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Old 12-12-2013, 04:58 AM
Dissonance is offline
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Join Date: Apr 2003
Location: Running Back & Forth
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Quote:
Originally Posted by Rocket 100 View Post
Stalingrad end 2.2.1943. Third Kharkov end 15.3.1943. Almost right after.
You have really got to get your facts straight. Stalingrad was fully encircled by the Soviets on November 23, 1942, bypassed and left to rot by the Soviets as they pushed on westward. The final starving remnants of 6th Army surrendered on February 2, 1943. It was four months after Stalingrad was surrounded and bypassed deep in the Soviet rear before Third Kharkov was fought, not almost right after. It was six weeks after the capitulation of the last starving 91,000 troops under Paulus' command at Stalingrad surrendered before Third Kharkov ended, not almost right after.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Rocket 100
That was mistake. It take way too long to start Kursk attack.
You can say this all that you want, but it doesn't make it true. It's not a mistake, the Rzhev Salient was abandoned without a fight by the Germans after 14 months of often very heavy fighting to retain control of it in order to free up some sort of reserve releasing 22 divisions to stabilize the front and to be able to carry out some form of limited offensive action in the coming spring and summer. That limited offensive was at Kursk, the launching of which was repeatedly delayed. The initial plan was presented to Hitler by Manstein on March 10, 1943, and
Quote:
On 10 March, von Manstein presented Hitler with an alternative plan whereby the German forces pinched off the Kursk salient with an offensive commencing as soon as the spring rasputitsa had subsided.[55][56] On 13 March, Hitler signed Operational Order No. 5, which outlined the intended launch of several offensives, including one against the Kursk salient.
The start date for the offensive at Kursk was then pushed back again and again until it was finally launched on 5 July 1943. That it took so long to actually launch Operation Citadel does not change the fact that the Rzhev Salient was abandoned to release forces for it.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Rocket 100
There was second front in Europe only in july.
Which again, you didn't convey in your initial erroneous statement that
Quote:
Originally Posted by Rocket 100 View Post
And what is important to notice: in 1943 there was only one front in Europe.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Rocket 100
For example, after bombing in april 1944 there was five months shut down in production. The bombing also effect heavily what comes to spare parts.
Um, horseshit. There was no five month shutdown in production of anything by Germany in April 1944. Production of armaments by Germany in all categories continued to increase from April until the end of the year in 1944. Reduction in output only began in the very last months of 1944 and in 1945 when Germany was losing physical control of the factories and raw material sources. Attempting to blame the poor mechanical reliability of the Panther and Tiger on the lack of spare parts due to strategic bombing is patently absurd. The Panther had an atrocious operational rate and broke down so frequently because it was in its very design mechanically unreliable and a maintenance nightmare. You'll note the Pz-IV and StuG-III didn't suffer from the mechanical problems and lack of operational rates the Panther and Tiger did.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Rocket 100
For example Adolf Galland, Hermann Göring, Albert Speer and Erhard Milch all said that it was definitely one the most important and crucial thing. And the US strategic bombing survey identified "catastrophic" damage.
Again, nonsense. Of course fuel was an important and crucial thing for Germany and was throughout the war because they didn't have access to enough of it, not because production of it suffered "catastrophic" damage from strategic bombing. See for example Operation Tidal Wave, the bombing of Germany's main source of oil at the Ploesti oil fields in Romania:
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The mission resulted in "no curtailment of overall product output", and so was deemed unsuccessful.[8]

This mission was one of the costliest for the USAAF in the European Theater, with 53 aircraft [out of 177] and 660 aircrewmen lost. It was the worst loss ever suffered by the USAAF on a single mission, and its date was later referred to as "Black Sunday".

Quote:
Originally Posted by Rocket 100
1) Loss rates were big but only temporarily.
You've got a strange idea of "temporary". In any event there is no reason to believe that strategic bombing would have been curtailed or halted had wunderwaffe miraculously caused loss rates to return to higher rates that the Western Allies were perfectly willing to accept earlier in the war when the Luftwaffe was still able to bleed the bombers before it was worn down to ineffectiveness even trying to defend the airspace over Germany as a result of attrition to Allied fighters that had the range to escort the bombers into the heart of Germany and the performance to be the equal or better of German fighters which never possessed anything close to that kind of range.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Rocket 100
2) When there is no fuel and no air forces it's pretty much impossible to win the war or even do successful defence. There were actually no Luftwaffe when Red Army destroyed Germany Army Group Centre in the summer 1944 and in the west there were no Luftwaffe when there was Operation Overlord.
Yeah, there was no effective Luftwaffe because it had been ground into dust resisting the strategic bombing campaign, and pilot quality fell through the floor when Germany had to reduce training time for new pilots to replace losses fast enough. The lack of training made them take losses at an even higher rate, which put them in an uncontrollable downward spiral as training time was cut further in order to make up for the losses, which resulted in even higher losses requiring an even further reduction in training time to try to produce enough pilots. You can even trace this back to Stalingrad, when the Luftwaffe stripped its training schools of pilot instructors and planes in a vain attempt to try to come up with enough Ju-52s and qualified pilots:
Quote:
Losses in men and materiel were replaced by crews and aircraft from the training commands, so that virtually all training of bomber crews came to a standstill during the winter of 1942-43. By the following spring the Stalingrad airlift accounted for the loss of 240 training crews and 365 training aircraft. The training program did not recover from the effects of these losses until 1944.