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Old 11-28-2013, 05:53 AM
Dissonance is offline
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Join Date: Apr 2003
Location: Running Back & Forth
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Quote:
Originally Posted by Rocket 100 View Post
What I meant was that the Third Kharkov battle and success came almost right after Stalingrad. (February and March).
Stalingrad was encircled in November 1942. Third Kharkov was fought in February and March 1943. That's four months later, not 'almost right after'. If you take another look at the map of the Eastern Front linked, you'll notice the Red Army continued to advance west from Kursk despite being stopped at Third Kharkov from further advances in that direction.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Rocket 100
It take way too long before Kursk started after that.
The Germans deliberately abandoned the Rzhev Salient after fighting to hold it for 14 months specifically to shorten the length of the front and to free up divisions for use elsewhere. That elsewhere turned out to be squandering them at Kursk. See here:
Quote:
Abandoning it effectively meant the Germans would abandon any future offensive against Moscow.

Defending the salient required 29 divisions. Its abandonment freed up 22 of those divisions. It created a strategic reserve which allowed the Germans to stabilize the front and somewhat recover from massive losses at Stalingrad.

It is easy to understand the doubts of general Heinz Guderian about the strategic aims of the later Battle of Kursk, since the Germans had to abandon the strategically important Rzhev-Vyazma for gathering troops to take a much less valuable one at Kursk.[5] In other words, the retreat of the Germans in operation Buffel was tactically and militarily successful, but the abandonment of "the Rzhev-Vyazma pistol" was a strategic loss for Nazi Germany on the Eastern Front.

The reserves gained by the Germans through the withdrawal were soon after used up in the offensive against Kursk later in 1943.
And here:
Quote:
the name Büffel Bewegung (Buffalo Movement in German) was given to a series of local retreats conducted by the German Army on the Russian Front during the period 1–22 March 1943. This movement eliminated the Rzhev Salient and shortened the front by 230 kilometers, releasing twenty-one divisions for use elsewhere. This allowed the Germans to create a reserve for operations elsewhere on the Eastern Front.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Rocket 100
Again what I meant It was only July when there was two front in Europe and compared to Normandy the Sicilian Campaign was different thing.
If that is what you meant, you didn't convey it by stating that there was only one front in Europe in 1943.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Rocket 100
There was problems in Germany tank production and definitely not the least was allied bombing raids against Maybach engine plant and other tank factories.
Again, German armament production in all categories increased every month from 1941-44 despite the strategic bombing, and the final collapse in production levels in 1945 was as much due to the physical loss of land where the factories and resources were located to the advancing Allied ground forces. This also does nothing to address the fact that the Panther had a horrible operational rate due to mechanical unreliability even in late models after the bugs of the engine setting itself on fire were addressed. The day prior to launching the largest offensive in the West since the Allies had returned to the continent the Panther only had a 71% operational rate. One month later the survivors had a 34% operational rate. The slow production rate of the Panther also ensured that the Pz-IV remained the mainstay of German panzer divisions, as it was much easier to produce and remained in production until the end of the war. It also wasn't uncommon for there to be more running StuG-III assault guns in panzer divisions than running Panthers despite the fact that on paper the 1944 TO&E(warning, pdf file) authorized more Panthers in the second panzer battalion than the number of StuGs in the (self propelled) Panzerjäger Battalion.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Rocket 100
Yes, when there is not heavy bombers to destroy enemy factories and industry the only real choise is to concentrate everything to protect own factories and industry.
Germany didn't get to make this choice. It was being buried in aircraft production by its enemies just like it was in all other categories of armaments. Germany concentrated on single engine fighters because there was no other choice for them. Among the other factors, they only needed one engine, not four. Either way, the He-177 was a disaster as a strategic bomber. The engines were extremely unreliable, hence the nickname "flaming coffin". Believe it or not, early models of the He-177 had dive brakes. That's right, one of the design requirements of the closet thing Germany came to a proper strategic bomber was that it be able to dive-bomb.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Rocket 100
Well, allied bombings had very heavy effect what comes to Germany fuel problems/fuel shortage. That was self-feeding situation.
Yet again, this is simply not true. The US Strategic Bombing Survey conducted after the war found that it had nowhere near the effect it was hoped to have in all categories of production, including fuel. Germany's fuel problem was that they simply did not have control over the production of enough of it. One of the primary effects of the strategic bombing was the destruction of the Luftwaffe as any kind of effective force through attrition combating the bombers, and more particularly their fighter escorts. The P-38, P-47 and P-51 could all ultimately escort the B-17s and B-24s deep into German airspace and perform equal to or better than the Me-109 and FW-190. The FW-190 and particularly the Me-109 had very short legs, as amply demonstrated during the Battle of Britain when the Me-109 was pushing its fuel reserve dog fighting over London from bases on the French and Belgian coast.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Rocket 100
StG44 mass production lasted very, very little time comparing to PPSh-41.
And? Again, pay attention to the numbers, they are the year they were introduced to service. More than 6 million PPSh-41s being produced from 1941 had a much greater impact than less than a half million StG44s being produced starting three years later. And again, any objections he may have had aside it was developed behind Hitler's back, and one he was made aware of it he gave it his blessing.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Rocket 100
1) Yes, but not enough. Not even near as big they would' ve be.

2) The strategic bombing campaign was vital to defeating Germany because it effect everything and in the end there was no Luftwaffe to fight.
1) Have you looked up the loss rates of Bomber Command and the 8th and 15th USAAF in early operations? To reiterate, Bomber Command was losing more flight crews KIA than the number of German civilians it was killing. In the disastrous Schwienfurt-Regensburg mission the 8th USAAF lost almost three times as many flight crews as the number of German civilians it killed. 2) Horseshit. The strategic bombing campaign was in no way vital to defeating Germany. They were going to be steamrollered by the Red Army in the end regardless. For the nth time, production of war materials by Germany increased every year despite the strategic bombing.