wwII - pearl harbor attack results

[justinh]

besides picking a fight with the US. what good did the attack on pearl harbor do? how many battleships were destroyed? I think only 2. air planes were destroyed but they were out of date anyway. leaving them intact might have just resulted in the few experience US pilots getting killed more easily. assuming that the carrier question was not relevant because nobody saw the importance of them at the time. I guess what I am asking is that the attack was such a success and surprise.... then it sure didnt have much net effect .

[RealityChuck]

Pearl Harbor was a preemptive strike that could have cripped the ability of the US to fight against Japan. I think about seven battleships were sunk, along with a lot of planes parked on the runways.

Since the importance of aircraft carriers wasn't understood at that point, this was a big plus for Japan. I think their attitude was that now that we crippled the navy, the US would give up and let them have what they wanted. But they didn't count on the fact that America would get pissed off at them and go into action (like most generals, they thought the enemy would crawl away after one decisive defeat).

[justinh]

I know 7 battleships were damaged/sunk but sinking a battle ship in 30 ft of water is not that big a deal. I think 2 battleships were destroyed (Arizona and West Virginia). I wonder how long it was before the other BBs were back in action? I agree that is was crippling if Japan was planning on following up the attack and needed to get the battle ships away from her carrier fleets. but they didnt plan that so again my question. Was it a complete failure as military strategy?

[Crusoe]

I don't think you can really say that raising a sunk battleship is "not that big a deal"! How do you raise it and repair both the external and internal damage? Those ships were in no fit state to go to war in the near future.

I'm not sure it was a failure of strategy; the Japanese didn't know that the carriers were elsewhere, and I'm sure they would have liked to take them down too. It was bad luck or bad timing from a Japanese point of view, I suppose. And while a battleship may be a fearsome weapon against other ships or in ground bombardment, I don't know how much the US Navy relied on them for the air defence of carriers.

[Sauron]

I seem to be responding to a lot of WWII threads lately.

Primary Japanese strategy was to attack the U.S. carriers at Pearl Harbor. They were disappointed to find none at home.

Many of the ships bombed at Pearl Harbor were indeed raised and contributed to the war effort -- but it took a long, long time. I think 18 months was the quickest any of them got back into action.

The Japanese wanted a quick, decisive strike against the U.S., to force a peace treaty on their terms. With the carriers gone, they lost that opportunity.

[Sofa King]

Pearl Harbor was just one strike in an overall strategic plan so massive in scope and so unexpectedly successful that even the Japanese were somewhat amazed.

The strike at Pearl was designed to take out the main body of the American fleet in order to allow them to pursue their other ends. Some of them were:

* The invasion of the forward American base in the North Pacific, Wake Island;

* The invasion of the forward American base in the Phillipines;

* The capture of the American naval base at Guam as well as Saipan;

* The consolidation of defenses in the Marshall, Caroline, and Gilbert archipelagoes;

* The isolation of the Dutch East Indies via attacks on the Malay Peninsula (and Singapore) and in the Admiralty Islands, as well as New Guinea;

* The capture of the oil- and mineral-producing areas of the Dutch East Indies themselves.

The plan was a result of the American oil embargo on Japan. Japan desperately needed oil and minerals, and could not produce enough within their empire as it stood before December, 1941. The overall plan is a strategic masterpiece of sorts, as it cuts off virually every line of attack on the East Indies, the supply line from there to Japan, and Japan itself.

Even more astounding, virtually every effort was successful, and by March of 1942 Japan was beginning to realize the return on its ultra-risky smash-and-grab operation. America was reduced to hit-and-run raids and nipping at the perimiter of the new Empire for almost a year, which was as far as the Japanese plan foresaw. After that, Yamamoto's prediction that he could raise havoc for awhile but could guarantee nothing afterwards came to fruition.

[jwg]

The Japanese (and Americans) felt that the real threat was the battleship. So they were the primary targets. And they were quite successful. Our aircraft carriers were away, I believe delivering fighters to Wake Island, and actually arrived the night after the attack. A prevailing perception was that aircraft carriers were great for scouting, but not much else.(Scouting was a tremendously important function in the days before satellites and radar). they would have been bombed had they been there. I don't think that Yamamoto at first appreciated the obvious - that his carriers that destroyed our battleship fleet - and always kept his flag on a battleship. We fought with carriers for one main reason - they were the only thing we had left - the surviving battleships were withdrawn to protect the West Coast (and so the West Coast could protect the battleships). We learned in time how valuable carriers could be, but developed an integrated strategy - aircraft carriers and battleships together. Aircraft carriers could be easy victims to the speed and big guns of a battleship, so we had battleships assigned to protect them. And the battleship needed protection from aircraft carriers.

the other element of Japenese thinking was the us decadent westerners would be so discouraged by defeat, we would want to concede. The Japanese leaders felt that only the Japanese had the strength of will to prevail. They never really got over this idea, right up to (and even after) the A bombs.

[justinh]

if the original mission was to take out the carriers then it must be a complete failure. thats my point. I would be interested in finding when the other BBs were back online. Oklahoma, maryland,tennesee (what were the others). this brings up the question of prior knowledge by the US military. Where were the carriers?

[tomndebb]

this brings up the question of prior knowledge by the US military

No, it doesn't. That particular issue has been raised on several occasions on this MB, most recently on Did FDR know about the attack on Pearl Harbor beforehand? (http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?threadid=26135)

The Pearl Harbor cannot be called a military failure. It can be called an overall strategic failure because it invoked the resolve of the U.S. people to pursue the war to a complete victory while the Japanses hped that the U.S. would sue for peace after their initial victories.

Besides effectively eliminating the Seventh Fleet as a military force for many months, it guaranteed that the U.S. could provide no effective defense or re-supply of the Philipines and put the U.S. on a decidedly defensive footing until Midway. Had the U.S. not been lucky enough to win at Midway (and a whole lot of luck was involved), the entire war would have progressed much differently. Pearl was still a brilliant initial strike.

[sqweels]

Here is rough breakdown (from memory) of the U.S. losses at Pearl Harbor:

Of the 8 U.S. battleships present:

Arizona - total loss

Oklahoma - capsized, later scrapped

West Virginia, California - torpedoed, sunk upright in shallow water, raised and refitted.

Nevada- torpedoed after getting underway, beached, raised and refitted.

Pennsylvania, Tennesee, Maryland - moderate bomb damage, refitted.

1 destroyer destroyed, 2 others and a light cruiser damamged, and the target ship, ex-battleship Utah a total loss.

Around 200 aircraft destroyed (nearly all on the ground).

About 2300 Americans killed, nearly half on the Arizona.


The Japanese lost 29 planes and several midget (I'm sorry, 'little person':D) submarines.


I think only 2. air planes were destroyed but they were out of date anyway. leaving them intact might have just resulted in the few experience US pilots getting killed more easily.

Not exactly, justinh. Many of the fighters wrecked were P-40s, which the Army continued to rely heavily on well into 1943.

[KCB615]

From sqweels:
Oklahoma - capsized, later scrapped

Oklahoma was sunk at Pearl, raised, then sold for scrap, but she sank on May 17, 1947 while being towed to San Fransisco.


The righting and raising of Oklahoma was an incredible undertaking. There were a bunch of derricks (I think there were 18 for some reason) erected on the hull (which was upside-down in the water) and connected to winches on shore. Over a lenghty period of time, the winches pulled the ship upright. A marvel of marine salvage.

[beakerxf]

[QUOTE]Originally posted by jwg
the other element of Japenese thinking was the us decadent westerners would be so discouraged by defeat, we would want to concede. The Japanese leaders felt that only the Japanese had the strength of will to prevail. They never really got over this idea, right up to (and even after) the A bombs. [/B]

I have heard that some in Japanese military hoped that America's heterogeneous mixture of national and racial backgrounds would keep us from ever presenting a united front.

I don't know about the fate of most of the battleships, but the USS Nevada survived the war, earned 7 battle stars, and was later sunk after surviving an atomic (or hydrogen) test blast and 4 days of target practice.

[Boris B]

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ships/dafs/CV/cv2.html
Note that the above link is pretty flexible; change the little 2 to a 3 and you'll go from Lexington to Saratoga, etc.

On December 7th, 1941:

Lexington (CV-2) was en route from Pearl Harbor to Midway Island.

Saratoga (CV-3) was just entering San Diego.

Ranger (CV-4) was sailing to Norfolk from Trinidad.

Yorktown (CV-5) was in Norfolk (where she remained until the 16th)

Enterprise (CV-6) was en route to Hawaii from Wake Island.

Wasp (CV-7) was in Grassy Bay, which I think is in Bermuda

Hornet (CV-8) had been commissioned six weeks earlier, and was in Norfolk

Essex (CV-9) was launched seven months later and commissioned New Year's Eve, 1942 (I mention her as a sort of "bookend"; I think the other bookend, Langley (CV-1) had been decommissioned or relegated to training by this point).

So only three of our CVs were in the Pacific at that point. Four were in the Atlantic, but three were moved quickly to the Pacific, leaving only Ranger (which missed the incredible carrier battles of the Pacific but supported Operation Torch in North Africa). It is interesting to speculate what would have happened had all Lexington, Enterprise, and Saratoga all been in Pearl Harbor that morning.

Interesting fact: where were four of these carriers (CV-2 through CV-8) on December 7, 1942? The bottom of the ocean. Only two carriers remained afloat in the Pacific (Saratoga and Enterprise, which had been damaged in the battles for Guadalcanal) until Essex arrived, and she didn't see action until long after the battle of Guadalcanal was over.

Trivia: CV-10 was also called Yorktown. She was laid down six days before the attack on Pearl Harbor, but before she was completed her namesake was sunk *doffs hat* at the Battle of Midway before she was commissioned.

[Boris B]

I didn't realize this, but we actually had several escort carriers in the water by the end of 1942. Long Island (CVE-1) was actually commissioned before Pearl Harbor. Eleven small escort carriers joined the U.S. Navy in 1942, (many other were sold to the U.K.) So a lot of my statements about carriers really only apply to large fleet carriers. Because the little jeep carriers were so much quicker to build than the fleet carriers (Essex and Independence classes), the joined the effort faster, even though they were a much later idea.

Also, Langley was sunk in the Pacific in February 1942, which jacks up the total of 1942 carrier losses to five. CV-1 started the war off the Phillipines and joined Australians reinforce Indonesia. With her 15 knot speed and hazardous location, it's not such a surprise she survived less than three months.

[justinh]

isnt it incredible how tough a battleship is? carriers sink like rocks. it seems it takes a battleship to sink another battleship. except the YAMATO and it was just disabled and later scuttled. the ARIZONA blew up when the magazine exploded but besides that they are just too stout and fast to beat.

[hardhead365]

Except the ones that were sunk by submarines :)

[egkelly]

Could the japanese have followed up the Pearl Harbor raid with an invasion? As I understand it, General Short had almost a complete Army division on Oahue-but what about the other islands? Seems to me yamamote should have told Tojo to plan a limited invasion of the Hawaiain Islands. That would have kept the US Navy in San Diego for most of the war!

[Danimal]

Originally posted by justinh
isnt it incredible how tough a battleship is? carriers sink like rocks. it seems it takes a battleship to sink another battleship. except the YAMATO and it was just disabled and later scuttled. the ARIZONA blew up when the magazine exploded but besides that they are just too stout and fast to beat.

Weren't Prince of Wales and Repulse sunk by Japanese bombers? Though I'm not sure if Repulse was technically a battleship or a battle cruiser (the distinction has always struck me as nebulous), Prince of Wales was an honest-to-God King George V-class battleship.

[Spritle]

Originally posted by tomndebb
Had the U.S. not been lucky enough to win at Midway (and a whole lot of luck was involved), the entire war would have progressed much differently. Pearl was still a brilliant initial strike.

not to nitpick, but I don't know if I'd put "whole" in italics here. There was some luck, but much more work on the part of American code breakers. The Japanese coding machines had just been deciphered weeks before. All correspondence between the Japenese Embassy and Japan had been monitored and was now being translated. It was known by the US Gov. that Japan was about to launch a major strike on a very important island in the Pacific, but it was not known which one, due to code names for the islands.

Eventually, (about 3 weeks before?) the attack, the US had it narrowed down to two islands. They had the Midway base send a message to Washington claiming that their desalinization plant was down and that they were without fresh water. A subsequent message from Japan to the embassy mentioned that the target base was without fresh water. Now, the US knew the target and rushed much of the available fleet to Midway to engage the enemy.

Sure there was some luck, but breaking Purple was the result of lots of hard work.

[Danimal]

Originally posted by spritle
Sure there was some luck, but breaking Purple was the result of lots of hard work. [/B]

And now here I am to nitpick the nitpick ;)

Purple was the Japanese diplomatic code, and was broken before the war started. The Japanese naval code was, I believe, called JN-25, and I believe this is the code you are referring to.

[tomndebb]

The arrangement of the battle was skill. The victory had substantial portions of luck, in it.

If nothing else, at the climactic moment of the battle, the Japanese covering aircraft had just finished destroying the the torpedo bomber assaults. The entire CAP was on the deck when the U.S. dive bombers found a break in the cloud cover and fell on the Japanese carriers. As fast a the A6M Zero was, it still took 7 minutes to climb to 20,000 feet. The dive bombers had no fighter opposition while they lined up their runs.

Additional points of luck:
One Japanese scout plane found the Yorktown long before the actual battle, but radio problems prevented it from notifying the Japanese fleet of the Yorktown's position.

The torpedo bombers were supposed to hit the Japanese in a coordinated attack, but the groups got separated and the torpedo bombers showed up early. Had the attack gone as scheduled, the Japanese CAP would have had to divide between defending against high- and low-level attacks, but neither the U.S. torpedoes nor the planes carrying them were that reliable, so the CAP would probably have concentrated on the dive bombers, reducing our ability to crush three carriers in a single blow.

The dive bombers that hit the Japanese were within a few minutes of exceeding their loiter time as they ran out of fuel. Their directions had been imperfect and they spent most of their time flying over heavy clouds with no Japanese below them. The discovery of the Japanese fleet occurred after the initial decision to turn back.

Naguno kept vacillating between attacks on Midway or attacks on the U.S. carriers and he had ordered the bombs changed (high explosive for land attack, armor piercing to attack ships) more than once, and in their haste to carry out the successive changes, the unloaded bombs were stacked on the deck instead of being returned to the magazine. It was the presence of so much live ammunition on the decks of the Japanese carriers that caused our fairly small number of bomb strikes to doom them. (You can chalk this up to bad command for Nagumo, but we still got lucky that he gave the specific orders he did.)

When the Yorktown was struck, a followup reconnaissance by the Japanese identified it as a separate ship, so instead of continuing to search for the Enterprise and Hornet, the Japanese attacked the Yorktown again, leaving the other two carriers to launch a final, fatal blow against the last Japanese carrier.

The U.S. forces fought Midway with intelligence, vigor, and incredible bravery (read some of the accounts of the torpedo attacks, especially in Martin Caidin's (out of print) Rugged, Ragged Warriors. However, the overwhelming nature of the victory owed very much to luck.

[Spritle]

Danimal, thanks, you're right; that's what I was thinking of.

tomndebb, point well made and taken. I read your first post with the lenses of "being able to get to that point". Yes, Sara and Dipity were both there for the American fleet. :)

[Boris B]

Originally posted by Danimal
Weren't Prince of Wales and Repulse sunk by Japanese bombers? Though I'm not sure if Repulse was technically a battleship or a battle cruiser (the distinction has always struck me as nebulous), Prince of Wales was an honest-to-God King George V-class battleship.
Yes. December 1941 was bad month for British battlewagons as well as U.S. Japanese aircraft did what the Bismark couldn't do - sink the Prince of Wales. Repulse was a battlecruiser - much older than her companion.

I think what allowed the USN to save so many battleships at Pearl Harbor was partly the shallowness of the water. The same ships sunk in 100 feet of water would have been total losses.

[DRY]

Originally posted by Danimal
Originally posted by justinh
isnt it incredible how tough a battleship is? carriers sink like rocks. it seems it takes a battleship to sink another battleship. except the YAMATO and it was just disabled and later scuttled. the ARIZONA blew up when the magazine exploded but besides that they are just too stout and fast to beat.

Weren't Prince of Wales and Repulse sunk by Japanese bombers? Though I'm not sure if Repulse was technically a battleship or a battle cruiser (the distinction has always struck me as nebulous), Prince of Wales was an honest-to-God King George V-class battleship.
I could very well be wrong about this, but wasn't the Musashi (sister ship of the Yamato) sunk by torpedos? Either from a bomber or a submarine. (I seem to recall the former.)

egkelly--I don't claim to be an expert, but I don't believe an invasion of the Hawaiian islands by the Japanese was logistically feasible. Particularly when the Japanese were also actively trying to make territorial gains in Indonesia.

As for Pearl Harbor, I don't believe the Japanese could have forced the Americans to sue for peace, but they could have done even more damage had they bombed:

--the oil tanks
--the repair facilities
--the airfields

Nagumo did not know the whereabouts of the American carriers and overrode the suggestion that a second wave of bombers be launched.

[Danimal]

Originally posted by DRY
I could very well be wrong about this, but wasn't the Musashi (sister ship of the Yamato) sunk by torpedos? Either from a bomber or a submarine. (I seem to recall the former.)
[/B]

Jane's reports that Musashi was sunk by U.S. aircraft at the battle of the Sibuyan Sea. This website (http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-fornv/japan/japsh-m/musashi.htm) reports that Musashi took 19 torpedo hits and 17 bomb hits at Sibuyan Sea, capsized, and sank four hours later.

While JustinH may have been exaggerating in thinking that it took a battleship to sink another battleship, I have to agree that it truly is impressive how much punishment it took to sink Musashi. Not many ships could have stayed afloat even for four hours after suffering that many high explosive impacts.

[justinh]

I guess I just remember the Bismark. and how it was not really sank in battle it was just disabled by the combined efforts of the navy and airforce. and the Germans scuttled it themselves. and how many bombs /torpedos were dumped on battleship row at Pearl with only destroying 1 battleship. that was my thought. they are so tough compared to a carrier/cruiser/destroyer...

[DRY]

Originally posted by Danimal
Jane's reports that Musashi was sunk by U.S. aircraft at the battle of the Sibuyan Sea. This website (http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-fornv/japan/japsh-m/musashi.htm) reports that Musashi took 19 torpedo hits and 17 bomb hits at Sibuyan Sea, capsized, and sank four hours later.

While JustinH may have been exaggerating in thinking that it took a battleship to sink another battleship, I have to agree that it truly is impressive how much punishment it took to sink Musashi. Not many ships could have stayed afloat even for four hours after suffering that many high explosive impacts.

Thank you for the information, Danimal! I should make clear that I don't disagree with JustinH's point, I only wished to find out that my recollection (read: My old fart memory) was correct. I was going to query whether the Yamato was at Midway (I thought it wasn't), but I saw that this was addressed already.

19 torpedo hits and 17 bomb hits is indeed a tremendous amount of damage!

[r2d6.51]

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ships/dafs/CV/cv2.html
Note that the above link is pretty flexible; change the little 2 to a 3 and you'll go from Lexington to Saratoga, etc.

On December 7th, 1941:

Lexington (CV-2) was en route from Pearl Harbor to Midway Island.

Saratoga (CV-3) was just entering San Diego.

Ranger (CV-4) was sailing to Norfolk from Trinidad.

Yorktown (CV-5) was in Norfolk (where she remained until the 16th)

Enterprise (CV-6) was en route to Hawaii from Wake Island.

Wasp (CV-7) was in Grassy Bay, which I think is in Bermuda

Hornet (CV-8) had been commissioned six weeks earlier, and was in Norfolk

Essex (CV-9) was launched seven months later and commissioned New Year's Eve, 1942 (I mention her as a sort of "bookend"; I think the other bookend, Langley (CV-1) had been decommissioned or relegated to training by this point).

So only three of our CVs were in the Pacific at that point. Four were in the Atlantic, but three were moved quickly to the Pacific, leaving only Ranger (which missed the incredible carrier battles of the Pacific but supported Operation Torch in North Africa). It is interesting to speculate what would have happened had all Lexington, Enterprise, and Saratoga all been in Pearl Harbor that morning.

Interesting fact: where were four of these carriers (CV-2 through CV-8) on December 7, 1942? The bottom of the ocean. Only two carriers remained afloat in the Pacific (Saratoga and Enterprise, which had been damaged in the battles for Guadalcanal) until Essex arrived, and she didn't see action until long after the battle of Guadalcanal was over.

Trivia: CV-10 was also called Yorktown. She was laid down six days before the attack on Pearl Harbor, but before she was completed her namesake was sunk *doffs hat* at the Battle of Midway before she was commissioned.

The Straight Poop

Very good straight dope & statistical references to what you cited. Yours was the most relevant as the amount of ignorance on PH is astounding but not surprising.

1. The fact is the Pacific War was won primarily through Naval Aviation(Carriers) & Amphibious Warfare Doctrine. Thus losing ships belonging to the Navy's Gun Club had no real impact on determining the outcome of the war. It was Carrier Task Forces & Tough as naiils Marines who hit the beaches to take property back that kicked their ass back to Tokyo that won the day.

2. Had the Japs focused on destroying shore installations like the Tank Farm(Oil), Dry Dock & Repair Facilities would have done far more to set us back & give them more time to build Island strongpoints & secure more property for defending the largest chunk of the planets surface(Pacific Ocean domain) in the No. Pacific, Central. Pacific, So. Pacific,S.E. Asia., & Far East that the Pearl Harbor attack did nothing to alter the inevitable outcomeif for no other reason than for every 1 aircraft carriers they sink of ours, & the 1 we sink of theirs it takes the Japsa year to put 1 more at sea to our 10, so by 43' it was all over but the shouting.

3. Simply look at the industrial might of the US & you'll see we supplied nearly the entire war effort against all Axis powers for the Brit's, the Aussies, the Soviets to a large degree due mainly by the extraordinary efforts by Russin people to completely remove from the floor foundation on up, every factory from the Industrial Region of Rosto on Don & Kharkov Industrial behemouth regions of the Soviet Union who mfg. The vast majority of Soviet Armored hardware that took Berlin in 45' like the T-34 medium tank arguably the best overall tank of WWII & moved past the Ural mountains where they kept pumping them out like nobody's business.

But the US was then & still is the most productive workforce on the planet, & in the end is how wars are won, until you start launching 50 megaton Nukes that can destroy an entire 25 square mile area of land in a sgl. Stroke 7 when you have 30,000 of them like the Soviets & us have it becomes a moot point. Hence the Cold War.

Nevertheless, what the Japs destroyed (because as tragic as it is to lose people they are always expendable) in Battleships & heavy floating cannon devices, did little if anything to determine the inevitable outcome. The Navy Gun Club in Battleships, & Heavy Cruisers played no strategic part in winning the Pacific war . They were however relegated to shore bombardment for tactical operations during Navy/Marine Corp.amphibious operations to take back occupied American or allied property (islands) but were no longer a strategic warfare asset as Naval Carrier Operations turned out to be.

As for no one knowing what they were doing with Carrier Operations thats nonsense & clearly someone whose not researched or well read on the Pacific War as an ignorant joke of an answer.

The Black shoe Navy Cannon Club who were still running thngs in WA DC would as time & attrition would weed them out of leadership billets in time, put Naval Aviators at the helm of NavOps, but Naval Aviation was esp. relevant and top strategic doctrine for offensive strategic operations by the mid 30's where the Brits & Japs considered it a vital part of overall defense of the realm & taking the fight to the enemy doorstep, as it still is today. You can put an air force in operation anywhere on the planet in minutes to conduct all sorts of air ops.to destroy or defend targets for strategic development & doctrine.

We were catching up & why so many carriers esp Jeep carriers were built during WW II.

In the end we rolled over the Japs in the amount of Carriers we built & put to sea by late 43/44 then 45 over 100 in service; it was game over in the Pacific Ocean.

NAV Air & Semper Fi Bulldogs won that war in the air over sea & the sandy beaches with Jarheads.

Semper Fi Dude

[Elendil's Heir]

"Japs" is, uh, not the preferred nomenclature.

[engineer_comp_geek]

r2d6.51, did you realize that you were dragging up a thread that is more than 10 years old? Most of the original thread participants are no longer around.

[mlees]

It was Carrier Task Forces & Tough as naiils Marines who hit the beaches to take property back that kicked their ass back to Tokyo that won the day.

Nitpick: The Silent Service (not yet employing zombies) had something to do with victory, too. ;) Subs sank half of the Japanese merchant fleet, crippling their ability to supply their forces overseas, and their ability to bring the conquered resources home.

Both Germany and Japan underestimated the U.S.'s production potential. I don't know what metrics they had available to measure the U.S.'s potential threat, in that regard, in the 30's. The mobilisation of the U.S. industry was staggering.

War Plan Orange, the plan drawn up by the U.S. interwar planners, foresaw the island hopping campaign that actually came about. (With CVs instead of BBs.) "Gun Club" v. Carriers was not really that important of a debate.

The Japanese thought that they could carve out and defend a huge Pacific perimeter. The problem with this plan was that the Allies could pick and choose where to attack, and bring all the forces they cared to commit to bear on one targeted area, while the Japanese would be eventually relegated to a reactive defense, which turned out to be the weaker plan.

r2d6.51, did you realize that you were dragging up a thread that is more than 10 years old? Most of the original thread participants are no longer around.

I blame Memorial Day.

[Sailboat]

I know 7 battleships were damaged/sunk but sinking a battle ship in 30 ft of water is not that big a deal.

I doubt most other countries would have been able to raise and refit the battleships. The recovery effort was pretty remarkable.

[Snnipe 70E]

Could the japanese have followed up the Pearl Harbor raid with an invasion? As I understand it, General Short had almost a complete Army division on Oahue-but what about the other islands? Seems to me yamamote should have told Tojo to plan a limited invasion of the Hawaiain Islands. That would have kept the US Navy in San Diego for most of the war!

I read one of those alternative history books several years ago. In the book the invasion of the Islands started the next day. The six carriers and the main batle group continued and were accompanied by an landing group. After a 3 wave on December 7th. the carriers kept up a CAP to take out the US carriers and the battleships shelled the islands to finish the defences.

It left the US having to mount a counter attack from the west coast.

[mac_bolan00]

pearl harbor, coral sea and specially midway taught carrier boys one crucial lesson: at the break of dawn, make sure you put in the first strike. if you do, you're likely to win the battle before the day's over.

that was nagumo's decisive failure at midway. twas his fault, not careless codes, not poor operations planning, not over-confidence, not luck.

[Boyo Jim]

...The U.S. forces fought Midway with intelligence, vigor, and incredible bravery (read some of the accounts of the torpedo attacks, especially in Martin Caidin's (out of print) Rugged, Ragged Warriors. However, the overwhelming nature of the victory owed very much to luck.

I have a ragged copy of this excellent book somewhere on my shelves. It covers the Army Air Force during the first year or so of the war, when they were fighting with obsolete and inadequate... everything. There's also chapters on Singapore, the AVG and the Japanese assault on Burma.

I think I was most surprised to learn that the British had gotten a squadron of Spitfires to Singapore, and the British were certain they would now be safe from Japanese airstrikes. The Japanese in their Zeros shot them all down in just a couple of days.

Almost forgot, it has an excellent section on the Pearl Harbor attack, and the lesser known battles that took place in the following months in the Philippines.

Something I've read about the loss of American battleship was that it turned out to be a blessing in disguise. No one really understood it yet, but the battleship was a dinosaur and in the future would be almost useless for anything other than shore bombardment. Their loss forced the Navy to restructure their strategy and tactics around carriers, which were the only capital ships they had left, and it was what they should have been doing anyway.

[Bartman]

I read one of those alternative history books several years ago. In the book the invasion of the Islands started the next day. The six carriers and the main batle group continued and were accompanied by an landing group. After a 3 wave on December 7th. the carriers kept up a CAP to take out the US carriers and the battleships shelled the islands to finish the defences.

It left the US having to mount a counter attack from the west coast.

That would be a bit unlikely. Hawaii was a low priority target. The goal of attacking Pearl was to neutralize the US fleet so they Japanese could conquer the "Southern Resource Areas" (mostly the Dutch East Indies). It was simply a raid to secure the west flank from American action, while the real attacks were going on.

The Japanese had the ability to ship and supply by sea what? around 11 divisions total? Invading Oahu alone would require at least one division and more likely something closer to three divisions. So to take Hawaii the Japanese would have to delay or scratch the Malaya or Philippines invasions. Which means they can't take the Dutch East Indies. And as the whole point of the exercise was to secure the Dutch East Indies, taking Hawaii is worse than pointless. It is a distraction from the vital oil fields the whole war was started to gain.

Add in the fact that Nagumo was basically out of fuel by the end of the 7th, and the idea of an immediate invasion becomes even more impractical. The kind of logistics train Nagumo would need to keep station off of Hawaii was simply unavailable to the Japanese.

[Boyo Jim]

pearl harbor, coral sea and specially midway taught carrier boys one crucial lesson: at the break of dawn, make sure you put in the first strike. if you do, you're likely to win the battle before the day's over.

that was nagumo's decisive failure at midway. twas his fault, not careless codes, not poor operations planning, not over-confidence, not luck.

He got in the first strike, but against the wrong target -- Midway Island. The American carriers weren't expected in the area for at least another day or two. The Japanese had launched a diversionary attack against the Aleutian Islands, and they expected the American to race north to deal with it. They expected to have taken Midway before any significant American naval forces were in the neighborhood.

Because of the code breaking, the Americans just ignored the feint, and were waiting iat Midway in advance.

I've also read some speculation that if the Japanese had just sent all their forces to Midway instead of splitting them, there's a very good chance they would have won despite the American ambush. The Aleutian attack was supported by two large carriers and other substantial surface forces. It's an interesting question what would have happened had they had six carriers rather than four at Midway. The Americans had three, though I believe the American carriers could hold substantially larger numbers of planes than their Japanese counterparts.

[t-bonham@scc.net]

"Japs" is, uh, not the preferred nomenclature.True, but as this is not the Pit, we can't use the nomenclature that is most appropriate.

[Askance]

Nagumo did not know the whereabouts of the American carriers and overrode the suggestion that a second wave of bombers be launched.
There were two waves or strikes launched at Pearl. What was at issue was a third strike, which would have exhausted pretty much all aviation fuel and armament on the strike fleet and left it vulnerable to a counter-strike from land or carrier planes. In retrospect neither were likely but there was no way of the Japanese knowing that. Also the returning planes would have had to have landed at night.

IMO bombing the airfields and fuel tanks at Pearl would not (pace Nimitz and Yamamoto) have had any significant strategic effect. By this time the British were repairing airfields within hours of a Luftwaffe raid, and the last thing the US was short of was fuel. The submarine base and cryptanalysis unit there would have been far more damaging losses, but were not designated targets.

[Boyo Jim]

There were two waves or strikes launched at Pearl. What was at issue was a third strike, which would have exhausted pretty much all aviation fuel and armament on the strike fleet and left it vulnerable to a counter-strike from land or carrier planes. In retrospect neither were likely but there was no way of the Japanese knowing that. Also the returning planes would have had to have landed at night.

IMO bombing the airfields and fuel tanks at Pearl would not (pace Nimitz and Yamamoto) have had any significant strategic effect. By this time the British were repairing airfields within hours of a Luftwaffe raid, and the last thing the US was short of was fuel. The submarine base and cryptanalysis unit there would have been far more damaging losses, but were not designated targets.

The airfields weren't particularly important, but the fuel storage tanks were. IIRC, they had enough for the Navy's needs for several months of operations. It would have taken a long time to replace that stock one tanker at a time, especially when we were about to start losing tankers like crazy in both oceans over the next several months.

[Boyo Jim]

Yamato was also sunk by aircraft near the end of the war. It was to be the biggest Kamikaze mission ever. It and a small escort fleet left Japan for Okinawa with only enough fuel for a one way trip. They were to attack the invasion fleet and beach the ships on the island if they survived long enough.

Unfortunately for them, they were detected by reconnaissance planes long before they reached the landing beaches, and nearly the every ship was sunk in within a couple of hours.

[mac_bolan00]

I've also read some speculation that if the Japanese had just sent all their forces to Midway instead of splitting them, there's a very good chance they would have won despite the American ambush. The Aleutian attack was supported by two large carriers and other substantial surface forces. It's an interesting question what would have happened had they had six carriers rather than four at Midway. The Americans had three, though I believe the American carriers could hold substantially larger numbers of planes than their Japanese counterparts.
"shattered sword" they say is the best account on midway. i grew up with walter lord's "incredible victory" which was an excellent read but they say had a lot of inaccuracies.

precisely because they targeted midway island instead of looking for the carriers, that's what doomed them.

it's so tempting to compare midway with leyte gulf because of the similar scale and complexity.

on your scenario of focusing all forces on midway, it would have been a lot like leyte gulf-american strategy. here, the invasion/covering fleet (ala 7th) would have consisted of the transport and kondo's 2nd fleet but with a significant carrier defense force (2-4 escort carriers instead of just 1.) the main force (ala 3rd) would be yamamoto's battleship force plus nagumo's fleet carriers. the main force would shadow the second force and dash at the americam carriers once they tried to interdict kondo. the weakness here is not being able to get in the first strike.

midway was a mid-ocean battle while leyte was a dance around an entire archipelago. carriers for midway and battleships for leyte. at leyte, halsey made a scientific decision to use battleships because even with overwhleming superiority in carrier strength, his 1,200-plane carrier force might not stop 7 japanese battleships rushing in at once.

at midway, the americans got the first strike in. they won. at leyte, ozawa's decoy carriers got in the first strike and were able to sink a US escort carrier --to no avail.

at midway, yamamoto wanted to use battleships to destroy nimitz's remaining forces. he failed. at leyte, halsey wanted the missouri and new jersey to smash kurita. he also failed.

at midway, the japanese split up and employed their favorite decoy force strategem. it failed because the americans knew the real target. at leyte, they used two decoy forces and succeeded. but it wasn't enough to win the battle.

overall, i think the japanese strategy at midway, though overmatching themselves to much, was still feasible. THEY SHOULD HAVE GOTTEN IN THE FIRST STRIKE ON THOSE US CARRIERS.

[Boyo Jim]

They did not know the American carriers were there. They didn't expect them to be there. By the time they found them, it was too late, and the American strike force was already in the air and on it's way to the Japanese fleet.

So yes, they should have, but it's a virtual impossibility that they could have.

[mac_bolan00]

well, it points the forces' primary objectives. having to do two tasks is always a bummer. nagumo/yamamoto should have been carrier-hunting exclusively. they knew the destruction of the american carriers was the key element for victory. leave kondo to pulverize midway. nagumo let the american carriers get to him.

the japanese strategy of laying out a decoy force to know just where the enemy's main carrier force is gives them a 50-50 chance of laying first strike (but you tend to lose some of your own.) coral sea was successful in that respect. midway was a wash. they did it again successfully at guadalcanal at sta. cruz. they busted the enterprise (after previously torpedoing wasp,) leaving the americans with the hornet as the only working carrier west of hawaii.