Gen. Omar Bradley takes up the question of how the battle plan developed after the German collapse in Normady, along with his assessment of it. I looks as if the movie condensed what was an involved assessment of what to do into a single scene where Patton asks for fuel for a “dash” to Berlin. What follows is based on information in Bradley’s book A General’s Life, Chap. 33.
Montgomery wanted to be given the bulk of the Allied forces for a drive along the French channel coast to Berlin. He claimed he could move fast enough that the demoralized Germans wouldn’t have time to stop him. This had a big advantage that, if successful, the V1 and V2 rocket sites could be eliminated rather quickly thus sparing Britain further punishment. And, Monty claimed, his plan would end the war quickly.
As to this Bradley wrote that Monty would be forced to drop off troops along the way to protect his supply line thus weakening his assault forces the closer he got to Germany. He summed up as follows: In my opinion, Monty’s basic assumption—that he could strike straight through to the Ruhr and Berlin before the Germans could organize to resist him—was downright crazy. I was sure the Germans could organize at least twenty to thirty crack divisions to defend their homeland. By then, Monty’s spearhead would be dangerously weak. There would not be time enough to open Antwerp for supplies; his lines would stretch all the way back to the invasion beaches. His flanks would be exposed to counterattack. In my estimation, there was a good possibility that Monty’s diminished spearhead could be utterly destroyed, that a determined German counterattack could drive us all the way back to the Seine.
At the same time Patton was arguing the same sort of plan on his own behalf with him getting the bulk of the armies and supplies. In spite of all sorts of myth, at this time Patton was not the all-conquering hero that he is made to to be. His 3[sup]rd[/sup] Army had been given the task of securing the Brittany Peninsula and capturing the Ports of Brest and St. Nazaire. It had not succeeded in that task and was finally pulled out and sent east to help with the 1[sup]st[/sup] Army’s attempt to close the trap at Falaise.
Here is Bradley’s assessment of Patton at the time and of his plan. *Alternately, what if we had backed Patton in an all-out pursuit without pause? Could he, as he claimed, have brought the war to an early end?
I am not aware that anyone other than Patton has taken this idea seriously. Undeniably Patton had a marvelous talent for gaining ground— and headlines. Without meaning to detract from his extraordinary achievements, Patton’s great and dramatic gains, beginning in Sicily and continuing through Brittany and on across the Seine at Mantes, Melun and Troyes, had been made against little or no opposition. Until now Patton had not really had a serious fight on his hands, and I was certain that sooner or later Patton was going to have one. I was not sure how good a tactician he would be in a tough fight. None of his divisions had ever been put to the real test.
Had we backed Patton all-out, it would have been necessary to throw the full weight—all three corps—of Hodges’ battle-hardened First Army into the chase with him. That, in fact, had been the original Allied plan on a much slower timetable. The addition of Hodges’ army would have imposed a logistical demand so heavy as to preclude pursuit without pause. As I have stated often, Patton gave little or no consideration to logistics. He and Hodges might well have pursued without pause to the German border, but logistical limitations would have halted them there, perhaps for a very long time, with no real gain to us.*
So, it is doubtful that the movie’s Patton-Bradley conversation about fuel ever took place. And in the opinion of Bradley, Patton’s scheme was ill-conceived. As for “Berlin in 10 days,” fuggidabowdit.