On what basis should social policy be debated?

[Joe Malik]

Logic requires that deductions follow from specific axioms. Empiricism demands than any logical structure explain and be in absolute accordance with all directly observable facts (it's a little more complicated than that, but I'm making a different point here). But what are the "facts" and "axioms" we should use to reason about social policy and values, especially in regard to the creation and criticism of laws and their enforcement. How do we weigh the "reliability" of an "observable fact"? How do we pick our axioms?

Obviously legality cannot establish truth; I'm talking (in part) about the means by which we create and modify the laws themselves.

Religion seems a poor method. The details of various religions differ too widely for a multicultural nation such as ours to peacefully negotiate our ways of living.

I suppose warfare is at least authoritative. Kill everyone who disagrees with you, and any position will become obviously true to everyone. Again, however, this seems an unsatisfying solution.

Merely insisting on internal consistency is not sufficient. Mathematics has shown that one complete (to Godel limits) axiom set can completely contradict another complete set.

My original position of accepting consensually accepted beliefs as axioms or observable facts and then using them to reason solutions into uncertain or controversial areas has been roundly criticized by people I both admire and abhor. So I'm in doubt about the value of this idea.

Perhaps rationality and logic themselves are poor methods for discussing social policy and values.

Can anyone offer a better solution?

Remember, I'm not talking about which values and policies are correct, I'm interested here in how we make the distinction in general between correct and incorrect values, "good" values and "bad" values.

[Monster104]

Money works.

[kabbes]

Phew - a damn difficult OP to comment on, IMHO. IT seems to be asking:[list][*]On what criteria do we decide which is the best system?[*]How do we work out the best way to implement that system?

I'll leave the first question for now.

On the second I have a suggestion - Joe, your methods seem to be all "bottom-up". That is, you want to start with axioms and deduce solutions from them. How about considering some form of "top-down" approach - consider what you want in your society and work out structures that allow that ends to be in place.

That way:

1. If two debators disagree about the ends, the means become somewhat irrelevant.
2. You should know what the point of each structure is.

I realise that this isn't entirely clear - I'm still trying to get my thoughts straight about this myself.

regards,

pan

[SPOOFE]

The best way to to figure out social policy: Trial and error.

Keep what works, scrap what doesn't.

Unfortunately, a different, twisted version of this notion seems to be implemented in the United States: Keep what gets votes, scrap what doesn't.

::sigh:: God bless America.

It's 3:43 AM!!! Do you know where your SPOOFE is?!?

[Collounsbury]

Originally posted by SPOOFE Bo Diddly
The best way to to figure out social policy: Trial and error.

Keep what works, scrap what doesn't.

Defining what works is part of the problem, as the original OP percieved.

[b]
Unfortunately, a different, twisted version of this notion seems to be implemented in the United States: Keep what gets votes, scrap what doesn't.

Your problem here might be that what captures votes is in fact what works from the point of view of voters. Your not liking it happens to be the minority view perhaps? The sticky part of democracy is the part where your POV loses.

[xenophon41]

Excellent OP, as it's relevant to many other issues discussed in this forum as well as to the democratic process.

kabbes' top down approach seems the most practical, and is probably how most people approach decisions IRL.

• What is our goal? Goals may be based on shared values and perceptions, or may be based on entirely pragmatic considerations. Compassion and emotion can play a large role in forming goals.
• What are the current conditions? These can be difficult to determine. Evaluation must be based on observable and demonstrable facts. Shared perceptions are irrelevant except insofar as they affect conditions.
• What are the variables affecting these conditions? Even more difficult. Observation and experimentation are required, but theory and supposition necessarily come into play as well. Evaluation of variables requires both analytical and intuitive skills; emotion has no legitimate role in the process. Not everyone can play well at this level.
• What actions must we take to reach our goal, based on these conditions and variables? Here's the crux of the matter, as it relates to social policy, and the reason why systems which allow many points of view to be represented are better at evaluation than more authoritarian systems, but are not as good at decision making or implementation.

I guess my point is that by "accepting consensually accepted beliefs as axioms or observable facts and then using them to reason solutions" we would tend to limit the effectiveness of our actions, because they would be based on and require the approval of the very same group which may have consensually perceived a problem based on erroneous assumptions or incomplete data.

Whew! Sorry about the run-on sentences there! I hope I was at least partially comprehensible.

[kabbes]

Well articulated xenophon.

This seems to me a form of the control cycle. For those not in the know it goes something like this:

1. Start by considering the general current environment. We're not in the cycle at the moment, merely gathering data.
   
2. Specify the problem - this is a matter of identifying your aims, goals and the potential risks you face in achieving them.
   
3. Develop the solution - model the situation to work towards a solution that addresses the issues in point 1.
   
4. Monitor the situation - data should continue to be gathered and analyses conducted to ensure that things are proceeding as we have foreseen.
   
   Now return to point 1 and continue indefinitely.

It's always served me well!

regards,

pan

[Joe Malik]

Interesting comments, but I detect a subtle problem.

With the top-down approach, we still have the same fundamental problem: How to define and evaluate competing goals. Conceptions of an "ideal society" obviously differ widely. For example, I personally hold as a top priority the abolition of poverty. Another might hold that poverty is necessary to compel economic participation. Yet another might hold that exact adherence to Biblical Law must be the highest priority.

My question is, how do we evaluate these competing claims, regardless of the process? We must have axioms to use logic, we must have facts to use empiricism, regardless of the nature and direction of the process. At whatever point we engage in debate we must either have facts and axioms or we must abandon logic and empiricism.

[xenophon41]

Hmm. Competing goals. Seems like we're always gonna have those in a multicultural society. The trick for society is to weed out those over which the government has no control, no mandate or no interest, and then to recognize which of the remaining are non-overlapping, which are overlapping and which are directly opposing paradigms.

Since those goals and concepts which do not directly affect each other aren't part of your question, we'll address the others.

Competing interests: In physics, when two or more force vectors are applied to an object, a sum vector results from the combination. In politics, applying two or more forces to an issue will result in the negation of some so that the other(s) may be misdirected. (Cynical enough?)

In reality, these issues always require a discussion of the merits of each view, applying the moral and philosophical standards of each participant (or representative). Through such dialogue alternatives to each claim can be often be reached which satisfy the core requirements of each faction (but which may not represent the full desires of any). --Keep in mind here that we're talking about the evaluation of social goals, not of social conditions.

Ideally, social policies are decided through such compromise leading to an attempt at consensus; when consensus cannot be reached, majority rule is applied. In Happyxenoland (the utopia I just invented), I would be the final arbiter. But alas, until I'm appointed benevolent dictator, majority rule is less objectionable and more flexible than adherence to political doctrine or rule by force.

Directly opposing interests: ***JOKE*** We call this the "two party system."

The viewpoint which is most persuasive to the greatest number gains the greatest support. Sometimes conflict escalates quickly to violence; more often it leads to separation and division, and sometimes to gridlocked ideologies. There IS no method of evaluation which can convince those unwilling to compromise. Sorry to sound so defeatist about this, but there you are; those who think in black and white will never be able see shades of gray.

[Joe Malik]

This is not getting any clearer. Let me rephrase my question.

I am arguing social policy X. My opponent is arguing not-X. We wish to persuade have an audience of scientists and other rationalist types.

How should I argue my point? What sort of statements should I and my opponent introduce as "fact"? On what axioms should we base our deductions?

Or should we abandon empirical logic entirely? Should I merely try to present my case in the most emotional way possible and hope that my presentation is more compelling than my opponents?

[Joe Malik]

Even more specifically, I might say that 99,999 people per year are harmed by a particular policy and claim this number is too large. My opponent says that this is an acceptable number. We have both accepted a particular fact, but our inferences completely contradict each other. How should we rationally resolve this contradiction? Or should we at all?

Merely making the claim and abiding by a vote implies that a majority opinion constitutes a legitimate fact. However, this methold offers no guidance to the individual voter except to rely on his or her own nature, regardless of inherent bias.

Take the creationist/evolution debate. The intelligent creationist says that "religious belief has equal standing to scientific empiricism when determining fact." Do we have a basis for calling that statement irrational? If a majority of Americans vote in favor of equating religious belief and scientific empricism, are we obliged to allow our public schools to teach it as fact?

This is the real metaphysics of politics.

[Lethal Lynx]

The problem is that you're looking for absolutes to dictate actions. Since non-instinctual actions require emotions to motivate them, say one action is right is tantamount to say an emotion is right.

At the core of any argument regarding what to do, there's going to be an unarguable desire. Either you want it or you don't.

This applies to even the seemingly obvious. "Child molesters should be jailed." At the core is the desire to protect children from exploitation. But if you met someone who does not share that desire, no reasoning will change his mind.

If you want something done, you must make your desires the majority's desires. For that to work, common ground is needed. For instance, if someone is unsure where to stand on the issue of child molesting, you could state your desire. "The reason I'm think child molesters should be jailed is because I desire a society that would protect others from harm." If he agrees with the idea of protecting others from harm, then it's a simple matter of convincing that kids count as "others". If not, move on.

Get enough people on your side, and you can get what you desire. Or you can overpower those you disagree with, removing their say. It's all about getting your axioms running things. This last paragraph isn't a suggestion, but an observation. That is the way things are.

[Joe Malik]

Lethal Lynx, you essentially recap my argument from the abortion thread. Common or consensual beliefs ("I desire a society that would protect others from harm") form empirical facts to deduce/test theories and deductions ("Child molesters should be jailed.")

The "quality of the observable fact" directly relates to the "degree of commonality of the belief." It's a little different than scientific empiricism: In science the facts never change (Even Newtonian mechanics is correct under most circumstances; we need Relativity and QM only when we examine unusual or extreme conditions or demand very accurate measurements). However the commonality of beliefs does change. However we are usually debating policy in the here and now; if commonality changes, we can reevaluate our theories then.

I'm not looking for absolutes, I'm looking for a framework to give debate semantic meaning. Social policy is much more complicated than physics; still that argues at least for a rigorous framework inside which we can communicate rationally.

[Stratocaster]

I'm with Joe regarding "top down" or other variations on this theme. To state an objective or define a problem are exercises that must, by definition, be based upon some value that is axiomatic. I also agree that a majority opinion does not automatically render some belief true and ethical. Neither does a belief's convenience to a large number of people.

Joe, your question is, how do we evaluate those notions we all hold to be self-evident and unprovable, correct? How do we prove (or disprove) an unprovable--isn't that what evaluating an axiom means? I'm agreeing with you (I think) in my first paragraph, which must mean I agree that your question needs to be answered if we're to establish social policy, and I'm concluding it can't be answered (I am frustrated by my own ability to get past this very notion in other threads such as the abortion ones). Gee, glad I could help.

I'm going to keep coming back to this thread. If you pull this off, we can close down the Great Debates; everything will become crystal clear.

[Joe Malik]

Joe, your question is, how do we evaluate those notions we all hold to be self-evident and unprovable, correct? How do we prove (or disprove) an unprovable--isn't that what evaluating an axiom means?

I'm not asking for proof, just agreement. For instance, scientists need not prove that primary observations constitute fact, they merely agree so. The meta-proof behind the agreement is that that it has allowed a large number of successful predictions, much larger, both in number and percentage, than any competing method.

And if we cannot find the answer to this question, we should shut down GD. Without a basis in fact, "debate" is impossible, just shouting and emotional propaganda.

[Stratocaster]

But what does "agreement" mean with regard to "value" axioms--i.e., where what is "observable and repeatable" is not necessarily in dispute? How do you evaluate axioms except relative to other axiomatic values? It's circular and unsolvable by definition, except in a very practical way which ignores this conundrum.

But if all you wish to do is identify something practical, since in the real world we must develop and install social policy, why not use the current method? Some variation on "majority rule" and/or "whoever is most powerful decides" has been an efficacious process for a long time, so long as we ignore any ethical problems that may arise (of course, that's not what you're suggesting).

Your "facts must rule the day" rebuke seems contradictory to me if there are no such things as indisputable facts--except, as you have pointed out, relative to a given set of axioms. Debate, then, may only be useful in pointing out how conclusions flowing from a given value set are not logical--e.g., if I hold that the right to life is absolute and inviolable, I can't be for the death penalty.

[Lethal Lynx]

"I'm not asking for proof, just agreement. For instance, scientists need not prove that primary observations constitute fact, they merely agree so. The meta-proof behind the agreement is that that it has allowed a large number of successful predictions, much larger, both in number and percentage, than any competing method."

Yes, but scientist come to agreement based on the objective. You're asking people to come to an agreement based on the subjective. Why don't we just ask if society can come to an agreement on which ice cream is better, chocolate or vanilla?

But preferences chocolate and vanilla are hardly comparable to actions like deciding what to do with a rapist. That question needs for there to be agreement with a sizeable chunk of the population.

There is hope for people to come together. State your desire in the simplest form possible. From there, get enough people to agree with you. I believe there is only one axiom: We assume what we observe to be true. We all reason similarly (whether that's because we observe the truth, or whether it's just because we are from the same species, I don't know. I guess it's a combination.) If you can show a contradiction in someone's philosophy/observation, you can reason to people that it is a flawed point of view.

Example:

Man 1: I am against abortion because it is the taking of a life.

Man 2: If you're against the taking of life, then why do you support the death penalty?

Man 1: ...Shut up.

All you have to do is come with a view (preferably one that can be reduce to a sentence or two, so people can easily reference your principle<s> against many situations), check it for hypocrisies (test it against real and possible events), and put it out there. People might not agree with it right away, but give them some points to consider, and eventually they'll change their minds... as long as they are not the stubborn emotional types.

That is the best way I can think of to get people to come to an agreement. Though it does take alot patience.

"My original position of accepting consensually accepted beliefs as axioms or observable facts and then using them to reason solutions into uncertain or controversial areas has been roundly criticized by people I both admire and abhor."

I'm curious, did they critize its logic, or is it just that they didn't like it?

[Joe Malik]

First of all let me state that I think everyone agrees that as a minimum any rational philosophy should be internally consistent and in accordance with ordinary facts.

Bob Cos:

If "majority rules", than the Constitution and Bill of Rights (for instance) has no justification, since it is explicitly and intentionally protected from alteration by a transient majority.

Your "facts must rule the day" rebuke seems contradictory to me if there are no such things as indisputable facts--except, as you have pointed out, relative to a given set of axioms.

I don't think we have conclusively determined there are no facts on which to base debate. There are a lot of items that can serve as facts and are objectively determinable (e.g. individual or consensual preference, the authority of various philosophers, pure immediate self-interest), we just have to decide which facts to use.

Debate, then, may only be useful in pointing out how conclusions flowing from a given value set are not logical--e.g., if I hold that the right to life is absolute and inviolable, I can't be for the death penalty.

The problem is that the by accepting certain premises (e.g. the "special innocence" of the fetus), any philosopy may have internal consistency, yet completely contradict another interally consistent philosophy. Clearly internal consistency is necessary but it is hardly sufficient.

Lethal Lynx:

Yes, but scientist come to agreement based on the objective.

They've agreed to use objective facts, rather than other criteria, such as religious belief or political power. There's really no way you can prove that empiricism is superior to religious faith. You just have to agree to it to do "science."

State your desire in the simplest form possible. From there, get enough people to agree with you.

But on what basis should I ask them to agree? Especially since, on almost every issue of importance, there is someone who holds a consistent but diametrically opposed view.

Again, if it is impossible to find a rational basis, then all we have left are force and emotional rhetoric.

I'm curious, did they critize its logic, or is it just that they didn't like it?

I understood the fundamental objection as "propositions are true or false regardless of what people believe." I am, however, unable to determine how to establish the truth or falsehood of a social value without regard to the beliefs of the people. My critics did not offer an alternative.

[Stratocaster]

Originally posted by Joe Malik
If "majority rules", than the Constitution and Bill of Rights (for instance) has no justification, since it is explicitly and intentionally protected from alteration by a transient majority.

The justification, in the sense I meant it (but which is clearly unsatisfactory), is that the second the majority and/or the most powerful decide that the Constitution and the Bill of Rights are not the laws of the land, they won't be. Governments topple, revolutions occur. That's the sense I meant in referring to it as a "practical" means of determining social policy--that's the way it has always worked.

I don't think we have conclusively determined there are no facts on which to base debate. There are a lot of items that can serve as facts and are objectively determinable (e.g. individual or consensual preference, the authority of various philosophers, pure immediate self-interest), we just have to decide which facts to use.

But that's your premise, I think, that "sound" facts don't exist except relative to specific axioms (anyway, that's my belief). There are many things that can "serve" as a fact, but that doesn't make it so, except relative to a base axiom--even science presupposes an observable reality (i.e., you're not just dreaming this reality and all its physical attributes and laws, an assumption that works quite nicely day to day). Your statement "in accordance with ordinary facts" begs the question, in this sense.

Again, how do you determine which "fact" to use as it relates to something that is not, in its essence, a physical, observable thing--how do you obtain agreement--except relative to a given axiom? I realize this is your question, but I'm concluding it's not answerable. Which philosopher is best? What is "better," immediate self interest or the greatest good for the greatest number? How will you determine this without first establishing an axiom set for the axioms? How do you do that?

The problem is that the by accepting certain premises (e.g. the "special innocence" of the fetus), any philosopy may have internal consistency, yet completely contradict another interally consistent philosophy. Clearly internal consistency is necessary but it is hardly sufficient.

Yep, I agree, if by sufficient you mean, "clearly establishing superiority."

I understood the fundamental objection as "propositions are true or false regardless of what people believe." I am, however, unable to determine how to establish the truth or falsehood of a social value without regard to the beliefs of the people. My critics did not offer an alternative.

Well, clearly I don't have one. I'm just not offering anything new here--so I'll stop beating the same drum--but I am greatly interested in the topic and will check in to see if anything shakes me from my position.

[Joe Malik]

Let me clarify: An ordinary fact is something directly observable by the senses. In this sense both a person's individual preference and a social commonality of preference do indeed constitute ordinary fact. To objectively ascertain a person's preference, you need merely ask him or her. You can use sampling and statistical methods to objectively ascertain the degree of commonality of a preference.

We have no shortage of actual objective facts that can relate directly to social policy. The question is, which facts are a priori relevant? In science, a priori relevance is trivial to establish: A scientific theory always makes predictions about specific facts. Every theory, by definition, makes certain facts immediately relevant.

I still submit that my original thesis has value: The commonality of preference and the historical effects of policy on social survivabilty form a sufficient factual basis for evaluating social policy. I challenge anyone to offer a counterexample of a rational, non-religious argument regarding social policy that does not explicitly or implicitly reference one of my criteria.

[xenophon41]

I still submit that my original thesis has value: The commonality of preference and the historical effects of policy on social survivabilty form a sufficient factual basis for evaluating social policy.

I don't think they are sufficient on their own. Since the start of the industrial revolution, new factors have been introduced into modern society at an increasingly rapid rate; the less static a society is, the more likely it becomes that any "commonality of preference" is based on out of date assumptions and that "historical effects" may not hold true for the same policies.

In another thread not long ago, I described the "liberal" philosophy as one which requires constant questioning and examination of public policy. I wish now that I had qualified that with a description of the process of evaluation that I provided above. Conditions always change, either through existing policies or through the introduction of new variables. This means that social policy must always be based not only on a common apprehension of reality but on scientific examination of empirical fact as well.

[Joe Malik]

xenophon41:

Let me clarify a little. First, I'm saying that agreement with observable reality is certainly necessary and I assumed it in my statement. I also mean to exclude purely scientific policy; I'm referring only to questions of value.

My more specific hypothesis is:

Agreement with observed fact together with one of commonality of preference or historical effects form the only necessary and sufficient basis for rationally evaluting matters of social value.

My challenge continues acording to the emendation, and my hypothesis will fall to a single counter-example.

[xenophon41]

[Emily Litella voice]Oh. That's very different.








(Since I'm neither inclined nor likely to come up with a counter-example...)
Never mind.[/ELv]

[Joe Malik]

Let me add a little more rigor to my thesis (and bump this thread while we're at it).

We are considering the metaphysics of debate on social value.

Such debate falls within the realm of logic. To do so, constructions must follow the rules of propositional calculus. Additional, the set of axioms (whether individual or by schema) we use to generate constructions must not lead to internal contradiction. If we find we can construct a contradiction, we must add, remove or change an axiom to prevent that construction.

Additionally, the aethethic guidelines of simplicity and clarity apply. If two axiom sets provide different conclusions to the same proposition, we should give more weight to the simpler set and the set with fewer ad hoc axioms.

Debate on social value also must accept the restrictions of empricial science. Any theory of value which contradicts ordinary objective experience, either in its assumptions or its predictions, must be held as false. Note that such contradiction does not necessarily invalidate each part of the theory; the theory may be amended to remove the contradiction.

The above restrictions are necessary, but are not sufficient. It is still possible to formulate two theories of value that each fulfill the above conditions but seem to contradict one another. We cannot tolerate such a contradiction, especially in the matter of law; as a single society, we have one law based on one set of values.

To determine whether a particular value should fall in the realm of law, and what that law should specify, we need to add a primary factual basis: a set of facts that has immediate relevance to theories in this domain.

We could accept as primary fact the meaning of the text of a specific body of religion or philosophy. However, in almost all industrialized Western countries, we have specifically excluded considering the meaning of a particular religious or secular text factually relevant to debate on social value. In other words, a contradiction between the meaning of the text of the Christian Bible (for instance) and a particular value is specifically held irrelevant to the domain of secular social value.

Such a claim of irrelevancy does not itself contradict the strictures of emprical science. An empirical claim that the physical text does not exist would be in obvious error; the meaning of the text, however, itself interpretive and (in a secular sense) conditional, need not be considered a primary fact of observation.

(1) I submit that the existence of individual preference and the commonality of such preferences form a body of objectively determinable fact using which we can test theories of value in an empirical manner.

(2) I also submit that the historical or scientifically predictable consequences of the implementation of a policy based on social value also form a body of objectively determinable fact.

(3) While by definition a logical and rational individual cannot hold mutually contradictory preferences, it is certainly possible for an individual or group to hold a preference in contradiction to anothers'. I submit that we can formulate a decision procedure to use all the individuals' relative weights to consistently either determine the dominant preference or exclude both preferences from the realm of objectively determinable value.

(4) I submit that all useful debate about social value in a secular society falls withing one of the three previous stipulations: establishing relative preference, making scientific preditions about the consequences of a policy based on those preferences, and formulating a decision procedure to weigh values in conflict.

The third stipulation is obviously speculative and most open to challenge. One, two and fource, because of their precise formulation, will fall to a single counterexample.

I am disappointed that Jodi and UncleBeer, having heavily criticized my thesis in other threads, have so far chosen not to comment when I have exposed my propositions to direct debate without the necessity of hijacking a topical thread.

[kabbes]

1) what do you mean by "commonality of such preferences"? How do you determine preferences, short of asking every person to fill out an exhaustive questionaire? Fact is not necessarily the same as determinable fact.

2) If I prefer cream cakes to doughnuts. What are the scientifically predictable consequences of this simple preference? I prefer to not live in a world where people are killed. What are the scientifically predictable consequences of this preference?

3) From what I remember of my propositional logic, this doesn't follow. Two groups can have contradictory belief structures that are internally consistent (as you said) but individual propostions aren't necessarily partially ordered. There is no way to say that one belief is superior to any other.

Dammit, I can't remember the language I need for this argument. I'll have to go and look up my logic books again.

4) Whilst I can't argue with this, I do think that (1) and (2) are impractical and likely to remain so until we have incredibly advanced psychic computers and (3) is dodgy at best.

And no doubt Libertarian will show up to remind us all that the logic epistimology is tautologous and no better than the religious epistimology for formulating decisions anyway.

regards,

pan

[Joe Malik]

Commonality of preference can be determined by a poll or vote, where a particular preference seems relevant to the debate on a specific value. I don't argue that the poll is decisive but that it forms a factual basis we can agree on to act as a starting point for the process of reason.

If you prefer cream cakes to doughnuts, I would argue science predicts there are no relevant consequences to a matter of value. I doubt you would even bother to sincerely argue otherwise.

3) From what I remember of my propositional logic, this doesn't follow. Two groups can have contradictory belief structures that are internally consistent (as you said) but individual propostions aren't necessarily partially ordered. There is no way to say that one belief is superior to any other.

I don't understand this paragraph. Please explain?

(3) is indeed dodgy. Suggestions? Ideas? Alternatives?

And no doubt Libertarian will show up to remind us all that the logic epistimology is tautologous and no better than the religious epistimology for formulating decisions anyway.

No doubt. All epistimology rests on a belief in an inerrant source. However the only source I know of that has a chance of gathering widespread agreement as to its text and meaning is the body of primary observations of sense data.

If we want a theory of value based on the Bible, the Bible then becomes the inerrant source. If we want a theory of value based on scientific empiricism, we need to find relevant primary observations. We have chosen as a culture and nation to base our system of values and laws on a scientific, emprical basis; rather, we have specifically excluded any particular religion as a factual basis (via the First Amendment). My desire to find a real basis in fact is in accordance with that choice.