While reading today about some mystery stuff falling off the space station, I wondered whatever happened to that astronaut who lost the tool bag.
I went to wikiand not only did it have a blurb about the kit, but it also intimated she was a bad astronaut, that losing the tool bag was the last straw and she was sort of forcibly retired shortly thereafter. First I’ve heard of that!
The entry didn’t have a link detailing the rest of her screwups, so now I am wondering if there are any Dopers out there that can substantiate this, point me in the direction of some kind of media detailing same, etc.
Safety protocols are understandably very important, and violation of explicit protocols is cause for a mandatory record for any space vehicle processing activities (generally including a reprimand). I assume the same is true for on-orbit activities. This isn’t just punitive; it is also to capture a record for excursions from defined processes and activities, so in case some anomaly or failure occurs later there is traceability back to potential root causes. However, as no specific cause was found for the bag being unsecured, I doubt that this was “the straw that broke the camel’s back.”
There is, by the way, a long history of losing tools and equipment on spacewalks. On EVA #2 of the Gemini 10 mission, Michael Collins managed to not only lose a micrometerite collection panel but also the Hasselblad camera he was using to take pictures of the Agena rendezvous. People don’t generally appreciate just how difficult it is to operate in freefall inside of a highly restrictive pressure suit, when every move you make causes you to translate or spin in the opposite direction. Earlier Gemini spacewalks with Ed White and Gene Cernan demonstrated that the anticipated workload (based upon studied done in a freefall simulation tank under water) massively underestimated the effort required to perform even simple tasks.
Yeah, he is still bitter about his mistake with the camera, because of that there are no pictures of his EVA activities with the Agena which would have been spectacular.
There was no specifc plan for securing the bag. There was one but it wasnt very good. The astronaut did not secure the bag because they just didnt follow the plan and screwed up. The astronaut did not secure the bag properly because the plan was poorly thought out. And some variations/combinations obviously. And possible mechanical failures as well.
I dont see why an investigation couldnt narrow down the most likely explaination in this case.
I remember thinking when this happened that something like this would be very unlikely to happen to folks like cave divers and rock climbers where the simple task of securing things properly is second nature and often means the difference between life and death.
Oh, and I seem to recall a case of a Shuttle crew launching a satellite and there being a major problem because the launch protocol wasnt followed properly. Don’t recall if it was the protocol that was screwed up, or the crews mistake or again a combination.
And yet, cave diving, even by experienced divers, is the most hazardous type of recreational SCUBA diving. While diving requires a lot of apparatus, operating in freefall and inside a pressure suit with limited visibility, dexterity, and no tactile response, is an order of magnitude more difficult. Imagine trying to touch type in a dark room with chopsticks taped to your fingers, and you get some idea of just how difficult it is to control fine movement.
I suspect you’re referring to the Spartan 201-04 Solar Observation spacecraft released on STS-87. Kalpana Chawla, the mission specialist who was responsible for deployment, was exonerated by a failure review board which determined that flaws in the software interface control and procedures caused the error. Chawla later went on to crew the ill-fated STS-107 mission in which Columbia broke up during re-entry.
[QUOTE=Stranger On A Train;12737125And yet, cave diving, even by experienced divers, is the most hazardous type of recreational SCUBA diving. While diving requires a lot of apparatus, operating in freefall and inside a pressure suit with limited visibility, dexterity, and no tactile response, is an order of magnitude more difficult. Imagine trying to touch type in a dark room with chopsticks taped to your fingers, and you get some idea of just how difficult it is to control fine movement.
I suspect you’re referring to the Spartan 201-04 Solar Observation spacecraft released on STS-87. Kalpana Chawla, the mission specialist who was responsible for deployment, was exonerated by a failure review board which determined that flaws in the software interface control and procedures caused the error. Chawla later went on to crew the ill-fated STS-107 mission in which Columbia broke up during re-entry.
Stranger[/QUOTE]
Yes, fine control is obviously an issue. But I dont see why properly securing things can’t be done “properly” with “proper” procedures and “properly” designed equipment (pardon my bad sentence). Unless this was just a rare case of bad luck (which is always possible) either something needs to be fixed or somebody screwed up. It would obviously take more care and verification. It not like we are asking them to do fine needle point in a space suit.
If we can put a man on the moon, we can make a clipping device that can be reliably used by astronauts
Yeah, thats probably the one I am remembering. Very early on, ISTR it being a case of “I did what I was supposed to” vs “You couldnt have because it didnt work right”. And boy, isnt that a case where being right didnt pay off in the long run.
Which just goes to demonstrate that even after over four decades of performing spacewalks (with a gap of nine years between the last Skylab EVA and the EVA on STS-6) the technology and processes are still immature. And it is an accepted truism that any process that requires a single individual to perform a critical task flawlessly without either automatic safety devices/checks or a second person to observe and check is a failure-prone process. Even the best trained person commits errors and oversights on a regular basis, which is why surgeons operate in teams and critical manufacturing/installation processes require quality control and inspection.
I’m not certain what this is supposed to mean, except that it seeks to place blame on the astronaut in question for numerous errors in software testing and procedure checkout. No critical process should ever rely on one person to do everything right 100% of the time, especially under pressure or in a novel environment, and particularly if “doing everything right” means improvising and assessing risk on the fly. When an individual fails to do their job, it is frequently not because they were negligent in following reasonable instructions but because they failed to receive proper training, necessary oversight or redundancy, or a reasonable work plan. Getting back to your comparison with divers, this is why divers dive in pairs, and perform pre-dive checks as well as carry redundant safety equipment; so that if anything fails, or one diver forgets to perform a check the other catches it.
I’m not certain what this is supposed to mean, except that it seeks to place blame on the astronaut in question for numerous errors in software testing and procedure checkout. No critical process should ever rely on one person to do everything right 100% of the time, especially under pressure or in a novel environment, and particularly if “doing everything right” means improvising and assessing risk on the fly. When an individual fails to do their job, it is frequently not because they were negligent in following reasonable instructions but because they failed to receive proper training, necessary oversight or redundancy, or a reasonable work plan. Getting back to your comparison with divers, this is why divers dive in pairs, and perform pre-dive checks as well as carry redundant safety equipment; so that if anything fails, or one diver forgets to perform a check the other catches it.