B. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Jurisdiction
28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) states that district court jurisdiction over claims against foreign state defendants is limited to cases in “which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under [**9] sections 1605-1607 of . . . title [28] or under any applicable international agreement.” The district court examined the relevant passages of the FSIA, and found that sovereign immunity barred suit against Iran. We affirm.
Under the FSIA, sovereign immunity is waived in suits “for money damages . . . against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (emphasis added). 28 U.S.C. § 1603(c) defines “the United States” for purposes of the FSIA to include “all territory and waters, continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”
This brings us to the heart of this case. Appellants argue that section 1603(c) should be interpreted to embrace “all territory and waters” with respect to which the United States exercises any form of jurisdiction. Inasmuch as United States embassies are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States for certain purposes, appellants argue that events occurring at the embassies fall within the waiver of immunity [**10] contained in section 1605(a)(5). Although a literal reading of the statute supports this argument, we decline to accept it because we believe the intent of Congress was to the contrary. Cf. United States v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44, 84 L. Ed. 1345, 60 S. Ct. 1059 (1940); Trailer Train Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 697 F.2d 860, 866 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 846, 104 S. Ct. 149, 78 L. Ed. 2d 139 (1983).
Our view rests on the proposition that Congress intended that the FSIA would make United States law on sovereign immunity consistent with international law. See Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 310 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148, 71 L. Ed. 2d 301, 102 S. Ct. 1012 (1982); H.R. Rep. No. 1487, supra, at 7, 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 6605-06. n5 Consistent with that intent section 1604 provides a general jurisdictional immunity for foreign states which is made subject to the exceptions specified in section 1605. n6 Section 1605(a)(5), the exception for noncommercial torts on which appellants rely, is directed primarily at the problem of traffic accidents in the United States caused by automobiles operated by a foreign embassy. The legislative history makes this clear. [*588] See H.R. Rep. No. 1487, supra, at 7, 20-21, 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 6605-06, 6618-20. Admittedly section 1605(a)(5) is cast in general terms and, with certain exceptions, includes all tort actions for money damages not encompassed by the commercial activity exception in section 1605(a)(2). See H.R. Rep. No. 1487, supra, at 20-21, 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 6619. However, nothing in the legislative history suggests that Congress intended to assert jurisdiction over foreign states for events occurring wholly within their own territory. Such an intent would not be consistent with the prevailing practice in international law. That practice is that a state loses its sovereign immunity for tortious acts only where they occur in the territory of the forum state. See, e.g., European Convention on State Immunity, Arts. 7, 11, Council of Europe, No. 74 (1972); State Immunity Act, 1979, pt. 2, § 7 (Singapore); State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, § 5 (U.K.).
Informed as we must be by that practice the issue before us is whether the embassy in Tehran is “territory . . . subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” Appellants contend that it is. Territory, of course, is a primary basis for jurisdiction, i.e., a state may prescribe and enforce a rule of law for conduct occurring in territory under the state’s sovereignty. Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §§ 10, 17, 20 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Restatement (Second)]. n7 A United States embassy, however, remains the territory of the receiving state, and does not constitute territory of the United States. Restatement (Second) § 77 comment a. Thus, [**13] United States embassies are not within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. See Meredith v. United States, 330 F.2d 9, 10-11 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 867, 13 L. Ed. 2d 70, 85 S. Ct. 137 (1964).