God, and existence as a predicate

Great Debates
1

Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason

If I may paraphrase what Kant has said, and by extension what commentators on Kant (like David Hume) have said, existence is not a predicate because it does not express a property by which a subject is individuated. For example, “Socrates exists” tells us nothing about Socrates that it does not also tell us about any entity that we may substitute in his place. Oprah Winfrey also exists. Cats exist and dogs exist and even trees and rocks exist. The statement “A exists” does not express any property of A that individuates A from any other entity.

On the other hand, if we say “Socrates is wise”, according to Kant, then we have individuated Socrates as an entity separate from trees and rocks and people who are not wise. In this case, the predicate is nominative of the subject and adds a property to the subject that is not expressed by the subject alone. It actualizes a potential that was intrinsic to the subject. Or, in Kantian terms, a statement about the subject has extrapolated the synthetic (what is known by synthesis) from the analytic (what is known by analysis). Later clarifications by a mortified Kant, who realized his mistake after already having declared that his book was the be-all and end-all of philosophical inquiry, served to concede that “Socrates is wise” is insufficient to individuate Socrates from all other subjects. There are, after all, other wise men. Therefore, a predicate may in theory be of any length, so that we could go on and on about Socrates until we have used enough phrases such that we describe a unique individual unlike any other.

But some modern philosophers (see, for example, The Fullness of Being, Barry Miller, Chapter 4) are becoming disenchanted with the notion that existence cannot be a predicate, and in fact, the whole question has been revisited by considering existence in a new way — not as the subject being the recipient of existence, but by the subject being its bounds. Consider that you have constructed a predicate so elaborately detailed that you have succeeded in individuating Socrates. Assume, if you like, that you used a trillion words, and call the predicate A. What you then can write is “Socrates is A”. Alternatively, you may write “Socrates exists qua A”. But when you have done this, and have individuated Socrates, you have made Socrates and A indistinguishable from each other. Socrates becomes merely a shortcut that is a synonym for A. In fact, what you have done in describing Socrates in order to separate his identity from all others is to predicate the whole bounds of his existence: where he was born and when, everything he has experienced, and every thought that anyone has ever had about him. You have not added a property to him; rather, you have described his bounds. In other words, “Socrates exists qua Socrates”, or “Socrates is Socrates”. This suggests that to be perfect, a predicate must be a tautology no matter how wordy or pithy it may be.

Now, suppose we define God ontologically as the Supreme Being. It seems reasonable to do so since it is the ordinary definition of God. Is God’s existence then a predicate? Certainly it is, because if God is the Supreme Being, then there is no other being equally as great. Thus, God’s existence individuates Him by its bounds. Modally, His existence is necessary, and predicates all other existence, meaning that contingent existence is a proper subset of His own. God therefore cannot be Socrates or a tree or a rock because none of these things are proper subsets of the other, but all are proper subsets of the set of things whose existence is necessary. Neither can God be the universe, since its existence is contingent upon the existence of energy.

If God exists in actuality in this manner (and it is almost trivial to prove that He does), then it is a fatal blow for existentialism. Essence, or the nature of God, must precede His existence. That means that He is uncreated — eternal, and outside the scope of space and time. His existence is predicated upon His essence, and by extension, so is the existence of all things. As it so happens, existence as a predicate dissolves Kant’s objection to Anselm’s ontological argument. The whole of his criticism was that existence is not a predicate, and therefore God may not be defined meaningfully as “that than which nothing greater can be conceived”. It is not the conception, Kant argued, but the actualization that predicates a subject. Now that God may be individuated by the bounds of his existence, and that existence may be shown to be actual, Kant’s argument is moot.

I would like this not to be a debate about the ontological argument per se. Kindly take it as given that necessary existence may be proved to imply actual existence. For the record, here is (one) formal proof:

Definition

G

Prove

G

Premises

  1. G -> G … from the definition

  2. ~~G … it is not necessary that God does not exist

  3. G -> G … the modal axiom

Inferences

  1. G v ~G … law of excluded middle

  2. ~G -> ~G … Becker’s postulate, 4

  3. G v ~G … free variable substitution, 4 and 5

  4. ~G -> ~G … modal modus tollens, 1

  5. G v ~G … free variable substitution, 6 and 7

  6. G … disjunctive syllogism, 2 and 8

Conclusion

G … modus ponens, 3 and 9

What I would like to debate is not whether the ontological argument is valid. It is unquestionably valid. I want to debate whether it is sound. I would like to debate whether there may be any other objection to the argument aside from Kant’s existence as a predicate dilemma. At the base of it all is whether the premise is true that “it is not necessary that God does not exist”. Because if that premise is true, then the argument is sound. Intellectual honesty would compel a reasonable person to accept the argument’s conclusion.

Not surprisingly, perhaps, I hold the position that the premise is true mainly because its opposite is untenable. How can it be necessary that that which exists necessarily does not exist? I predict that this discussion, if it develops at all, will descend inevitably into objections over the definition itself. But if that happens, it’s just as well since the crux of that debate will be over whether Kant was right all along. Well, right the second time around anyway.

2

This is a rather odd contention Lib (BTW, a hearty welcome back to GD!). May I ask where or from whom you received this, or is it your own work? The universe is not contingent on the existence of energy: energy is merely a characteristic of the universe, in the same way that trees are not contingent on the colour green. We could even postulate a “zero-energy universe” (and indeed such an entity may even be necessary in a “multiverse” as proposed by some cosmologists such as Andre Linde, in which case the word “universe” would strictly apply only to that entity having three dimensions of time and one of space in which we live, even though it should retain its meaning as everything “combined into one whole”).

The universe is not contingent on anything: It has always existed, and will exist for all time. It is everywhere - there is nowhere where it is not. The universe has the property of Necssary Existence (NE). I contend that nothing greater than the universe can be conceived.

Now, the more theistic amongst us might say “Oh, I can. How about a universe which is somehow conscious? This would provide a distinction between those two commonly discussed concepts: God and universe, and it is clear that an entity which is “conscious” is a far superior to one which is not. I move that, as Beings go, the conscious one is more Supreme than the unconscious.”

However, I would suggest that this anthropomorphism is an extremely suspect distinction between such entities; rather like saying God is more Supreme because it is white, while the universe is black. “Thought”, “free will” and “consciousness” are all human concepts which are, to some extent, illusions.

I would ask you, Lib: How should we distinguish God and universe, given that neither are contingent?

3

I first ran across this proof when reading Adler. I must admit that I find it remarkably unsatisfying.

In fact, it is a proof, not that God exists, but that any D which is well defined and which cannot be proven that it is not necessary that Do does not exist does, in fact, exist. God is simply such a D. There is nothing special about God; aliens, apples, and purple unicorns fall under the same rubric.

But, in fact, we are fairly sure that this is not true. The universe is not big enough to contain all the various combinations that DNA can come up with; and, in fact, purple unicorns is one such combination that (we are fairly sure) can be programmed into DNA which has not yet made an appearance. So, while it is not necessary that purple unicorns do not exist, we are fairly sure that they do not exist, have not existed, and probably will not exist (barring the idiocy of some DNA engineer; given that, there is some other DNA combination of which this may be said).

4

Im a bit rusty: can anyone help me with the exact definition of “Necessary” and “Contingent”? Its my suspicion that a Supreme Being is neither.

5

nicky, Necessary Existence is true. This is equivalent to saying “something must exist, whose existence does not depend on (ie. is contingent on) something else”.

Now, so the argument goes, hardly “Supreme” would something be if it did not actually exist! So, the Supreme thing must exist: Its existence is necessary.

All of which I have no problem with, since it is effectively simply admitting that something exists. My problem, personally, comes with what I perceive as sleight-of-hand with the word “Being”. Instead of a “thing” or “entity”, we are all of a sudden speaking of a “being” such that one might have a chat with and become chums with, even warranting a personal pronoun with a capital letter: “He”!

If we divest the word “Being” of its personal pronoun and accept that possessing some kind of “personality/sentience/self” does not make it more Supreme than the Being without such properties, I suggest that the debate can continue with more focus.

6

I don’t see these as equivilent arguments. We can draw a purple unicorn. Many people will agree that a supreme being cannot be consistently defined as a being of inequitable status or power; and that such a property would actually negate the supremecy of such a being. A supreme being to many would be a being who handicaps itself infinitely and yet is always selected and replicated. For example, if God gives everyone a button that acts as a “kill God switch” that anyone can freely press, then God is considered a supreme being if that button is never pressed. The very notion of inequitable ability contradicts the necessary conditions that some attach to the notion of supreme… because the supremecy is contingent and not absolute, it is relative and not absolute. When you get into relative supremecy, then you’re not differentiating a concept of God from the concept of any and or every human that can be selected by random.

7

Yes, necessary existence implies existence. That’s all well and good; the proof is valid. But I don’t see why we must accept G.

Also, this proof applies to houseplants and snowblowers just as well as God, so maybe it’s not all that interesting.

8

1.) What is meant by “supreme?”

2.) What is meant by “Greatest” and how do you quantify it?

3.) Where is the proof that the universe is contingent on such a being.

It sounds like you’ve downgraded the definition of God to show necessary existence and then tried to backload the classical attributes of God as predicates after the fact.

Let us suppose that God is a giant cow, the biggest cow in the universe, and that this cow is uncreated and created the universe herself.

Now we can prove rather easily that some cow must be the biggest cow in the universe, however, it does not follow that the biggest cow in the universe is automatically an uncreated creator.

You’ve taken one attrubute “greatest” and extropolated qualities for “greatest” which haven’t been proven.

9

My objection to the ontological argument is really the same problem most people have when first confronted with it, basically a common sense objection that does not depend on the logical status of the concept of “existence.”

Simply put, the ontological argument seems to be using logic to summon God into existence, as though logic was a from of magic, rather than a tool for the analysis of reasoning.

The fact is the universe (or reality) is under no obligation to pay any attention to our reasoning. It is what it is. The only way to find out what entities exist is to actually go out and learn something about reality, through experience, observation, science, etc. Logic is useful in examining the form of our reasoning but it cannot provide us with information about the matter of our reasoning. (With of course the exception of mathematics.)

By the way I agree with your criticism of the idea that existence is not a predicate. Surely when you say “George Bush exists, but Homer Simpson does not exist.” you are predicating something about George Bush that makes him qualitatively different from Homer Simpson.

Also a very very very minor nitpick. Hume preceded Kant, and in fact it was Hume who awoke Kant from his “dogmatic slumber” and started him on his lifelong journey to redifine Metaphysics after the Empiricist criticism of earlier philosophy.

10

Hold on a second. A being’s greatness has no bearing on its existence, unless you can somehow show that a being that exists is somehow greater than one that doesn’t, when all else are equal.

Yes, it’s as valid as:

  1. A
  2. Therefore, A

Surely it is valid, but totally meaningless.

11

Believe it or not, Urban Ranger, that is precisely the argument of the Ontological proof, at least as origianally posed by St. Anselm. Namely that:

A:We have the idea of a being greater than any concievable other being.

B: A being that exists is greater than a being that doesn’t

C: Therfore that being (God) must exist.

I’m severely oversimplifying but that is the basic Gist of the argument.

12

If you’re that fatalistic about it already, then why not change things up a bit, and make your best case against it, being as inventive and incisive as you can? I predict that that would make for a much more enlightening discussion for all, and avoid a retread of ghosts of post-christmases’ past. You have nothing to lose, given that the failure of the positive argument is not a disproof of any God, and I even bet dollars to cents you’ll STILL get people to disagree with you just on the principle of the thing.

But, until then, if I may descend…
G1 = G
But can the G in <>G (i.e. ~~G) really be G1, or can it only be a PART of G1? This confuses me, because it feels like the scope is changing without warning when the G in these two premises are used together as if they were the same.

Consider a cube in flatland: the single slice of the cube that one flatlander sees is not the whole cube (which might, for instance exist equally in every flatland), and indeed, “exists in every flatland” is not a characteristic that any one slice has, it is a characteristic of the entire cube. One could argue that the slice found in every flatland is actually the SAME slice: yet still I’m not sure that “exists in every flatland” is a quality of any instance of that slice in any particular flatland. A <>Cube premise seems to describe the Cube, but it is ambiguous: it could also be speaking about particular flatlands, and so speaks only to the best representation of what “Cube” means in flatland (i.e. a slice/sqaure), all of which by themselves lack the key characteristic that makes them identical to the Cube. Flatlands cannot include characteristics that describe other flatlands. Possible worlds can contain G, but perhaps not the same G as in the definition/Premise 1, since the definition goes outside the definitional scope of any one world.

Does that convey what I’m thinking about, or is that gibberish? And if it does make sense, and I’m mis-thinking, how do I correct my conceptions?

Well, what we mean by the known universe and “all-that-exists” may be two different things. I don’t think it makes much sense to swing from ontology, where we can posit concepts alone, to demands for actual empirical obsrevation about things. How much energy is in the universe anyways? And if, for instance, the universe IS energy, how is it contingent on energy?

I don’t know if we’re capable of having informative discussions about what the universe is, since it could always be far more than we think and see. Even if a personal God is there at the end of the contingency, who knows how many unseen steps there are between that being an what we think of as “the universe.”

13

Well, you may be right, but I’m not sure that’s the response that critics of Kant are making. One might point out HS doesn’t have a qualitative difference with George Bush, in that if he doesn’t exist (as a actual man, since if all we mean is the concept of HS, then he does exist, as a concept), then he doesn’t have any qualities at all.

I think the more recent critics have different tack, as Lib described. They are rethinking the idea of existence as being a list of boundary conditions. I’m not sure the discussion of that is complete, because as far as Lib desicribed, one can still point out that Socrates may not exist: you may have described all these things about what THE Socrates must include, and yet the description may not refer to anything that exists: meaning that there is still some special concept related to existence that this new thinking has not ferreted out, and is outside the normal function of predicates. The critics have a strong response to this, and I don’t feel informed enough from memory attempt to summarize it at the moment (away from me library), but I think this later, core component of their attack is missing from Lib’s summary (which may be because only the first part is directly necessary to his OP’s purpose, since God is going to be defined as a being that bypasses that particular dispute anyway)

14

my problem with existence as a predicate is our lack of ability to negate it. surely all predicates must have a meaningful negation, no? not existence. for example:

god does not exist.

is a nonsensical statement. for any x, “x does not exist” is a nonsensical statement. semantically, the sentence can’t be fully interpreted, since if there is no thing which we may call “x”, then what are we trying to say doesn’t exist?

and personally, i never understood what anselm meant by “that than which nothing greater exists.” is god some sort of number?

15

If x is a method to the square the circle by means of only a compass and straightedge, then x does not exist.

16

What is the definition of “greater?”

17

Let us ignore for the moment the purple unicorn criticisms of the argument.

Assume you’ve established there is a God. By your own argument, the existence seems to be limited to tautological bounds. How do you go from “God is God” to the attributes of God? There’s nothing to indicate that whatever we define as God is the “Supreme Being” except by definition–which inevitably leads to the question, “Have we actually found God?” Even the secondary definition on your dictionary cite betrays itself:

“Supreme Being n. the supernatural being conceived as the perfect and omnipotent and omniscient originator and ruler of the universe”

There’s no reason to assume that the most supreme being is the one who created the universe, and if there is universe creator, there could potentially be a universe creator creator. As pointed out, even if we accept there’s one being most supreme, it says nothing about the nature of that supremacy. Presumably we can agree that Socrates is more supreme than Mussolini. Indeed, for all we know, Socrates could be the most supreme being, and thus Socrates would be God. Or perhaps the universe as a whole is the most supreme being, and thus (as many believe) the universe as a whole is God.

As far as I’m concerned, the discussion ends up being a semantic argument that tells us nothing. What good is it to prove that “God” exists without proving in any useful sense what “God” is?

18

Precisely. You can’t attach meaning to a statement unless you follow through with the implied “Exists as…”. With logic you have some choices after the word “as”.
Undecidible given the current closed set of conditions
Contradictory given the current closed set of conditions
Logically consistent given the current closed set of conditions

If you claim that something is inherently indecidable, that has the problem of contradicting the purpose for coming to the conclusion, as you are postulating an aspect of existence through which determinism doesn’t operate. This will always act as a backdoor from which the stability of your claim about its undecidability is always vulnerable. So, even when determining undecidability, it is only consistent to refer such to a reference of conditions. “Given this current set of closed conditions”. It’s a means of stating, “It is decidable, I just haven’t figured out how.” This is implied in reasoning. The moment you ‘declare’ an inherent undecidibility you’re immediately refuting yourself.

The shortest proof for God is defining God as a being that exists.
By stating this, all you are stating is that God is a linguistic token that is discernable as a result of you reading it.
That in no way proves the emminence of such a being.
Also, with matters of relativity, “greatest” is also defined in terms of conditions. “Greatest on what scale?” As noted earlier, an being of inequitable ability would necessarily not qualify for greatness on any scale. God is generally defined as being the sole possessor of all sought after inequitable distributions. Thus, God would rank as the most inferior being on this scale.

19

Let’s try your proof with a different premise:

  1. G -> G
  2. ~G – “It’s not necessary that God exists.”
  3. ~G -> ~G
  4. G v ~G
  5. ~G -> ~G
  6. G v ~G
  7. ~G -> ~G
  8. G v ~G
  9. ~G
  10. ~G

Hey, I’ve used modal logic to prove definitively that there is no God!

Basically, if there’s even the slightest possibility that there isn’t a Supreme Being then there can’t be one. The fact that we’re having this discussion at all establishes my premise #2. Thus the rules of logic make it impossible for Him to exist.

Kind of an interesting philosophical point really. If there actually was a Supreme Being his existence would be unassaibly obvious to everyone and such arguments would be unnecessary. The very fact that we can argue over the existence of God conclusively proves His non-existence.

20

No, necessary existence is not greater than non-necessary existence. For instance, an omnipotent being existing in a world where arbitrary, capricious, and evil things happen to the inhabitants would be lesser than a being that did not exist in such a world.