Under Britain’s unwritten constitution, the Queen is supposed to act only on the advice of her ministers. The legal scholar Bagehot wrote, as I recall, that the sovereign has the power only to listen, advise and warn. I think it was Bagehot who also opined that the king would have to sign his own death warrant, if it was duly passed by Parliament.
The last British sovereign to actually veto something passed by Parliament was Queen Anne, in 1708, of a bill “for the settling of militia in Scotland.” Even George III, determined to restore royal power, never did it.
Some legal scholars think that the royal veto has atrophied away; others argue that it remains a reserve power that could, in some great emergency, still be exercised. Perhaps the Queen should veto some minor piece of legislation now and then, just to assert the prerogative, and not wait until some crisis when it might cause serious problems and disputation.
I suppose she could try. I think though that it would be an unwise move. If she started to veto legislation then Parliament could react by legislating to make it clear that the monarch no longer has a power of veto. And that would be one bill that she coudn’t refuse to sign, for fear of setting off a whole constitutional crisis.
Also, people might well start questioning the whole basis of the “constitutional” monarchy. I doubt that she’d want that to happen.
Precisely. I think if she tried it, even with minor legislation…perhaps moreso with minor legislation, she’d force Parliment to rethink the monarchy. And thereby jeopordize her right to listen advise and warn. Which are not insignifigent powers, actually.
(Err…I didn’t think the UK qualified as a constitutional monarchy…or is that why you put it in quotes?)
The Queen attempting to exercise any of her hypothetical powers in the absence of extenuating circumstances making it blatantly obvious that it was necessary would result in a very, very rapid movement to there being a whole bunch of republics in the Commonwealth. The constitutional monarchy has proven to be a pretty good system of government in a substantial number of countries, but pretty much all those countries aren’t so wedded to their monarchies that they’d hesitate much in dumping a monarch who tried to exercise direct political power.
The Queen’s prerogative powers are, in general, exercised on the “advice” (a polite way to say “instructions”) of her ministers. However, there are certain circumstances where she acts “on her own” (though, being a person of some political wisdom, she will seek advice in the normal sense). The choice of Harold Macmillan and of Alec Douglas-Home as prime minister were two instances where she exercised independent prerogative. (The Earl of Salisbury was instrumental in both choices, but she was under no obligation to accept his advice or that of anyone else at that point.)
I would say that when she feels she can carry the majority of Englishmen with her decision, she would have the right and duty to veto. An example might be a bill superseding the Septennial Act as revised by later Parliament Acts, to give the House of Commons unlimited tenure.
Another example might be: A very closely divided Parliament passes bill X by a narrow margin, and it goes to her for the royal assent, normally a mere formality. Very shortly thereafter, before she has actually received the bill Y is brought up, and the (coalition) government falls over it. The P.M. resigns; the leader of the opposition, establishing a coalition, becomes the new P.M., and advises her not to sign bill X. While he could seek its reconsideration, advising her to veto it as no longer the wish of Parliament is the simpler move.
[nitpick]The Queen doesn’t have a right of veto, which is a negative power, overriding the legislative branch. Rather, as one of the three component parts of Parliament, her assent is necessary for legislation to become law, just as the assent of the Commons and the Lords is necessary.
The Queen’s power of royal assent differs from the veto power of the US President in two ways: if she refuses assent, the other two components of Parliament cannot override her decision (unlike the fact that Congress can override a presidential veto by a two-thirds majority). Second, royal assent is necessary for a bill to become law; by contrast, if the President does nothing for ten days, a bill will automatically become law. [/nitpick]
Getting back to the OP, while it’s true that the monarch has not refused royal assent in the U.K. for around three centuries, there have been a couple of cases in Canada at the provincial level where royal assent was refused: one in Ontario in the 1880’s, and one in Prince Edward Island in the 1940’s.
The Ontario case was actually rather similar to the hypothetical that Polycarp gives. Party discipline was fairly loose back then, and a private member introduced a bill that actually passed the Assembly, over the opposition of the Premier, Oliver Mowat. Mowat did not want the bill to become law, and he advised the Lt. Governor (the Queen’s representative at the provincial level) to refuse royal assent. The Lt. Gov. did so. That episode was completely constitutional, since the Lt. Gov. acted on the advice of the Premier, and the Premier was willing to take the responsibility for that action.
The PEI example was more unusual, and arguably involved unconstitutional behaviour by the Lt. Gov. PEI was dry at the time, and the Assembly passed a bill to repeal prohibition. The Lt.Gov. was a strong prohibitionist, and refused royal assent, against the advice of his Premier. The matter ended up in court, which confirmed that the royal assent was still a necessary component of the legislative process, and the bill was not law.
Just because a constitution is not written down with the heading: “Constitution” on it doesn’t mean it doesn’t exist. Great Britain has a constitution. Ask any of the thousands who take British Constitutional History or Constitutional Law each year.
The above is true in most cases. However, if Congress adjourns during the 10-day period, the bill does not become law. This is known as a “pocket veto.”
Actually, the “factual answer” here is: "She and her predecessors have failed to exercise the “veto power” (actually, as Northern Piper notes, the power to refuse the royal assent) “for close to 300 years. She is obliged not to go against the advice of her ministers, provided that they can command a majority in the Commons. It would be exceeding odd for her ministers to permit a bill to pass Commons and then advise her to refuse the royal assent.” We have noted circumstances in which she (or her surrogates) might (and in one case did) refuse the assent. But owing to the flexible, unwritten nature of the British Constitution, there is no means of defining an absolute answer; it would, like an issue in which Bricker and I would report varying understandings of how a given U.S. Constitutional issue might be interpreted by SCOTUS, be a case where the basic principles are known but how they might be applied would be subject to discussion.
The constitutional crisis of 1910 (over rejection of the Budget, and repeated rejection of the Home Rule Bill) is as close as the Crown has been in modern times to taking sides in party politics. In the midst of it Edward VII died and and George V, succeeding him, was faced with the prospect of having to take the Prime Minister’s ‘request’ to create sufficient Liberal peers to swamp the Conservative majority in the Lords. In the end it didn’t come to that.
True, but there was an almost precise precedent. In 1832, the Lords had rejected numerous Reform Bills intended to abolish rotten boroughs, give seats in Commons to cities which did not have them, and come closer to a fair representation of the public in Commons. William IV was persuaded that he would have to threaten to create enough Whig peers to pass the bill. Armed with this information, the Duke of Wellington (a strong Tory but with an eye for constitutional proprieties) was able to convince many of the stiffnecked Tory Lords to either vote for Reform, abstain, absent themselves from the House of Lords, or otherwise not stonewall the passage of the Reform Bill. George V in 1910 did nothing more than copy exactly what William IV had done, including specific requirements that would need to be met before he did a wholesale creation of new peers.
[sur-nitpick]True, but the “pocket veto” is not truly in the President’s control; ultimately, it’s in the control of Congress. If Congress is determined to have a bill become law after they have passed it, they have control of their sittings and can simply continue sitting for ten days after passage. The only way the President could then prevent the bill from becoming law would be by a true veto. [/sur-nitpick]
What does that have to do with the price of tea in China? :rolleyes:
The original nit-pick attempted to draw a distinction. That distinction was not completely accurate, as the second nit-pick showed. Your post adds nothing to the original point being made.
