Progress in Afghanistan and relation to Iraq

Well, with the Iraqi “transfer of power” scheduled in a bit less than two months, questions have been raised nationally and internationally about the ability of the United States to install, as it is said, a “stable, western-style liberal democracy” in the place of the theocratic and dictatorial governments being overthrown. It is my hypothesis that what is wrong in Afghanistan needs to be our guide for what not to do with Iraq. Our failure to address them in the recent past is the best indicator of our vulnerabilities. While I hate to use the lives of 10 million people as “training wheels” for millions of others, well, we have to prevent this from being as large a clusterfuck as it can be.

There are many basic fundamentals that a nation needs to run a successful democracy. Security, money, trade, elections, self-determination, recognition of authority, international recognition, and careful census of the population are some of the key factors. These are also the factors that have failed to be addressed in Afghanistan.

  • Security
    Outside of Kabul and other large cities, Afghanistan is almost entirely out of the control of the government and occupying military forces. An overwhelming 70% of the nation’s 10 million citizens live in rural areas - areas that are 75% controlled by warlords and factions. Over a third of the country is off limits to UN employees, including most of the south, where the Taliban has regrouped. The government has failed utterly to establish security in the country, and can not even reach a good number of its citizens. Of the 100,000 enemy combatants estimated, the UN has only officially accepted the conversion of 2,700. Evidence of the lack of control is the constantly rising opium market, which at one point was an international target.
  • Money
    Afghanistan has been drained dry, and nothing more is pouring in. The Western governments and NGOs that are funding Afghanistan’s rebuilding are coming up short of the Afghan government’s estimates - only $16 billion of an estimated $24 billion needed in a 6 year period. Much of the funds are concentrated on humanitarian relief, rather than reconstruction.
  • Trade
    The Afghan economy and industrial base has not been touched. As mentioned, the largely rural nation has seen a vast conversion to opium producing crops, leaving the country on shifty ground in terms of international trade. Importing nearly everything and not controlling most of the nation’s infrastructure, Afghanistan remains wholly dependent on Western governments.
  • Census and Registration
    The voter registration was a much discussed part of Afghan rebuilding, until interest waned. Roughly 10% of the Afghan citizens are registered - almost exclusively in urban areas, and almost exclusively male. Only 2% of the female population was registered to vote until very recently. The populations in the south and the ethnic Pushtans are the most lacking groups - in a country that has as many ethnic tensions as Afghanistan, this is absolutely unacceptable.
  • Elections
    Put simply, the elections were delayed. Due to be held in June 2004, the lawlessness and unfitness of the Afghan government to hold elections has caused numerous delays in the process. Given the sad state of progress, it is difficult to estimate when elections will be held.
  • Self Determination
    Due to a lack of funds, complete lack of security, including the facing of overwhelming numbers of warlords and private armies, and the inability to hold elections, Afghanistan lacks self determination. Reliant almost entirely on funding from foreign powers and in the international spotlight, the country has done very little of anything, and has been guided by the hand by Western powers. The people of Afghanistan have the same or less representation as they did under the Taliban.
  • Recognition of Authority
    No country lasts long if the people within it do not recognize its authority. This is the case in Afghanistan. With such large parts of the country in control of private armies, the central government can be considered one ruler among many. If not for the presence of foreign military powers, the central government very likely would not exist, and the region would be in civil war. Over 200 government officials were murdered in around Kabul in August of 2003 alone.
  • International Recognition
    Seen in the Muslim world largely as a tool of Western invaders, the Afghan government does not have much status. Pakistan is anxious over the warlords and terrorists along its border with Afghanistan, and engages in regular skirmishes. The other surrounding nations recognize only the authority of the Western militaries.
    For these and other reasons, the American operation in Afghanistan has been a horrible adventure in mismanagement and inept government. One could easily question whether the country was ever able socially to support a democracy, much less an underpowered one installed by a hostile government. Without the international spotlight being given to the invasion of Iraq, perhaps the terrible failure of the Afghan government would be more visible to the media, especially that of America, which seems to have largely forgotten about Afghanistan and moved on.

However, I my hypothesis is that this misadventure is a predictor of what may happen in Iraq. While not as largely rural and better developed, Iraq has the makings of being divided by factional warlords, and unprepared economy, lack of investment, and a too-decentralized government that lacks the authority to back up its word. Already, we see parts of the country under questionable control by the American military, which has a much stronger presence than it did in Afghanistan. Further, the economic situation in Iraq is much more complex, given the industrial and petrolium interests.

With less than two months until the alleged transfer of power to Iraqi self-government, the United States has failed utterly to outline in detail a form of government and constitution for the Iraqi people, and more importantly, neither has it consulted with the Iraqis themselves on what they want in their government. This has all the markings for a collosal failure, which is indicated also by laws America introduced that stand in direct violation of Iraqi and Muslim culture. The government will be seen as a tool of America, and will, as in Afghanistan, fail to establish its authority and control over much of the country, and thus fail to be a representative government of the Iraqi people.

Unless we change a lot. Now.

Did I write this too long for neocons to read, or something? :wink:

/not bumping, I swear!

Actually, I would kinda like a reply. I wrote this because our ability to build a democracy has come up frequently in the pro-con Iraq debate, with not much evidence either way. I’m putting a lot of my faith and time into this analysis, and I’d prefer to know if I am incorrect. I think it is pretty indicative of where we are going, and I don’t see any major changes in our Iraq policy; I’d prefer not to miss something obvious. I tried to keep my tone as neutral as possible in the body (though obviously I expressed a view in the conclusion). Keep in mind that I’m not a dirty Democrat out to nuke anyone. If no one really has any objections, I’ll be more than happy to assume that I’m largely on target, and that kinda cements my position on Iraq. :-/

I now return you to your reguarly scheduled controlled flamewars.

Not a neocon, but I’d like to see a discussion of your OP also, Zagadka. Having written my share of overly long analyses, I hate to see a good one ignored.

Unfortunately, I can’t give you much of an argument, as I don’t disagree with any of your major points regarding Afghanistan. However, I think your thesis, while quite correct as far as it goes, is an insufficient approach to our problems in Iraq. The situations are not parallel, simply because we never established a military occupation of Afghanistan.

You’ve properly listed the security issue first and foremost in your analysis. People will forgive, or at least take a relatively sanguine attitude toward all manner of irritations if they are provided secure conditions, access to food and medical care and some predictable social structure.

I have to question your assessment of the democratic prep work that’s been done in Iraq. I don’t have cites which dispute it, mind you, but it’s a flat, absolute assertion which I suspect can be disproven. Unfortunately, the official CPA website is extraordinarily unhelpful in discovering what specific groundwork has been laid or outreach to Iraqis has been done in advance of Iraqi sovereignty. I doubt that the facts regarding this aspect are more impressive than the reconstruction efforts so far, but I can’t imagine there’s an absolute lack of detail and consultation, as you’ve portrayed things. The mere existence of the various transitional initiatives gainsays the assertion, although I’ve seen nothing that gives me confidence that the Authority’s preparations have been at all adequate either.

Granted. The places in Afghanistan where we do maintain a military presence are relatively stable. However, we’re seeing a lot of factionism and unrest throughout Iraq, and I believe that this suggests that if it were not for the military occupation, good parts of Iraq would fall to being controlled by private armies.

One key difference is the social industrial makeup of the countries. Afghanistan is largely rural, whereas Iraq is much more urbanized. This makes occupation and security easier for the occupiers in Iraq. A private army outside of the population centers lacks power. However, were it not for that strong military presence, I believe that evidence points to warlords taking direct control of the population. Unless we plan on running a democracy where we prevent certain people from being elected and maintain a state of constant warfare, I don’t see the situation getting better.

Actually, I left a little bit out of the OP.

Part of my thesis for Iraq is this. Democracy is not for everyone. It takes a good deal of social and economic preparedness in order for a nation to convert to a democracy, without having that government become a perversion. In a country where people still make and respond to physical threads, follow the orders of their religious structure, and are used to their government being more direct, the result of democracy will usually be a corrupt and dictatorial regime, if not outright civil war and rebellion. Democracy requires an educated and willful populace that is free to express itself. When an external power - a political party, organized religion, ethnic majority, or other group - exists, democracy won’t work. Furthermore, a cornerstone of democracy is respect for the other citizens’ rights. Unfortunately, Iraq is a nation torn by ethnic and religious conflicts, and I fear that any democracy would become a tyrrany of the majority.

For these reasons, Iraq is simply not prepared for a democratic government. (see below) The United States has not answered any of these questions.

Well, you can’t damn me for a little rhetoric slipping in there :wink:

There seems to be an assumption by the Feds and certain political elements that simply walking in, getting rid of the dictator, and blessing the people with a “democracy” will make them all happy. First of all, they refer often to “democracy” without defining the term. Do they mean an American-style Republic? How will the constitution be formed? What branches of government, and the checks between them? How do you protect the rights of the minority citizens in a country that is torn by conflict? America itself took over 200 years to answer some of these questions, and some are still being hotly contested to this day. The simple fact is, as I outlined above, Iraq is not the same as America. While it may be a happy and warm and fuzzy idea to spread democracy and good cheer to all of the people of the world, you have to be very, very careful with who gets it when. It takes a lot of social growth for democracy to happen - it historically has been over the process of hundreds of years. Trying to cram that into 2 years will result in a population that is not prepared for the drastic changes. In fact, one of the primary problems with Africa is that the European powers went in and started throwing about industrialized structures into pre-industrial society. They were simply unable to handle it.

What worries me is that we have not seen hide nor hair of the Iraqi constitution. We have not seen things like how the government will be structured, how votes will be counted. We don’t know what rights the people get. We don’t know the military structure that exists alongside the government. We don’t know how those rights will be protected. We don’t know how the representative government will work. We don’t know how much power each branch will have. We are working on assumptions here. Americans and the international community need to see how this government will be formed - it can’t just be, “here, surprise, it is June 30th.” The Iraqi people need to be involved in forming their own government.

An example of how tricky this situation is is the CPA. It has been juggling appointments for the past year just trying to represent all of the minorities. How will that work when it goes to election? No one will be able to come in with the hand of god and start moving people around because some group is underrepresented. The fact is, we have absolutely no idea what we are doing, as we have demonstrated time and time again - and we have an obligation to do this right.

It was my understanding that we lost hold of Afghanistan because we shifted our focus to Iraq before the job was done. The Taliban were allowed to regroup and rearm, and now it’s a mess.

The Afghan National Army (ANA) is working with the US against the Taliban, I guess, but none of the military types I know think very highly of the ANA.

Afghanistan might be the best example of why we shouldn’t leave Iraq until everything is said and done.

That is a good point, and very true. Had we been more dedicated to establishing the authority of the Afghan government, much trouble would have been averted.

(Here comes the “but”) However, I think that we have to be very careful in considering how long we do stay. While the longer we stay, the more stable Iraq will be during that time (and thus more likely to remain stable after we leave), the longer both the US and the new Iraqi government will have regional and international tensions building up around them.

For instance, from all indications, we do not mean to ever leave. Over a dozen military bases and a tremendous embassy spell out a long term involvement. I think that is a very bad sign for the people, who clearly are uneasy about the prolonged American presence.

This combines to leave you with a government that is resented for continued military occupation with “the enemy.”

One could make an analogy to our occupation and prolonged presence in Japan. However, I believe that to be similar only in the superficial similarity that they are an example of nation building. Japan did not have a strong resistance movement, nor did it have hostile neighbors or a strong ethnic/religious tie to the region. Also, we poured boatloads of money into rebuilding Japan’s industry. We maintain a presence in Japan that is still largely resented, even for a nation that is on overall perfect terms with the United States. Also, Japan was in a situation to be a producer, rather than a consumer. Iraq has (in simple terms) one natural resource.

Is it possible for us to maintain a decades-long presence in Iraq that results in a relatively stable producer nation? I certainly can’t rule that out. In the short-medium term, we may very well succeed in an overall economic and political reversal in Iraq. This would involve decades of intense financial and technological investment, as well as careful political control. However, I am still concerned about the regional tensions and cultural differences that America does not seem to be taking into account. As long as Iraq remains under “American control,” it is likely that it will remain a target for Islamic freedom fighters, which will justify a continued American presence, creating a negative loop.

I wish I could propose a solution to this problem. The closest thing I can come to is morally reprehensible - to allow a strong faction to take control and back out of the situation. I do not believe that it is possible to reach the long-term goals of an Iraqi democracy and peaceful coexistance with the neighboring countries. I wish I could believe in that, but I am, nonetheless, pessimistic about America’s ability to relate to the Iraqi culture.