Well, I don’t agree with doing that. There are plenty of accusations to be slung, and rightfully so, at those who conceived this invasion and oversee it.
Aside from the actual pretense for going, which most Americans now believe was predicated on either believing faulty intelligence or slanting the intelligence to persuade Congress to approve the war, Rumsfeld fucked up a lot of logistical and military tactics by failing to heed his own Chief Of Staff’s advice, so what did he do? He replaced Shinseki. Bad move.
Nobody semed to have had the foresight to see how the occupation would degenerate into urban warfare as it did, and we’re relatively new at that kind of fighting (but adapting quickly).
We didn’t go in with enough boots on the ground from day one.
We disbanded the Iraqi Army, which many viewed (as I do) as a mistake. It set us back quite awhile in terms of basically rebuilding the new Iraqi Army from scratch, instead of weeding out the Batthist loyalists from the existing Army and repatriating the rest. Instead we allowed many of these trained and armed soldiers blend back into the Iraqi population to cme and fight us again, with a grudge towards us because “we took err jobs!”.
We didn’t have all the nicieties to fight in close urban settings initially, failing to foresee the IED and EFP proliferation until too many died from a lack of body armor or up-armored vehicles like HMMV’s that operate in such narrow confines.
We didn’t seem to have a political goal for Iraq…this notion of being “greeted as liberators” was a stretch then and it’s the opposite of reality now. We should have worked harder to unify the government and foreseen the possibility of an utter breakdown along religious lines and been proactive to prevent it.
The biggest mistake in this war, besides the inception of it (depending on what you believe), was poor planning. If you’re going to do it, do it right. Overwhelming force. A plan for the aftermath. These were lessons we were supposed to have learned militarily from Vietnam, and seemed to put those lessons to use in Gulf War I. But this is a totally different war and we’d be better off now to get out of there as soon as a reasonable amount of governmental and military/police security can be established, then slowly, inexorably withdraw, leaving behind a contingent force to continue with training and assistance with infrastructure repair/construction.
Maybe then, out of all this, we will at least have achieved a strategic foothold in this volatile region, where we can ensure having a supply of a precious resource (oil) until we can wean ourselves off of it.