripe-1&pf_rd_t=201&pf_rd_i=080619958X&pf_rd_m=ATVPDKIKX0DER&pf_rd_r=0N8J9YMAS6PFWYPE3N28) under my pillow.

Okay, it's been on the floor for a month and I just picked it up today, but still. ;)

[Oakminster]

In order for the South to win Gettysburg, Pickett's Charge can't happen. A.P. Hill has to realize that he hasn't actually found the Army of the Potomac, he just found some scouts. He needed to blow right through them, and take the high ground on the first day, before the Army of the Potomac shows up that night. If he does that, it's a whole different battle. The South is dug in on top of the high ground, and the Yankees have to fight their way up the reverse side of the hill.

One of my ancestors was part of Pickett's Charge. He fell at the stone wall just shy of the "High Water Mark"...or so the family story goes.

[silenus]

One of my ancestors was part of Pickett's Charge. He fell at the stone wall just shy of the "High Water Mark"...or so the family story goes.

My aforementioned grand-uncle: Private Moses Potter, Company D, 3rd South Carolina Volunteer Infantry Battalion, Kershaw's Brigade, McLaw's Division, 1st Corps (Longstreet), Army of Northern Virginia (Robert E. By God Lee). Right in the thick of it at the Peach Orchard July 2nd. The unit suffered horrendous casualties, but the Union III Corps was shredded.

The whole battle changed when Reynolds held Day One. Just long enough.

[dropzone]

Reynolds, for all intents and purposes, selected the battleground, but got killed almost immediately. Yes, the area around Gettysburg is eminently defensible if one holds the considerable high ground, as the Federals did for the most part, but was it a conscious choice or just where he happened to be? And, though Abner Doubleday has received far more than his share of glory, he did take over for Reynolds. And as Buford first delayed Ewell, which should give him some credit.

And I know that Ken Burns has a total man-crush on Chamberlain, but the Federal forces on Little Round Top did prevent the rebels from gaining even that bit of favorable terrain.

[silenus]

The whole battle started as a meeting engagement that neither side wanted. Because of that, there was confusion and disorder. 20/20 hindsight shows that Longstreet was right, and the Confederates should have swung around to the right and cut off the Union forces. Major credit on the Union side has to go to Hancock, who instantly recognized the strength of his defensive position and made the most of it. If, if, if...

If Hill's forces had charged though the initial Union positions...

If Ewell hadn't been confused by Lee's "if practicable" ...

Hell, if Ewell had done his job...

If Stuart had actually done his, and screened the ANV, rather than haring off to gather glory...

[dropzone]

If Stuart had actually done his, and screened the ANV, rather than haring off to gather glory...See, that's what I meant. Custer was not brilliant and, had Stuart been where he BELONGED....

Who was it who said that, had Southerners not read "Waverly," the war might never had taken place?

[RTFirefly]

And I know that Ken Burns has a total man-crush on Chamberlain, but the Federal forces on Little Round Top did prevent the rebels from gaining even that bit of favorable terrain.Burns undoubtedly got that crush from Michael Shaara, whose The Killer Angels is really quite a remarkable book. Shaara was totally besotted with Chamberlain.

Not without reason: Chamberlain's heroism on the second day, and its importance, are quite real - and it's just one piece of the arc of an exceedingly remarkable life.

But Bruce Catton, in his Army of the Potomac trilogy, gives a much more measured account of Chamberlain's importance in the overall action of the second day, describes no less than a half dozen separate instances where the Confederates came scarily close to turning or breaking through the Union line; Chamberlain and the 20th Maine stopped only one of these. It took a great deal of heroism under fire to hold the Union line during that long afternoon and evening.

[Mr. Excellent]

ETAAA: And they did most of it at a walk. Against cannister and massed rifles the last few hundred yards.

Poor bastards. :(

Not a civil war buff, so perhaps this is a foolish question - but did no one consider, well, *running*? Perhaps in some sort of crouch? Dodging from side to side a bit?

[silenus]

Not a civil war buff, so perhaps this is a foolish question - but did no one consider, well, *running*? Perhaps in some sort of crouch? Dodging from side to side a bit?

One mile. In July. Wearing wool uniforms and carrying a weapon, ammo, and other equipment. Uphill. :dubious:

Add into that the fact that massed fire is the only way to use muskets, and that since they were advancing over open ground, uphill, with a fence in the middle of the advance, any kind of run would get whatever troops that survived there in no formation at all, unable to break through a pack of Boy Scouts, much less the Union 2nd Division.

(A sad note is that, while most Civil War muskets were rifled, the tactics that were used were those more suitable to smoothbores. Thus, the appalling casualties.)

[dropzone]

There is a segment from movie Gettysburg (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FiDumCX_Pr8&feature=related) that shows it: filmed on the exact same ground with a similar number of men, most of whom were heavily-armed re-enactors so you know that any deviation from reality by the writer or director was likely to trigger gunplay, and you can get a feel for what happened that day.

[silenus]

Because it's more dramatic, the camera angles all look like there is just a thin line of Union soldiers facing the Charge. One good push, and you'd think they would break. Of course, the whole frakking Union Army was massed at that point. All the Charge managed to do was erode the front line a bit.

[dropzone]

There was that, yes.

ETA: And Ted Turner's death was the worst I've seen in a movie made after 1928, though still enjoyable.

[Captain Amazing]

The clip also had the four dumbest soldiers in the world.

"There's a rebel, take him prisoner! You three help me carry him, even though the battle is going on around us and the rest of the rebels are still marching toward us!"

[dropzone]

OKAY, it wasn't always realistic. I'd've bayoneted the Rebel cuss myself, to avoid the paperwork, but we are referring to Noble Yankees Cut Down By Horrid Rebels.

[dropzone]

...but we are referring to Noble Yankees Cut Down By Horrid Rebels.That needed a sarcastic ;).

[Dallas Jones]

One mile. In July. Wearing wool uniforms and carrying a weapon, ammo, and other equipment. Uphill. :dubious:

Yep, you start out way over there in the far line of trees and need to get to where the photographer in this picture was standing. While being shot at most of the way.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Picketts_Charge_Field.jpg

[Deeg]

Not a civil war buff, so perhaps this is a foolish question - but did no one consider, well, *running*? Perhaps in some sort of crouch? Dodging from side to side a bit?
The more pertinent question is: did no one consider frontal assaults stupid? The answer is yes but unfortunately not enough, thus the appalling casualty rates. To give you an idea of how appalling they were, the Allies had a 5% casualty rate during the D-Day landings in WW II (source (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Normandy_Landings)). In the Battle of Gettysburg the casualty rate for the North was 24%, the South 33% (source (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Gettysburg)).

[Yllaria]

See, that's what I meant. Custer was not brilliant and, had Stuart been where he BELONGED....

Who was it who said that, had Southerners not read "Waverly," the war might never had taken place?

Is "Waverly" a book on tactics?

[MovieMogul]

Burns undoubtedly got that crush from Michael Shaara, whose The Killer Angels is really quite a remarkable book. Shaara was totally besotted with Chamberlain.

Not without reason: Chamberlain's heroism on the second day, and its importance, are quite real - and it's just one piece of the arc of an exceedingly remarkable life.

But Bruce Catton, in his Army of the Potomac trilogy, gives a much more measured account of Chamberlain's importance in the overall action of the second day, describes no less than a half dozen separate instances where the Confederates came scarily close to turning or breaking through the Union line; Chamberlain and the 20th Maine stopped only one of these. It took a great deal of heroism under fire to hold the Union line during that long afternoon and evening.The movie Gettysburg is, in many ways, an overwrought and bloated mess. But deeply embedded in it is a profoundly moving and brilliant performance by Jeff Daniels as Chamberlain--easily the best work he's ever done and alone makes the movie worth seeing.

[silenus]

Is "Waverly" a book on tactics?

Waverley (http://www.walterscott.lib.ed.ac.uk/works/novels/waverley.html) by Sir Walter Scott.

[Sampiro]

The bombardment that was supposed to provide support was a disaster due to miscalculations. The Confederate cannons overshot the Union lines or else hit the field between them when adjusted. Had the bombardment worked and opened a gap there would have been a slim chance of success perhaps. Certainly there's any number of occasions of people with the higher ground being routed anyway. However this was a misfire on all levels.

Many biographers believe that Lee suffered a mild heart attack shortly after Chancellorsville/before Gettysburg. It's record that he was still heartbroken over the recent death of his daughter Annie the year before (he mentioned this constantly in his letters) and of course he was under major stress all around and add to this he had lost his father-in-law's enormous estates* and a host of other professional/military/personal matters ranging** just all worked together to severely cloud his usually good judgment. In Longstreet's memoirs he mentions that grieving over the recent deaths of three fo his own children in one week the year before combined with learning just before they entered Pennsylvania that two more were sick (they recovered) definitely clouded his own judgment and concentration.


*For those who don't know the story: Lee's father-in-law (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Washington_Parke_Custis), grandson of Martha Washington/adopted son of her husband, was one of the richest men in Virginia and left a huge but hugely complicated estate to Lee's children. Lee was executor. The estate included several plantations (most famously Arlington) and many thousands of acres, more than 200 slaves, stocks and bonds and cash and real estate in D.C. and Baltimore and shipping interests, etc., and also LOTS AND LOTS of debts ranging from a few dollars to many thousands to various creditors. And... the request that all of his slaves be freed within 5 years of his death.
Lee took a leave of absence from the army to figure out how to honor the will and pay off all the debts and it took him several years. He was doing this when called to active duty to take care of John Brown and when offered the armies of two nations. A glossed over portion of Lee's life is that while his men were said to have loved him and would "march straight into hell for that old man", the slaves he controlled detested him; one called him "the meanest man God ever made" and another "the hardest taskmaster in Virginia" and Arlington under his management was at the point of near slave revolt (reported in the New York Tribune long before the war broke out); he was so disliked that many of his slaves, knowing fully well that they were set to be freed within 5 years of Custis's death, nevertheless ran away rather than work for him and when he redeemed them he ordered them flogged- both males and females.
His father-in-law, who had promised his late wife (a very progressive thinker on terms of race) on her death bed that he would free the slaves when he died, had specifically stated that if the estate needed cash then the lands were to be sold- he even named the order- rather than the slaves go unfreed, and he forbade the selling of any slaves or separating of any families. Lee sued to break the will in order to retain the slaves for more years to pay off the estate debts without selling the land, and he also rented out most of the male slaves to other farmers and planters in Virginia and Maryland which effectively separated every family at Arlington (something that had never been done). He fought this lawsuit even while in the field against the Yankees, but ultimately lost; ironically he was ordered to have every slave freed by January 1, 1863, coincidentally the same day as the Emancipation Proclamation took effect. He managed to "get 'r' done" but only at great stress.


**Lee had never had high hopes for the Confederacy's chance of victory and unlike Davis and others he saw Gettysburg as a last ditch effort to make the north surrender; he knew that if it failed then it was to be a defensive war from then on, and this was much on his mind. The recent death of Jackson, the earlier death of his daughter, the Union's decision to use black troops (Lee had no love for blacks and not much more for Mexicans, Irish, or other groups who weren't WASPs from the Mid-Atlantic- even for the times he was a snob), the confiscation of Arlington and other family properties, the estate issues and other matters (perhaps even the fact that
his oldest son (http://www.nps.gov/archive/arho/tour/history/bios/custislee.html)was 31, unmarried, "shy around girls" and nicknamed 'Bunny') all were causing him to nearly collapse under the pressure.

[Sampiro]

A secondary question: if Pickett's Charge had succeeded or somehow else Lee had won at Gettysburg, what do you think the ultimate outcome would have been?

Personally I think the war might have ended sooner. D.C., among the most unprotected capitol cities in the hemisphere when the war started (surprising considering they'd been burned to the ground 50 years before) had almost overnight become the most fortified, and tens of thousands of rebels marching through Pennsylvania and Maryland would probably have been destroyed by an upswelling of militia and anyone with a gun before they ever got within cannon's range of D.C.. Vicksburg and Tennessee were already damned.

[dropzone]

Is "Waverly" a book on tactics?*laughing* In a way. It is a conceit of some historians, I think including Catton and Shelby Foote, that the historical novels of Walter Scott, full of dashing horsemen and glorious warfare, were rather too popular in the antebellum South and led many hot-blooded young gentlemen to be overeager for war.

[silenus]

Depends on when the Confederates won the battle. If they had pressed through on the first day, cost be damned, and taken the heights before Hancock could arrive, then maybe they could have forced a battle more of their choosing. Maybe. Even then, Meade wouldn't have to attack. He could play a waiting game that Lee couldn't.

If they had flanked the Union position on Day 2, and rolled up from the south, then maybe they could've broken Meade. At the very least they could have trounced him soundly. Then it would be political, and your scenario might happen. It was a close-run thing, and Sickle's III Corps was shattered by the days fighting. If Lee had thrown everything he had around the Union left, instead of mucking about with a "demonstration" against Culp's Hill, things might have been different.

By Day 3 the cause was lost. The assault against the middle of the Union lines was suicidal from the get-go, barrage or not.

I think if Meade was forced from the field, Lee would have faced scorched-earth the likes of which he had ever imagined.

[dropzone]

So, how was Meade as a general?

[Sampiro]

So, how was Meade as a general?

He rarely makes either the best or the worst lists, but he was far more capable than incompetent, certainly a vast improvement over McLellan and Hooker. Lincoln was livid after Gettysburg because, like McLellan and Hooker, he didn't pursue Lee after the battle, but he had some good reasons. One was that he couldn't count on support from Hooker and he'd already had the hell blasted out of him at Fredericksburg when he was aggressive without adequate assistance, and though defeated Lee's army was far from harmless and though victorious Meade's men had just been hit hard.

[Dallas Jones]

It was late last night before I decided to quit reading about Picket's Charge, and all the related issues and people involved.

Thank you dropzone and silenas for bringing up the topic.

I watched half of the film Gettysburg this afternoon.

But I will have to wait until after the wife watches monday night football to finish.

[dropzone]

I don't know who will win the football game, but the Good Guys ( :) to Sampiro) win at Gettysburg.

[Sampiro]

Ever read a description of Pickett incidentally? Perhaps he's what we'd today call a metrosexual, but he was inordinately vain and spent a small fortune and ridiculous amounts of time (aLa Custer) on his hair and beard. He also wore perfume. Pic. (http://wpcontent.answers.com/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/b7/GeorgePickettearlyphoto.jpg/250px-GeorgePickettearlyphoto.jpg)

I've wondered if this had anything to do with his second wife. She was called Morning Mist and was a full blooded Haida Indian from what's now Washington, and like many tribes Haida men (and their women) were extremely vain about their grooming. (Pics (http://www.vanishingtattoo.com/haida/haida_tattoo1x.jpg) of Haida men (http://www.queencharlotteislandseh.com/nav/chief.jpg).) Pickett took a lot of crap from his fellow Virginians for the fact his wife was Indian, including his own wealthy Virginian relatives. When Morning Mist died in childbirth and left Pickett a widower for the second time his family refused to take in his half Haida son (http://www.pickettsociety.com/jimmy20.jpg) which hurt him deeply; he arranged for a surrogate family.

Pickett graduated dead last in his West Point Class. That said he gave possibly my favorite quote about the war in a later interview and one that shows very keen military insight. When asked for the umpteenth time why he though his charge failed he answered "I've always thought the Yankees had something to do with it".

[dropzone]

Stuart's nickname was "Beauty," which guys used to his face. Take it as you will.

[Captain Amazing]

Stuart's nickname "Beauty" at West Point was used ironically.

[Sampiro]

Pickett's third wife did send her stepson Jimmy (son of the Haida mother) whom she never met his father's saber when he died. That'd be a good one for History's Lost and Found. Jimmy was a fairly talented artist (http://www.pickettsociety.com/mt_rainier.jpg)whose works turn up once in a while.

[dropzone]

Stuart's nickname "Beauty" at West Point was used ironically.True, but it continued to be used long after his days at the Point. To his face, by his friends. Not that there's anything wrong with it, and not that he didn't work on it. Back to "Waverly," one must work at being dashing to be an effective officer of horse. I mean, look at Custer. The Federal cavalry was mounted infantry because the familiarity of Northern farmboys with horses began and ended at the plow end. The second sons of the Confederacy had been astride since childhood, and they brought their best mounts with them when they enlisted.

[Spavined Gelding]

There are two good, readable and not too technical books on the climatic assault at Gettysburg that are widely available. The first is George Stewart’s Pickett’s Charge, a micro history of the final attack at Gettysburg , 1959, and Earl J. Hess’s Pickett's Charge - The Last Attack at Gettysburg, 2001. The general answer from both Stewart and Hess is that the attack was doomed. Hess seems to say that the way the attack was organized and supported it was doomed while Stewart seems to be of the there-was-no-way-in-Hell-that-it was-going-to-work school. Stewart is critical of Lee while Hess is critical of Longstreet and, to a lesser extent, of Hill. In any event the two books will answer most questions and give a fair statement of the various controversies and arguments.

Another book to look at is Carol Reardon’s Pickett’s Charge in History and Memory, 1997.

One thing that is often neglected in thinking about combat in the Civil War is that while the rifled .58 caliber musket was potentially a killer at a half mile and in the hands of a trained marksman was, the way the weapon was employed tactically in the hands of an ordinary soldier it had an effective range of about 200 yards. Since it took from 20 to 30 seconds to reload and fire discipline was not a strong point for Civil War soldiers the volume of fire laid on Pickett’s and Pettigrew’s soldiers was not all that severe until the attacking force crossed the Emmetsburg Road.

In addition the pre-charge bombardment did badly cut up the three of four Union batteries stationed at the point of attack. Even when there were operating and crewed guns they were desperately low on ammunition. To that extent the bombardment had done its job. While flanking batteries did considerable long range damage, in the last few hundred yards the close range canister fire was not as horrendous at it would have been without the artillery preparation of the Second Corps position.

In terms of casualties, most authorities conclude that Pickett’s three brigades suffered losses of about 60% in killed , wounded and unwounded prisoners. It is almost certain that with one exception Pettigrew’s and Trimble’s six brigades suffered equally. The Light Cavalry Brigade at Balaclava had losses of less that 50%. The casualty figures alone should give some idea of what sort of a chance the charge had of breaking into the Union position.

[The Second Stone]

The movie Gettysburg is, in many ways, an overwrought and bloated mess. But deeply embedded in it is a profoundly moving and brilliant performance by Jeff Daniels as Chamberlain--easily the best work he's ever done and alone makes the movie worth seeing.

What? You are dissing Dumb and Dumber?!?

Just kidding.

As to the question of the OP, Pickett's charge was doomed to failure. And it was Lee's fault, as he said immediately afterward. If the Civil War should have demonstrated clearly to anyone anything, it should have been Lee who realized that frontal assaults were stupid as he had seen his enemies slaughtered in them repeatedly.

I'm not of the Lee was a great general or wonderful gentleman club. He was a son of a bitch fighting for slavery and usually a highly competent officer. He, of all people, should have known the frontal attack was destined for disaster.

The more interesting question was whether he could have won Gettysburg at all, and I think the answer is no, and that he did realize that. And without winning Gettysburg, he could not win the war and would be crushed the by the every strengthening Union forces. I think that is why he ordered the charge: he was desperate and if everything went his way on that long mile, he could perhaps dislodge the Union and deal with them on a retreat. To let them dig in and perhaps have other forces come to the aid of the Union and cut off or harry the retreat if it dragged on for a few more days (were there other forces? did Lee know that?) would have been suicide.

Could Lee have retreated before the charge? I suppose so, but then the Union might have had the energy to follow.

Without better ground than Gettysburg to fight on, Lee was doomed. Outnumbered and in foreign territory with poor foraging ability as compared to home, it was a matter of time, unless the battlefield positions had been reversed and Meade made the mistake of engaging on that ground.

[Captain Amazing]

The Federal cavalry was mounted infantry because the familiarity of Northern farmboys with horses began and ended at the plow end. The second sons of the Confederacy had been astride since childhood, and they brought their best mounts with them when they enlisted.

There wasn't a big difference between Union and Confederate cavalry. Both sides used them primarily as mounted infantry and dragoons.

[Sampiro]

There wasn't a big difference between Union and Confederate cavalry. Both sides used them primarily as mounted infantry and dragoons.

True this yet a very common error in movies and novels. Most never fought on horseback unless they were ambushed or in retreat.

[dropzone]

And I bet it broke their hearts. But that was more true in the later stages of the war. Early on there were some cavalry charges against mass rifle fire, with predictable results, but it still carried on traditional cavalry jobs of harrying the flanks of the enemy infantry and running down retreating soldiers.

[Spavined Gelding]

(snip) but it still carried on traditional cavalry jobs of harrying the flanks of the enemy infantry and running down retreating soldiers.

Once mounted troops lost their role as shock forces – demonstrated in the Crimea and again in the Franco-Prussian War – they retained their function of reconnaissance, security and raiding. The Federal cavalry did its job well, making contact on the morning of the First Day, holding position long enough to force Hill’s corps to deploy and until Reynolds and Howard could come up. In addition, because of a headquarters screw up, Buford’s cavalry division was sent to the rear at Westminster, MD, to refit and was not replaced as flank security along the Emmetsburg road. Had cavalry been in place the Second Day could have been much different.

Stuart, on the other hand, was allowed to go off on a frolic of his own, depriving Lee of much of his recon capability. In fairness to Lee, it was not clear that Stuart was going to take himself out of contact with the army until it was too late to do anything about it. While Lee had other cavalry with the main body they were formations and commanders who were definitely second rate when compared to Stuart’s division and in whom Lee had little confidence. In addition the non-Stuart cavalry was covering Lee’s western flank, not the eastern flank where the Army of the Potomac was maneuvering.

In short, when Lee needed recon and security his most trusted cavalry leader was off raiding - the last thing Lee needed. Some of Lee’s staff and some of the corps commanders wanted Stuart to be brought up on charges of dereliction for his escapade and failure to perform his essential mission. That of course was papered over at the time and, when Stuart was killed the next spring, forgotten as JEB ascended into the Confederate Valhalla.

There is a fair argument that all of his senior commanders – Longstreet, Hill, Ewell, Stuart.-- failed Lee at Gettysburg, a failure facilitated by Lee’s hands-off style of command.

On the other hand Meade was ably served and assisted my most of his senior commanders – some of whom exercised admirable independent judgement in moments of crisis.

[silenus]

There is a fair argument that all of his senior commanders – Longstreet, Hill, Ewell, Stuart.-- failed Lee at Gettysburg, a failure facilitated by Lee’s hands-off style of command.

I'd hold that Longstreet's failure was in not insisting on a flanking move much further to the south of the Union left. When he let Lee convince him to attack where and when he did on Day 2, it doomed the Confederate battleplan.

[jtgain]

I'd hold that Longstreet's failure was in not insisting on a flanking move much further to the south of the Union left. When he let Lee convince him to attack where and when he did on Day 2, it doomed the Confederate battleplan.

I agree, but then again I don't. Lee had a full string of victories. He had beaten them the day before. Why go off and leave them in control of the field? They ran all of the other times, they will run again. Hit them on the rocky hill and they will leave.

Plus, the South didn't have the luxury of a drawn-out war. They were invaders in the north and had to have a decisive victory. Longstreet's plan would have worked with Grant's army, but Lee knew better. Just because he ended up being wrong doesn't mean that he didn't make the best choice at the time.

[Captain Amazing]

I'd hold that Longstreet's failure was in not insisting on a flanking move much further to the south of the Union left. When he let Lee convince him to attack where and when he did on Day 2, it doomed the Confederate battleplan.

I think Longstreet's bigger failure on Day 2 was delaying his attack on the Peach Orchard until Law came up, which gave the Union the time to reinforce Cemetery Ridge.

[Spavined Gelding]

I think Longstreet's bigger failure on Day 2 was delaying his attack on the Peach Orchard until Law came up, which gave the Union the time to reinforce Cemetery Ridge.


The delay in getting Longstreet’s attack underway on the Second Day has been the subject of argument ever since it happened. Clearly he took much longer that might have been hoped to move the two divisions of his corps which were on the field from the Cashtown Road across country to the positions beyond the Union left flank. The surprise, however, was that Dan Sickles small two division corps had taken position along the Emmetsburg Road - Peach Orchard - Devils Den position. That is not what Lee or Longstreet expected to find, or Meade either. But the problem wasn’t that Meade had time to reinforce the Cemetery Ridge- Little Round Top position. Lee expected to find the Union flank in the air about half was down Cemetery Ridge which would allow a repeat of the Chancellorsville maneuver to roll up the Union army from south to north. This is why Lee positively forbid Longstreet and Hood from seeking to pass around the Round Tops and insisted on an attack up the Emmitsburg Road. The real problem with Longstreet’s slow movement to his jumping off positions was that there was only about four hours of daylight left when the attack got underway.

Again there is a fair argument that had Stuart been present Lee would not have fallen victim to misinformation and out of date information about the Union positions and strength.

If any one wants to pursue a detailed analysis of the Second Day they might refer to Harry W. Pfanz’s Gettysburg, The Second Day, 1987, probably the definitive popular study of the whole Peach Orchard-Wheat Field - Devil’s Den - Little Round Top fight.

[Spavined Gelding]

I'd hold that Longstreet's failure was in not insisting on a flanking move much further to the south of the Union left. When he let Lee convince him to attack where and when he did on Day 2, it doomed the Confederate battleplan.


Longstret was not convinced of anything by Lee on the Second Day or on the Third Day. Indeed Longstreet probably broke into out right insubordinate language in trying to dissuade Lee from a frontal attack on the Union center on Day Three. The inescapable fact is that Lee was the army commander and Longstreet was obligated by honor and duty to follow his commander’s orders even though he may have thought them wrong. His duty was to obey or ask to be relieved. No good officer can ask to be relieved when his soldiers are in contact with the enemy and a good officer can carry his argument only so far. Lee had the choice between leaving a clearly dissenting Longstreet in command or relieving him. Lee clearly thought he was better off with Longstreet in command of his corps that not.

It hardly seem fair to criticize Longstreet for not persuading Lee that Lee’s tactical plan was flawed.

[silenus]

It hardly seem fair to criticize Longstreet for not persuading Lee that Lee’s tactical plan was flawed.

Agreed. I'm firmly in Longstreet's camp on this one. Lee screwed the pooch, and there was little Longstreet could do to fix things.

My copy of Pfanz gets read regularly.

[jtgain]

Lee had the choice between leaving a clearly dissenting Longstreet in command or relieving him. Lee clearly thought he was better off with Longstreet in command of his corps that not.


I didn't know that Longstreet's dissent had reached that level where he was considering resigning or Lee was contemplating relieving him.

A lot of the time, sadly, history gets written by the men who live the longest. Wyatt Earp is a prime example. He lived until 1929, so most of the crap he spewed was taken as gospel.

Longstreet lived until after 1900, so he was out telling stories long after many other participants had passed. I'm sure that each time he told the story, his disagreement with Lee got a little stronger.

[jtgain]

I think Longstreet's bigger failure on Day 2 was delaying his attack on the Peach Orchard until Law came up, which gave the Union the time to reinforce Cemetery Ridge.

Keep in mind, though, he was already down Heth's division that got chewed up in the Day 1 fighting, and Pickett didn't get there until that night. I can understand his hesitation.

[Spavined Gelding]

Keep in mind, though, he was already down Heth's division that got chewed up in the Day 1 fighting, and Pickett didn't get there until that night. I can understand his hesitation.

This is a nit-pick. Heath’s Division was part of A.P. Hill’s Corps, not Longstreet’s. Heath's was pretty well chewed up on July 1. None the less, Lee chose Heath’s Division under the command of J.J. Pettigrew (Heath was wounded on the First Day) and two brigades from Pender’s equally cut up division (Pender had also been wounded on the First Day) to act as the left half of the assault force on the Third Day.

Longstreet’s Corps had not been engaged on the First Day. Hood’s Division and McLaw’s Division came up on the morning of the Second Day and were heavily engaged on the Peach Orchard – Wheat Field – Devils Den – Little Round Top line. Pickett’s Division had been covering the rear of the army and did not come into the Gettysburg vicinity until late in the afternoon of the Second Day. Longstreet persuaded Lee that both Hood’s and McLaw’s were too worn out to participate in Pickett’s Charge and that they both needed to hold their positions to prevent Meade from launching an attack that might roll up the Rebel line from south to north.

After the war Longstreet never had an empty field in terms of creating the history of the war. His mild criticisms of Lee’s generalship at Gettysburg roused any number of pro-Lee partisans, notably Jubal Early (who hated, in order The United States, Yankees and James Longstreet). Early was an effective advocate and a prolific writer. In addition Longstreet had ruined his credibility with many ex-Confederates by taking a job with the US government. Some have suggested that Longstreet’s biggest sin was that of being right. None the less, Lee relied on him and Longstreet was with Lee at the end at Appomattox Court House. Lee never did speak publicly or do any post war writing about the war.

Richard Ewell is reputed to have said when years later he was asked about Gettysburg, “It took a great number of mistakes to lose the Battle of Gettysburg: I made most of them myself.”

[jtgain]

This is a nit-pick. Heath’s Division was part of A.P. Hill’s Corps, not Longstreet’s. Heath's was pretty well chewed up on July 1. None the less, Lee chose Heath’s Division under the command of J.J. Pettigrew (Heath was wounded on the First Day) and two brigades from Pender’s equally cut up division (Pender had also been wounded on the First Day) to act as the left half of the assault force on the Third Day.

Longstreet’s Corps had not been engaged on the First Day. Hood’s Division and McLaw’s Division came up on the morning of the Second Day and were heavily engaged on the Peach Orchard – Wheat Field – Devils Den – Little Round Top line. Pickett’s Division had been covering the rear of the army and did not come into the Gettysburg vicinity until late in the afternoon of the Second Day. Longstreet persuaded Lee that both Hood’s and McLaw’s were too worn out to participate in Pickett’s Charge and that they both needed to hold their positions to prevent Meade from launching an attack that might roll up the Rebel line from south to north.

After the war Longstreet never had an empty field in terms of creating the history of the war. His mild criticisms of Lee’s generalship at Gettysburg roused any number of pro-Lee partisans, notably Jubal Early (who hated, in order The United States, Yankees and James Longstreet). Early was an effective advocate and a prolific writer. In addition Longstreet had ruined his credibility with many ex-Confederates by taking a job with the US government. Some have suggested that Longstreet’s biggest sin was that of being right. None the less, Lee relied on him and Longstreet was with Lee at the end at Appomattox Court House. Lee never did speak publicly or do any post war writing about the war.

Richard Ewell is reputed to have said when years later he was asked about Gettysburg, “It took a great number of mistakes to lose the Battle of Gettysburg: I made most of them myself.”

Very true. Heth was part of Hill's Corps. My mistake.

I've heard many scholars say that if Ewell had done his job and taken Culps Hill and Cemetery Hill on Day One, that not much would have changed. Gettysburg would have been known as a rather large skirmish and that the major battle would have happened elsewhere after the Union redeployed to more favorable ground.