Can emotions be classified as rational (or irrational)?

I don’t believe this question has a factual answer, and I’m not sure whether it belongs in GD, so I am posting here.

I’m curious as to whether emotions in general can be labelled as either rational or irrational (as in an irrational fear) or whether they defy this kind of classification altogether.

I’ve recently been engaged in some conversations on the matter that have made me question my views on this and I’m curious to know what others think.

My thinking up to this point has gone like this: I feel that emotions can be labelled as either rational or irrational, at least the ones we understand the motives for. If I have a fear of heights, that is rational because falling from a height could have a negative impact on my welfare, so it is therefore rational that I should fear that. A fear of something that cannot hurt me, say something like dandelions, is irrational because the fear does not correlate to the amount of danger presented by the object.

But does this hold for other emotions? Can we analyze them in the same manner? Or do they defy this kind of analysis altogether? Is it the emotion itself that I am justifying as rational, or just the motivation behind it?

I think this would fit GD better, but here goes anyway.

There’s been considerable philosophical (and psychological) discussion about the supposed rationality of emotions. I recently read a book by one of the better known modern-day defenders of the rationality of emotions, R. Solomon (Not passion’s slave). He defends the standpoint that emotions are judgements, and that we are in that respect partly responsible for them. I don’t feel up to completely describing his argument (which I don’t recall to clearly, having read the book rather quickly). Still, I found his reasoning lucid, though not always fully convincing.

Rereading my previous post, it seems less than helpful, so let me add a little bit.

Solomon analyses emotions as being purposive: they are a judgement against a state of affairs, frequently with a wish that the world be different in some respect. That judgement may be perfectly rational.

If people talk about emotions being irrational, they use ‘rational’ in a different sense, to wit that the expression of the emotion is not the best means to achieve the goal that the emotion ‘wants’. That may often be true, but it is an incorrect polarisation to say that emotions are ‘therefore’ completely irrational. They are rational, that is to say, they have elements of rationality. They can be understood. In fact, the sense in which emotions would be irrational, would also be a sense in which a great many intentional acts of people are irrational since they are not the best means to achieve the intended purpose.

Hope this helps the debate a little. FTR, I’m just echoing Solomon (in particular his chapter ‘The rationality of the emotions’ in aforementioned book).

I’ve always described emotions as arational. It’s not in most popular dictionaries, but it’s often invoked by philosophers. It means “neither in accordance with, or a violation of, reason.” In other words, “not applicable.” Emotions can only be premises, not an argument or conclusion.

From what you said of him, he seems to be confused.

A judgement can only be formed after a logical analysis of an issue, which cannot be found in emotional reactions. Take claustrophobia for example. Where is the rational basis for such an overwhelming fear? There is none.

Emotional reactions themselves are always irrational. Why do many people hate durian? Where is the rational basis for that?

If you’re looking for intro reading on the subject, you might want to check out the book “Emotions Revealed” by Paul Ekman.

Actually I’m not sure whether what you say is correct. Isn’t ‘judgement’ used in a much broader sense? A prejudice is a judgement, as is a judgement on first impression (‘I don’t like him.’ ‘Why?’ ‘I don’t know. He seems untrustworthy.’). They may be unconsidered judgements, but they are judgements, aren’t they?

You seem to want to reserve the term ‘judgement’ to considered, well-reasoned judgements. But is that not to mistake the justification of a judgement with the judgement itself? I find it dubious whether people in normal life actually make practical decisions based on a full logical analysis of the issue.

If I reach a red traffic light, I slow down. I do not think at that point I have an actual reasoning: light is red, driving through is a violation, I should not violate traffic law, to do so I must stop, to stop I must brake, I must press my foot to the brake. What I do in fact is follow the usual response without giving it a second thought. It is a common philosophical mistake to think that the analysis after the fact is what actually occurs at the time. Justification is not the same as causation (or description). You seem to confuse the two precisely when you demand a ‘rational basis’.

So if you follow your definition of ‘judgement’ you will find yourself with a large category of acts and thoughts that in normal parlance are called ‘judgements’, which are not unreasonable or even reasonable (which is not the same as being reasoned), which are normally called ‘rational’. These acts and thoughts are not clearly separated from emotions. You can only save your primary statement by applying a very restrictive definition of ‘judgement’ and ‘rational’ (fully logically reasoned, instead of the looser
‘being reasonable, on closer inspection being justified’). If you demand a ‘rational basis’ as criterium for ‘being rational’, an emotion might pass muster, if it can be justified after the fact.

Your first sentence seems like a bare statement. I find it overly generalized. To prove it, you cannot point to a specific example.

I agree that insofar Solomon says that emotions are always rational, he may be overplaying his hand. But that doesn’t mean the converse is true, which is what you state. In your example you may be right, but what about the examples the OP gave? The fact that emotions are not based in a logical analysis before the fact, does not preclude them having a rational basis upon analysis after the fact. Some emotions may be rational, even if not all are.

I have a personal theory that the emotions are a part of a class of qualities that were evolved in animals before reason as a faster, more efficient substitute for it, and that, though we have now evolved the ability to reason completely, they are still necessary. Basically anything our nervous system does without the aid of reason falls under the category. Just a few examples would be a reflexive jump in response to a loud, unexpected noise, getting angry with a mosquito that won’t leave you alone, or stopping at a red light, as Tusculan points out. All of these situations could be handled by reason alone, but that would be slow and inefficient.

Now emotions (which, remember, are only a small part of this category) have the responsibility – if I may be allowed to speak broadly – of expressing and carrying out the thoughts and decisions of the brain. With the evolution of reason, they were necessarily at its service. There are, of course, still decisions made by the brain without the aid of reason, and thoughts that can influence our emotions without even being believed or decided upon, which means that emotion can be sometimes at the service of reason, and sometimes not. Plato believed that in the best-ordered soul, emotion is entirely the former, likening emotion to warriors and reason to the leaders who give them orders.

But that’s just my view of it.

I believe, and am prepared to defend in Great Debates if necessary, that rationality functions as a subset of what emotions do. No emotions, no rational thought. If you can’t feel, you can’t think thoughts either.

In light of that, no, you can’t classify emotions as rational or irrational. It’s like trying to classify subatomic particles as either organic or mineral.

Are emotions rational? Heck, is how one’s own heartrate or blood pressure responds to a given situation rational? I don’t think so. It’s just the way we’re wired and conditioned and functioning at that time.

Now how we respond to our emotions, and what we do with them reflects our own degree of rationality or lack thereof. I don’t believe we’re primarily responsible for how we feel. But we are responsible for what we do with those feelings.