I am sorry - what I meant was that I felt slightly ridiculous picking up on that very small detail (to wit, barrel exchange times) in an otherwise precise and informative post.
Actually, Spiny was describing his own nitpick as ridiculous because he’s a self-effacing Dane who doesn’t wish to offend. Whatever happened to the good old Vikings of yore? They wouldn’t worry about anything as silly as somebody’s feelings! 
Okay, now a question about Saving Private Ryan. In the movie bullets from those MG3s still could kill after passing through six or seven feet of water. Wouldn’t the water have slowed them more?
Don’t know if this is actually a response to the Op but Hitler apparently believed the Allied landings to be a mere diversion. He believed the real landings would be opposite Dover. This kept him from moving other troops to repulse the landings in Normandy which the German General Staff advised. IIRC Ambrose and others contend that the initial attack is fairly(if you are willing to pay the price in blood) easy to make. Simply put overwhelming force at the point of attack. The trick is fighting off the counterthrust by the enemy. Gallipoli for example, the landings suceeded but the Turks were able to bring up reinforcements against a stalled front and were able to push them back.
I don’t think that’s irrelevant. Depending on who you ask, the French Resistance also created so much havoc that some of the German reinforcements couldn’t get to the area for weeks. I think that was an episode of Mail Call.
Well, going from memory, the 7.62 NATO bullet will penetrate about 3 ft of ordinance gelatin, so I suspect it would continue through about 4-5 ft of water before stopping. The heavier bullets used in the MG34 and 42’s would penetrate a bit further. Keep in mind, though, you still need enough remaining penetration to enter the body. I suspect 5 ft is a safe limit as the bullets slow enough that your gear will function as body armor.
–Patch
Not remembering the details of the battle scene, did you see an individual MG fire for 100+ round bursts, or just that much continuous fire from the bunker? Bunkers like that were set up with multiple Schwere MG42s which made the bunker quite capable of sustaining continuous fire.
And while it’s true that under typical combat conditions, short bursts were normal, this wasn’t a typical combat situation. Loads of exposed infantry were running around, just waiting to get mowed down. In this particular circumstance, being liberal with the use of ammo is perfectly justifiable - especially since the bunker is bound to have lots of it and plenty of spare barrels, with multiple MGs per bunker.
So the reality is, I’d imagine, with that much infantry exposed openly - who could get to cover if you don’t get them now - with plenty of ammo and spare barrels available, it wouldn’t be unreasonable for the soldiers in the bunkers to forego the general practices of typical battles and go nuts.
It certainly seems logical, in any case. Ammo isn’t a big factor, as bunkers have tons of it - and barrels can be switched while the other 1-3 MGs in your bunker are firing - the big factor is time. The infantry is exposed now, and you can’t let it get to cover. In that case, using lots of ammo makes perfect sense.
*However, the films I’ve seen of the landing did not show enough men coming ashore at once to make killing all of them before they reached the seawall and could mount an organized attack all that dfficult. *
There’s very little film that I’m aware of, of the landings, I’m sure you’ve seen it. About ten seconds worth, if that. Shows one or two guys getting hit and dropping. Most historical documentaries use film from other landings in lieu of actual footage apparently. All the other films were ruined in the lab? Maybe I’m thinking of still photos only - Frank Capa might have been the photographer on that, a classic photo of landing craft obstacles and a floating infantryman. Has a blurry quality to it because of improper processing.
Yeah, that’s the ten seconds I’m thinking of. Considering we supposedly had cameramen on shore the night before to film the landings (where on earth did people get the impression that the US and Hollywood are synonymous? ) you’d think there would be more.
All the film was collected from the photographers after the action and then lost at sea when transferred from the beach to the support ships. Capa’s film wasn’t turned in and is the only surviving stills from the landing.
I’m pretty sure the film that you are speaking of is of a British landing. The helmets look like British helmets. And it might not even be film of the Normandy landings. I’ve seen stock footage, not that particular one, in many documentaries about the landings because actual photos are scarce. As was pointed out, the still camera fim was largely ruined in processing.
One example of such stock, and erroneous, footage of the Normandy landing air support in a History Channel film was a shot of some North American Aircraft B-25’s supposedly bombing the beach defenses. I’m quite certain that there were no B-25 equipped combat units in the ETO.
You mean you can’t just pick up an M60, tear your shirt off, twist your face into an assymetric grimace, yell incoherently, and lay your finger on the trigger for minutes while armies, helicopters, towers, and cars disintegrate before you?
I need to do some more research. Is what I call hell really what he calls home?
Of course, we cannot forget how much easier the landing would have been had the bombing by heavies the been more accurate and effective.
David, you were in a B-26? Over Normandy? They say nice things about you boys here.
Okay, according to this site, http://world.guns.ru/machine/mg33-e.htm , barrel change on an MG-42 could be done in 6-10 seconds, a time I would be inspired to make or beat considering all the ships in the known universe were sitting offshore unloading men who wanted to kill me, and would need to be done every 250-300 rounds, or a box of ammunition. Each gun was issued with two or three spare barrels so let’s say I had 1200 rounds before I ran out of barrels. Fired prudently and by trying to make every burst count that gives me about five to eight minutes of shooting before I ran out of barrels and started wondering what June would be like in a POW camp in Kansas. And if Sgt Shultz disagreed, well, who had the machine gun?
Okay, I’m starting to understand. And I also understand why the guys my age the Germans drafted later on were sent places where either they couldn’t desert or surrender or if they did it wouldn’t affect the war effort that much. Getting killed for Onkel Adolph is for teenagers.
Actually, the entire German intelligence organization believed this, and told Hitler so; they also believed an invasion of Norway was likely, which also was not true. Virtually every bit of intelligence they were analyzing was part of an elaborate web of lies spun by the British. Een after the invasion, Abwehr (the German intelligence agency) was saying the main attack would fall on Calais at any moment.
So for once it wasn’t Hitler’s fault; he was following the advice of the professionals.
As far as Gallipoli goes, there was a number of problems:
-
Shortage of water in blazing semi-desert conditions.
-
Shortage of troops - 70,000, instead of the 150,000 the plan had originally called for.
-
Shortage of artillery - the British divisions normally had 304 guns a piece, in this campaign they had 118, with few mortars and howitzers, precisely the weapons needed for the terrain.
-
They badly underestimated the Turks - there was a bit of early 20th century racist superiority at play here, as the British command pretty much disdained the ability of the Turks to fight good British soldiers ( Hamilton figured each British soldier to be worth several dozen Turkish soldiers ). They expected the attack to be a walkover and were rather shocked when it wasn’t.
-
Poorly trained and prepared troops - relative to the campaign, anyway. The greenish territorial units used had been trained to fight in France, which meant trench warfare. In the conditions at Gallipoli the only units that knew how to fight well in that kind of terrain were the limited number of Gurkhas that took part and unsurprisingly they fared best. The British troops tended to dig in and to funnel in to the deceptively false safety of the ravines, instead of trying to gain the high ground. The inexperience of the troops was magnified by the great success of the Turkish snipers in taking out senior officers early in the campaign, which left units somewhat aimless and floundering.
-
As mentioned no real maps or conception of just how difficult the terrain was.
-
Failure to exploit the landings at Suvla Bay when a critical opportunity presented itself. This chiefly involved a breakdown in communication between Hamilton and his subordinate Stopford ( Hamilton was entirely too hands-off ), confusion in the high command about what exactly they were doing, and Stopford’s own inadequacies as a commander under these circumstances ( he tried to fight in Gallipoli as if it were France and was overcautious and passive by nature ).
- Tamerlane
You kinda can in SOCOM II. You can run in circles or back in forth around an opponent laying your finger on the trigger of the M60E3 and still take their head off despite their use of a more accurate weapon.
(oh, it should be noted that I’m not saying this is an accurate representation by any means. I’m just saying that if you’re excited enough to want to do it, you can buy that game :))
Bravery=men willing to chance getting killed. By 1944, all the Allied troops had a LOT of training. They were skilled and very motivated. In a lot of respects, their commanders didn’t order them to attack, they just let them loose on the enemy. No matter what else happened on D-Day, a lot of men were killed. They died because they risked all to win that battle. That’s why Omaha Beach was won.
Having said that, here are my observations:
Initiative
Down to the lowest NCOs, the Allies took the initiative to make things work. The ordinary soldiers won the day. They ran up the cliffs regardless of gunfire and mines, they organized attacks, they moved inland.
Topography
The topography at Omaha both favored and hampered the Germans. The Germans could fire into landing craft and exposed soldiers, but once the soldiers got into the shallow cliffs they were a bit hidden from direct fire. As I see it, the water was unsafe, the beaches were unsafe, but the draws and cliffs offered a bit of protection. If the same German forces had been firing on Americans moving over a flat beach, they’d have caused mayhem.
Strength of forces:
Once at the top of the cliff, the Germans were pretty thin. Enterprising GIs could get through the clifftop defenses and out into the open fields beyond, then regroup and fight off small counterattacks.
Counterattacks:
The Germans failed to mount effective counterattacks. IMHO, the Germans could have fired away at the landing craft, then withdrawn in force to good defenses several hundred yards inland on relatively flat ground. When the GIs hit the clifftops, the Germans could have counterattacked with artillery, mortars, and machine guns and inflicted heavy casualties. Repeat as necessary. Give up a bit of ground but remain intact and inflict heavy casualties. Sooner or later the enemy runs out of men. Hitler was particularly stupid about this; he always insisted that forces “hold to the last man,” “never retreat,” etc. That’s dumb. Move your forces effectively and you can defeat a far superior force. My favorite example of this is the Confederate victory at Chancellorsville.
Lack of armor.
At Dieppe, the Canadians were defeated by tenacious counterattacks from the Germans, plus a lack of naval/air bombardment support and no armor against German panzers. Well, we learned from that. We got some armor ashore at Omaha (though not nearly as much as we had planned to) but it was a lot more than what the Germans had. Hitler had two divisions of Panzers available but refused to let either Rommel orVon Runstedt command them. Hunh? “OK, guys, defend France, but with one hand tied behind your back!” By the time these divisions got into the fight, the Allies were too firmly entrenched to drive off.
Regarding Gallipoli, the major failure was naval - the British Admiral had orders to force the straits at all costs, clearing the way for the big battleship guns to be trained on Istanbul - which would have been almost defenseless. But the admiral was afraid of losses to mines and did not obey his orders, even though they specifically instructed him to ignore losses (at all costs). The Turks also had Kemal Attaturk on Gallipoli, who due to some bureaucratic oversight, never got the memo that Turkish leadership was second rate.
Minor correction
There were, indeed, B-25s in the ETO. While the majority of the Mitchells were assigned to the 15th Air Force in Africa and Italy (still ETO), the RAF had a few Mitchells flying out of Britain.
(Now, the three captioned thumbnails on this page are almost certainly in error. The odds that a B-25 was used to take pictures from what appears to be the inside of a formation of B-26s seems less than likely. (At least two of the thumbnails on this page labeled “B-25” display B-26s in the photos.)