In another thread, somebody said that if they could travel back in time, they’d stop Gavril Princip from assassinating Franz Ferdinand and thereby prevent World War I (and by extension a lot of subsequent history).
Do you think this was a realistic plan (other than the time travel part obviously)? My personal opinion is that a war was pretty much inevitable. Europe was divided into two camps, each of which had reasons to look for a war. While they was some maneuvering around to try to have it on the most advantageous terms, I don’t see how war could have been avoided entirely. Eventually some incident was going to lead to a general war.
If I remember my Barbara Tuchman (The Guns of August) correctly, WWI was inevitable. The heads of most of the nations were practically family members, who didn’t get along, and they had so many double secret alliances that all it took was a spark.
I know Germany had been building up its Navy and spoiling for a fight since at least 1900, so yes, I agree, *some *excuse or another would have been used.
While there’s some truth to what you say (Kaiser Wilhelm was Queen Victoria’s grandson, for instance, and often feuded with his English cousins), most of the monarchs of Europe wielded little real power by 1914.
Tsar Nicholas II (who was married to a German princess) was about the only European monarch who truly ruled over his land and who could make military decisions personally.
Robert Massie’s book Dreadnought provides an excellent account of the
20 years leading up to the first World War.
The two strongest nations were the UK and Germany, and neither one
had any legitimate reason to look for war.
The UK traditionally kept out of continental affairs unless one power
became a threat to obtain hegemony. Germany was probably as strong
as any two other continental powers on land and sea, and so had nothing
to fear if it could count on the support or neutrality of any of the three
other strongest; in the actual event Austria-Hungary was an ally, and the
duo France+Russia would have had no chance of prevailing against Germany+A/H.
What destabalized the scene was Germany’s irrational naval challenge
vs the UK, its irrational support of A/H aggression in the Balkans, and its
irrational quest for another victorious military enounter with France, all
enabled by a paranoid Army General Staff, and an emotioallly unstable Kaiser.
It may be true that Serbia shared blame for inciting the Sarajevo crisis,
and that Russia shared blame supporting Serbia after the crisis begain.
However, Germany’s security in no way depended on Sebian submission
to A/H, and because it encouraging A/H to attack Serbia, which was sure
to lead to a general war, Germany should be considered the most fundamentally
guilty party.
The issues that let to WWI were far more complex than indicated here (rprior the colonial’s post that is). If it wasn’t for the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand, it would have been something else. There was too much competition, too much testosterone and too much bad blood to avoid the war.
And I concur, Dreadnought was an outstanding book. A must read if one is interested in this.
I’ve read more histories of WWI than I can count and and subject is still baffling. It’s extraordinarily difficult to determine just why so many countries elected to commit mass suicide.
One of the reasons it’s so hard to to figure it out, though, is that in truth there WASN’T any sort of overall plan. As much emphasis as history has put on the inflexibility of the initial battle plans, the truth is that none of the major powers involved actually went through the war with a coherent long term strategic plan; they were changing direction from month to month based on whatever the most recent battlefield results, political pressure, or random bullshit was. AJP Taylor notes that over and over, a major power would make a huge change in strategic intent based on the optics of the most recent battle result, many of which were of limited actual importance. There was NO major power that even had a logical manner of making strategic decisions; military leaders, even in the democratic powers, had far too much influence on political decisions and fought with each other incessantly.
It’s hard to imagine the pile of ineptitude and military avarice that was 1914 Europe somehow would NOT have resulted in war, if not in 1914 then soon after. These countries weren’t building giant armies just for parades.
As you pointed out, the United Kingdom was worried about Germany’s growing navy. They felt that forcing Germany to back down on its naval expansion was a legitimate cause for war.
Germany feared for its future. Italy and Austria-Hungary were weak and undependable allies and would be likely to become weaker and more undependable as time went on. Looking at the opposition, Germany could see that the alliance between Britain and France was growing stronger and Russia was starting a major economic and military reform program which would make it a more powerful enemy. So Germany felt pressure to fight what appeared to be an inevitable war as soon as possible before the odds against it grew worse.
I’ve read (forget where) that historians now believe, based on Kaiser Wilhelm’s correspondence and diaries, that for years before 1914 he fully intended to force a war at some point on some pretext. He was sure Germany would win as it always had won its wars since unification, show Britain its place, and win Germany’s place in the sun, maybe a few more African or Asian colonies and respect as a leading member of the colonial-imperialist community, at least equal to Britain. When the war came he had second thoughts, but as a general told him, “Once the troop trains left the stations there was no going back.”
Well, all Germany’s military success had been under Bismarck, whose policy it was for Germany always to be on good terms with France whenever it was on bad terms with Russia, and vice-versa, because Germany could not be sure of winning a two-front war. Wilhelm forgot that bit.
No, the UK did not try to force Germany to back down on its naval expansion.
The UK addressed the problem by increasing the size of its own Navy.
Germany did not need to fear for its future unless the UK got involved,
and it was crazy of the Kaiser and the military to antagonize the UK as
they did. With the UK out my point was that all Germany needed was for
one of the three other strongest powers to be neutral. Having A/H as an
ally was even better, and as events proved A/H was in for the duration
on Germany’s side. Also, Italy was a paper ally of Germany whose activity
would have to be taken into account by anyone wishing to start something
with Germany.
The reason the UK and France were drawing closer was Germany’s unreasonably
aggressive behavior toward France in the form of bullying for its own sake.
See Tangier and Agadir on that note.
There was virtually no possibity that any power would care to take aggressive
inmitiative against a country as mighty as Germany, especially when it had alliances
with A/H and Italy which might be of significant wartime value.
This is a bit garbled. Germany had not fought any wars since official
unification took place while the Franco-Prussian war was in progress,
However, the was no doubt in anyone’s mind, including Germany’s own,
that Germany had the strongest army in the world.
Also, it was impossible for Germany to be on good terms with France as
long as Germany possessed Alsace-Lorraine, and in fact Germany never
bothered to try to be on good terms with France. It did, under Bismarck,
try to be in good terms with A/H and Russia (See Dvaikiaserbund and
Reinsurance Treaty). After Bismarck was forced from office the Kaiser
and the German foreign Office foolishly let lapse all friendly association
with Russia, preferring to back A/H more or less uncondtionally in the Balkans,
thus driving Russia into the arms of France.
As somebody who spends no small time educating my unwilling friends about these things, I did a little research, and this is my understanding of the whole scenario. The truth is that it’s a great deal more complicated than this, but IAGTU that this is all essentially true.
Archduke Ferdinand of Austria is assassinated in Sarajevo by the Black Hand. Sarajevo is a part of the geographical region of Bosnia, which was home not only to ethnic Bosnians but also to ethnic Serbs, to which Gavrilo Princep and the other members of the Black Hand belonged. Austria had only recently won Bosnia in a war against the Ottoman Turks, but the Black Hand wanted it and other parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire to become part of some greater Serbia or Yugoslavia.
Russia took a tremendous interest in Serbia, for a number of reasons. Serbs are Slavic people, like the Russians; they are also Orthodox Christians. Add in their growing sense of nationalism and they seemed like a ripe opportunity for the Russians to expand their influence in the region - a victory they desperately needed after the fiasco of the Russo-Japanese War.
The Austrians also wanted war; they gave the July Ultimatum to Serbia in the hopes of intimidating the Serbs into abandoning their interests in Bosnia. The Ultimatum was designed to be humiliating; the Serbs were not supposed to accept it. They didn’t, or rather, they accepted 8 of its 10 provisions. Austria replied with war. Russia, intent on keeping its influence in the Balkans, declared war on Austria in reply.
The Germans then mobilized in response, preparing to make war on Russia and Serbia (though they thought the Austrians could handle tiny Serbia on their own). The Germans had no specific territorial gains in mind for the war; their goal was to find for Germany ‘a place in the sun,’ and to establish themselves once and for all as the dominant superpower on the continent. Germany had become extremely powerful in the field of science, military might, and especially industry, but it was a latecomer to the colonial scene and the Kaiser - a man trying to deal with complicated emotional issues stemming from the premature death of his father - wanted Germany to become a true world superpower, like France and England.
Under the provisions of the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1892, the French entered the war on the side of the Russians. Of all the powers (except perhaps Serbia, which was fighting for its life against a superior enemy and still somehow winning), France had perhaps the most clear-cut reason for entering the war - to take advantage of Germany’s distraction against Russia and to not only smash its neighbor and rival, but to retake the border territories of Alsace-Lorraigne.
For 200 years, the diplomatic and military goal of England had been simple - to support the weak against the strong and to ensure that no continental power would ever become strong enough to challenge England’s control of the Channel and the North Sea. As Germany was becoming the strongest continental power, it behooved England to support France and Russia in beating it down. This was especially important seeing as how Germany had so quickly expanded its naval capacity.
The Ottoman Empire had been secretly aligned with Germany since before the war began. The Turks had been defeated decisively several times by the Russians, most lately in the Balkan Wars that forced the Ottoman Empire to give up virtually all of its territories in Europe (including, hmm-hmm, Bosnia). It was vital to the Germans that the Turks enter the war, so as to pin the British forces in Africa and to threaten the all-important Suez Canal. Also, the Turks were hoping to maybe take back some of the soil they’d lost three years prior in the Balkan War, particularly in what is now Bulgaria.
The Italians joined the war late, but when they saw how well the Allies invaded Turkey, they decided to act on some old grudges with the Austrians, dating back all the way to the Battle of Solferino and Italian unification, and enter the war. They spent most of it fighting Austria.
The Romanians were supposed to join the Central Powers, but the Allies made them a better deal so they joined up with the Allies, and were richly rewarded for it later on.
The Bulgarians owed much of their existence as an independent state to Austrian and German assistance in the Balkan War, so they joined up with the Central Powers. It proved to be a very poor idea.
The Japanese also joined in on the side of the Allies, because they saw lots of delicious German colonies in China and the Pacific and thought, ‘yeah, I bet we could take these without a problem.’ After the war, they got to keep them. The Japanese are one of the three countries that changed sides between WWI and WWII, along with Romania and Italy.
We Americans liked the French and British very much, so we sent them arms and supplies. Even if we didn’t (though we totally did, though we said we didn’t), we were still shocked and appalled by the sinking of the American ship Lusitania by a German submarine. We didn’t help much, but it’s the thought that counted.
There were very few pivotal battles in World War I. For the most part, it was just an endless, grimy war of attrition.
Austria-Hungary was looking for a foreign war for domestic reasons.
It was not a very solid country. Besides the Austrians and Hungarians (who didn’t like each other all that much) there were a bunch of other ethnic groups in the Empire: Croats, Czechs, Italians, Poles, Romanians, Ruthenians, Serbs, Slovaks, Slovenes, and some very confused Cherokees.
Franz Joseph, the Emperor, was holding things together almost by himself. He’d been around for decades (he’d been crowned in 1848) and everyone was used to him. The problem was most people didn’t like the heir very much, Franz Joseph’s nephew, Franz Ferdinand.
So there was a big concern that when Franz Joseph died and Franz Ferdinand took over, the Empire would fall apart. Some people thought they had a solution. A short victorious war against a foreign enemy would unite all of the various internal groups in the Empire.
So when Franz Ferdinand was assassinated, it seemed like an opportunity. For the record, the Serbian government really was guilty and Austria-Hungary had a legitimate cause for war. But it was a cause for war that was convenient for what some people in Vienna wanted anyway.
I agree that there was no need for Germany and Britain to be enemies. Historically, the two countries had been close and there was no real grounds for disagreement between them.
But Britain saw its naval supremacy as a vital interest. And Germany would not accept naval inferiority. Which was, quite frankly, stupid. Germany had no real need for a major navy and had nothing to gain from having such a navy. Germany basically made an enemy out of Britain for no reason (and paid a fortune to do it).
Britain was not happy about German naval expansion. They joined in a naval race to stay ahead of Germany but only because, as I said, they saw their naval supremacy as a vital interest. Even so, it was a controversial program. Britain would have been much happier if there had been no need to expand its navy.
Lusitania was a British ship. It was built in Britain, owned by Britons, operated by Britons, sailed under the British flag, and its port of call was Portsmouth. As it happened, some Americans died when it was sunk, and in any event there was worldwide outrage over the sinking, not just in the USA.
It’s underselling the American contribution to dismiss it as “we didn’t help much.” For one thing, the sinking of Lusitania, and resulting American hostility, caused Germany to cease unrestricted submarine warfare for two years, which was obviously to Britain’s benefit.
More importantly, though, the astounding buildup of American forces in Europe forced Germany’s hand in 1918; they either had to attack and win or, it was obvious, they would be hopelessly outnumbered. At one point the U.S. was sending the equivalent of a new division to France every two days, troops that forced Germany to play its cards and that would end up helping drive the German army out in the 100 Days’ Offensive.
Craots and Serbs apparently hated each other, so perhaps the Croats might
have been drawn closer to the federal government by a war against Serbia,
but I have my doubts about the reality of expecting any of the others to react
in the same way. For example, union with Italy was surely overriding in the
minds of the Italian minority, and independence or autonomy would have
been so in the minds of the Polish minority. Austria’s relatively poor military
performance may have been partly the result of the lack of enthusiasm of
its non-German/Hungarian conscripts.
None of that matters, however, because Austria would not have risked war
against Russia without wholehearted German support, and Germany delivered.
Germany was the key player, and it was the neurosis of the German royal
and military leadership which brought about a general war. If the Kaiser’s much
more stable and liberal father (b. 1869) and survived until 1914 there would
likely have been no war.