Actually I’m not sure whether what you say is correct. Isn’t ‘judgement’ used in a much broader sense? A prejudice is a judgement, as is a judgement on first impression (‘I don’t like him.’ ‘Why?’ ‘I don’t know. He seems untrustworthy.’). They may be unconsidered judgements, but they are judgements, aren’t they?
You seem to want to reserve the term ‘judgement’ to considered, well-reasoned judgements. But is that not to mistake the justification of a judgement with the judgement itself? I find it dubious whether people in normal life actually make practical decisions based on a full logical analysis of the issue.
If I reach a red traffic light, I slow down. I do not think at that point I have an actual reasoning: light is red, driving through is a violation, I should not violate traffic law, to do so I must stop, to stop I must brake, I must press my foot to the brake. What I do in fact is follow the usual response without giving it a second thought. It is a common philosophical mistake to think that the analysis after the fact is what actually occurs at the time. Justification is not the same as causation (or description). You seem to confuse the two precisely when you demand a ‘rational basis’.
So if you follow your definition of ‘judgement’ you will find yourself with a large category of acts and thoughts that in normal parlance are called ‘judgements’, which are not unreasonable or even reasonable (which is not the same as being reasoned), which are normally called ‘rational’. These acts and thoughts are not clearly separated from emotions. You can only save your primary statement by applying a very restrictive definition of ‘judgement’ and ‘rational’ (fully logically reasoned, instead of the looser
‘being reasonable, on closer inspection being justified’). If you demand a ‘rational basis’ as criterium for ‘being rational’, an emotion might pass muster, if it can be justified after the fact.
Your first sentence seems like a bare statement. I find it overly generalized. To prove it, you cannot point to a specific example.
I agree that insofar Solomon says that emotions are always rational, he may be overplaying his hand. But that doesn’t mean the converse is true, which is what you state. In your example you may be right, but what about the examples the OP gave? The fact that emotions are not based in a logical analysis before the fact, does not preclude them having a rational basis upon analysis after the fact. Some emotions may be rational, even if not all are.