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#1
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WWII what ifs
Probably a boring subject to most but something I've been giving some thought to recently after doing some reading. Two different scenarios have sort of floated around my brain and I was wondering what others thought.
First, would Germany have had a chance of pulling off an airborne version of Sealion? As I understand Germany's strategy, the Luftwaffe was to defeat the RAF first giving Germany a chance to gain control of the sea-lanes before attempting to invade England. Obviously that failed but what if Germany had concentrated its airpower over a small portion of England and used airborne troops. With the transportation needs requiring large numbers of round trips, maybe a staging of around Calais to the English coast to get the shortest distance possible. First objective would be to secure airfields to land troops and stage Stuka's out of to repel English armor. A long shot but with their resources after the fall of France and the damage to the English army, could the Germans have pulled it off? Second, what if Germany had presented themselves as liberators of the Soviet Union instead of making it a racial struggle. Offer the people 20 or 30 acres of land to either join the German side or to simply keep the population happy and not eventual join the partisans. With the numbers of Russian prisoners taken and Stalin’s actions against the kulaks and the forced collectivization, this would seem like the way to go. Go a step further and offer Ukraine and other subject states their independence and gain support against the Russians. Would this have had a chance of tipping the balance and ending the war or were those huge numbers of T-34 always going to be waiting at the end of the line no matter what road the Germans took? |
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#2
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And there was always Churchill's last ditch plan, to use chemical weapons on the advancing german forces if they looked likely to get close to London. Britain had an immense network of defences, ranging from gun emplacements (both on land and at sea), camoflaged pillboxes, and anti-tank defences. In addition there was the Home Guard, which whilst getting off to a rather amusing start (drilling with brooms etc) were extremely dedicated. And finally the 'Auxillary Units' essentially these were trained insurgents, equipped with the best weapons and explosives. They remained a state secret until well into the late 20th Century. They trained under the assumption that they would survive roughly 14 days after invasion, but in that time they were to disrupt enemy operations. |
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#3
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#4
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The only way to maintain an invading army would be by being able to resupply, which means using the channel. An airbourne-only invasion would have failed, much quicker than a combined air-sea-land operation. With airbourne only, you also lose the armoured vehicles, artillery and tanks. Which would have made breaching the various rings of defences impossible. Have a look here |
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#5
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#6
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Thing is, an airborne invasion just won't work. You can't just land troops and expect them to fight, because modern war requires truly staggering amounts of fuel, ammunition, spare parts, food, and supplies. And an airborne invasion means no artillery, no trucks, and especially no TANKS.
You can't blitzkrieg across England with paratroopers only. Any troops landed on the island would be cut off from supply and would wither and die. It's not like Crete, where paratroopers could seize a few key locations and the resistance is over. And even on Crete the Germans took such a beating trying to take the island they pretty much gave up on later airborne operations. See the wikipedia article: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Crete |
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#7
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The impression I always get is that the Germans could have pulled it off, but only if they had strung together an impossibly long chain of what-ifs that would basically have required the German High Command to receive a detailed cookbook from the future and followed it to the letter. And even then some unforeseen event might have tripped them up.
If the Germans had managed to destroy the BEF in France, achieve local air superiority and get any subtantial forces across the Channel during the 'pikes and cudgels' phase of defense preparation, they probably wouldn't have been needed armour or anything heavier than small arms and field artillery to tear apart the defense. The logistical challenges of supplying them would have still have been huge, though. It could conceivably been achived, but certainly not with Germany being run by a bunch of nihilistic racist incompetents. And without them in charge there would almost certainly have been no war at all, so its a wash. |
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#8
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Well, considering that as the Wehrmacht moved into the Ukraine, Belorussia, and western Russia, the natives usually met the invaders as liberators, there's a lot to be said for the idea that the Germans could have won the war on the eastern front. Especially since, for all the huge area in Russia to the east of the Urals, most of the industrialization of the nation was in the western portion of the nation. It wasn't until the administration of the occupation began, and the Germans treated the captured peoples as helots that the Soviet propaganda could work to get the people involved in resistance against the invaders. So, I think that, yes, if the Germans had been more humane in their control of the conquered territories of the USSR they'd have had fewer problems advancing, and far fewer problems with partisans. And I don't know, but I suspect that the Soviet Union would have fallen if Moscow had been taken. One more imponderable, however, is that there is a lot of racial tension between Russians, and other Slavic peoples, and Germanic peoples. It was part of the whole Nazi purification schtick, but it's also part of the reason the people did rally against the invaders. So I can't say that there would have been no resistance at all, nor any partisans. |
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#9
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Regarding Sea Lion...
Why is it assumed that the Royal Navy would have just rolled in and demolished anything the Germans managed to put into the channel? Sure, the RN was the biggest and baddest (maybe), but the entire channel is well within range of land-based aircraft. I seem to recall that land-based aircraft did very bad things against most navies. Since the whole Sea Lion is predicated on removing the RAF from the equation...what am I missing here? -Joe |
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#10
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Without air superiority, they probably wouldn't have lasted long after the sun came up. At that stage nobody was really aware of the protean nature of air power, and how vulnerable ships were (the Japanese were shortly to demonstrate it). While this meant that the RN didn't have much in the way of AA, it also meant the Luftwaffe had few torpedoes and AP bombs and not much anti-shipping experience. But even so, any vessel given the undivided attention of a couple of Stuka squadrons operating a few minutes away from their airfields would probably not have survived long. |
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#11
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So, can it be agreed that, were the RAF eliminated, the RN wouldn't have added a whole lot to the defense of Britain? -Joe |
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#12
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For one thing, the Channel isn't very wide, and any aircraft coming in range of Royal Navy vessels near the English coast was also likely to be in the range of the English Bofors 40mm Ack-Ack guns. One of my favourite Sea Lion stories: The production of the Sten SMG was facilitated because the BEF left most of their equipment behind in Dunkirk- and despite ordering more Thompson M1928A1s from the US, there was a period of several weeks where there were fewer than two dozen submachine guns in England (The Royal Navy had the Lanchester SMG, but they weren't sharing.) As a result, the idea of an SMG that could basically be made in someone's garage (and were, as the Marquis later proved!) was born, rushed into production, and saw service right through until the mid-1960s! The Sten story is a bit more complicated than that, of course, but trust the English to turn a stop-gap measure into something that was still in service 25 years later!
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#13
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Well, look at Crete. There, the Luftwaft tried an airborn only invasion- on an island with less that 1/100th the population and defences of England, and it was a near-fought thing that gutted the Paratroop corps of the German military.
Look at the disaster of Operation Market Garden. Airborne doesn't work for crap by itself. What it does is allow you to get some forces behind the enemy so that your REAL ground forces can then psuh the enemy back intot he ground the airborne holds and is cutting off the supply & communicatiosn lines of. |
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#14
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#15
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I think it's fairer to say that some hypothetical genius with 20/20 foresight in charge of the invasion could set up the schedules and dispose their forces in such a way that they could defeat the RN without suffering losses catastrophic to the enterprise. It would still be horribly costly and delay the conquest of Britain by weeks or months. If the Luftwaffe had longer-range aircraft that could harass the RN anywhere in home waters then they might be neutralised completely, but I understand that would be pretty much impossible given the state of the German industrial base. |
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#16
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#17
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The British, of course, had the Home Field Advantage- and crucially, Luftwaffe aircrews shot down over the UK ended up in a POW camp, whilst British pilots shot down over the UK got a cup of tea in a farmhouse (or a pint at the local pub!) whilst they waited for someone from their squadron to come and pick them up. In other words, whilst both sides suffered horrendous casualties, the Luftwaffe pilots and who went down over England were effectively out of action for good- regardless of whether they were killed or captured- which also took it's toll on the Luftwaffe and eventually left them with a real shortage of trained aircrews. |
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#18
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The very political conditions (Nazi ownership of Germany) that started the war in the first place also doomed it from the beginning. The problem with "wargaming" after the fact is that it removes the political and ideological conditions that led to war in the first place. Subtract Nazification from the equation, you have no war in which Germany tries to "rectify" the "injustices" visited upon it after WWI. You have no invasion of Poland, no annexation of Austria, no invasions of the USSR or England. Add Nazification into the equation, you have the weaknesses inherent in tyrannical regimes -- micro-management from a central command, imperialistic motives and goals, and idological blindness to reality (sort of like what's happening in Iraq now, come to think of it.) Only the Nazis would have tried to do what Germany tried to do during World War II, and yet the very things that made them Nazis also doomed their military efforts.
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#19
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There's an interesting essay on why Operation Sealion wouldn't work. It brings up an aweful lot of what's been talked about here, and in addition some quite relevant facts about the state of the Kriegsmarine, the lack of transport and landing ships, the lack of air superiority and anti-ship weaponary and skill. It's quite interesting.
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#20
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First it is worth mentioning that both these things could not happen. Hitler could not have invaded England (presumably sometime in Fall 1940 and still invaded Russia in 1941 no matter how he cased it – not sure anyone said that – just I am pointing out that this wouldn’t have happened).
I agree with the thoughts on this thread on a main air invasion of the UK. To echo just one of the fine points made on this thread I think slaphead has it right about the bombers. Goring had built the airforce to tactically support the army NOT to be used strageically to bomb like was going to be necessary to invade Britian properly. So you would have to re-write history back to about ’33 build more bombers less of the regular airforce (and that would have implications in France, Poland and the USSR). So no I can't see this working. Quote:
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#21
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#22
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(AA in this sense is not only explosive shells filled with shrapnel on timed fuses, but anyone capable of using a rifle to shoot at a big, white parachute.)
__________________
"Ridicule is the only weapon that can be used against unintelligible propositions. Ideas must be distinct before reason can act upon them." If you don't stop to analyze the snot spray, you are missing that which is best in life. - Miller I'm not sure why this is, but I actually find this idea grosser than cannibalism. - Excalibre, after reading one of my surefire million-seller business plans. |
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#24
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As for the hypothetical Russian campaing, I think the wermacht would have shot its bolt completely after doing Poland, the Low Countries, France AND Britain within one year. Reforming, re-equipping and getting sorted out for a spring 42 offensive would have given time to get all that captured industry to work and finish mechanising properly (get rid of all those horses!), but would also have given Stalin more time to prepare for the storm even he would have seen coming. Would a modernised and better-prepared Wermacht fighting on only one front and supported by the whole resources of Europe and some of its overseas territories (oil!) be able to overwhelm a better-prepared and forewarned Red Army without the benefit of the Murmansk convoys and without the propaganda advantages of Nazi brutality? I don't think it's any less feasible than a successful invasion of Britain, i.e. it 's less unlikely than a squadron of flying pigs that speak esperanto. Not by much though. |
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#25
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DrDeth smarter men than me have agreed with you ... I am just saying I am not convinced, but I understand your points |
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#26
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-Joe |
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#27
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I agree that if Germany had presented itself as liberators that might have changed WWII also. But I consider that a political "what if" as opposed to a military what if- and a "what if" that simply wasn't going to happen under the real world Hitler. However, Hitler easily could have let Mussolini get bogged down in SouthEast Europe, and gone with Hitlers original plans. |
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#28
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I agree with Merijeek's point. And, I think, ralph124c, you're underestimating the way that Stalin's USSR had made initiative anathema. Without a central point for orders to come from, there is just too much confusion in the system as it was running for me to believe that it would continue to work.
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#29
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IMO, you have to change the circumstances of the time so dramatically that the comparison becomes a little strained. If Hitler had invaded early in the year having made peace with Britian, the Japanese had invaded with him (thus preventing their thrust downwards toward the European colonies, and, in all likelihood, stopping America from entering the war) and both had possessed a reasonably managed invasion plan (as oppossed to the ridiculously optimistic Barbarossa), then Russia might have fallen, perhaps as early as 1941/2. Otherwise? Forget it. |
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#30
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Also, any realistic planning would have suggested that winter equipment and clothing would be necessary, even if a quick victory was achieved. I've never understood why the Germans didn't plan for field operations in winter - assuming the russians would just surrender and everyone would be in barracks by the time it got cold seems insane. No counter-partisan sweeps, rebellions that needed crushing or any other military operations? If Britain were to fall in 1940, then presumably the Balkans would have been without external support, and even a bufoon like Mussolini could safely have been left to his own devices down there - he may not even have needed any help. |
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#31
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#32
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Sure, but the performance of the Italians in Abyssinia campaign is rather comparable to the performance of the Russians in their attack on Finland. Of course the Russians would be easy pickings. I know it's not worth anything, of course, but I've also done plenty of reading that agrees with DrDeth - the Balkans cost the Germans two months of pre-winter invasion. Two more months...I think that the Germans could have taken Moscow in that time. -Joe |
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#33
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From what I read, the Germans (and their allies, Rumania, Hungary, Italy) were stretched to the breaking point by December 1941. Only the stupendous mis-management of th Russian High Command prevented a German defeat. By December, the cold was so intense that many tanks broke down, and soldier's feet froze because they had no winter boots. In addition, the horse-drawn German Army lost half of its horses. Clearly , the planning was pretty poor. The Blitzkrieg was out of steam-the Germans were able to resume offensive operations in the spring of 1942, but not on the same scale. So, as I say, the capture of Moscow migh have helped, but not by much.
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#34
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I don't think it's entirely appropriate to assume that the Red Army was some sort of invincible behemoth that no-one else had noticed. I think most militaries who had looked into the situation were aware that the Red Army was very large and equipped with enough material to put up a reasonable resistance. The germans themselves were still using horses - it's not like they were going to be that snooty about Russian equipment. They were shocked by the way Stalin seemed to be able to produce endless divisions of fresh troops, and specific items of gear like the T-34, but apart from that they had a reasonable idea what to expect.
The history of success in western europe plus Nazi racial doctrine led to the Germans over-reaching themselves, but if the professionals had been allowed to assemble and execute a plan without intereference from the loony-in-chief and his acolytes they might conceivably have pulled it off, given sufficient industrial capacity to back them up and the lack of racial fanaticism from the Nazis. In terms of russian capability increasing over time, I agree that it would, but without the vast assistance of US Lend-lease not nearly as quickly as it did in the 'real world'. The Japanese I think can be pretty much written off - if necessary Stalin could have pulled back a thousand miles into Siberia without significant impact to his military capability, and the Japanese were in no shape to push that far inland. Nearly all the soviet industry was in the west, and even after it was shifted east of the Urals the Japanese would have had trouble reaching it across unoccupied terrain, never mind with partisans and siberian troops fighting them. As far as Leningrad and Stalingrad go (and even moscow, probably), the germans would have been far better off just bypassing them, cutting them off and leaving them to starve behind a holding garrison. Putting an army into a defended hostile city is a usually just going to leave you with a shredded army and not much to show for it. |
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#35
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#36
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I think that the Japanese would never be anything but a minor annoyance to the Russians. Japan had neither the resources of the will to attack Eastern Siberia. Their first probing attacks into Mongolia were met with a crushing response from General Zhukov-most of a Japanese army division was wiped out in the battle of Khalkin Gol. The Japanese had no heavy tanks or anti-tank weapons-they were slaughtered.
The Japanese were quite wise NOT to take on Russia. |
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#37
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#38
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The assumption that this would have worked seems to hinge on two things; 1. That the Soviet populace turned against Germany, and 2. That partisan warfare was a really decisive factor. But neither of those things is wholly true. Germany DID, in fact, get a lot of support from the populace. Entire divisions of Soviet, non-Russian troops fought for the Nazis. And the partisan effort, while it was certainly a problem, was very far from decisive; Germany probably got more support than resistance from Soviet civilians. |
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#39
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WRT the eastern front. I think that the posibility of Germany taking Moscow, Stalingrad and Leningrad is a realistic assuming that they don't dick around in Yugoslavia for those 6 weeks, but at that point I think the question becomes political more than military. I think it likely that Russia would have sued for peace at that point. However I also think that they would have done what they did anyway-used the time gained to reconstitute their industrial base east of the Urals and started gearing up for WWIII (Electric Boogaloo)-the Russian counter attack aimed at taking back the land the Nazi's occupied. If Germany has any plans of making their occupation of western Russia more than a temporary situation they would have had to appease the native peoples in occupied Russia (which has been noted as something they easily could have done, yet their racial bias precluded it), worked their asses off to get the southern oil fields into full production (oil was the single resource they needed the most) and dedicated their industry to a massive-and I mean massive- resupply of the armies holding the L/M/S line. Otherwise a year or two later Stalin does to the Germans what they had just done to him (and what he did to them in real life as well).
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#40
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Let me agree with Happy Clam and DrDeth to this extent vis a vis a Japanese Far Eastern Front:
I think Stalin might likely have over-reacted to a Japanese Move. As it was, IRL he kept far too many resources** (and far too long) to protect against the "what if". I am not saying the Axis would have conquered the USSR -- just I think in a "What if" scenario that does happen in - is more conceivable with that happening. **From a good article on Ralph124's (excellent) ref ofKhalkin Gol Even as he [Stalin] summoned 1,000 tanks and 1,200 warplanes from Soviet Far Eastern forces to battle the German invaders who were making spectacular gains, 19 reserve divisions, 1,200 tanks and some 1,000 aircraft remained in Mongolia to confront the Japanese. |
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#41
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DrDeth, was the book you were thinking of How Hitler Could Have Won WWII by Bevin Alexander? His engaging analysis ranges from the biggest bloopers (re. Barbarossa and lost opportunities at Dunkirk and North Africa) to the relatively minor ones, like the paratroop attack on Crete (instead of Malta, which was of far greater strategic importance and was easier to conquer).
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#42
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Admittedly it wasn't very good, but it proves the Germans knew a good idea when they saw one... they copied the Sten Gun later on in the war, too- especially when raw materials were getting hard to come by. |
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#43
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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Sorge Quote:
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#45
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#46
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#47
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with all due respect, "Jap" is a derogatory inflammatory term. It is not synonomous with "Convicted War Criminal Government of WWII Japan." In your context, it would be the Japanese as part of the Axis pursuing a war of aggression with Russia. Or specifically the Japanese Kwantung Army, who were slaughtered en masse in the battle of Momohan by the Russians, thus ending that possible scenario. The Kwantung Army was responsible for numerous atrocities in Manchuria.
Please also note that "Krout" is not synonomous for "Nazi" or "Germans" and one would be rightly called for such usage on these boards. |
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#48
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"Nazi" refers to a political or ideological belief or association, and contains no slur against Germans, Europeans, people with pale skin, etc.; whereas "Jap" is a disparaging term for an entire ethnic group, whether or not they were or are proponents of the fanatically nationalist/racist militarist ideas of the Japanese regime before and during World War II. "Nazi" (or "Fascist" or "Commie") are not in the same category as "Kraut", "Wop", or "Jap". Unfortunately I don't know of any short, punchy words for "proponents of the fanatically nationalist/racist militarist ideas of the Japanese regime before and during World War II", but there you go. |
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#49
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#50
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Sino-Japanese relationship is a quite complicated love-hate kinda thing. As is any other former enemy now ally and trading partners (can anyone say European Union?). So says the son of a decorated WW2 Pacific Theater & Korean War combat vet (who rarely used the proper word for Japanese, Chinese or Asians).
Now that this spelling error has been corrected, howsabout getting back to a pretty interesting thread... It would have been interesting if the Japanese had in fact been serious about invading Siberia/Russia instead of expanding their involvement in China. My understanding it was basically rouge elements of the Japanese Kwantung Army that wanted to expand into Mongolia/Siberia. The one big battle Khalkin Gol/Momohan has a decisive defeat for the Japanese. What would have happened if the Japanese had concentrated on Mongolia/Siberia instead of China, and thrown their whole weight into the campaign? |
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