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Old 12-11-2013, 04:07 PM
Rocket 100 is offline
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Join Date: Nov 2013
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Quote:
Originally Posted by Dissonance View Post
Stalingrad was encircled in November 1942. Third Kharkov was fought in February and March 1943. That's four months later, not 'almost right after'. If you take another look at the map of the Eastern Front linked, you'll notice the Red Army continued to advance west from Kursk despite being stopped at Third Kharkov from further advances in that direction.
Stalingrad end 2.2.1943. Third Kharkov end 15.3.1943. Almost right after.

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The Germans deliberately abandoned the Rzhev Salient after fighting to hold it for 14 months specifically to shorten the length of the front and to free up divisions for use elsewhere. That elsewhere turned out to be squandering them at Kursk. See here:And here:
That was mistake. It take way too long to start Kursk attack.

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If that is what you meant, you didn't convey it by stating that there was only one front in Europe in 1943.
There was second front in Europe only in july.

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Again, German armament production in all categories increased every month from 1941-44 despite the strategic bombing, and the final collapse in production levels in 1945 was as much due to the physical loss of land where the factories and resources were located to the advancing Allied ground forces. This also does nothing to address the fact that the Panther had a horrible operational rate due to mechanical unreliability even in late models after the bugs of the engine setting itself on fire were addressed. The day prior to launching the largest offensive in the West since the Allies had returned to the continent the Panther only had a 71% operational rate. One month later the survivors had a 34% operational rate. The slow production rate of the Panther also ensured that the Pz-IV remained the mainstay of German panzer divisions, as it was much easier to produce and remained in production until the end of the war. It also wasn't uncommon for there to be more running StuG-III assault guns in panzer divisions than running Panthers despite the fact that on paper the 1944 TO&E(warning, pdf file) authorized more Panthers in the second panzer battalion than the number of StuGs in the (self propelled) Panzerjäger Battalion.
For example, after bombing in april 1944 there was five months shut down in production. The bombing also effect heavily what comes to spare parts.

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Yet again, this is simply not true. The US Strategic Bombing Survey conducted after the war found that it had nowhere near the effect it was hoped to have in all categories of production, including fuel. Germany's fuel problem was that they simply did not have control over the production of enough of it. One of the primary effects of the strategic bombing was the destruction of the Luftwaffe as any kind of effective force through attrition combating the bombers, and more particularly their fighter escorts. The P-38, P-47 and P-51 could all ultimately escort the B-17s and B-24s deep into German airspace and perform equal to or better than the Me-109 and FW-190. The FW-190 and particularly the Me-109 had very short legs, as amply demonstrated during the Battle of Britain when the Me-109 was pushing its fuel reserve dog fighting over London from bases on the French and Belgian coast.
For example Adolf Galland, Hermann Göring, Albert Speer and Erhard Milch all said that it was definitely one the most important and crucial thing. And the US strategic bombing survey identified "catastrophic" damage.

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And? Again, pay attention to the numbers, they are the year they were introduced to service. More than 6 million PPSh-41s being produced from 1941 had a much greater impact than less than a half million StG44s being produced starting three years later. And again, any objections he may have had aside it was developed behind Hitler's back, and one he was made aware of it he gave it his blessing.
StG was ready for mass production in early 1943.

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1) Have you looked up the loss rates of Bomber Command and the 8th and 15th USAAF in early operations? To reiterate, Bomber Command was losing more flight crews KIA than the number of German civilians it was killing. In the disastrous Schwienfurt-Regensburg mission the 8th USAAF lost almost three times as many flight crews as the number of German civilians it killed. 2) Horseshit. The strategic bombing campaign was in no way vital to defeating Germany. They were going to be steamrollered by the Red Army in the end regardless. For the nth time, production of war materials by Germany increased every year despite the strategic bombing.
1) Loss rates were big but only temporarily.

2) When there is no fuel and no air forces it's pretty much impossible to win the war or even do successful defence. There were actually no Luftwaffe when Red Army destroyed Germany Army Group Centre in the summer 1944 and in the west there were no Luftwaffe when there was Operation Overlord.