Consciousness

I have a question for Cecil, or for whoever wants to answer it: wasn't the original question in Cecil's column "What is conciousness?
Don't you think the subject is NOT "humans vs. computers"?
I mean, this IS an interesting subject, but is not what Mr. Jeremy Fields asked.

J. Fields asked, in part, "If consciousness (which we all experience intimately) is merely an epiphenomenon of the mind, which is an epiphenomenon of the brain, then there must be a physical mechanism in the brain that accounts for it." Cecil could not respond in his mere 600 words, but I'd like a crack at that small part of the larger question.

This is an example of the phrasing of a question limiting the possible answers, which can in many cases make questions unanswerable, can lead apparently to paradoxes, can block roads to truth or greater understanding, etc. This sort of thing often happens in political discussion, religious discussion, etc. (Not that I mean to criticize participants of those pursuits or the questioner in this instance - not at all - but it might be to one's advantage to be aware that accepting a questioner's phrasing can set the discussion within an implied or explicit world view which then interferes with fruitful discussion or even leads irrefutably to a predetermined answer. On the other hand, arguing semantics can be just as damaging to fruitful discussion.)

But to the topic at hand: no, there NEED NOT be a "physical mechanism in the brain" that accounts for consciousness, but neither is there a need to resort to explanations such as "soul," "spirit," or other higher forms of existence. (Of course, a lack of "need" is not proof on either side of the argument; it just leaves the question open.)

The question as stated does not make room for the existence of "emergent properties" of a system. Emergent properties are behaviors, states, functions, etc. of a system that are possible only when the system is functioning, but which cannot be detected (do not exist?) in the assemblage of parts.

To give an example which I hope is clear, think of an automobile. Automobiles, when functioning properly, can exhibit the emergent property of "locomotion." (They can drive from place to place.) Leaving out issues of the driver, think simply of a disassembled auto. If I showed you a garage full of working parts sufficient to make up an automobile, but which were not assembled into a functioning system, and asked you to identify which part or parts contained the locomotion, you would recognize that this was a moot question. You can also see that assembling the parts properly can allow the various emergent properties to, well...emerge...again.

Note that this is also a possible answer (to my mind, a good answer) to the question, "What is life?" When the requisite quantities of materials (carbon, oxygen, hydrogen, etc.) are assembled in a sufficiently complex arrangement (proteins, carbohydrates, genes, etc.), they exhibit the ability to metabolize, to interact (physically, chemically, sensually, bahaviorally) with other components of the larger environment, etc. Arrange them one way you get a platypus, arrange them another way you get a tree. A few small breakdowns and the cell, or the organ, or the individual, loses that which we call "life" - but that doesn't mean that any Thing has left. It just means that the system doesn't exhibit that "life property" any longer.

It could be the same with consciousness. Awareness or mind could be an emergent property of a functioning, sufficiently complex (recursed, or fedback) brain. Less complex brains might exhibit a lesser level of consciousness - and if we accept that we get to stop wondering whether dogs have souls.

So a last question (or two): what level of interaction and "group memory" and feedback and etc. might be necessary to raise a community or a society from what appears now to be essentially unconscious (self) control to some glimmerings of a larger awareness or "mind?" And where can I buy stock in the Internet company looking at mapping that road?

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It was a wonderful discussion of the difference between humans and computers, but unfortunately Cecil missed the spirit of the question.

It's not about thinking or computing, it's about awareness. That's the thing that separates us from the machines and possibly my flies that constantly beat themselves against a window in the expectation that it will suddenly turn from a solid into a gas.

If I remember my high school biology correctly, a frog operates almost entirely out of its spine and its brain performs few functions. It is a creature that reacts to things, based on a pre-programmed response. Does the frog have awareness? We know it can react, but is it conscious?

So Cecil, how about taking another run at it and this time define it from an awareness point of view rather than simple reactions.

E1skeptic: I suspect Cecil was on vacation and he had his computer answer the question. The computer saw the words consciousness, brain, and mechanism and immediately produced the lengthy answer.
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Sven and Ole's pizza, Grand Marais, MN

Jimmy G. has it right. Cecil nodded, as all people must occasionally, and evaded the question.

Awareness of self--self consciousness--has run up a lot of printing bills without a compelling explanation. This generation's version of Aquinas had no answer, either, and we are left distraught.

My. my. You can not see any spiritual aspect of conciousness? You think your conciousness is just electricty running through circuts in
your brain with some chemical/nuerotransmitter aspect thrown in
for emoitional instability? I think the VOLUME of near-death experiences, intuition, and peoples ability to
do extrordinary mental things shows us the human brain is more than just a damn computer. Why are our brains able to waste time with such abstract concepts as this? I se a lot more than just a computer to sustain the body. See you in hell.

Ah, said proponents. You don't understand Chinese. But the system as a whole (you + the rule book + the box) does. Nonsense, replied Searle. Suppose I memorize the rule book and dispense with the black box. Now I constitute the whole of the system. People hand me symbols; I respond
with other symbols based on the rules. I appear to understand Chinese, but I don't. I merely display a facility in Chinese syntax. Chinese semantics, the essence of thought, eludes me. Just so with computers.

And just so with chimpanzees and sign language. They can memorize the rule book and the signs, but they don't understand the abstract ideas behind the signs. Hence no language and no intellect, something only humans (so far) have been blessed with.

(Shameless plug)
Dr. Mortimer J. Adler has some very valid philosophical ideas on the nature of human conciousness, including what our ideas really are, why they cannot be apprehended directly by our own concious, and the difference between the human brain and those of the lower animals in his two books Mind Over Matter and The Difference In Man And The Difference It Makes. I highly recommend these to anyone interested in the philosophical and scientific aspects of conciousness and the marvelous human brain.

Thanks, Cecil, for a great column.

All this speculation and evasiveness shows our total ignorance on the subject.

Alas, how can we show the existence of consciousness objectively?



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I would like to think that a good criterion for "thinking" is the ability to come up with an original thought. This is, by definition, impossible for the Chinese black-box example.

Have you ever worked on a difficult problem, and then got a flash of inspiration, and could not explain where that inspiration came from? I'd like to think that this is what separates people from computers.

I had lost track of Doug Lenat in recent years, but one thing I was sure of was that that his original 10 year deadline wouldn't be met. What I didn't expect was that he would be able to get money to keep going. I like the fact that he's managed to make the deadline recede so much faster than at clock speed. Someone less full of it would probably be a constant 10 years from getting finished.

I wonder if he is still upset at having his reputation among people that aren't dumb enough to fund "AI research" be defined by the entry for microLenat in "The Hacker's Dictionary". I've always felt that this was too lenient, and that the real term should be the femtoLenat, which is the amount of bogosity that is instantly fatal to the reputation of anyone not in AI...

Nickrz writes:

And just so with chimpanzees and sign language. They can memorize the rule book and the signs, but they don't understand the abstract ideas behind the signs.

I was under the impression that we have scientifically shown that apes **ARE** able to represent abstract ideas using sign language. The three most famous of these apes are Koko (a gorilla), Chantek (an orangutan), and Washoe (a chimpanzee). All of which have demonstrated a rich sign language vocabulary and have used this vocabulary to communicate reasonably complex thoughts. If you're assertion is correct, these apes are, at least, smart enough to fool hundreds of linguistic experts... Maybe you're thinking of birds...

Have Cecil ask Al Gore - he invented consciouness, didn't he?

Keeves wrote:

I would like to think that a good criterion for "thinking" is the ability to come up with an original thought.

This criteria would rule out more than 90% of humans I've met... [grin]

richard younkin wrote:

You think your conciousness is just electricty running through circuts in your brain with some chemical/nuerotransmitter aspect thrown in for emoitional instability?

Actually, quantum mechanics probably plays a more important role in consciousness than do the electrical impulses. For a couple of great books on the subjet of consciouness (and other 'neat stuff') check out Roger Penrose's "The Emperor's New Mind" and "Shadows of the Mind". Very readable!

Still trying to fathom why Cecil answered the "what is consciousness?" question with the "why computers aren't conscious" answer???

He must be suffering from non sequitous avoidicus..

The discussion seems to be wandering from the original question, which if I remember correctly is: what is Consciousness? Manipulation of abstractions is not prerequisite to Awareness (or more precisely, to recognition of Self and one’s own mental, as well as physical, existence) and near death experiences and intuition are red herrings. Quantum mechanics (like “Society” in the opposite direction) are probably involved, but at a level of analysis too far removed to concern us here (that is, the biochemistry is much more immediate).

Development and maintenance of Self-Awareness, or Consciousness, is one of the major things which separates simple minds from complex minds. It is explainable in terms of simple mental processes layered recursively on top of each other until they become complex and the mental fiction “This pattern is remembered as ‘I’ because it is always here and can be traced over time; all else is not” develops on top of the unavoidable physical truth, “This is the body I feel and control, and that’s not.” And yes, that’s all that’s needed to explain it (though I point out that Occam’s Razor does not generate proof positive).

For those with the fortitude, an explanation follows. I may not make myself clear, but I hope that it’ll at least give an idea. It’s not rocket science, and it doesn’t require magic or Goddess to explain.

I earlier proposed that “Consciousness” or “Awareness” is not a Thing but rather a state, like “aliveness” or “happiness.” It is a name given to some of the emergent properties of a properly-functioning, sufficiently-complex Information Processing System or “Mind” at work. Historically these mind states and functions have been associated with a Central Nervous System (biological brain and spinal chord, and possibly more), but there is no reason to think they will always be so limited (Cecil’s point). It could also be said that we recognize certain states and the functions/processes/mechanisms that produce them as “consciousness,” but deny such categorization to other states et al.

So: what sort of mechanisms might be important to Consciousness? At a building-block level I would say Memory, Sensory (or other) Inputs, some form of Decision-Making or Comparative process.

Okay, great, so our immune systems are conscious? They demonstrate all of those abilities.

Well, obviously our immune systems are not Aware within the meaning of the English word, so a definition of “Consciousness” requires some higher order or orders of function and complex process. Examples incorporating the basic building blocks could be Prediction and Recursion. (Prediction is the comparison of (i) changing data over time and/or (ii) new sets of data against learned data in order to predict an anticipated state. Examples might be (i) predicting the flight path and landing zone of a baseball or (ii) recognizing that this man one has never met before is about to lose his temper. Recursion would be those processes by which a Mind checks itself and its “outputs” (decisions, behaviors, learnings, predictions) against not only new data and predictions but against desired states, etc. If you will, it is basic to the process of the “Mental Editor.”)

The level and complexity of functioning are critical to our characterization of any mind and its outputs, and to whether we would call that mind “Conscious.” A basic mind (say, in those flys mentioned earlier) takes Inputs and generates, or incorporates them in, a transitory State which then (usually) engenders an Action (such as flying towards the light/green/warmth). (No "intention" necessarily involved.) When the actions generated by a simple mind are prevented (the fly hits the window), that mind doesn’t have the complexity to even remember that it just tried that behavior, let alone to learn to recognize that there is such a thing as “glass.” Presumably, the Memory or Comparative powers necessary are lacking, and it just takes its new set of sensory inputs and tries again.

And below even this level we could argue pretty successfully that plants don’t have Minds at all, for despite the fact that they can detect infections, seal off damage, grow towards water or light, determine what season it is, etc., there is no central-clearing or decision-making point with alterable States dedicated to producing “plant behaviors.” Plants don’t really learn or remember or decide; their behaviors are a result of their natural pre-determined functioning, which reacts and/or produces different future “behaviors” more due to accident or gross physical changes – or, at the intergenerational level, due to evolutionary changes – than due to “experience.”

In contrast a relatively complex mind NOT ONLY interprets Input (say, modulated sounds or finger patterns - “speech”), compares it to previously encountered inputs (interprets the consistent past contextual meaning of said "speech"), generates a contextually-associated “understanding” of the intended meaning of the speech, makes a whole series of second-and-higher-level associations (that’s my wife’s voice; she was happy this morning; in the past when she used that tone it meant more than she is now saying with words; etc.), and makes predictions (if I continue to act this way the outcome may be similar to the previous times) – but it is a mind that has become SELF-Aware. (Thus the ‘I’ in “if I continue to act this way…”) It’s about the ‘I’, not the speech - and not abstractedness or the degree of separation between the intended communicative concept and a physical object or process. (We could argue that almost all speech includes varying levels of abstraction - even just at the grammatical level.)

The complex mind recognizes then a sense of Self vs. Other in a detailed way, over and through time and in a myriad of circumstances. This is where Recursion starts to come into play. The truly complex mind can not only compare the current (complex and evolving) present with the past and infer associations from those experiences, can not only analyze the evolving present for subtle variations and opportunities to move events towards a desired future outcome or state and then further evaluate the results of interim actions in terms of the positive or negative influence on the desired outcomes (this could almost apply to a frisbee dog gauging the flight of its target and adjusting for the wind as much as it could apply to a social encounter), BUT it can further make the (possibly false) distinction between outside events and internal states and can modulate itself as a tool for behavior control. (“I’m getting angry. I can’t afford that. I must control myself. Think of something pleasant… It’s not working; okay, depart this vicinity. But this is my boss; I can’t just walk out. Okay, think of the long term benefits. You can’t afford to be fired now. Just get through this and you will…etc.” In this example, the long term benefits do not exist, other than as a predicted or an imaginative occurrence within the mind. They exist only "in" an assumed future and may or may not ever come to pass, yet they can have great power over the state of the Mind involved.)

Basically that’s it: Consciousness of Self just requires a mind complex enough to remember and recognize its own separateness and its own continued existence over time. And of course if Awareness separates very simple minds from very complex minds, there is also a range on the continuum from less-complex to more-complex. I'd wager rats are Self-Aware on a basic level, dogs more so, humans (perhaps) most of all. Elephants? Of course. Human (or any other) infants? At first not really, but as their brains and minds develop, yes, within the limits of their species. So while the question may be open as to the abstractive ability of non-human ape minds, I have seen no one seriously propose that they are not Aware. Evidence strongly suggests that elephants and apes (at least) recognize and mourn Death - and while confusion at a sudden and complete Difference is understandable, mourning req

I think the VOLUME of near-death experiences, intuition, and peoples ability to
do extrordinary mental things shows us the human brain is more than just a damn computer.

Near death experiences (NDEs) and out-of-body experiences (OBEs) are indeed numerous but their occurrence in large numbers proves nothing. There are neurological processes that can produce all of the subjective experiences reported in NDE and OBE testimonials. I have experienced OBEs myself during epileptic seizures.
That having been said, I have to say that it's a bit odd to hear people inevitably start talking about computers when discussing consciousness. I think it stems from the frustration of getting nowhere for centuries with these questions. We want to talk about something we can understand. Computers do something that is reminiscent of conscious thought, maybe, and we understand computers pretty well. But we don't understand our own minds at all.

Our understanding of mental processes is extremely crude. We know how atoms behave on a microscopic level, and we have a pretty good grasp of the cellular mechanisms that are involved in protein interactions with neurotransmitters and sodium/potassium channels. We know the microanatomy of neurons and we've mostly figured out how they behave, we know how they are arranged in different brain structures, and we know how those structures are all connected with each other and the rest of the body. In theory we have all the knowledge we would need to explain consciousness, but we can't. It's a bit like studying an immense clockwork machine, with a good understanding of what the individual gears, levers, and springs are and how they work. When you stare at all the little gears turning around, you can see what each little gear is doing. On that level, you understand what is going on. But you can't understand how the entire clockwork can tell time, or predict eclipses, or compute logarithms, or play chess, or whatever the machine does. (If you've ever tried to fix a mechanical problem in your broken VCR by yourself, you know the feeling.) So people turn to computers in their philosophizing about consciousness, because all the talk about the brain has gotten us nowhere for so long.

But I can tell you from having studied computational neuroscience for a year, and from being a computer programmer now- a computer is absolutely nothing like a brain. Studying the ways computers work will give no insight into the way the brain works.

Which is not to say that using computers to simulate the brain has no merits. Although computers by their very design are far more suited to other tasks than to simulating neural networks, you can get some surprising behavior from computers when you order them to run these simulations. I myself wrote a neural network applet in Java that can perform optical character recognition; you can draw a digit from 0 to 9 with your mouse and it will (hopefully) tell you what digit you drew. This is something that usually is best done by brains, not computers; but by running a simulation you can get a computer to do it. Does that mean we know how the brain recognizes letters and numbers? We have theories of how the brain does this, but we don't really know. I honestly don't even know how my simulation program is doing it. So we can run a successful simulation of something we don't understand, but then we don't understand how the simulation is working. We've just moved the problem. And we're still no closer to understanding all the aspects of consciousness.

One good example is memory. Computer memory is easy to understand. It's a collection of bits. One bit can either be on or off, and there are a fixed number of them. Fill them all up, and there is no more memory. A computer will have no more difficult a time storing a million random numbers than it will storing a million zeroes. (That's obviously without compression technology.)
Of course, if I ask you to memorize 100 digits of the decimal expansion of both pi and 1/3, you're likely to stumble on pi but you'll retain the 0.333333... with no problem. No matter how stupid someone is, he isn't going to memorize each "3" separately- people adaptively notice patterns and take advantage of them when the opportunity presents itself. Computers don't do this by default; they have to be programmed to recognize patterns, and even then they can only recognize the specific patterns they've been programmed to search for.
But the computer metaphor still pervades people's thinking about memory, and people have an impression of "brain cells filling up" the way computer memory fills up. The impression I got from studying neuroscience and artificial neural networks is that a single memory doesn't simply "park itself inside a neuron", the way a single piece of information resides within an individual computer bit. Your kindergarten teacher's name is not being "remembered" by one single cell. My guess is that a single memory is actually "smeared" across millions of different neurons, and each neuron has thousands of synapses which are the actual locations of the changes that occur to "store" that memory. Everything is very distributed. Another single memory might be "stored" across this same field of millions of neurons. In fact lots and lots of information can be "remembered" by the network before recall begins to suffer. Information is stored in the network as a whole, and not individually in single neurons. It is extremely unlike computer memory.

Probably the most fundamental reason why studying the workings of computers doesn't provide insight into the workings of the brain is that whereas brains have evolved, computers (like all machines) have been designed. When something is designed, much care is (or should be) taken to avoid "hacks". A hack is something that arguably works but that isn't obvious as to why it works or as to what conditions will make it stop working. A hack is usually difficult for other people to understand- and therefore hard to fix or to build stuff onto. If you're debugging software with lots of hacks in it, you'll go nuts. There are standards that people are expected to follow in both computer design and software design, and deviating a lot from those standards is strongly frowned upon. The purpose of the standards is to make things as simple and easy to understand as possible for everybody.
If you ever take a neuroscience course and study the anatomy of the brain, you will quickly realize that it is full of hacks! There are redundant systems all over the place. Division of labor between different parts is spotty at best, and at worst can seem to make no sense at all. The brain works as well as natural selection has forced it to, but from the largest scales to the smallest, there are thousands of needless complications that are the result of various evolutionary accidents. Natural selection simply provides no obvious incentive for neuroanatomy to be simple and easy to understand. So neuroscience courses- and medical courses in general- are hard to pass.

Still, neuroscientists and philosophers have both been searching for the neuronal correlates to consciousness, and recently there are some things we have been able to figure out. For example, you can only give your attention to one thought at a time, and attention is most likely controlled by the thalamus. The thalamus is the central relay station of the brain. All network traffic between the cortex and the rest of the body goes through it.
The idea of consciousness as a single indivisible entity is embodied in the old philosophical idea of a "homunculus". The word homunculus is Latin for "little man". The movie "Men In Black" had a good illustration of a homunculus. Remember that scene where the dude's head opens up and there's a little bald guy insi

The thing that always bugged me about Searle's argument is its assumption that syntax is all there is to conversation. A bit of thought (or observation during your next phone call) will reveal how lame this idea is. Those of us involved in education have observed how everyone brings a theory of the world with them to every conversation and interprets everything they see in terms of that theory. Changing the theory, the object of education, is extremely difficult in part because some of the underlying assumptions are so deeply buried that they are difficult to identify even by people who have managed to more or less excise them from their own thinking.

I suspect it is impossible for a rigid set of rules to encode responses of absolute rectitude as that would necessarily entail encoding the civilization within which appropriate responses are embedded. As that civilization is always in flux, such rules would necessarily be provisional and therefore unsusceptible to being codified. A corollary, of course, is that a truly conscious machine would probably have to be raised, rather that programmed, integrating experience into its reasoning patterns and interacting from the very beginning with other conscious beings.

Second point: I find it interesting that the response to this question focusses strictly on the attempts to implement consciousness via programming (or, actually, to implement intelligence, Turing's point, and something which is not exactly the same thing as consciousness). One could wish for a commentary on another perspective on consciousness, that of Yale psychologist Julian Jaynes in "The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind." I don't know if I exactly buy all of Jaynes' argument but it is quite interesting and well argued and speaks more clearly of human rather than machine consciousness.

Jaynes essentially argues that consciousness in humans is relatively recent (~5000 years old) and derives from a degradation in the division between left and right hemispheres of the brain -- essentially a reprogramming of human behaviour under the influence of environmental pressures. I thought it was particularly interesting that this breakdown approximately coincided with a change in the nature of warfare in the same part of the world, noted by John Keene in "The History of War." There's more to life than computer science. There's more to consciousness as well.



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The beauty of the universe consists not only of unity in variety but also of variety in unity.
-- Umberto Eco, The Name of the Rose

jwg: GOOD one! (Now, can anyone prove Al ever took advantage of his invention?)

JoeyB: Take a look at the portion of Cecil's article I quoted. If you agree with the logic therein, apply it to non-human great apes. Chimps can learn symbols that have a direct cause and effect relationship, that is, they can learn to associate a sign for food with the action of being fed, but no animal other than human has ever been able to communicate indirect (abstract) concepts using symbols they learned directly. For instance, a chimp might learn the sign for food, and can be taught that displaying that sign in certain situations will result in their being fed, but that does not mean they understand the abstract concept of hunger, and it certainly does not mean they will ever extrapolate that sign into another abstract statement "I hunger for knowledge" because such concepts cannot be taught them using a direct cause-effect relationship. "Food" as such is not a sign in front of a concept - it's the "concept" itself. Humans don't have to work that way because we use can symbols as abstracts. Such is the essence of a true language and intellect - computers don't have this ability, and niether does any other animal save man. "Reasonably complex thoughts" do not issue from the flashcards or fingers of gorillas.
If you don't agree with the quote, then I guess this argument is moot.

As for Cecil's avoiding the question, hey give him a break. I'm sure he has a 6,000-word treatise he can send you that will explain everything.

Thank you David for your interesting voluminous reply on consciousness. You mention that consciousness is in fact self-awareness and that a sufficiently complex information processing system (say, a mind) may produce this state.

Then you go on discussing what in fact concernes intelligence, not necessarily consciousness, but finish interestingly again stating that some animals such as elephants and apes might have self-awareness too.

I want to first address the issue of animal self-awareness and then come back to consciousness in general.

I vaguely remember an article about an experiment with apes and a mirror. Some tests would be done to see if the ape recognized his image in the mirror as himself or as some other member of the same species.
It is clear that most animals recognize members of their own species. Of course, they need to to find a partner. But birds for example will mistake their image in a mirror for some other bird. Many people with a pet bird hang a mirror in its cage, so that the bird doesn't feel alone. This works pretty well. Apes however recognize themselves. The article goes on to argue that apes therefore are self-aware.

The simplest system that would recognize itself in the mirror would be a simple robot with visual capabilities, that could recognize its own shape from any angle and could verify its own movements. So, is self-recognition-in-mirrors the same as self-awareness?

This requires a thorough examination of the concept consciousness itself.
We know (or rather we defined) that people are conscious, and that ALL people are conscious (except maybe certain psycologically impaired or very young people, but let's not go into that). To know what consciousness is (or any concept) it must either be defined (in which case there is no discussion: consciousness is a unique property of human beings and that's it) or one must be able to classify all objects as having this property or not. To do this, a classification method must be defined.

Searle tries to define this method by checking the output of a system, by conversation. The checking party itself is a human being, not the most objective classifier known. Not only is the deciding party unrelyable, the method demands that the tested object produces output. This means that any person inable to produce output due, for example, to paralysis cannot be conscious. Obviously, this is not correct. Furthermore, any system that does produce output would have to be understood by the classifier. If the tested object speaks some language no-one understands, does this mean he/she/it is not conscious?

Other people try to detect consciousness by observing the system itself. For human beings, the brain or the brain functions. As David argues, these processes must be sufficiently complex to produce self-awareness. But why? Is complexity a premisse for self-awareness. There is no evidence whatsoever that leads one to believe this.
A complex eco-system like an ant-colony is a very complex system, but is it self-aware? Douglas R. Hofstadter, in his book "Gödel, Escher, Bach" (a very interesting book by the way) raises the same question.

I'd argue that complexity is not necessary for consciousness. This would not leave any possibility I can think of to test for self-awareness. That's a somewhat unsatisfactory, however interesting, conclusion.

So let's focus on methods evaluating the output of a system. Let me put an example forward that produces understandable output. I could write a simple computer program that to any input invariably produces the output: "I am aware of myself". The program does not show very much creativity, but I argue that creativity is not necessary for consciousness. Neither is it intelligent. It just states that it is aware of itself. Now, looking only at the output, does this imply self-awareness? The message is clear enough: "I am aware!", so why doubt? The system produces the same output as an uncreative, unintelligent and unwilling person.

Sander writes:

Apes however recognize themselves. The article goes on to argue that apes therefore are self-aware.

and

So, is self-recognition-in-mirrors the same as self-awareness?

and

...one must be able to classify all objects as having this property [consciousness] or not.

Consciousness and self awareness are probably continuums. Certainly, the ability to recognize oneself in a mirror is on the lower end of this continuum, but it probably does not match what most of us mean by "self-aware". When most humans see themselves in a mirror they recognize that they are an individual, with independent thoughts. They are able to contemplate what it means to exist and to interact with their environment. Your simple robot certainly would not have thoughts about individuality or self-ness. The ape is probably somewhere in between (contrary to what Nickrz will allow himself to believe).

As David argues, these processes must be sufficiently complex to produce self-awareness. But why? Is complexity a premisse for self-awareness. There is no evidence whatsoever that leads one to believe this. A complex eco-system like an ant-colony is a very complex system, but is it self-aware?

David said that a sufficiently-complex Information Processing System is apparently requisite for self-awareness. He did not say that complex systems are self-aware. However, I take your point: Consciousness may not be a function of complexity.

Now, looking only at the output, does this imply self-awareness? The message is clear enough: "I am aware!", so why doubt?

Well, in this example, you told it what to say, so that's not valid. However, if it arrived at that conclusion on it's own, then I tend to agree - why doubt?

I agree with David on most everything he said, except that he indirectly connected consciousness and self-awareness. I think the two are possibly independent. Imagine a world where there is only one individual. This individual could be conscious, by all the definitions that we care to invent, yet he might not be self-aware because to acknowledge the self you must also acknowledge another. Without another, he might have no concept of self.

I'm not a very religious person. But, I believe we are all more than the sum of our parts. Last year, a group of scientists concluded, after a 10 year study on consciousness, that they were completely stumped. They were no closer to an answer than when they began the experiment. Maybe there are things we are not intended to know. Consciousness, and even life are beyond anything we can imagine, or resolve. Let's try to understand, and live with the universe around us first. Then, we can deal with the questions that live on the edge. Leave the philosophical questions to the guys that hang out on mountain tops for now. We have a lot more to understand before we get to the BIG questions.

"What is consciousness?" is a very different question from "What is intellegence?", or "What is language?" or "What is self-awareness (in the sense of recognizing my physical image)?" or "What is self-awareness (in the sense of noticing that I have thoughts and feelings)".

Dogs are clearly, obviously conscious when they are awake, but they can't answer "yes" to the other questions. Cats are obviously con--- well, it's a little harder to tell with cats, but they are conscious. Plants are not conscious. Flys probably are not. There may not be a specific set of neurons that is the seat of consciousness, but it still is a real byproduct of the brain's action, and you need a brain (or a sufficiently designed computer) to get it, just as you need a heart or a sufficienly designed pump to get your blood circulating.

A good intro about this (and many other related topics) is Steven Pinker's "How the Mind Works", which is about a year old or so and summarizes new psychological research in a way that is nearly as funny and smart as Cecil himself. I was very surprised that Cecil was obviously unaware of this book.

Interesting discussion all around!

1. Mirrors.
2. Intelligence vs. Consciousness.
3. Consciousness vs. Awareness of Self.
4. Complexity, Systems Theory, and Ants.
5. Why aren’t you Cleopatra?
6. Mountaintop existence.

1. I’m not sure mirrors are a good test, at least not for proving absence of Consciousness. There’s too much cultural context involved. And they’re probably not good for proving presence of Consciousness, either - Inferring, perhaps; Proving, no.

For a new(?) take on animal intelligence / culture / consciousness see: http://www.msnbc.com/news/280690.asp#BODY (caveat emptor). Among other things, it is claimed that chimps have about the same mental ability as a four year old human. Anyone want to question a four year old’s possession of consciousness? Also, I heard a snippet of a report on the radio yesterday (caveat emptor redoubled) that seemed to say British researchers have discovered that chimpanzees can identify human family relationships from photographs of the individuals. (Mother-son relationships were most easily identified.) If anyone can find a link to that report, you might want to publish it here. If true, that would seem to indicate a higher order of understanding even than, “hey, that’s me reflected in that vertical, solid pool, there.”

2. Sander, I didn’t intend to address Intelligence rather than Consciousness. I meant to show how Consciousness can “evolve,” or derive from, complex combinations of simpler mental processes, without having to assume the existence of a separate “essence” or a dedicated organ. For example Memory, while admittedly critical to all forms of learning and to what most of us call “Intelligence,” is needed herein (as some sort of “internal state memory” - perhaps something like an internal film) for the processing system to trace its own internal changes, and become able recognize itself, over time. In this way an awareness of an omnipresent “Self” can build up through aggregation, whereas if in every cycle of the system the world is “ever-new” (green dead ahead / fly to the green / BONK <pain> / green off the port forward quarter / turn and fly to the green / BONK <pain> / green off the starboard side / turn and fly to the green / BONK, etc.), well, there will be perception (of external inputs) and decision-making and action, but there will be no continuity of perception (ESPECIALLY of internal states) and so no chance for a concept of Self to evolve. Flies and computers largely lack this kind of processing.

3. Ah yes, language… If by Consciousness we mean “that which ‘departs’ under general anesthesia or after a crack on the noggin,” then yes, that IS different from SELF-Awareness. I daresay all animals from at least amphibians on up have this definable Consciousness/wakefulness-as-opposed-to-sleep/hibernation. And we could all address the topic of the waking mind vs. the dreaming mind, but I have to say that the question, “Where does your consciousness [awakeness] go when you sleep” strikes me like the question, “where does your lap go when you stand up?”

I believe the original question was, “Who am I? or Who is the knower? or What is consciousness? (All the same question, roughly.)” I don’t mean to play semantic games; the questioner himself draws the link from awareness of the “I” to (self-) consciousness, and clearly limits the context of the discussion to Consciousness as synonym for Self-Awareness, as in, “the unexamined Life is not worth living [examination of the state of Self as tool to perception, understanding, and ultimately satisfaction]” and maybe, “Man, did you see that play? He was unconscious! [~Zen or Dao(?), and one unit’s functioning in the larger system]” If anyone can propose, in this context, a clear difference between Consciousness and Self-Awareness, I would be interested.

As for a reductionist-logic requirement to classify all objects as having this property (consciousness) or not having it, it ain’t that simple. This is a spectrum, and it becomes as difficult to define at the edges as it is to draw the dividing line between yellow and green. Pure yellow and “pure” green (50% yellow and 50% blue?) may be as “easy” to define as saying humans have consciousness and lobsters don’t, but when you get down into the fine mixtures, where do you draw the line? On which day did your child, or you, become recognizably “adult,” and can anyone be certain there was a dividing line day? Otherwise, must we doubt our adulthood?


4. Nope, didn't mean to suggest complexity equals consciousness. Correlation is not causality. Everything in the Universe is connected – but not all the connections are significant to a given analysis. Nor is consciousness automatically resultant from complexity. The Universe is pretty complex - taking all levels of analysis at once it’s the most complex “system” possible - but I would not argue it is Aware. Rather, I would say that complexity Of A Certain Type – in this case, information processing capacity – IS requisite to development and maintenance of consciousness. It is the medium, if you will, on which the pattern may or may not be drawn.

A mountain, or an ecosystem, is complex, but that’s the wrong KIND of complexity. Or, if you will, the system being analyzed has been inappropriately limited, and the result is that the emergent property sought is not seen. To make an analogy to an earlier example: if I examine a transaxle (alone), or a Ford Motor Corp. factory, or the structure and communications of DaimlerChrysler’s human resources department, I will find lots of complexity - but I will not find Locomotion. To do that, I have to limit my analysis to one of the cars coming out of that Ford factory.

In doing any analysis of complexity one must define the boundaries of the system that will be examined. As an early systems theory philosopher put it (I’m paraphrasing), “There are many ways to skin a cat, but first you have to decide which part is cat and which part isn’t.” In analyzing Mental Existence, say, we might decide that we will examine individuals in the abstract (THE Personality, not A Personality), brain functions from the whole organ down through the neurons down to the neurotransmitter level, and Mind States (Consciousness, Affect, Temperament, etc.). Then we observe, theorize, test, conclude as may or may not be possible.

Just As Importantly, by doing this we are saying (among other things) that we have decided that Society is a level of analysis we can safely ignore for this exercise, that both the quantum mechanical descriptions and the chemical reaction descriptions of how a given neurotransmitter type bonds to a given receptor type are unimportant (but the gross Effects ARE important; we included them above), that personal historical experiences – which undoubtedly shape us all – are unimportant to the given larger question, that examining the solar system, the Milky Way and the Local Group will not add anything of value to our analysis, ad nauseum.

It may later become apparent that we erred in not including certain linkages / subsystems / supersystems, and it may be that we erred but did not realize it. As a result, we may not discover anything useful or reproducible. But recognize that framing the question can be critical, and conversely, in systems analysis, descriptions that are found to apply to a given level of analysis of a system are not negated merely by changing perspective. (Thus, psychological insights and drug therapies which work wonderfully with individuals may be inappropriate for application to the behavior of social institutions. Yet individuals and social groups ARE connected, and do influence each other through various kinds of feedback.)

So, are ant colonies complex? Yes. And the hand is complex in many ways, including at the cellular level. Both systems are highly interconnected from certain perspectives (neuromuscular, metabolic), but neither becomes self-aware. Even though they demonstrate internal feedback, they lack the information processing

Sorry, JoeyBlades, forgot to address your interesting example of the world with only one person. (For a very interesting if flawed view on that, watch the Australian movie The Quiet Earth. The final scene really got me.)

I assume that this world would be like ours, not some featureless void. How about other animals? In either case, the individual could draw the line between Self and NotSelf*; it would be the defining of the nature of Self that would be difficult. With no other proper examples for guidance, it might be sort of like legends of the Wolf Boys.

But Awareness? Of a simple kind, I'd venture to say yes. Animalistic by our standards, but let's not be too snobby. What would be missing would be all the other things we unconsciously assume are Human. We would almost certainly decide this person was Insane, were we to meet hi/r, and we might not be able to establish the kind of communication that says to us, "There is a like being behind those eyes."

* I previously used Other, but that infers similarity, so perhaps NotSelf is better?

David,

You wrote:

In either case, the individual could draw the line between Self and NotSelf*; it would be the defining of the nature of Self that would be difficult.

I agree, this individual might develop a conceptual distinction between Self and NotSelf. I'm just not convinced that it would be necessarily so. My point really was that this distinction may not be requisite for consciousness... In other words, let's not confuse awareness with self-awareness.

BTW
What's up with that "other" conciousness [sic] thread?

DavidForster has greatly improved on Cecil's shorter response, which merely scratched the surface. I agree that together with Life, Self-Awareness is necessary and sufficient to produce consciousness (="the recognition by the thinking subject of its own acts or affections" - Hamilton).
As to whether complex systems such as ant colonies or Human Resource departments can exhibit self-awareness, I don't know that I am knowledgeable enough about such matters to provide a learned opinion. But who cares, my guess is yes. The reason is obvious: we are all complex systems combined of billions of individual, independent, un-conscious cells.
Language, physical/tactile consciousness, and so on are probably unnecessary.

A couple of good resources to follow up are:
Schroedinger's essay, "What Is Life?"
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on the web, http://plato.stanford.edu/contents-unabridged.html
Alan Turing's paper, "Computing Machinery and Intelligence", in which he proposes the Turing test, http://www.abelard.org/turpap/turpap.htm. Too bad Turing couldn't have written this column.


------------------
The state of non-bliss implies some knowledge.

The question of consciousness does not hinge upon whether or not we can create a machine that mimics our subjective experience. Conscioiusness is not thought, per se, but rather the awareness of awareness, the awareness of thought--the presence of an internal monologue. As Descartes's wife said, "I think I think, therefore I think I am...I think."
Computers are fundamentally different from the manner in which the brain is organized. The former are largely linear systems. The brain is massively parallel and massively interconnected. Most importantly, the brain exists inside a biologic entity called a body, which provides a cacophony of inputs--sensory, hormonal, metabolic, toxic and traumatic. One cannot divide the brain from the body, they are all of a piece and cannot exist one without the other. Rather than designed from scratch to spec, the brain is an evolutionary and experiential garbage heap as well with layers of obsolescent technologies and routines running beneath the more advanced "Consciousness98" OS. (Hmmm. Rather like running Windows on an Intel box in a way.)
The higher aspects of consciousness that are most of interest are meta-phenomena of the escalating complexity of the mammalian central nervous system and in human lineage, at least, go hand in hand with the evolution of language. Nature shows us that when you put enough of something in one place, the rules that govern it often change. Put enough hydrogen in one place--you get a star. Put more and you get a black hole. Put enough macromolecules together and DNA starts replicating itself. Hook enough neurons together and in some bipedal prehensile ape-oid fellow and, voila, consciousness.

As previous posters have correctly noted, Cecil did pass the buck on this one. He gave the questioner an irrelevant answer. Straight Dope readers deserve to know Cecil's opinion on consciousness. Is it epiphenominal? If so, how does he account for any kind of epistemological justification? How can any sort of truth exist? Contrary to some of the dismissals encountered here, substance dualism seems like the way to go. It is the only way to account for consciousness, which entails a lot more than simple awareness. Any other option would be not only reductionist, but self-stultifying. If consciousness is to be explained only in physical terms, then it follows that we are only a bunch of electro-chemical reactions. This would mean we can never know truth, for we could never know anything at all. Our thoughts would be nothing more than reactions and so would lack any sort of purposeness or intention or even will. We could not even truly know that we are communicating with each other; our personal electro-chemical reactions just make it seem that we are. Perhaps this is why Cecil avoided answering the question in favor of giving us a history lesson on AI. He doesn't want to admit to substance dualism out of fear that his credibility may be blown.

Hey, c'mon, folks... Cecil started by saying, what, in 600 words? ... and he chose to focus on whether "consciousness" can be simulated; the underlining question is whether/how we could mimic or detect it.

Notice the length of some of the postings here. There are great huge volumes written on this subject, and the conclusion of most is that it is unknowable.

Cecil chose to take the question in a direction that can be answered, by focusing on artificial intelligence.

But CK, this IS why it's good we have a message board here.
Jill

I realize many of you think this issue tangential to Cecil's column, and I realize most of you think I'm wrong, but this begs a few questions:

Are any animals aware of the connection between the sex act and the appearance of their offspring? Are any animals aware of their own mortality? Are any animals endowed with free will, the ability to always choose otherwise?

The answer to all is "None save man."

Animals are intelligent to varying degrees, but only man posesses intellect, that ineffable quality that is prerequisite to conciousness. Other apes might recognize their own features in a mirror or in their progeny, but man alone is aware of the connections of reflected light and reflected DNA characteristics.

No one is taken to calling chimpanzees intellectual creatures, nor can it be properly said that they are anti-intellectual, as is certainly the case with some humans. The difference in the brain of man and those of the lower animals is one of kind, not one of degree. Man alone among the animals posesses free will. All other animals lack the qualities of conciousness necessary to choose otherwise. Their behavior is determined, ours is not.

Nickrz writes:

I realize many of you think this issue tangential to Cecil's column, and I realize most of you think I'm wrong, but this begs a few questions:

I've had to bite my toungue a few times in this thread... but since you ask...

Are any animals aware of the connection between the sex act and the appearance of their offspring?

Not a good example... some humans don't understand this connection.

Are any animals aware of their own mortality?

Also, not a good example... for the same reasoning as above. Also, how do you know that apes (or any other animal, for that matter) are not aware of their own mortality?

Are any animals endowed with free will, the ability to always choose otherwise?

Well, I can't argue with you here because I don't completely understand your point. What choices are you referring to? Again, how do you know that animals don't make choices?

Seems by your definition, the young and the mentally handicapped may not qualify as conscious?

Animals are intelligent to varying degrees, but only man posesses intellect, that ineffable quality that is prerequisite to conciousness.

What evidence do you offer that intellect is prerequisite to consciouness? What evidence do you offer that only man posesses intellect? If it's ineffable, how do you define it's limits or it's identifying criteria?

Other apes might recognize their own features in a mirror or in their progeny, but man alone is aware of the connections of reflected light and reflected DNA characteristics.

So in other words, prior to our understanding of these concepts, man could not have been considered conscious?

Not only are you off on a tangent from the original topic, I think you're on a tangent from your own point... currently you are arguing that only man is educated.

So this argument goes on forever. All it arises from is basically two kinds of people -- those that think there are two kinds of people and those that don't. . . No, I mean, those that fear the loss of (hu)mankind's worth, or feel it humanity is a goner at such moment as it be viewed as part of a continuum of molecular evolution or as its behavior patterns become indistinguishable from those of inanimate artifacts it should construct, i.e., silicon-processor-controlled gizmos or whatever -- versus those who aren't on that trip, hangup, religion, or whatever, and just hang around this universe, having fun conjuring up attempts at such gizmos or just speculating in free thought.

Since Nickrz seems to be labeled 'moderator', I guess I should watch what I say here though. . .or my post won't see the light of day. He may deem it just communicational artifacts due to sunspots.

Well, to me, most of these chasms of argument arise merely by viewing the same things differentially between the dual aspects of the subjective and the objective. My above statements are, of course, subjective. Objectively, there are only correlations of pixel data between posts coming from somewhere in this universe -- perhaps an amused chimp with a PC or an organized gas plasma that learned to lase a comm link to Earth.

It seems to me (from both a mentalistic and hardware viewpoint) that behind this objective/subjective bifurcation lies the pragmatics of a complex organism's (surely, though, not limited to just a human's) being able to thrust against entropy, in the same lifetime and universe, by use of both a bottom-up synthesis of concepts like sticks and stones and an empathetic, social analysis of complex behavioral concepts too complex to deal with in the bottom-up manner. I would further speculate that one studying the organization of the human or higher-animal brain ought to be able to find some physical bifurcation, in the structure of such organs, which correlates to this split in cognitive method.

But getting back to the posts here, I am particularly puzzled as to the stance taken by Lipochrome, a person who claims quite an involvement with computers and additionally has explored software neural nets, neurobiology and perhaps some sorts of so-called cognitive science. He would seem to defy my simplistic dichotomy of people, since, in spite of his computer and neurocomputational context, he appears to feel computers inherently have no chance for stealing advanced human roles and picks on such things as their hardware-substrate-level means of memory storage, and also the non-existent difference between the existence of something and its simulation to the full extent of the domain covered within a given argument.

In his position, he certainly recognizes that artificial systems which most nearly approach human-style information processing are layered up from the very inhuman organization of their bottom-level silicon substrate. Neural nets, though of course, much simplified from their biological correlates, provide their own level of memory in the weightings of their synapse analogues, leaving the substrate's inflexible mode of memory irrelevant to arguments over their ability to (excuse the expression) ape humans.

Lipochrome also clearly draws a general, distinct line between existance of something and its simulation. In any given discussion, only a finite range of the complement of attributes of a concept is germane to such discussion. If what is "simulated" involves everything that is at stake in the discussion, that "simulation" also *exists* as the stereotypic entity upon which the discussion is centered (and stereotypes are what the brain and other neuro nets are all about, "PC" or not "PC", so to speak). Thus, if the stand-in for a human happens to have (as a single individual or as a stereotype of a genus) only three toes per foot, and the argument is over humanoid complexity or "hummanness" of activity/"thoughts" in the brain/mind -- one should not discount this stand-in in respect to its capacity for "human" behavior, in short, its "humanity", on the basis of its lack of two toes per foot. Of course, one may note that, to simpler humans -- and in a way, even to more complex ones -- a human-looking face painted on a very intellectually dense robot is likely to strike more of a human chord than is such robot's rendition of human intellectual feats. Then again, many human amputees have far fewer toes than six. Similarly, should the artifact employ, at its lowest level of organization, non-content-addressable memory, this is immaterial. At the lowest level of objective organization of the human brain, memory results from mere molecular bonding, as we apply modern chemical science, though such scientific modeling have little interest to so-called "humanists".

No one (except Creationists) should argue against the fact that language processing in humans has involved a significant evolutionary change in the wetware of their brains from that of those ancestors they have in common with the great apes. As one with an engineering background who has experienced some capacity for non-verbal innovation (exercised also by artists) -- from an introspective view, I highly object to any notion that "humanity" is predicated on an organism's or mechanism's ability to manipulate well-defined symbols; in fact, such manipulation can be exemplary of very poor engineering or art, and very commonly, of not very uplifting airheadedness. But some literary academics get really wound up on the humanness of symbol-tossing. (No doubt they would they claim that I have done a poor job here.)

One should note that today's commerce in computers is free-market, except perhaps, in academia and government labs. Open commerce, of course, does not have as a goal the simulation or replacement of human beings. Thus the speed of evolution of more humanoid computer intellectual behavior is not as fast as it would be were we hell-bent on replacing ourselves. There have been a few academics who have announced that they were on such a direct artificial-replication pursuit. I believe they have found themselves rather limited in funding, which may be the reason they have of recent made no great announcements of progress. OTOH, they may have been better at symbol manipulation than at the subverbal talents necessary to their announced goal.

In comparing digitally (or analogically, if you must) implemented centralized information processors with the human brain, it seems to me one has to take into consideration two basic structural-implementation factors -- 1) specific patterns of physical organization and 2) brute-force quantity of elements. What's hanging onto this assemblage and is in its sensory and social/communication-link environment are also part of the formula for the ultimately comparable behavioral results. A human brain directly interacts, of course, with other organs of the body that contains it -- in part, in such ways as to sustain its body within its particular sensory and effectory environment, and in that containing others of its kind with which it can communicate; and it is given a lifetime to informationally interact with these, although this may include some rote imprinting, as well as much more complex interaction. Such a brain has some very specialized parts in order to do this and also has somewhat modularly arranged cortices, generalized to varying extent, to adaptively modify its body's behavior in these and less-apparently applied tasks -- such as the instant one. (Occasionally one of the latter may get the species over a hump in its evolutionary contest with its environment, but not often. Like the moderator can say this individual "gushed" and squish its linguistic stain out of existence.)

It has been mentioned that advanced human-simulating / humanoid systems may require time-consuming "raising" within certain environments while attached to appropriate sensors. Of course, some time can be saved by canning some of the results of this on storage media and feeding it s

I forgot to note, in reference to the "brute-force" component of humanoid manufacture, that the state of the art in either hardware or software neural-net structures, as I understand it, falls many orders of magnitude short of the numerical claims made for the human CPU of something like 100 billion neurons, each interconnected on average to 10,000 of its fellows. This limitation alone restricts humanoids to very minor leagues.

Ray's machine

Anything Nickrz doesn't understand, in his little species-centric den containing The Rules, as set out in Philosophy 101 and other sources of limited views of the real world, he apparently conveniently labels "misuse of language". Maybe he should try to grow out of his knickers and relate to a larger world not based solely on the views of monks and whatever. I agree that his character doesn't need to be highlighted for clarification; it sticks out there like a well-self-polished sore thumb or bump on a log. If others had stopped at Philosophy 101, or maybe even failed to avoid it, we wouldn't have any computers here with which to disagree. . .and I suppose we would just have to go at each other with sapiers, right? (Of course, we only got as far as sapiers because some, who thought beyond the pictures of animals on the cave walls, decided there ought to be something more effective than the clubs called out in The Rules of an earlier pictographic Philosophy 101.

On a different tack, one comment I meant to make is that I don't know whether any charting of a theoretical course toward producing artifacts having the nature and complexity of human cognition and control, considering the use of layering of the basic hardware and software one can think about via modes of design of today, really relates to a possible realization within a reasonably procurable *quantity* of the necessary doped-silicon matter and such possibly convergible software as would be needed in order to produce something, no matter how awkward, that would function at a time rate somewhere near comparable to the reasoning of humans. However, such a failure to implement with technologies forseeable today would not shoot down more refined approaches to such implementation that would not be composed of carbonaceous neurons.

Ray

I wasn't going to get involved in this thread, but I just have to jump in here.

NanoByte, that last paragraph of yours is practically gibberish. You could have said the same thing in half the space, but instead, you intentionally use large words and overly-complex sentence structure in an attempt to make your argument seem more intelligent.

The aforementioned circumlocutory, periphrastic grandiloquence necessitates ocular review of an inordinate duration, previous to complete comprehension, yet fails in contributing to the import of the text. A request is made from me after reading it, that you, having written the post to which I'm referring, in the future kindly moderate your verbosity.

(In other words: "It takes much longer to read but doesn't add meaning. Please quit it. Thanks.")

Uber: a comment. You say that Life and Self-Awareness are necessary and sufficient to produce Consciousness. (I would agree accept that, until someone clarifies it better, I see Self-Awareness as being the same thing as Consciousness, which exist(s) in more or less complex form among a variety of species.) While sufficiently-complex information-processing-capability is assumed in self-awareness, when it comes to Life I see it differently – DEPENDING on our mutual definition of Life. (I assume some sort of biological/metabolic process.) I presently cannot imagine Consciousness developing independently of Life, BUT once it has developed I see no reason to assume “Life” continues to be a necessity for the maintenance and transmission, or reproduction, of Consciousness.

Jack Rambo: Yes, I think you put it very well when you point out that computers (and flies, etc.) are largely linear, while we “Thinkers” are massively parallel and massively interconnected. It is that increasingly interconnected (informational) complexity that allows for the development of higher Consciousness, and which is missing in ant colonies and ecosystems and, frankly, corporations. But it may not ALWAYS be missing from society… On good days, I predict that society as an organism, or system, or system of systems of organisms, will achieve “Consciousness of Itself” before a single ‘computer’ does; I think in view of recent developments that it’s less of a leap, especially given the assumption that the base components already embody ‘Conscious’ abilities. But would a component of that system (i.e. you, or me) ever be able to Recognize that ‘Social Consciousness’… whatever form it takes? That may sound flaky, but for those who understand what I have been saying here, I submit that the same principles could apply on a slightly larger scale.

When you point out that, “when you put enough of something in one place, the rules that govern it often change,” it is also as true to say that when one changes the scale / perspective / limits of the system one is observing, the possibilities / behaviors / outputs change. (Think of the following systems – cell, organ, entity, tribe – and you can understand.)

MendozaR: with all due respect, I think that substance dualism is an explanation arrived at by our ancestors who couldn’t understand the question or the playing field, let alone the answers. At the risk of sounding argumentative, I would submit that the standard beliefs in this area are those which are reductionist, as well as ultimately tautological. You say that, “If consciousness is to be explained only in physical terms, then it follows that we are only a bunch of electro-chemical reactions.” There are two ways to answer this, depending on where we draw the boundaries and the nature of the definitions being assumed: 1) Yes, and…?, or 2) not at all; reducing the complexity out of our statement, or definition, of the system APPARENTLY removes the complex property or state being sought, but this is an error of definition not understanding. Are Van Gogh’s or Rembrandt’s paintings “only a bunch of” brush strokes of various colors? Is the screen you are looking at “only a bunch of” vari-shaded pixels on one side of a glass surface, or is there more meaning than this embodied in what you are looking at even now? At one level of analysis, you ARE “just” looking at a bunch of dots. At another level, those dots form patterns (characters, and “words”). At another, they can parse as sentences that embody complete ideas – and at yet another they can instigate formation of associations to all sorts of other ideas and experiences you have encountered throughout your life. Do those physical phosphor-dots therefore embody another sort of essence, some sort of “Communicative Property” which is slight in any one dot but builds up into a Message in sufficient quantities? No, of course not. It is the PATTERN which is important. And thus with Life – it is the structure and metabolism of the body that allows it to move and breathe and reproduce – and thus it is with Mind – it is the Pattern of our (electro-chemically-based) thoughts that makes us.

You also point out that, “We could not even truly know that we are communicating with each other…” Well, DO we know it? Exactly HOW do you know I exist, for example? Heck, even with those I meet face-to-face, I often wonder if we are truly communicating. Given the nature of their responses, I am frequently forced (I could tell you HORROR stories!) to doubt it – EVEN if substance dualism explains both our being there.

Nickrz: Concerning the posting of 6/21 06:50 AM (and WHAT are you doing at that hour? Either you work too hard, or you’re one o’ Them – a Morning Person), I think JoeyBlades has done a good job of reflecting questions back on certain of your questions, assumptions, and assertions, so I will merely add support to his response. (I realize that means little or nothing.) But as for your final paragraph I must heartily disagree. Everything I have argued here is that the mental difference between humans and other animals IS one of degree, NOT of kind – and that, even leaving the possibility that our hubris blinds us aside, the degree of difference can be great enough to lead one to suspect that it is a difference of kind (even if it isn’t).

The human tendency to view invention and innovation as proof of consciousness and higher-order thinking, and to believe that only We innovate and therefore only We are conscious, has the strength of historic dogma behind it, but in reality it is more and more clearly being proved to be a self-aggrandizing myth. A neat little Science News article can be found at http://www.sciencenews.org/sn_arc99/6_5_99/bob2.htm. The truth is, we humans typically don’t see what we don’t want to see, or what we aren’t culturally prepared to consider as a possibility, and in the West this has resulted in our seeing ourselves as shepherds and the literally(?) dumb animals as Lesser Beings. (There is evidence of verbal communication in many species that contains more than pre-programmed, genetically-or-otherwise determined information.)

Concerning animal intellect, one of my favorite animals has always been the female Japanese macaque who not only invented the washing of sandy potatoes in water – a behavior never before observed among her group or species – but who, years later when the researchers started putting rice out on the beach sand, was able to realize that similar behavior could make that food supply useful, too. I’d say that hers is not only a SMARTER solution than some people I’ve known could find, but that it indicates a higher-order understanding, of herself and the universe, than mere determined behavior would allow for. (Or to put it another way, you can argue that her realization – and that of her alone – concerning the generalizability of certain behaviors to other objects and situations was in some way automatic, determined, unconscious, lacking in free will(?), but then I would argue that exactly the same is usually true of many people.)

From the article above, I have to say my favorite was, “a house sparrow [that hovers] in front of the sensor that triggers the automatic door at a bus station and then [flies] inside for food.” This is a bird with a brain the size of – what – an apricot pit? A cherry pit? Think about it – the bird had to somehow associate being in a certain location with the opening of a door AND with the concept of an “inside” of the bus station that exists independent of the door’s state. If nothing else, EVEN if we argue that this might be nothing more than a “lucky” association and/or superstitious behavior (meant in the psychological sense of superstition, an apparently unrelated behavior included in a learned sequence of actions) which turned out to be realistic by pure chance, it still brings into great question the nature of discovery, understanding, and invention among humans. Perhaps innovation is not (usually) a ‘purely intellectual pursuit by the consciousnes

Not only are you off on a tangent from the original topic, I think you're on a tangent from your own point... currently you are arguing that only man is educated.

This is the last statement in a whole series of statements and silly arguments that show you understand nothing (or are being purposely opaque) about the valid questions I raised. If you do not understand "my point" behind the concept of free will or determined behavior, then I suggest you buy a copy of Philosophy 101 and bone up before pooh-poohing things you have no knowledge of. Oh, and while you're at it, try finding out the difference between intellect and intelligence. I'll refer you back to the books in my original post.

Since Nickrz seems to be labeled 'moderator', I guess I should watch what I say here though. . .or my post won't see the light of day. He may deem it just communicational artifacts due to sunspots.

Egregious attempt at the use of sarcasm to influence my behavior and aspersion cast on my character duly noted.

I was preparing to eliminate all posts in this forum that disagreed with me, but Lo! and behold, much to my surprise and consternation, I don't have that power in here. Drat! But then again, why would I pass up the opportunity to label as "unadulterated stilted blather" the following uncanny spectacular misuse of the English language.

It seems to me (from both a mentalistic and hardware viewpoint) that behind this objective/subjective bifurcation lies the pragmatics of a complex organism's (surely, though, not limited to just a human's) being able to thrust against entropy, in the same lifetime and universe, by use of both a bottom-up synthesis of concepts like sticks and stones and an empathetic, social analysis of complex behavioral concepts too complex to deal with in the bottom-up manner.

Nano GIGO. Now, if you'll excuse me, I have some entropy that needs thrusting against.

NanoByte writes:

But getting back to the posts here, I am particularly puzzled as to the stance taken by Lipochrome,....

[snip]

... in spite of his computer and neurocomputational context, he appears to feel computers inherently have no chance for stealing advanced human roles...

I think Lipochrome is dead on with his assessment of the parallels (or rather, lack of) between AI computing systems and the human brain. So add me to your list of people who "defy your simplistic dichotomy".

In his position, he certainly recognizes that artificial systems which most nearly approach human-style information processing are layered up from the very inhuman organization of their bottom-level silicon substrate. Neural nets, though of course, much simplified from their biological correlates, provide their own level of memory in the weightings of their synapse analogues, leaving the substrate's inflexible mode of memory irrelevant to arguments over their ability to (excuse the expression) ape humans.

Ten years ago, folks in the AI field believed that neural nets were a close model to the way the brain works, but today not many serious practitioners would make this argument. Certainly there are elements of functionality that are shared between the two, but we don't have a comprehensive understanding of how the brain works. It's quite true that there is some massive parallelism going on in the brain, but perhaps it's not in the way we suspect. The way the human brain works is like a giant jigsaw puzzle and we've managed to piece together most of the border and consolidate a few distinct chunks in the middle. We've assembled (maybe) 10% of the total puzzle and we're trying to guess what the picture is...

Don't let science fiction writers fool you. Neural nets are not the answer. They can do certain specific tasks well, like pattern recognition (still not as good as the human brain), but ask a neural net to add two numbers and it will fall flat on it's ass.

At the lowest level of objective organization of the human brain, memory results from mere molecular bonding, as we apply modern chemical science, though such scientific modeling have little interest to so-called "humanists".

I don't think we can say. As Lipochrome pointed out, memory is "smeared" across the brain in ways we can't even fathom. The mechanisms for memory may extend beyond our simple view of electro-chemical reactions between the synapses.

Also, NanoByte writes:

But some literary academics get really wound up on the humanness of symbol-tossing. (No doubt they would they claim that I have done a poor job here.)

So... you realize you have a problem... I'm sure there are 12 step programs for people with your problem. [wink]

Nickrz,

You wrote:

This is the last statement in a whole series of statements and silly arguments that show you understand nothing (or are being purposely opaque) about the valid questions I raised.

I believe my points did serve to invalidate your questions, or at least show that your questions have an inherent bias (education). Rather than simply calling me silly, how about attempting some sort of rational argument?

If you do not understand "my point" behind the concept of free will or determined behavior, then I suggest you buy a copy of Philosophy 101 and bone up before pooh-poohing things you have no knowledge of.

You missed my point. Your "Philosophy 101" will have all the same biases that you've been injecting into this discussion. I believe you are working with a flawed notion of free will, but that's why I asked you to define it more clearly. I believe animals **DO** exhibit free will. Have you ever watched a dog come to a junction in a road, stop and look left, then right and choose a direction? Have you ever seen a cat refuse to eat the new brand of cat food you bought? Animals demonstrate free will all the time. Sure, you can overlay boundary conditions such as requiring the decisions to be of a moral or intellectual nature, but that gets us back to my point about educational bias. BTW, I didn't "pooh-pooh" anything. I merely asked how you know that animals (and that would have to be **ALL** animals, save man) don't exercise free will.

Oh, and while you're at it, try finding out the difference between intellect and intelligence.

Now that's funny. Previously you claimed:

...only man posesses intellect, that ineffable quality...

I started to challenge you, at the time, that intellect might not be inherently ineffable, but decided to avoid that argument altogether. Now you claim that you can distinguish between intellect and intelligence...
OK, smart guy. [wink] Let's hear your distinction.

DavidForster shared a few stories about animal inventiveness... I thought I'd share a few of my own.

There have been quite a number of studies where apes have been taught sign language. Nickrz argues that these animals are merely exhibiting a pavlovian response. I agree. At least in the early phases of these studies. Most of the teaching techniques center on rewards - not too unlike early learning mechanisms in human communication, BTW. However, in many cases the subjects end up communicating ideas that have no bearing on rewards. If there's no reward, why would they bother to "communicate"? Still not convinced??? I don't blame you, but here's the thing that makes me suspect that apes may have some level of consciousness. In several of these studies, new apes were introduced to the trained groups, but given no training from humans and given no rewards for adopting a habit of communicating. Invariably, the trained apes took it upon themselves to train the new apes in this new found art and the apes would communicate amongst themselves without humans even being around. I simply can't dismiss the posibility as easily as Nickrz...

A couple of other examples (not in the same class as above, but makes me think, anyway):

I used to have a dog; a pug. His food and water dish was in the kitchen beside / in front of the refrigerator. One day my wife and I had the refrigerator door open, trying to decide what we wanted to have for dinner. The door was blocking the dog's dish. The dog came over and stood for a moment, then layed flat on his belly and extended one paw under the refrigerator door and dragged his food dish out to the center of the kitchen. If you know pugs, you know this is not a simple feat. They are not built for this sort of manouvre and he had to gradually scoot his body backwards as he dragged his dish. A casual observer would have deduced that he was trained to do this trick, yet he only did it that one time.

One of my neighbors had a cat that learned, on it's own, how to turn on an electric piano and play it. The cat seemed to recognize that it could press certain buttons to change the voice and that different keys would produce different sounds. The cat would routinely go into the study, turn on the piano, and tap out random tunes to entertain itself... The neighbor tried to teach the cat a simple tune, but you know cats... he had no interest in pleasing it's master... I watched this cat one day and can attest to three things (1) the cat clearly and deliberately turned on the piano [it was no accident] (2) the cat then layed down on the back of the piano and tapped along the keyboard at various points producing sounds and (3) the cat had no formal training in music theory.

By the way, Jack Rambo, you made reference to the "Consciousness98" OS.

I am not sure I can communicate the extent of my outrage. My mind most certainly is NOT running on a Microsoft product!

At least, not yet.

Alas, gentlemen, I will not have time until Friday to address your questioning of my viewpoint. (Right, like you're all holding your breath).

No. Actually, I was starting to turn blue... [wink]

Returning in a more rational frame of mind -

1. You have me on the "ineffable" statement. The word should have been "ethereal." Substituing the wrong word for the right thought is one of those effable qualities that separate humans from the lower animals.

2. I have neither the time nor the inclination to launch into a debate over the
characteristics of free will vs. determined behavior. Either you understand the concepts or you don't, imho.

3. Denying the validity of my question "Are any animals aware of their own mortality?" by stating "Some humans are not aware of theirs" is wholly specious argument. I refuse to indulge such meandering. (And likewise with the reasoning behind JB's other
"questions").

4. I'll refer you back to my original post and the book citations therein. If any of you are truly interested in this opposing point of view, read them. I dare you. I suspect none of you arguing for lower animal intellect wish to have your ridiculous assertions and ideas challenged by anyone who has the philosophy and facts in ready form, as Dr. Adler does. I don't need to rewrite his ideas here.

Ta Ta, Gents