Should Jimmy Doolittle have Bombed the Imperial Palace in Tokyo?

[Crane]

Ascenray,

Not expressing a wish at all - simply exploring an alternative path of history.

Crane

[Marley23]

Originally Posted by Crane

Marley,

I used it appropriately in it's historical context. It is the least offensive of contemporary terms. I can give you a list if you wish.

I have a better idea: skip the contemporary terms (i.e. slurs) in favor of terms that don't have that kind of ugly baggage. I got the sense you were probably trying to use contemporary language rather than expressing your own view of the Japanese, but that was not completely clear. (I felt DrFidelius's "Kraut" comment was more obviously rhetorical.) That's why I gave you a mod note instead of an official warning. In the future, don't do it.

[Crane]

OK - however, it's rather non-academic to discuss the time without it's contemporary language. ie, Discussing 'The "Japanese persons" attack on Pearl Harbor' lacks the emotion of the time. An emotion that is vital to understanding the America of 1942.

Crane

[Boyo Jim]

Originally Posted by Crane

Ascenray,

Not expressing a wish at all - simply exploring an alternative path of history.

Crane

Nothing in your OP or subsequent posts supports this. If you were interested in exploring an alternate history, you would invite people to speculate about what might have happened if the emperor was killed in the raid, which which might have resulted in responses suggesting the war would have been prolonged rather than shortened. Instead, here you are claiming the American leadership made a mistake which prolonged the war, and you've done nothing but dismiss any disagreement with your predetermined conclusion.

You have ignored my posts showing that the mission was planned as a night raid (making precision bombing impossible), that the Japanese were already building shelters. You have ignored other's comments that the Japanese high command essentially felt the same way as the Americans did -- if the emperor were removed there would be a higher barrier to peace, not a lower one.

[Boyo Jim]

Originally Posted by Crane

OK - however, it's rather non-academic to discuss the time without it's contemporary language. ie, Discussing 'The "Japanese persons" attack on Pearl Harbor' lacks the emotion of the time. An emotion that is vital to understanding the America of 1942.

Crane

Wow, what a load of bullshit this is! An academic would define the word "Jap" as a common slur used by Americans against the Japanese at the time, if trying to make a point about emotions during a time of war. An academic would never simply use the term as a routine word in a narrative.

[Crane]

Boyo,

I haven't ignored the posts, I simply have not yet responded.

For the sake of argument, I will take the position that we should have bombed the palace and will respond shortly.

Crane

[Marley23]

Originally Posted by Crane

OK - however, it's rather non-academic to discuss the time without it's contemporary language. ie, Discussing 'The "Japanese persons" attack on Pearl Harbor' lacks the emotion of the time. An emotion that is vital to understanding the America of 1942.

That's all well and good, but this is a message board, not an academic paper or a journal, and you're not quoting from a primary source. Nobody's asking you to say anything ridiculous like "The Japanese persons." "The Japanese" is fine. "Japs" is not because at the time it quickly became a slur against both Japanese citizens and Japanese- or Asian-Americans, and it's still recognized that way. You don't need to use the slurs of the time to discuss the emotions people felt, and you can certainly make it clear that Americans were very angry at Japan without using language that can leave a reader with the impression that you might share those views. OK? I don't want to take this discussion off-track.

[Crane]

OK-Thanks.

Crane

[Morgenstern]

Originally Posted by Boyo Jim

I very much doubt the US had any way of knowing whether the emperor was even residing at the palace at the time of the raid. Even if he was there, there surely would have been a sturdy bomb shelter they could have shoved him into in very short order. The odds would be astronomically against killing him.

But one question this raises to me -- if the raid had killed him, would (could) they just cover it up? I've read all these stories that the vast majority of Japanese people never saw his face or even heard his voice until his surrender speech. I would think the US would know the truth in relatively short order through code breaking, but how long would it be until the Japanese people knew?

This is probably quite accurate. Remember, after the Nagasaki bomb, the military was still not willing to surrender. It was the Emperor who made that decision, and shortly thereafter, there was a small, unsuccessful military uprising to take control of the government and continue the war. IIRC, a condition for the unconditional surrender was that the Emperor remain, happily residing in his palace.

[Dissonance]

Originally Posted by Boyo Jim

Wow, what a load of bullshit this is! An academic would define the word "Jap" as a common slur used by Americans against the Japanese at the time, if trying to make a point about emotions during a time of war. An academic would never simply use the term as a routine word in a narrative.

Absolutely true today and for some time now. Something I found interesting in Samuel Eliot Morrison's 15 volume History of United States Naval Operations in World War II was his occasional use of the word Jap or Japs rather than Japanese in early volumes and its disappearance by later ones, except when quoting someone's words during the war of course. He had personally served in operations in the Pacific during the war, and the 15 volumes were written from 1947-62.

[Crane]

"Japan's Meiji Constitution of 1889 defined the emperor as "sacred and inviolable" and placed him at the pinnacle of power: all legislative, executive, and judicial power. The Emperor was also the supreme military commander..." (Racing the Enemy Tsuyoshi Hasegawa) The Kokutai system defined Japan.

For Doolittle to have struck the Palace Grounds directly would have been a tremendous boost to American morale and an equally devastating blow to that of the Japanese people. The Emperor was the Icon of Japan, not it's industry. Such a blow would have caused major disruption within the chain of command.

Disruption of the leadership could have been sufficient to precipitate a Communist take over of the government resulting in an immediate cessation of the war.

Crane

(Boyo - since we are discussing possible outcomes your points about planning are interesting but not pertinent)

[Morgenstern]

Originally Posted by Crane

. . .

Disruption of the leadership could have been sufficient to precipitate a Communist take over of the government resulting in an immediate cessation of the war.

Crane
(

Because? Do you really think Japan was without a line of succession in 1942? The idea that the communists would have marched in, unopposed, and taken control of Japan is not rational. The Russians didn't want any part of that war until August, 1945 when they declared war on Japan, some 2 days after Hiroshima was bombed.

[Crane]

Morgenstern,

Who said anything about Russia? Stalin was honoring a non-aggression treaty between Russia and Japan.

There was a strong Communist movement in Japan. Disruption of the government might have been sufficient for a take over from within.

Crane

[Acsenray]

Do you suppose that the administration might have believed that there were good reasons not to facilitate a communist takeover of Japan?

[Crane]

That might have been the concern of some, but not the majority view of the Roosevelt administration. Russia was a partner of the US and the traditional enemy of Japan. The possibility of an early cessation of the war would have tipped the scales.

Crane

[cckerberos]

Originally Posted by Crane

There was a strong Communist movement in Japan. Disruption of the government might have been sufficient for a take over from within.

I don't think so. The communists had been crushed pretty mercilessly in the 20s and although they still existed underground to an extent, they weren't of any significant influence. The only reference I remember coming across them in terms of WW2 is late in the war, when a number of conservative politicians around former prime minister Konoye feared that mass starvation would lead to a popular revolt against the government.

[Crane]

Exactly - disruption in the leadership would also have provided an opportunity. The Communists were a factor in post war elections.

Crane

[Morgenstern]

Originally Posted by Crane

Exactly - disruption in the leadership would also have provided an opportunity. The Communists were a factor in post war elections.

Crane

The Japanese communist party was a very small factor if at all. The party was illegal in WWII and membership subjected the member to sanctions. In fact, it wasn't until the US occupied Japan, post war, that the party was legalized.

[Dissonance]

Originally Posted by Crane

"Japan's Meiji Constitution of 1889 defined the emperor as "sacred and inviolable" and placed him at the pinnacle of power: all legislative, executive, and judicial power. The Emperor was also the supreme military commander..." (Racing the Enemy Tsuyoshi Hasegawa) The Kokutai system defined Japan.

Disruption of the leadership could have been sufficient to precipitate a Communist take over of the government resulting in an immediate cessation of the war.

You're seriously misunderstanding the Emperor’s position, role and actual power in practice as opposed to what it was claimed to be in theory. He was not the supreme military commander, much less the head of all legislative, executive, and judicial power. His practical role was more to rubber stamp decisions already made; the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal had far more practical power as the Emperor’s advisor than the Emperor himself did. To give you an idea, from wiki

Kido was the grandson of Kido Takayoshi, one of the leaders of the Meiji Restoration. A graduate of Kyoto University, he held numerous minor bureaucratic posts before becoming Minister of Education in the first Konoe cabinet (1937), and Home Minister in the Hiranuma Cabinet (1939). During the period from 1937 to 1939 Kido adopted the conspirator's views and devoted himself to this policy wholeheartedly. As education minister he applied himself to the development of a warlike spirit in Japan. He was active with Konoye to replace existing political parties with a single party to dominate all political action. Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal (1940), he recommended to the Emperor that Fumimaro Konoe succeed Mitsumasa Yonai for a second term as Prime Minister of Japan. In 1941, he recommended that Hideki Tōjō become Prime Minister after Konoe.

Kido was also one of the more cautious advisors to the emperor at the beginning of World War II (because he feared the powers of western allies), and one of the chief advocates of peace at the end (trying to ingratiate himself with the conquerors). Kido is known to have advised the emperor against attacking the Dutch East Indies in 1941, explaining that such an attack might provoke the United States into war, and that any oil obtained by taking the East Indies would still have to be transported, and would be subject to blockades and attacks by plane and submarine. Kido also claimed after the war that Emperor Hirohito was never aware of the plans to attack Pearl Harbor until after the attack occurred. Four years later, at the end of the war, Kido is generally credited with convincing the government to accept the Potsdam Declaration and surrender. He also convinced the emperor that it would be necessary to deliver a personal speech in order to ensure that all civilians and soldiers would cease fighting.

The military had actual control of the government and most certainly did not take their orders from the Emperor nor even seek his approval. When the Army occupied Manchuria in 1931 the Emperor didn't even know about it until it had already happened. On the militaries role in the government

The Army and the Navy also had decisive say on the formation (and survival) of any civilian government. Since the law required that the posts of Army Minister and Navy Minister be filled by active duty officers nominated by their respective services, and since the law also required that a prime minister resign if he could not fill all of his cabinet posts, both the Army and the Navy had final say on the formation of a cabinet, and could bring down the cabinet at any time by withdrawing their minister and refusing to nominate a successor. In reality, while this tactic was used only one time (ironically to prevent a General, Kazushige Ugaki, from becoming Prime Minister in 1937), the threat always loomed high when the military made any demands on the civilian leadership.

The leaders of the attempted coup prior to surrender intended to place the Emperor under house arrest and prevent the broadcast of his surrender speech. They felt they were doing so out of patriotism and reverence for the position of Emperor, acting against the expressed wishes of the Emperor in the name of his 'true' wishes.

[the_diego]

If Hirohito were killed, the Japanese would have focused on a number of projects aimed at attacking the US civilian population in the mainland. There were the paper balloons intended o start forest fires in the pacific coast, and the pestilential fleas to be dropped from 6-engined seaplanes.

[Sailboat]

I differ significantly on some of the opinions in this thread.

Originally Posted by Crane

Avoiding offense of the "Japanese people" was of little concern to US citizens during the atrocities of the 1930s and 1940s. Their treatment of US citizen civilians was sub-human. They have done nothing to redeem themselves.

An argument I have recently seen advanced is that the very low surrender rate of Japanese soldiers during the island battles was not entirely due to a fanatical wish to die to preserve their honor, but also at least sometimes due to American troops more or less massacring those who did surrender, or were on the verge of surrendering, and their leadership largely turning a blind eye to the practice.

Certainly that war was brutal on all sides, whether one considers a Japanese sniper in a spiderhole shooting some teenage Iowa farmboy, or an American with a flamethrower immolating a bunker full of draftee clerks fro Tokyo.

The American firebombing campaign against Japanese cities did not do much to elevate our moral position or "redeem" us, either.

This is not to say the Japanese were innocent in any way -- clearly there are numerous documented cases of their war crimes. I am not saying the Americans were "as" guilty, but it seems likely that a certain amount of rose-colored glass tints our memory of our part in the war.

Originally Posted by Crane

By early 1942 there were shortages of food and materials. Rationing went into effect in May and the national speed limit was imposed at 35 MPH in October.

Rationing in the US was at least partly for psychological effect, and partly due to redistribution of key resources. There were shortages of some items, but in general, the US was producing so much of everything that most of the rationing was for a different purpose than one might think:

Historians have questioned how important rationing was for the war effort, but most agree that it was an important psychological measure to create a sense of sacrifice at home.

(cite)

Originally Posted by Crane

For Doolittle to have struck the Palace Grounds directly would have been a tremendous boost to American morale and an equally devastating blow to that of the Japanese people. The Emperor was the Icon of Japan, not it's industry.

The Japanese leadership was aghast at the raid, which could have killed the Emperor even by accident. A long-standing argument between factions as to which course of action to take was immediately settled in favor of Yamamoto's plan to invade Midway (they saw Midway as the weak spot in their island perimeter through which the attack had come).

Given that they immediately made a fatal blunder out of fear for the Emperor's safety (more correctly, fear of being thought to be unconcerned for the Emperor's safety), it's hard for me to believe that coming measurably closer to hitting the Emperor by hitting the palace grounds would have made much difference.

Originally Posted by the_diego

If Hirohito were killed, the Japanese would have focused on a number of projects aimed at attacking the US civilian population in the mainland. There were the paper balloons intended o start forest fires in the pacific coast, and the pestilential fleas to be dropped from 6-engined seaplanes.

I think they focused on those programs anyway. It's not like they decided to let up on America because Doolittle missed the Emperor, is it? Both sides spent the war doing their utmost to hurt each other -- they weren't holding back some special extra anger that would have been unleashed if we'd done something different.


.

[carnivorousplant]

Originally Posted by the_diego

...pestilential fleas to be dropped from 6-engined seaplanes.

That's right up there with fire bearing bats dropped from B-29s!

[ralph124c]

The raid inflicted very little damage, and it exposed the USN to enormous risk-what if the carrier (Wasp) was sunk?
Also, the reaction of the IJA was severe-they went on a rampage in China-many Chinese civilians lost their lives because of this.
Yes, it boosted US moral (to launch an attack on the Japanese home islands)..but was it sound judgement to have done so?

[Boyo Jim]

The carrier Wasp was at no risk at all from this mission, as it had no role in it. You are thinking of another carrier/flying bug, the Hornet.

[ralph124c]

Thanks! Wasp..Hornet, Iceberg, Goldberg..whatever

[carnivorousplant]

Originally Posted by ralph124c

The raid inflicted very little damage, and it exposed the USN to enormous risk-what if the carrier (Wasp) was sunk?

The awakened giant had to do something.

[Sailboat]

Yeah, it was basically a stunt. The US could not have foreseen that the Japanese would make a war-altering blunder (Midway) in response to a scattering of bombs (most residents of Tokyo were unaware of the attack -- talk about a pinprick!). It's not like Nimitz said to himself, "If we drop a few bombs here and there, they'll wreck their navy!"

But it was something we could do directly to the heart of their empire, not the fringe, very early on. And while it did risk the carriers to some degree, it wasn't that big a risk. In those early days of the war, carriers could count on the vastness of the ocean and on acting unpredictably to hide pretty effectively until they got close to land-based planes. And indeed, it was at the fringe of the land-based air umbrella that Halsey launched his bombers and turned away. Japanese early-warning craft might have spotted him, and he didn't want to give the land-based air any time to react and sink his carriers. So he acted to minimize the risk to the priceless carriers, even though that exposed the raid aircrews to greater risk (by extending their flight to the edge of their fuel range).

Lastly, although it wasn't much, it was doing something with the carriers. Unused assets might as well be sunk.

This lesson was re-learned at Guadalcanal, where the American Marines had terrible difficulties with the Japanese navy running in reinforcements, and even bombarding the Marine positions with battleships and cruisers. The naval commander, Robert L. Ghormely, was unwilling to risk major fleet units in the confined waters off Guadalcanal, deterred by the threat of land-based air and aggressive Japanese surface forces. Finally he was sacked and replaced with Bill Halsey. Halsey immediately asked the Marine commander, Vandegrift, what he needed. Vandegrift essentially told him the Navy had to shoulder some of the risk, rather than sheltering itself at cost to the Marines. Halsey committed his carriers to action and within 8 days of taking command fought the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, losing Hornet and suffering major damage to Enterprise, but damaging both Japanese carriers in the action and inflicting crippling losses on Japan's irreplaceable elite airmen.

Worse was to follow. In a series of confusing night surface actions, the US Navy lost numbers of cruisers and destroyers and even had a battleship shot up. Several of these actions were outright defeats for the Americans, and two admirals were killed closing with the enemy in the most Nelsonian style (Daniel Callaghan and Norman Scott) . The Japanese also suffered major losses in these fights. So many ships were sunk, the area acquired the nickname Ironbottom Sound.

Despite the mixed tactical results of the Navy's intervention, the cumulative effect was to take the pressure off the Marines, who went on to win the Guadalcanal campaign, kicking off the island-hopping offensive that would eventually win the war.

Lesson: sometimes even the major fleet units have to be risked, even lost, for anything to be gained.

[Dissonance]

Originally Posted by Sailboat

But it was something we could do directly to the heart of their empire, not the fringe, very early on.

The effect on American morale of doing something this audacious and succeeding shouldn't be taken too lightly either. Before the raid news from the war had been nothing but a gloomy string of defeats: Pearl Harbor, Guam, Wake Island, the Philippines, Corregidor starving and under siege waiting to fall, and the Battle of the Java Sea just to name some American defeats. The only positive propaganda spin the US public had heard thus far was of sacrifice in defeat, both real (the Marines at Wake Island) and mostly fiction (Colin Kelly crashing his damaged B-17 into and sinking the battleship Haruna).

[the_diego]

You bomb a palace, you basically bomb a sturdy pile of rocks. What do you hope to achieve?

[carnivorousplant]

Originally Posted by the_diego

You bomb a palace, you basically bomb a sturdy pile of rocks. What do you hope to achieve?

Piss off the Bad Guys.

[Sailboat]

Originally Posted by the_diego

You bomb a palace, you basically bomb a sturdy pile of rocks. What do you hope to achieve?

Originally Posted by carnivorousplant

Piss off the Bad Guys.

"It might account for Japan's panicking into error. Unless hindsight is wrong, and it is never wrong, they are headed dead into the fire swamp. Uh...Midway."

[prongo]

Apologies if this is slightly off-topic re: bomb the emperor vs not bombing him.

My father was a middle-school teenager in Tokyo during the war and witnessed the Doolittle Raid first hand. I thought his, admittedly very limited, viewpoint might be of some interest in regards to the morale effect on the Japanese civilian population.

He recalls that he was playing outside in his front yard when he suddenly heard a distant *pop* *pop* *pop* of anti-aircraft fire. He looked up to see expanding black puffs of smoke in the sky and then a very fast, very low flying airplane shot across the city. The anti-aircraft fire was ineffectual and didn't appear to touch the bomber. Dad speculates that the gunners were inexperienced and didn't lead the aircraft properly and thus he saw a stream of exploding black clouds trailing the speeding aircraft without damaging it.

When the aircraft was lost from sight, he ran to inform his friends and then they all ran to his house to search their magazines for a likely identification. Dad says that early on in the war that there were lots of books and magazine-type publications available that discussed the various world's fighter planes and bombers and their known specifications. It was extremely popular among the young boys to read up and be the first to correctly identify any military planes they saw flying. Dad had a very good view of the unknown plane and positively identified it as an American Mitchell bomber! How exciting that the Americans had come to fight in the skies over their homes! (he goes on to say that throughout the war, and especially towards the end, it was the best thing ever to watch and cheer on the pilots as they dogfighted over Tokyo. They had no sense at all of the serious nature of warfare and it was like a movie, except far better)

The next day there was a single headline in the newspaper, informing the citizens that the Americans had staged a pointless and ineffectual raid, led by the notorious Captain Doolittle. In fact the actual headline was something along the lines of, "Mr. Do-Nothing accomplishes...nothing". Thereafter, Dad always heard him referred to as Captain Do-Nothing by the adults.

As to the effect on morale, Dad says that from his perspective there was no change at all in attitude among his friends and neighbors. The belief seemed to be that nothing was accomplished and that the raiders obviously could not hurt anyone. So who cares?

I asked him about bombing the emperor during the Doolittle Raid, as discussed in this thread. His personal opinion is that, at the time, it would have been a huge mistake to attempt to kill the Emperor. He believes that it would have caused outrage among the population and created even more support for the war. Perhaps if he had been killed when the war was going poorly, it may have made some difference. But at this early stage, the people were feeling confidant and would have seen it as an inexcusable provocation.

Granted this is all from the perspective of a teenage boy recalled by an 82 year old. Interesting nonetheless.

[carnivorousplant]

Thanks, Prongo.
Very cool.

[Crane]

Thanks Pongo,

Priceless!

Crane

[BigAppleBucky]

Originally Posted by carnivorousplant

I never heard of that. I'll politely ask for a cite.

In 1993 I was told this personally by at least two Japanese people, one was a tour guide in Kyoto and the other a senior officer of the Japanese bank I worked for at the time.


http://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/20/op...d=print&src=pm

James F. McManus (letter, Aug. 10) credits Edwin O. Reischauer with intervening with American officials to spare Nara and Kyoto from American bombardment. The honor belongs to Langdon Warner, a scholar and enthusiast of Japanese art. It was his intervention that spared Japan's two ancient capitals. A grateful Japanese nation erected a memorial in his honor. UMBERTO LA PAGLIA Philadelphia, Aug. 10, 1995

http://angiesommer.blogspot.com/2010...ee-cities.html

https://www.radiowaves.co.uk/story/25916

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyoto

[GythaOgg]

Originally Posted by BigAppleBucky

In 1993 I was told this personally by at least two Japanese people, one was a tour guide in Kyoto and the other a senior officer of the Japanese bank I worked for at the time.


http://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/20/op...d=print&src=pm



http://angiesommer.blogspot.com/2010...ee-cities.html

https://www.radiowaves.co.uk/story/25916

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyoto

It's worth noting that Kyoto was originally on the short list list for the atomic bomb - precisely because it -was- undamaged. Secretary of War Henry Stimson, who had honeymooned in Kyoto and liked the city, very firmly ordered General Groves to take it off the list. Nagasaki was substituted.

[Boyo Jim]

Originally Posted by Crane

...(Boyo - since we are discussing possible outcomes your points about planning are interesting but not pertinent)

They certainly are. The planners considered and rejected a daytime attack. They considered the risks too high because the opposition would be alerted before the bombers reached their targets, and the defenses would be too strong. Attacking the palace would have made a daylight raid absolutely necessary, and they ruled out a daylight attack against any target. It turns out they were wrong, but they only discovered that through hindsight.