Could fighters have at least partially replaced bombers in WWII Europe?

[cornflakes]

Related to the thread in GQ about strafing a locomotive.

If I remember my history correctly, the air war in Western Europe focused on long range strategic bombing. The RAF bombed at night, and the USAAF bombed during the day.

That said, P-38s and P-47s cost 40 percent of what a B-7 cost, and the US could buy almost five P-51s for the cost of a B-17. .50 caliber shells cost a fraction of what a 500 or 1,000 pound bomb cost, and strafing had a far better accuracy than the 7% success rate attributed to Allied bombing.

Given, there were plenty of targets that could only be destroyed by big bombs, and incendiary bombing consumed German resources and had a significant affect on morale. That said, could there have been an advantage to replacing some of the strategic bombers with fighters and attacking targets through large scale strafing raids? To some extent, it seems that this would have been more effective: the larger number of planes could overwhelm antiaircraft defenses; accuracy would be improved (though less damage might be inflicted), and more eyes in the air might mean a better chance of identifying the targets.

[Lumpy]

In the aftermath of WW1, a guy named Giulio Douhet proposed that land warfare was obsolete; the attacker would always be at a disadvantage against the defender- except in the air, where the roles would be reversed. The speed and freedom of movement in the air would make aerial attack virtually indefensible against. Douhet theorized that future wars would be defensive stalemates on the ground and that victory or defeat would almost entirely depend on which side could most efficiently reduce its foe to rubble from the air. In particular he popularized the idea of a "knockout blow" on the eve of war which could leave a country's capital a flaming ruin and it's leaders dead or disorganized. Strategic air power would also be the most effective way to wage chemical or even biological warfare; nuclear war, only without nukes one might say.

The United States and Britain (both incidentally being powers that had the widest separation from potential foes) were the countries where the adherents of "strategic" air power had the greatest prewar influence, and where long range (for the time) heavy four-engine bombers were produced. The adherents of strategic air power considered any other utilization of air power a distraction at best or a waste of vital resources at worst. It took the actual experience of WW2 to prove them wrong. Strategic bombers took staggering losses from enemy air defenses and were not terribly effective until the Axis air interceptors were beaten down by sheer attrition, and the bombers gave up "precision" bombing (which routinely dropped bombs kilometers off target) and used radar to target incendiary night raids with the goal of indiscriminately torching entire cities.

By the end of the war fighter-bombers were effective in carrying out "interdiction" attacks against such things as bridges and railways in support of ground campaigns, as well as direct tactical air support of troops: exactly the things that the "Air Power" bomber enthusiasts had always opposed. Had it not been for the invention of nuclear weapons, "strategic" bombing would have been a footnote in history.

[dropzone]

The first Mustangs were designed as fighter-bombers, to the point that they had dive brakes. I think it was a matter of cognitive dissonance on the part of the generals, who were convinced that heavy bombers were the only way to deliver lots of bombs. They got over it by Korea, when they realized that a Skyraider could carry as much tonnage as a WWII bomber.

[chacoguy]

Much smarter men, with better data, spent many sleepless nights coming up with the answer that they did. Billions of dollars were invested in their decision. This is now history; I believe they came up with the war-winning answer.

[dropzone]

But at what cost? I believe the OP is asking if it could've been done cheaper, in lives and treasure, if it had been done by fighter-bombers.

[chacoguy]

Fighter-bombers would have been useless at busting the dams on the Ruhr, Ploesti or burning down Dresden. I don't wish to create a hijack, but the guys that made the decisions and flew the planes, thought that they got it right. There's a good reason that the B-29 was built.

[RickJay]

The first Mustangs were designed as fighter-bombers, to the point that they had dive brakes. I think it was a matter of cognitive dissonance on the part of the generals, who were convinced that heavy bombers were the only way to deliver lots of bombs. They got over it by Korea, when they realized that a Skyraider could carry as much tonnage as a WWII bomber.
That doesn't go a long way towards explained why they commissioned the design and construction of the B-52, rather than sticking with Skyraiders.
Had a WWII fighter been able to carry the bomb load of a B-17 or a Lancaster, over the same distance, they would have used them. No such fighter existed in World War II (Skyraiders didn't come along until it was too late, and in any event carried nowhere close to the bomb load of the late war bombers.)

[Lumpy]

There's a good reason that the B-29 was built.Yes, it could fly higher than any interceptor the Japanese had. Had the B-29s faced a technologically comparable foe, something like the Grumman F8F Bearcat, it would have seen the 30% per mission casualties the bombers in Europe faced. Not to disparage heavy bombers- there's nothing like a big ol' truck for carrying lots of tonnage- but they require near-total air supremecy as a precondition of operating effectively.

[Dissonance]

The first Mustangs were designed as fighter-bombers, to the point that they had dive brakes. I think it was a matter of cognitive dissonance on the part of the generals, who were convinced that heavy bombers were the only way to deliver lots of bombs.Only the A-36 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_American_A-36_Apache) dive bomber variant of the P-51 had dive breaks. For real cognitive dissonance look to the Luftwaffe which required all bombers to be able to dive bomb, even though only the Ju-87 Stuka dive bomber ever operated that way. And I mean all bombers, the Do-17, He-111, Ju-88 and even the He-177 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinkel_He_177#Dive_bombing) had to be designed able to dive bomb.

[chacoguy]

Yes, it could fly higher than any interceptor the Japanese had. Had the B-29s faced a technologically comparable foe, something like the Grumman F8F Bearcat, it would have seen the 30% per mission casualties the bombers in Europe faced. Not to disparage heavy bombers- there's nothing like a big ol' truck for carrying lots of tonnage- but they require near-total air supremecy as a precondition of operating effectively.

Good point, if the Japanese had Phasers and Cloaking Devices, that would have REALLY tipped the balance. The Top Brass made their decisions on what information, technology, budgets and time-lines that they had available AND THEY WON. Ten men were lost every time a B-17 or a B-24 went down; it's arrogant and foolish to think that a bunch of messageboard folk could be wiser, in hindsight.

[Magiver]

Much smarter men, with better data, spent many sleepless nights coming up with the answer that they did. Billions of dollars were invested in their decision. This is now history; I believe they came up with the war-winning answer. this is my thought. The mix of aircraft was VERY specific. Nothing and I mean nothing went into production without a great deal of thought behind it. We had aircraft designed as fighter bombers and they were used effectively in that role.

Consider the P-61 which carried 6,400 lbs of bombs plus (4) 50 caliber guns and (4) 20 mm cannons. For a 2 engine aircraft it carried 3200 lbs per engine for 600 miles. Compare that to a B-17 which carried 8000 lbs of bombs for short range missions which is 2000 lbs of bombs per engine. the B-17 was a long range bomber so a great amount of effort was put into carrying a 4500 lb payload long range (800 miles).

On paper it seemed like the P-61 should have been the defacto bomber but when you need to travel 800 miles to deliver a payload then the metrics change considerably.

[cornflakes]

But at what cost? I believe the OP is asking if it could've been done cheaper, in lives and treasure, if it had been done by fighter-bombers.Yes, this is basically what I'm suggesting. Sorry for the drive-by posting; I'll join in tonight.

[Oakminster]

Strafing runs are dangerous. You'd lose aircraft to AA, and also to pilot error. Factor in the shorter range and reduced payload of fighters, and the decision to use bombers the way they did seems to be the most efficient use of resources.

[Bozuit]

I'd imagine one problem with using a lot more fighters would be lack of fighter pilots. Also surely it would make air defences need to be little more than armour on roofs.

[Little Nemo]

I'd imagine one problem with using a lot more fighters would be lack of fighter pilots. Also surely it would make air defences need to be little more than armour on roofs.I think this is an important point. Strafing runs are good against targets like a truck convoy moving down a road but it's not going to be very effective against a factory building. It's pretty easy to just dump a few feet of dirt up on the roof and around the walls that will stop any bullets from getting through. You need a few tons of explosives to knock out a target like that.

[RickJay]

this is my thought. The mix of aircraft was VERY specific. Nothing and I mean nothing went into production without a great deal of thought behind it. We had aircraft designed as fighter bombers and they were used effectively in that role.

Consider the P-61 which carried 6,400 lbs of bombs plus (4) 50 caliber guns and (4) 20 mm cannons. For a 2 engine aircraft it carried 3200 lbs per engine for 600 miles. Compare that to a B-17 which carried 8000 lbs of bombs for short range missions which is 2000 lbs of bombs per engine. the B-17 was a long range bomber so a great amount of effort was put into carrying a 4500 lb payload long range (800 miles).
It's worth noting that the B-17 was not designed at the same time as the P-61 and so naturally did not have the same capabilities, or is "pounds per engine" a meaningful comparison, for that matter.

First of all, the B-17 was a pre-war design, created in the 1930s and starting service in 1938. The P-61, by comparison, was not operational until late 1943, which inthe context of World War II is a long, long time in aircraft design.

Secondly, there was a lot more to the B-17 than bomb load; the aircraft was designed, redesigned, and retained in service for other reasons as well. It dedicated a lot of its design and weight to defensive armament, which as it turns out might not have been the best idea but that was the theory they were working with, and was (successfully) designed to be durable to an extent no fighter could possibly match.

[Muffin]

The Mosquito (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_Havilland_Mosquito) was a bomber/fighter.

[Lumpy]

Good point, if the Japanese had Phasers and Cloaking Devices, that would have REALLY tipped the balance.No need to be snarky; I DID say "comparable" technology. The Japanese had one of the best fighter planes in the world in 1940; the problem was that's what they still had five years later, while the US had vastly improved aircraft engines available. The Top Brass made their decisions on what information, technology, budgets and time-lines that they had available AND THEY WON. Ten men were lost every time a B-17 or a B-24 went down; it's arrogant and foolish to think that a bunch of messageboard folk could be wiser, in hindsight.They won against foes whom they had triple or more the manufacturing capacity. In anything like a closer match, the losses of the bomber commands would have gone down in history as a folly comparable to the human wave tactics of WW1. Even as late as the end of '44 the air generals were still refusing to reduce the number of defensive guns (and their crew) on the bombers, despite ample evidence that they helped so little the planes would be better off without them.

Remembering the spectacular successes of the bombers in 1945 is like remembering how well trench storming tactics worked in 1918, while forgetting what had happened before the enemy defenses had been worn down.

[Magiver]

It's worth noting that the B-17 was not designed at the same time as the P-61 and so naturally did not have the same capabilities, or is "pounds per engine" a meaningful comparison, for that matter.

First of all, the B-17 was a pre-war design, created in the 1930s and starting service in 1938. The P-61, by comparison, was not operational until late 1943, which inthe context of World War II is a long, long time in aircraft design.

Secondly, there was a lot more to the B-17 than bomb load; the aircraft was designed, redesigned, and retained in service for other reasons as well. It dedicated a lot of its design and weight to defensive armament, which as it turns out might not have been the best idea but that was the theory they were working with, and was (successfully) designed to be durable to an extent no fighter could possibly match. I chose the payload to engine reference because it's a rough indication of the efficiencies of the plane in terms of both cost/maintenance and payload delivery. If you apply the metric to the more advanced B-29 you get roughly 5000 lbs per engine over a much farther range. The cost of the B-29 was over 3 times that of a P-61.

I picked the P-61 because it represents the theoretical replacement of bombers by a fighter/bomber. If all that was necessary in war is to bomb stuff and poke holes in things this plane was probably the most cost effective of the lot.

But there's a small problem with using a one size fits all airplane. It's easily defeated with a specialized interceptor airplane. The success of virtually every war is to calculate a winning combination of assets and strategies before it starts and then improve both in real time.

[Morgenstern]

Besides destruction of property, mass bombing destroys the moral of the enemy. More so than a P-51 on a gun run would do. The idea is to destroy the enemy's will to fight. Bombers are great for that. Reinforced targets require large bombs to destroy, and bombs are heavy. Smaller fighters have to balance the need for fuel into the weight/range calculations, often leaving no capacity for bombs.

[Der Trihs]

Even as late as the end of '44 the air generals were still refusing to reduce the number of defensive guns (and their crew) on the bombers, despite ample evidence that they helped so little the planes would be better off without them.I recall reading of that; they slowed the planes down and made them more vulnerable, but the people in charge insisted the guns remain for morale reasons.

Besides destruction of property, mass bombing destroys the moral of the enemy. Well, that was the theory. It seldom if ever seems to actually work like that though until you escalate to the level of using nukes.

[Trinopus]

Besides destruction of property, mass bombing destroys the moral of the enemy. . . .

The good citizens of London might not agree with this.

[Magiver]

The good citizens of London might not agree with this. You know what's worse than hearing a buzzing noise and them a loud explosion? Not hearing any noise at all and a loud explosion.

Make no mistake, it was demoralizing to have your neighborhood blown to bits.

[Trinopus]

Demoralizing, certainly. But Morgenstern said it "destroys moral," and I don't think that's proven. Even the Japanese, suffering vastly more from bombing than the British or Germans, retained the spirit to resist.

Not until the advent of nuclear war has strategic bombing attained the power to win a war by itself, solely by dint of sheer destruction.

I first saw the debate over tactical vs. strategic air power in the Dunnigan/Pournelle letters, many years ago... I don't even recall who was on which side...

My opinion is that emphasis on tactical air power would have shortened the war, by moving the front lines forward faster.

Also: if you blow up a factory, well, most of the parts can be put back together fairly swiftly. The tools are still right there. But if you let the enemy build their tanks, put them on flatcars, and ship them all the way to the front lines...and then destroy them...you're making them do more work for no benefit.

[Little Nemo]

I think most people now realize that Londoners were demoralized by the bombings. So the Germans and Japanese citizens were demoralized by the bombings they went through.

What the bombing advocates missed was thinking demoralization would have some huge effect on the outcome of the war. It turned out that demoralized people kept doing their jobs pretty much the same way they had been.

[Bozuit]

Also: if you blow up a factory, well, most of the parts can be put back together fairly swiftly. The tools are still right there. But if you let the enemy build their tanks, put them on flatcars, and ship them all the way to the front lines...and then destroy them...you're making them do more work for no benefit.

But how many tanks can you take out of the war in one go if you bomb a factory compared to bombing tanks on or near the frontlines?

[Trinopus]

But how many tanks can you take out of the war in one go if you bomb a factory compared to bombing tanks on or near the frontlines?

Certainly, there is some economy of scale. Outside a factory, it is rather rare for the enemy to line their tanks up in one compact target zone. Tactical air power requires more, small-scale strikes; strategic power relies on single, high-density strikes.

But factories are fairly easy to get back in working order. Again, the tools, spare parts, power supply, everything is right there. Scattered about some, but right there.

If you scatter a tank around near the front lines, the enemy has to drag the parts back to a repair depot. Spare parts and tools are not normally found at the front lines.

Tactical air strikes are an indirect drain on the enemy's transport.

Also: strategic air strikes had a record of being expensive. A lot of bombers got shot down. Tactical air strikes are harder to defend against. The most obvious reason is that they don't penetrate deep into enemy territory, but hit right at the front lines, or close behind them. You don't give the enemy hundreds of extra miles of opportunity to shoot at you!

I'm certainly not saying that 100% of the air effort should have been redirected to tactical air power. But I do think that the actual apportionment of force was wasteful, and that tactical air power should have had much more support.

[Otara]

Im surprised the Mosquito took so long to be mentioned.

They made a pretty good case for being a better alternative to heavy bomber, from the Wiki entry above:

"They were also used as "nuisance" bombers, often dropping 4,000 lb (1,812 kg) "Cookies", in high-altitude, high speed raids that German night fighters were almost powerless to intercept."

"Post war, the RAF found that when finally applied to bombing, in terms of useful damage done, the Mosquito had proved 4.95 times cheaper than the Lancaster."

Otara

[Magiver]

Im surprised the Mosquito took so long to be mentioned.

They made a pretty good case for being a better alternative to heavy bomber, from the Wiki entry above:

"They were also used as "nuisance" bombers, often dropping 4,000 lb (1,812 kg) "Cookies", in high-altitude, high speed raids that German night fighters were almost powerless to intercept."

"Post war, the RAF found that when finally applied to bombing, in terms of useful damage done, the Mosquito had proved 4.95 times cheaper than the Lancaster."

Otara Except that high altitude night time bombing = throwing a dart blind folded. I've already made a case that it was cheaper to operate different aircraft but they simply didn't fulfill the task.

As an aside note. The P-61 I mentioned earlier was the first US aircraft specifically designed as a night time interceptor and was the first aircraft to be built from scratch to use radar. It was a scrappy bit of aircraft in it's day.

[Dissonance]

Tactical air strikes are an indirect drain on the enemy's transport.

Also: strategic air strikes had a record of being expensive. A lot of bombers got shot down. Tactical air strikes are harder to defend against. The most obvious reason is that they don't penetrate deep into enemy territory, but hit right at the front lines, or close behind them. You don't give the enemy hundreds of extra miles of opportunity to shoot at you!Tactical airstrikes were a direct drain on enemy transport and supply lines. Most tactical airstrikes weren't on the front lines or even particularly close to them; they were strikes against supply and transport targets behind enemy lines. Developing a doctrine for close air support and getting it to actually work didn't really happen until near the end of the war. Up until around mid to late 1944 the last thing Commonwealth or American ground troops wanted to see were Allied aircraft on attack runs; they were as likely to be bombed themselves as the enemy was.

Additionally tactical airstrikes could be very expensive as unlike high altitude strategic bombing low altitude strikes exposed them to a great deal more anti-aircraft fire from light guns that couldn't reach the altitude that strategic bombers operated at.

As an example of how just how costly tactical strikes could get, there's this (http://www.tarrif.net/wwii/guides/bof_timeline.htm) on the RAF tactical bombers during the fall of France. Admittedly not near the norm on loss rates, but as an example of how bad it could get, just from the first few days:
May 10, 1940
Daytime 32 British Battle bombers attack German columns in Luxembourg. 13 are shot down; all others are damaged.
May 11, 1940
Daytime 8 British Battles bombers attack German columns entering Luxembourg. 7 are shot down
May 12, 1940
Dawn Nine British Blenheim bombers attack German column on the Maastricht - Tongres road. Seven are shot down.
Dawn Five British Battle bombers attack bridges over the Albert Canal. They break one bridge, but four planes are shot down.
Morning 24 British Blenheim bombers attack bridges and roads in Maastricht. 10 bombers are shot down.
May 14, 1940
Morning 63 British Battle bombers and 8 Blenheim bombers raid German bridgeheads over the Meuse River. 40 planes are shot down.
May 17, 1940
Morning 12 British Blenheim bombers attack advancing German columns near Gembloux. 11 planes are shot down.

[Kobal2]

Also: if you blow up a factory, well, most of the parts can be put back together fairly swiftly. The tools are still right there. But if you let the enemy build their tanks, put them on flatcars, and ship them all the way to the front lines...and then destroy them...you're making them do more work for no benefit.

The problem is that, by and large, fighter-bombers flying CAP missions just weren't very good at blowing up tanks.

They were if you trust the pilots - which it should be noted scored a very impressive kill tally: by the end of the war, Allied fighter bombers on the Western front alone had, on paper, destroyed the entire German armoured contingent thrice, and more than a few claimed more kills with iron sighted machine guns and dumbfire 200lbs bomblets in one day than modern A-10 pilots can muster in one week using Maverick TV-guided antitank missiles and radar+IR-enhanced murderguns. They just don't train 'em the way they used to, huh ?

In the field of fact-based reality however, most of those "kills" either missed entirely, were barely winged, threw a track for about an hour's delay in their operations, were actually friendly fire and so forth. I think we can authoritatively assert that the entire Heer was not destroyed once, let alone thrice. As for .50 cals, those simply don't kill tanks (although they could do a number on half-tracks, particularly the open top kind the Germans used. Assuming the pilots could actually hit them zooming by at 100+ mph)

This also ignores the fact that dive-bombing or low altitude strafing Jabos give AAA operators a chubby, and the Germans were very diligent in putting up reinforced AAA towers everywhere they went, to say nothing of the large numbers of Flakvierling tanks they fielded (those were just as good at cutting infantry to ribbons, so...)

Finally, fighter bombers didn't exactly boast the same operational range and fuel efficiency as flying fortresses. You try firebombing Tokyo with P-51s :D

[Mk VII]

Strafing causes negligible damage, except to people, who are very replaceable, and is very costly in terms of aircraft lost.
Precision bombing with Mosquitos using OBOE was, in retrospect, probably the most cost-effective, though it was surprising OBOE remained as unjammed for as long as it did, and of course the guidance system could only handle one aircraft at a time.

[lisiate]

For an accessible and very good overview of this question the OP should read Stephen Budiansky's Airpower (http://www.amazon.com/Air-Power-Machines-Ideas-Revolutionized/dp/014303474X/ref=sr_1_4?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1329681660&sr=1-4). Despite the subtitle, it tracks the idea of Airpower from before the Wright brothers up until now.

Lumpy's post basically summarises Budiansky's conclusions about WWII.

[Bozuit]

Certainly, there is some economy of scale. Outside a factory, it is rather rare for the enemy to line their tanks up in one compact target zone. Tactical air power requires more, small-scale strikes; strategic power relies on single, high-density strikes.

But factories are fairly easy to get back in working order. Again, the tools, spare parts, power supply, everything is right there. Scattered about some, but right there.

I'm not entirely convinced a factory can be put back together that easily. Surely there are plenty of things, especially machinery and precision tools, that cannot simply be put back together like Lego. The buildings certainly can't.

[Baron Greenback]

I'm not entirely convinced a factory can be put back together that easily. Surely there are plenty of things, especially machinery and precision tools, that cannot simply be put back together like Lego. The buildings certainly can't.

The factory workers are a more obvious target.

[DeptfordX]

I first saw the debate over tactical vs. strategic air power in the Dunnigan/Pournelle letters, many years ago... I don't even recall who was on which side...



That sounds interesting. A quick google didn't come up with much. Do you know where i can find more about this?

[Trinopus]

That sounds interesting. A quick google didn't come up with much. Do you know where i can find more about this?

I searched also, and couldn't find it. It was MANY years ago, in a series of letters between Jerry Pournelle (I believe this was before he was a published science fiction author) and James Dunnigan (it was very early in his career as a military boardgame designer.)

If memory serves, the letters were in the Avalon Hill General, a board wargaming magazine. One of the two men took an extreme view in favor of tactical air power, claiming that an emphasis on it would have shortened the war by a year(!) The other held a more traditional view, favoring the historical mix of strategic and tactical air power. (Damn my eyes, I wish I could remember which was which!) Worse yet, the letters were heavily abbreviated in editing, and so lost a lot of cohesion.

Lum! I know! Gimme a couple days, and I'll write Pournelle and ask him!

[lisiate]

Is this (http://boardgamegeek.com/wiki/page/The_GENERAL_Vol.9,No.2)it?

•The Avalon Hill Philosophy - Part 34: Origins of World War II GOOD GAME, BAD HISTORY??? by J.E. Pournelle (with editorial reply by Jim Dunnigan)

[Trinopus]

Is this (http://boardgamegeek.com/wiki/page/The_GENERAL_Vol.9,No.2)it?

Dang! I'm impressed! (I LOVE THE INFORMATION AGE!!!!)

However, no, not quite: that was a different exchange (I believe; God, it was a long time ago) where they were arguing about the Origin of WWII, in the context of the "Diplomacy" boardgame of that title. They differed about appeasement, Anschluss, the Finnish/USSR "Winter War," and other things.

(The game is an interesting one, and kind of fun. The "teachable lesson" is, essentially, that if all the other countries worked together to contain the Nazis, they could have prevented the war. But since every country was busy pursuing their own national goals, and failed to unite in a meaningful way, Hitler pretty much got what he wanted. I've played the game, and, if it has any meaningful accuracy at all, then, yes, the war could have been averted. But...does the game have any real historical value? Pournelle and Dunnigan disagreed on that!)

[Really Not All That Bright]

The answer is much more obvious than anything brought up so far, though people have hinted at it: the Allies didn't have any fighters capable of reaching German industrial centers until the Mustang arrived late in the war.

The Hurricane, Spitfire and Airacobra, et al. could only escort bombers about halfway to Berlin, let alone fly there and back with a bomb load.

[Kobal2]

(The game is an interesting one, and kind of fun. The "teachable lesson" is, essentially, that if all the other countries worked together to contain the Nazis, they could have prevented the war. But since every country was busy pursuing their own national goals, and failed to unite in a meaningful way, Hitler pretty much got what he wanted. I've played the game, and, if it has any meaningful accuracy at all, then, yes, the war could have been averted. But...does the game have any real historical value? Pournelle and Dunnigan disagreed on that!)

This is the kind of prisonner's dilemma that you see a lot in multiplayer strategy games - each player wants to see the top dog or most aggressive player taken down a peg, but each player also wants someone else to do the heavy lifting the better to swoop in later and reap all of the rewards while spending none of the effort (or at least want to see every neighbour busy spending resources like crazy in their wars against the threats while themselves build up in peace and prosperity)
It never ceases to be infuriating.

[tomndebb]

it's arrogant and foolish to think that a bunch of messageboard folk could be wiser, in hindsight.Not really. The point is that we have hindsight. No one has posted that the air commands were fools; we are simply considering whether a different set of tactics would have worked better. (And there are many stupid decisions that the air commands did make--often documented in reports such as the Strategic Bombing Survey, so it is not as though there was no internal criticism of all the choices made.)

They got over it by Korea, when they realized that a Skyraider could carry as much tonnage as a WWII bomber.B-29s flew missions on 1076 days of the 1106 day Korean War. In fact, it was the one combat plane that was used throughout the entire war.

As an example of how just how costly tactical strikes could get, there's this (http://www.tarrif.net/wwii/guides/bof_timeline.htm) on the RAF tactical bombers during the fall of France. Admittedly not near the norm on loss rates, but as an example of how bad it could get, just from the first few days:On the other hand, these figures are also a bit misleading in that the Fairey Battle was already obsolete at the time and Blenheims were never really intended for that sort of operation. In addition, the Luftwaffe had the sort of control of the air that the Allies established later and were able to attack the bombers without serious (read "any") threat from accompanying British fighters.

In contrast, later in the war a Thunderbolt or a Typhoon raid would often have its own CAP and those planes could each jettison a bomb load and make a fairly effect defense as a fighter if jumped.

[Bridget Burke]

The answer is much more obvious than anything brought up so far, though people have hinted at it: the Allies didn't have any fighters capable of reaching German industrial centers until the Mustang arrived late in the war.

The Hurricane, Spitfire and Airacobra, et al. could only escort bombers about halfway to Berlin, let alone fly there and back with a bomb load.

Thank you. That's the first thing that came to my mind. The bombers could go to places fighters couldn't reach--for a long time. And the bomber crews paid the price....

[Dissonance]

On the other hand, these figures are also a bit misleading in that the Fairey Battle was already obsolete at the time and Blenheims were never really intended for that sort of operation. In addition, the Luftwaffe had the sort of control of the air that the Allies established later and were able to attack the bombers without serious (read "any") threat from accompanying British fighters.Perhaps I should have said not anywhere near the norm on loss rates rather than not near the norm on loss rates; it was intended as a counterpoint to the idea that strategic bombing suffered higher losses and tactical bombing was harder to defend against because they spend less time over hostile territory. Another example would be the Ju-87 in the Battle of Britain where loss rates got so bad that they were withdrawn from action after August having lost 20% of their numbers. Again, not the norm on losses but an example of tactical bombing not suffering fewer losses and being easier to defend against than strategic bombing.

[Trinopus]

FWIW, I asked Jerry Pournelle, and he remembered the letters. His view is (still) that attention to tactical air -- not necessarily close support, but zone interdiction and isolation -- might have shortened the war. Heavy bombing ravaged Europe, but produced fewer strategic benefits than anticipated.

[slowlearner]

FWIW, I asked Jerry Pournelle, and he remembered the letters. His view is (still) that attention to tactical air -- not necessarily close support, but zone interdiction and isolation -- might have shortened the war. Heavy bombing ravaged Europe, but produced fewer strategic benefits than anticipated.

one of the few benefits was it forced speer to have skilled factory labor work a second shift, having to pay OT no doubt was bad for the german economy

[dropzone]

One of the two men took an extreme view in favor of tactical air power, claiming that an emphasis on it would have shortened the war by a year(!) The other held a more traditional view, favoring the historical mix of strategic and tactical air powerThe important word here is "mix." As suggested in the OP. I don't think any of us are suggesting that the heavies could be completely eliminated.

[robinson]

I understand that led to the addition of bombs to fighters, so that the defenders could no longer simply ignore fighter raids.

[Kobal2]

Another example would be the Ju-87 in the Battle of Britain where loss rates got so bad that they were withdrawn from action after August having lost 20% of their numbers. Again, not the norm on losses but an example of tactical bombing not suffering fewer losses and being easier to defend against than strategic bombing.

To be fair the Ju-87, as iconic as its sirens might have become, was something of a piece of shit. It could dive and...um...that is... it could also...well it dived real well !

[lisiate]

Well the sirens were really good at panicking refugees clogging the roads as well. But yeah, the Stuka was a bit of a dog really.

[Sailboat]

Demoralizing, certainly. But Morgenstern said it "destroys moral," and I don't think that's proven. Even the Japanese, suffering vastly more from bombing than the British or Germans, retained the spirit to resist

Concur -- practically everything I've read on strategic bombing points out that it almost always hardened the "will to resist" among civilian populations bombed. The idea that it would destroy morale seems to have been incorrect, at the very least, and may have been chauvinistic in origin -- British Bomber Command believed that while strategic bombing had been unable to break British morale, concentrating Britain's own efforts on German factory workers would "excite the laboring classes into rebellion against the upper classes of society" -- a an argument rooted in class and national bias.

Also: if you blow up a factory, well, most of the parts can be put back together fairly swiftly. The tools are still right there.

Historian John Keegan noted that it proved remarkably difficult to destroy steel machinery and tooling with high explosives.

[robinson]

I want to underline the points made by Muffin and McGyver. It wasn't just fighter vs. heavy bomber. The Mosquito was designed to be a fast twin-engined bomber and carried a crew of 2 and no defensive armament. It was made of wood and was constructed in furniture factories, so from a strategic materials and resources standpoint, it was a "gimme" for the Brits. Almost 8,000 were made, and they continued in use after WWII. It was used in a wide variety of roles, including night fighter, pathfinder and precision attack (including several attacks on Gestapo regional headquarters). On occasion, the same plane with different crews dropped a 4000 lb bomb on Berlin twice in the same day.

The initial state of the bombing art was unbelievably crude, and the Brits were hampered by preconceived notions. The pilots didn't know where they were (night bombing and lousy weather) and couldn't even talk to each other (no VHF radio). It wasn't until late 1942 that the Brits began to achieve the accuracies demonstrated by the Germans during the blitz (at least 10% of bombs on target). It wasn't a matter of using the best single type of plane as much as working out effective technique combining several plane types on the same mission. Mosquitos and Mustangs (yes, they had some in 1942) both played notable pathfinder roles, often on the same mission. The Mosquitos could carry and use radio navigation equipment that the Mustangs couldn't (2nd man was a navigator). The turbocharged Mustangs could get above the weather. The heavies, of course, carried the weight.

[Really Not All That Bright]

The Mustang was supercharged, not turbocharged.

[swampspruce]

I think there are some assumptions here that are flawed:
1) Even if you had the fighter bombers available to precision bomb the targets who would fly them all? BCATP (http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/history/secondWar/bcatp/page5)
Keep in mind that although the pilot training was 10 to 16 weeks that was a completely green pilot who still had to train up on whatever they ended up on. Further, while most people can use the business end of a gun, not too many have the diverse skill sets to keep an airplane in the air while others are doing thier best to shoot it down....
2) As others have noted, the really capable fighter bombers with legs were developed late in the war so existing tech in the period would limit your numbers. So, if you can't be close, drop lots. To drop lots, use bomb trucks with 4 engines. Again, existing technology....
3) Bombing the factory not only is an inconvenience, but destroys any product/experienced personnel about to go to the line or run your next rebuilt factory. The PITA factor of constantly rebuilding your factories is a major contributing factor that drove the Germans and Japanese to lose. Having the unhindered might of the American industrial complex able to put out massive amounts of firepower with no interference says it all.

[Cicero]

Bombing factories forced workers- some skilled, some not so much, to get into bunkers. Molten steel cooled- blah blah blah. Also the fire bombing of Dresden or Tokyo killed several tens of thousands of people. You don't go into the nearest labour exchange and replace them on the spot, especially if a lot of the population is away in the armed forces.

The effective fighter bombers were ony available later in the War. Even planes like the Hudson were little more than converted mail planes, and the fighter bombers had less capacity, and very little range.

One point I believe is this- the fighter bombers- and dive bombers such as Stukas were designed for a tactical war, not a strategic war. When they tried to be employed in such a capacity they were found out.

[Mekhazzio]

Well the sirens were really good at panicking refugees clogging the roads as well. But yeah, the Stuka was a bit of a dog really.That's rather the whole point, though. When you have an aircraft built from the ground up to be really good at dive-bombing, what you get is an aircraft that's not very good at much of anything else...and the opposite is equally true.

The entire "fighter-bomber" term was largely a marketing gimmick up until about the 70s. All WW2-era aircraft labeled as such were designed either as fighters, or as bombers, and the fact that they could theoretically dabble in the other field didn't make them good at it. A light bomber with some forward facing guns isn't a serious threat to anything but transport aircraft, and similarly, a P-51 with a tiny bomb or two strapped on doesn't have anything like the accuracy or throw weight of a real tactical bomber.

The extra versatility is valuable, since you get some opportunistic air to ground use out of the patrol or escort that you were sending anyway, but it's a ridiculous idea that fighters, in any quantity, could put bombers out of a job, for either tactical or strategic bombing, up until the development of precision guided weaponry.

[Trinopus]

Well...what if, in 1943, someone in the U.S. got the idea, "Let's build a bunch of planes specifically designed for close ground support" -- moving artillery platforms -- and so designed, from the drawing pad up, tactical bombers? A bunch of the money spent on big bombers was spent on these guys instead.

So it turns into two questions: one: did the technology of the time permit the design of really effective tactical support aircraft, either tank-busters or railroad smashers, or anti-artillery strikers, or enemy command tent strafers, or whatnot...

and, two: if that kind of thing had been emphasized and deployed and really worked, would it have shortened the war, by moving the front lines forward more swiftly?

My opinion is yes to both... But opinions are like armpits...

[Mekhazzio]

You can answer that what-if by delving into the history of the Eastern Front. That was, in a nutshell, the Soviet approach. They largely ignored strategic bombing and sank massive resources into producing tactical attack aircraft instead. They produced more Il-2s than anything else and certainly thought highly of them, but I don't think the results really bear out the idea that it was a (no pun intended) revolutionary approach.

The performance was about as you'd expect: very useful against supply lines and soft targets, but of limited effectiveness against anything hardened, and extremely vulnerable to fighters and air defense. No doubt that the outcome would have been more dramatic had they been able to obtain air superiority over the Luftwaffe, but that not being the case, it's hard to say that the focus on attack aircraft gave them much, if any, of an edge in the strategic sense.

[Dissonance]

Well...what if, in 1943, someone in the U.S. got the idea, "Let's build a bunch of planes specifically designed for close ground support" -- moving artillery platforms -- and so designed, from the drawing pad up, tactical bombers? A bunch of the money spent on big bombers was spent on these guys instead.They already did, and long before 1943. There was the A-36 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_American_A-36_Apache) Apache dive bomber, B-25 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_American_B-25_Mitchell) Mitchell, B-26 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martin_B-26_Marauder) Marauder, and A-20 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Douglas_A-20_Havoc) Havoc tactical bombers.

So it turns into two questions: one: did the technology of the time permit the design of really effective tactical support aircraft, either tank-busters or railroad smashers, or anti-artillery strikers, or enemy command tent strafers, or whatnot...

and, two: if that kind of thing had been emphasized and deployed and really worked, would it have shortened the war, by moving the front lines forward more swiftly?They were emphasized and deployed and worked as well as things went, but as I noted earlier using them at the front lines in close air support was as dangerous to friendlies as enemies for most of the war; it wasn't until very late in the war that effective doctrine for close air support was developed. Most tactical bombing wasn't altogether that different from strategic bombing aside from the targets being closer to the front lines. Interdiction targets could include bridges, railroads, and towns unfortunate enough to be road hubs.

Post-war analysis found that rocket attacks on tanks were far less effective than imagined at the time; but the technology certainly existed to make effective tactical bombers. For example the B-25G, B-25H and B-25J had the nose modified for strafing as can be seen here (http://www.google.com/imgres?q=b-25h+blister&hl=en&biw=1613&bih=880&tbm=isch&tbnid=xqZgu7ADAf8W4M:&imgrefurl=http://www.vectorsite.net/avb25.html&docid=5L_DDCItyzTPqM&imgurl=http://www.vectorsite.net/avb25_09.jpg&w=502&h=335&ei=r75PT9HONa7F0AGKkIXRDQ&zoom=1) and here (http://www.google.com/imgres?q=b-25h+blister&hl=en&biw=1613&bih=880&tbm=isch&tbnid=0iis7aadsGdpPM:&imgrefurl=http://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail.asp%3Faircraft_id%3D81&docid=KTezYcr9jTzclM&imgurl=http://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/imgs/northamerican-b25-mitchell_2.jpg&w=800&h=536&ei=r75PT9HONa7F0AGKkIXRDQ&zoom=1); the G and H had 10 forward firing .50 machine guns and a 75mm cannon, the J model did away with the 75mm cannon which was of questionable practical use allowing 14 .50 machine guns for forward firing.

[John DiFool]

The performance was about as you'd expect: very useful against supply lines and soft targets, but of limited effectiveness against anything hardened, and extremely vulnerable to fighters and air defense. No doubt that the outcome would have been more dramatic had they been able to obtain air superiority over the Luftwaffe, but that not being the case, it's hard to say that the focus on attack aircraft gave them much, if any, of an edge in the strategic sense.

[Underlining mine]

Hanh? By the end of the war the Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front was pretty much an afterthought; while the Germans did have better pilots and arguably better fighters (maybe), they were outnumbered pretty much from c. fall '41 to the end. I'd say they lost air superiority specifically, as a whole, sometime in late '42.

[Lumpy]

I notice that even though the US had 20mm and 37mm aircraft guns, they seemed to prefer the .50 caliber; why is this, when you'd think the heavier calibers would be more effective ground attack guns?

[Kobal2]

I notice that even though the US had 20mm and 37mm aircraft guns, they seemed to prefer the .50 caliber; why is this, when you'd think the heavier calibers would be more effective ground attack guns?

At a guess: more ammo by weight. It's better to be able to shoot for 3 minutes than for 1, even if the shots that manage to hit their targets don't do as much damage.

Also cheaper/easier to manufacture both the gun and the ammo in bulk, since they were the exact same .50 cals carried by infantry or mounted on pretty much anything with wheels and/or treads. Makes logistics easier, too: even if you ship the wrong ammo crates to the wrong location, no problem, somebody can use that !

[OttoDaFe]

I notice that even though the US had 20mm and 37mm aircraft guns, they seemed to prefer the .50 caliber; why is this, when you'd think the heavier calibers would be more effective ground attack guns?When it came to airborne weaponry, the US armed services tended to evaluate in terms of air-to-air combat rather than air-to-ground. For that purpose, the .50 was judged to be the right balance between projectile weight and rate of fire.

IIRC, some aircraft were fitted with 20mm cannon later in the war (after the opposing air forces were beaten down sufficiently that ground attack became more practical). But that's as large as they got. My impression is that the USAAF's experience with the Aircobra (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell_P-39_Airacobra) pretty much soured them on anything bigger.

[Dissonance]

The P-38 had a single 20mm cannon and the P-61 Black Widow had 4. The P-61 was designed as a night fighter, so by definition it would be shooting at bombers in its primary role where the greater punch of the 20mm would be the most useful. One other minor advantage of 6 or 8 .50 machine guns over half that number of 20mm cannons is jamming. When a round misfires, the pilot of the fighter obviously can't just walk out onto the wing and clear the round. AFAIK neither was more prone to jamming, but the loss of one 20mm to jamming was a greater loss of total firepower than the loss of one .50.

[Mekhazzio]

Hanh? By the end of the war the Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front was pretty much an afterthought; while the Germans did have better pilots and arguably better fighters (maybe), they were outnumbered pretty much from c. fall '41 to the end. I'd say they lost air superiority specifically, as a whole, sometime in late '42.There's a big gap between one side losing air supremacy and the other gaining it. By the time the Luftwaffe was completely rolled up, the Eastern Front had already been decided on the ground, so we never got to see the impact that a heavy tactical air presence could make in a pitched battle of the era. The Il-2's never got to act with strategic impunity until well after the point that it still mattered.I notice that even though the US had 20mm and 37mm aircraft guns, they seemed to prefer the .50 caliber; why is this, when you'd think the heavier calibers would be more effective ground attack guns?This is something of a holy war still being argued to this day. There were a lot of stated reasons: a greater rate of fire and quantity of projectiles helped compensate for the poor aim of the typical inexperienced pilot, no need for heavier weapons due to little enemy heavy bomber presence, easier supply and standardization with a tried and tested weapon, you name it. Both arms of US air power were in love with the .50 and confident in that selection...but nobody else in the world agreed with them. Every other air force was continually moving towards heavier and/or more numerous cannon over the course of the war, even the RAF, which was operating exactly the same kind of combat.

A great example of the difference in opinion is the case of the P-39: the only major American fighter based around a heavy cannon. It was not well-loved by US forces, considered a dog due to its performance at high altitude or high speed and even its armament was not appreciated - the different weapon trajectories was considered a weakness! The Soviets, however, received rather a lot of P-39s through the lend-lease program, and preferred them greatly over any other American design, as the only one that had maneuverability and firepower. They loved the things and used them right up through the end of the war.

[casdave]

To put the German navy build up into a more modern context.

Imagine if France decided to build a fleet of vessels designed to do nothing but sink aircraft carriers.
Who is likely to become alarmed at a policy that is solely aimed against them, and no-one else?

Germany had no real use for a navy, so the construction of a powerful fleet had only one implication.

[Sailboat]

and similarly, a P-51 with a tiny bomb or two strapped on doesn't have anything like the accuracy or throw weight of a real tactical bomber.

While that's true, some aircraft came closer than others. The P-47 Thunderbolt could carry two 500-pound bombs and deliver them with some semblance of what passed for accuracy in the day, which approaches a strategically useful payload.

In Hell Hawks (http://www.amazon.com/Hell-Hawks-American-Savaged-Wehrmacht/dp/0760329184), a mission is described in which 36 P-47s were sent against a German railroad bridge. They swooped in at almost 400 miles an hour and each one dropped two 500-pounders. Sure, a lot of them missed outright; but tactical dive-bombing was accurate enough that seventy-two 500-pounders obliterated the bridge.

The P-47 did such good work in the ground-attack role that it's often forgotten that it had excellent performance at high altitudes (due to the huge engine, the "paddle" style improved prop, and the massive supercharger). Counterintuitively, at extreme altitudes, it's been described as the most maneuverable fighter of the war (possibly because its powerplant continued to perform while others gasped, and of course in thin air the fat jug shape was less of a hindrance? I don't know the technical reasoning).

[casdave]

....bugger, wrong thread

[CannyDan]

In Hell Hawks (http://www.amazon.com/Hell-Hawks-American-Savaged-Wehrmacht/dp/0760329184), a mission is described in which 36 P-47s were sent against a German railroad bridge. They swooped in at almost 400 miles an hour and each one dropped two 500-pounders. Sure, a lot of them missed outright; but tactical dive-bombing was accurate enough that seventy-two 500-pounders obliterated the bridge.


Sorry, not to be argumentative, I'm just confused. The entire payload of the mission was 72 bombs, two per plane. And "a lot of them missed outright". So how many bombs on target did it take to actually obliterate the bridge? I'm thinking not so many.

I think the accuracy of tactical dive bombing might be more fairly judged by a comparison of the number actually needed to effect destruction versus the number thrown in the bridge's general direction.

[Sailboat]

Sorry, not to be argumentative, I'm just confused. The entire payload of the mission was 72 bombs, two per plane. And "a lot of them missed outright". So how many bombs on target did it take to actually obliterate the bridge? I'm thinking not so many.

I think the accuracy of tactical dive bombing might be more fairly judged by a comparison of the number actually needed to effect destruction versus the number thrown in the bridge's general direction.

I don't follow what you're asking here.

I wasn't making any attempt to analyze the accuracy of dive bombing -- I take it s a given, from everything I've ever read.

"Lots of bombs missed," but the target was hit == highly accurate for the day and age (a typical high-level bombing mission result was "No bomb fell within 5 miles of the target.")

My point was mostly that the use of 36 aircrew, 36 engines, and 72 bombs to take out a strategic target was highly efficient compared to a typical 4-engine-bomber strategic raid...and thus there's some grounds for the OP's argument.

[Lumpy]

Low-flying aircraft take more AA fire and so have to be very robustly survivable against damage. With that and carrying specialized ground-attack weapons means that fighter-bombers and ground attack aircraft still suffer from the weakness that they are at a disadvantage against dedicated air-superiority fighters. So you still need air superiority or at least very good escorts. It's sort of like how dragoons were effective against foot troops but outclassed by true cavalry.

[CannyDan]

Sailboat, thanks, I understand your point now and cannot disagree.

[Mekhazzio]

"Lots of bombs missed," but the target was hit == highly accurate for the day and age (a typical high-level bombing mission result was "No bomb fell within 5 miles of the target.")

My point was mostly that the use of 36 aircrew, 36 engines, and 72 bombs to take out a strategic target was highly efficient compared to a typical 4-engine-bomber strategic raid...and thus there's some grounds for the OP's argument.That's not comparing apples to apples, though.

It goes without saying that a low diving attack will net greater accuracy than a high altitude lob. The reason that strategic raids used the high altitude profile was because it was the least costly way to attack very heavily defended targets. A low altitude attack against heavy air defense, even with faster, smaller aircraft, invariably resulted in ruinous attrition. The Germans, Russians and Japanese all took heavy losses in their tactical attack wings learning that lesson.

If you're going for a poorly defended target, however, a heavy bomber on a low profile is just as capable of accurately delivering a much larger payload. The RAF did a fair bit of use of medium and heavy bombers in low-altitude roles, and chalked up quite a few successes with only a handful of bombers per target.

[dropzone]

Low-flying aircraft take more AA fire and so have to be very robustly survivable against damage. With that and carrying specialized ground-attack weapons means that fighter-bombers and ground attack aircraft still suffer from the weakness that they are at a disadvantage against dedicated air-superiority fighters. So you still need air superiority or at least very good escorts. It's sort of like how dragoons were effective against foot troops but outclassed by true cavalry.Tell the P-47 jockeys they and their mounts weren't equal to, or better than, their opponents.

[Sailboat]

Low-flying aircraft take more AA fire and so have to be very robustly survivable against damage. With that and carrying specialized ground-attack weapons means that fighter-bombers and ground attack aircraft still suffer from the weakness that they are at a disadvantage against dedicated air-superiority fighters. So you still need air superiority or at least very good escorts.

Tell the P-47 jockeys they and their mounts weren't equal to, or better than, their opponents.

Yeah, the Thunderbolt was a first-rate air-superiority aircraft when properly used.