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Originally Posted by Stratocaster
My point is that your rebuttal is based on what you see as the faulty predicate, "There is a $$$ tipping point that transforms any tax into a penalty." That is indeed faulty and also is a straw man. There is no unavoidable tipping point, that level (perhaps different for each tax) where in every instance a revenue collected transforms from tax into penalty.
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If a tax can actually be a penalty, then there must be some tipping point, even if we don't tip-toe to it (which was only illustrative that some threshold exists). Whether it is different for every tax is just irrelevant. This is how we can show that taxes and penalties are different: beyond some point (which may be different for each purpose), a tax becomes a penalty or, in the other direction, a penalty becomes a tax. If we ignore the tipping point notion, then the identification of a tax as a penalty has already in itself addressed the possibility of a penalty being a tax, and the question is resolved.
I am merely trying to make sense of the notion that taxes can be penalties but penalties can't be taxes. I find no coherence in it. If you want me to avoid making strawmen, then please offer me something that is substantive enough to show why a) the "tipping point" fundamentally doesn't exist, or b) the very fact that we've identified a tax as a penalty doesn't simultaneously point out that the penalty is or can be a tax. This is the dissent's claim, that we see one but not the other, and it doesn't make sense. Their argument is basically, "Well, no one's ever said it that way." This isn't even an argument. If the set of all taxes and the set of all penalties overlaps, then the question is simply resolved and there is nothing to say. What force of gravity would they like to cite which says we can funnel As into Bs but not the other way? Do we need a supreme court case about speeding-traps-as-revenue-generators, or parking-tickets-as-revenue-generators, to finally put the issue to rest? (How would we get it there?)
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The "tax's" revenue collection aspect is secondary. But not all onerous taxes are penalties (as the legal term of art) and therefore your assumption that since there's always some point up the scale that changes a tax into a penalty (there isn't), there must be that same point on the return down the scale that changes a penalty into a tax.
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Again, the tipping point argument is just there to try to make sense of the notion "a tax can be a penalty." It is an answer to my question, "How?" Any answer to "how" I can imagine simultaneously shows that a penalty is or can be a tax. I have given two answers to the "how" question, which is two more than the dissent offered, and both answer their question. In my opinion, the reason the dissent did not even attempt to address this issue is because that particular objection would vanish.
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A tax is to collect revenue that the government can spend. A penalty is to impose a punishment. The fact that we might be able to point to separate instances where each respectively cost a citizen $50 doesn't make them in any other way equivalent.
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Which I would agree with,
if the dissent didn't point out that there is some equivalence at least sometimes. Since they did, I want to know "How?" in a way that renders their objection meaningful. I can find no such interpretation.
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But as a secondary and incidental outcome. The reason we have taxes (the dissent would argue) is because the government needs the dough. Any other consequence is coincidence.
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Whether it is a coincidence or not, they put forward the position that a tax can be a penalty, and challenged others to find a case where a penalty was a tax. But that is a weird shifting of the burden. If we know how taxes can be penalties, then the question is already answered how penalties can be taxes.
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BTW, I don't think this particular point provided the bulk of the weight in the dissenting opinion, not even close to it. They could have omitted this portion entirely, I think, and their logic was still sound.
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It seems to me this portion is particularly important, if Robert's justification was that the penalty was a tax (for the purposes of the constitution).