# 157 Dead Ethipian Airlines Crash in New Boeing 737 Max

**URL:** <https://boards.straightdope.com/t/157-dead-ethipian-airlines-crash-in-new-boeing-737-max/830885>\
**Category:** Miscellaneous and Personal Stuff I Must Share\
**Created:** [March 10, 2019, 12:05pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/157-dead-ethipian-airlines-crash-in-new-boeing-737-max/830885 "2019-03-10T12:05:48Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 20\
**Page:** 8

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**Author:** ![PastTense](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/pasttense/32/14550_2.png) [@PastTense](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/PastTense)\
**Post date:** [March 26, 2019, 11:48pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/157-dead-ethipian-airlines-crash-in-new-boeing-737-max/830885/141 "2019-03-26T23:48:24Z")

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> [@](#):
>
> In testing performed in a simulator, Boeing test pilots recreated the conditions aboard Lion Air Flight 610 when it went down in the Java Sea in October, killing 189 people. The tests showed that **the crew of the 737 MAX 8 would have only had 40 seconds to respond** to the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System’s (MCAS’s) attempts to correct a stall that wasn’t happening before the aircraft went into an unrecoverable dive, according to a report by The New York Times.

> **[Lion Air 737 MAX crew had seconds to react, Boeing simulation finds](https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2019/03/simulations-show-lion-air-737-crew-had-little-time-to-prevent-disaster/)**
>
> Boeing test pilots determine crash was unavoidable if MCAS wasn't shut down in 40 seconds.

New York Times article:

> **[In Test of Boeing Jet, Pilots Had 40 Seconds to Fix Error (Published 2019)](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/25/business/boeing-simulation-error.html)**
>
> They had just moments to override an automated system and avert disaster in simulations of problems with the Lion Air plane that crashed last fall.

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**Author:** ![Magiver](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/4491bb/32.png) [@Magiver](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Magiver)\
**Post date:** [March 27, 2019, 12:43am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/157-dead-ethipian-airlines-crash-in-new-boeing-737-max/830885/142 "2019-03-27T00:43:32Z")

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The article isn’t completely accurate. Doing nothing for 40 seconds in any airplane would have been a serious problem if it was nosing over.

The crew would need to shut off the MCAS system but the logical solution would be to trim neutral with the normal electric trim and THEN shut off the MCAS. assuming they knew how to do it. As long as the electric trim worked they could play trim tag to the next airport. They should have recognized the time interval involved when the MCAS kicked back in.

I have to wonder if there wasn’t a secondary issue that, when combined, made the situation much worse.

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**Author:** ![Richard\_Pearse](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/richard_pearse/32/13144_2.png) [@Richard\_Pearse](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Richard_Pearse)\
**Post date:** [March 27, 2019, 3:27am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/157-dead-ethipian-airlines-crash-in-new-boeing-737-max/830885/143 "2019-03-27T03:27:02Z")

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I don’t think the article is suggesting 40 seconds of doing nothing at all, just 40 seconds without trimming or disconnecting the electric trim, you’d still be pulling back on the control column.

The secondary issue was probably just that they had no idea MCAS existed or what it did and why it did it. It’s obviously not an insta-death fault because the previous crew dealt with it satisfactorily with the help of someone in the jump seat. It’s not surprising the jump seater was useful, you pick up a lot more when you can sit back and take in the big picture.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Magiver](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/4491bb/32.png) [@Magiver](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Magiver)\
**Post date:** [March 27, 2019, 3:49am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/157-dead-ethipian-airlines-crash-in-new-boeing-737-max/830885/144 "2019-03-27T03:49:02Z")

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wouldn’t you see the trim wheel spinning on it’s own and figure out it’s a powered-trim issue?

At some point while pulling back on the yoke it should be obvious the tail plane is trimming itself.

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**Author:** ![Delayed\_Reflex](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/delayed_reflex/32/3172_2.png) [@Delayed\_Reflex](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Delayed_Reflex)\
**Post date:** [March 28, 2019, 10:47pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/157-dead-ethipian-airlines-crash-in-new-boeing-737-max/830885/145 "2019-03-28T22:47:10Z")

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> [@Magiver](#):
>
> wouldn’t you see the trim wheel spinning on it’s own and figure out it’s a powered-trim issue?
> 
> At some point while pulling back on the yoke it should be obvious the tail plane is trimming itself.

Here’s some anecdotal analysis from a 737 pilot who thinks it might not have been that obvious of a situation: [Ethiopian airliner down in Africa - Page 102 - PPRuNe Forums](https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/619272-ethiopian-airliner-down-africa-102.html#post10423122)

> [@](#):
>
> Second: For all the arm-chair Monday morning QB’s who are saying: “Oh, they should have recognized it immediately and disconnected the trim:”
> 
> (1) Just after takeoff there is a lot going on with trim, power, configuration changes, and as noted above, the darn speed trim is always moving that trim wheel in seemingly random directions to the point that experienced NG pilots would treat its movement as background noise and normal ops. Movement of the trim wheel in awkward amounts and directions would not immediately trigger a memory item response of disconnecting the servos. No way.
> 
> (2) The pilots could very reasonably not have noticed the stab trim movement. Movement of the stab trim on the 737 is indicated by very loud clacking as the wheel rotates. On the -200 it was almost shockingly loud. On the NG, much less so. HOWEVER, the 737 cockpit is NOISY. It’s one reason I am happy to not be flying it any more. The ergonomics are ridiculous. Especially at high speeds at low altitudes. With the wind noise, they may not have heard the trim wheel moving. The only other way to know it was moving would be yoke feel and to actually look at the trim setting on the center pedestal, which requires looking down and away from the windows and the instruments in a ‘leans’-inducing head move. On the 717, for example, Ms. Douglas chimes in with an audible “Stablizer Motion” warning. There is no such indication on the 737.
> 
> (3) The fact that they were at high power and high speed tells me the stick shaker was activated. With that massive vibrator between your legs, alternating blue sky and brown out the window, your eye balls bouncing up and down in their sockets as the plane lurches up and down in positive and negative G’s, it would have been a miracle if one of the pilots calmly reached down, flicked off the stab servo cutout switches, folded out the trim handle, and started grinding the wheel in the direction of normalcy. These pilots said over the radio that they had “unreliable airspeed”. So they did not even know which instruments to rest their eyes on for reliable info. Their eyes were all over the cockpit looking for reliable info, the plane is all over the place like a wild boar in a blanket not behaving in any rational way. And the flying pilot may have been using the tiny standby IFDS for airspeed and attitude. Ouch.
> 
> Finally, runaway stab trim is a very, very rare occurence up until now. We trained it about once every other year in the sim because it is so rare. And when we did it was obvious. The nose was getting steadily heavier or steadily lighter with continuous movement of the trim wheel. That is a VERY different scenario than what these pilots faced.
> 
> We also trained for jammed stabilizer, the remedy for which is overcoming it with force. The information they were faced with could very reasonably have been interpreted that way, too.
> 
> An URGENT AD from the FAA/ Boeing after Lion Air would have helped get it back to the front of the pilot’s minds for sure. Extra training by the airline or an urgent pilot memo would have helped. Maybe one was issued, we don’t know yet.
> 
> A better question might be: given this nose down attitude, high speed, and fully nose down or almost fully nose down stab, how much altitude would they have had to have to be able to recover. I’m thinking at least 10000 feet to recognize the problem, disconnect the switches, fold out the handle and start frantically winding the stab back to normalcy while the flying pilot tries to gain control via the elevator. It’s entirely possible that this scenario, if not recognized early on, is unrecoverable at any altitude.

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**Author:** ![Magiver](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/4491bb/32.png) [@Magiver](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Magiver)\
**Post date:** [March 28, 2019, 11:57pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/157-dead-ethipian-airlines-crash-in-new-boeing-737-max/830885/146 "2019-03-28T23:57:03Z")

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> [@Delayed\_Reflex](#):
>
> Here’s some anecdotal analysis from a 737 pilot who thinks it might not have been that obvious of a situation: [Ethiopian airliner down in Africa - Page 102 - PPRuNe Forums](https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/619272-ethiopian-airliner-down-africa-102.html#post10423122)

An interesting read except for the first sentence is a bit of a straw man:“Oh, they should have recognized it immediately and disconnected the trim:”

I think the repeated engagement of the MCAS to be more obvious then initial input by the system.

plane noses down, pilot pulls back and retrims. plane noses down, pilot pulls back and retrims. plane noses down pilot pulls back and retrims…At some point the trim system should enter the thought process because that is what the pilot is fighting against.

Keep in mind all this is speculation until the black box data becomes public. Assumptions are being made as to what the MCAS system normally does and not what transpired in either of the accidents.

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**Author:** ![GreenWyvern](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/greenwyvern/32/2834_2.png) [@GreenWyvern](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/GreenWyvern)\
**Post date:** [March 30, 2019, 7:35am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/157-dead-ethipian-airlines-crash-in-new-boeing-737-max/830885/147 "2019-03-30T07:35:10Z")

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\*\*Latest black box data \*\*emerging from the Ethiopian crash seems to confirm that a faulty AOA sensor and MCAS were the cause, as everybody has been guessing.

New York Times:

[In Ethiopia Crash, Faulty Sensor on Boeing 737 Max Is Suspected](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/29/business/boeing-737-max-crash.html)

> [@](#):
>
> Black box data from a doomed Ethiopian Airlines flight suggests the crash was caused by a faulty sensor that erroneously activated an automated system on the Boeing 737 Max, a series of events suspected in an Indonesian disaster involving the same jet last year.
> 
> Data from a vane-like device, called the angle-of-attack sensor, incorrectly activated the computer-controlled system, according to several people who have been briefed on the contents of the black box in Ethiopia. The system, known as MCAS, is believed to have pushed the front of the plane down, leading to an irrecoverable nose-dive that killed all 157 people aboard.  
> …
> 
> The new connections between the two crashes point to a potential systemic problem with the aircraft, adding to the pressure on Boeing. The company already faces scrutiny for its role in the design and certification of the plane. The Federal Aviation Administration delegated significant responsibility and oversight to Boeing.
> 
> The company is now on the defensive, as investigators, lawmakers and prosecutors try to determine what went wrong. The Justice Department is investigating the jet’s development, while the Transportation Department’s inspector general is looking into the certification process. The inspector general has issued a subpoena to at least one former Boeing engineer for documents related to the 737 Max, according to a person familiar with the investigation.

Sydney Morning Herald:

[Investigators find first hard link between the two 737 MAX disasters](https://www.smh.com.au/business/companies/investigators-find-first-hard-link-between-the-two-737-max-disasters-20190330-p5197w.html)

> [@](#):
>
> Investigators of an Ethiopian Airlines crash have concluded that the same system that malfunctioned in an earlier accident off Indonesia was activated, and they are searching for a key piece of equipment that might explain why, according to people briefed on the probe.
> 
> Preliminary flight data from the Boeing 737 MAX jet’s black-box recorder indicates that a new anti-stall system known as MCAS was pushing the plane’s nose down during the March 10 disaster, said the people, who asked not to be named because the findings aren’t yet public.
> 
> One of two sensors known as angle-of-attack vanes, located near the nose of the aircraft, would have to malfunction or be damaged to cause the scenario suspected in the crash. Searches of the wreckage as of Thursday night had failed to locate the part believed to have been involved, said one of the people.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![GreenWyvern](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/greenwyvern/32/2834_2.png) [@GreenWyvern](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/GreenWyvern)\
**Post date:** [March 30, 2019, 7:42am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/157-dead-ethipian-airlines-crash-in-new-boeing-737-max/830885/148 "2019-03-30T07:42:11Z")

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Longer read, about how it happened:

[The emerging 737 MAX scandal, explained](https://www.vox.com/business-and-finance/2019/3/29/18281270/737-max-faa-scandal-explained)

> [@](#):
>
> Boeing executives are offering a simple explanation for why the company’s best-selling plane in the world, the 737 MAX 8, crashed twice in the past several months, leaving Jakarta, Indonesia, in October and then Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in March. Executives claimed Wednesday, March 27, that the cause was a software problem — and that a new software upgrade fixes it.
> 
> But this open-and-shut version of events conflicts with what diligent reporters in the aviation press have uncovered in the weeks since Asia, Europe, Canada, and then the United States grounded the planes.
> 
> The story begins nine years ago…

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Velocity](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/velocity/32/18006_2.png) [@Velocity](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Velocity)\
**Post date:** [March 30, 2019, 1:26pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/157-dead-ethipian-airlines-crash-in-new-boeing-737-max/830885/149 "2019-03-30T13:26:39Z")

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Given Boeing’s bad PR at the moment, wonder if this would be a good time for an airline who still has faith in the 737 MAX to place orders for some MAXs at a discount that wouldn’t be given under normal circumstances - if Boeing would agree to it.

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**Author:** ![N9IWP](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/n9iwp/32/3154_2.png) [@N9IWP](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/N9IWP)\
**Post date:** [April 3, 2019, 6:19pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/157-dead-ethipian-airlines-crash-in-new-boeing-737-max/830885/150 "2019-04-03T18:19:14Z")

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Looks like the pilots did turn off the MCAS, but it came on again (it is not sure if they turned it on again or it came on again automatically)

> **[Ethiopian Air pilots turned off 737 MAX anti-stall system. Then it turned on...](https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2019/04/ethiopian-air-pilots-turned-off-737-max-anti-stall-system-then-it-turned-on-again/)**
>
> Pilot properly switched off stabilizer control system but could not regain control; software may have rebooted.

Brian

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Folly](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/folly/32/3219_2.png) [@Folly](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Folly)\
**Post date:** [April 3, 2019, 6:24pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/157-dead-ethipian-airlines-crash-in-new-boeing-737-max/830885/151 "2019-04-03T18:24:18Z")

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> [@N9IWP](#):
>
> …(it is not sure if they turned it on again or it came on again automatically)

Talk about a big difference in liability for Boeing between those two options!

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Magiver](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/4491bb/32.png) [@Magiver](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Magiver)\
**Post date:** [April 3, 2019, 10:36pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/157-dead-ethipian-airlines-crash-in-new-boeing-737-max/830885/152 "2019-04-03T22:36:14Z")

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If you couldn’t shut the system off that would be a huge problem.

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**Author:** ![wolfpup](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/wolfpup/32/10618_2.png) [@wolfpup](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/wolfpup)\
**Post date:** [April 3, 2019, 11:37pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/157-dead-ethipian-airlines-crash-in-new-boeing-737-max/830885/153 "2019-04-03T23:37:04Z")

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There’s a real lack of clarity about exactly what was “turned off”. The implication that they followed the exact procedure in the Boeing and FAA bulletins and it still didn’t help is certainly disturbing, but it’s as likely as not to be merely confused reporting based on an unofficial leak. Which is why it’s important to wait for at least the preliminary report. It seems hard to believe that physical switches cutting off both primary and backup power to the electric stabilizer trim could fail to disable the MCAS. Something seems wrong with the set of facts being reported here.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Velocity](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/velocity/32/18006_2.png) [@Velocity](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Velocity)\
**Post date:** [April 4, 2019, 5:13am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/157-dead-ethipian-airlines-crash-in-new-boeing-737-max/830885/154 "2019-04-04T05:13:29Z")

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Possible bird strike:

> **[Bird hit on sensor could have doomed Ethiopian Airlines' Boeing 737 Max jet,...](https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2019/04/03/boeing-737-max-ethiopian-airlines-pilots-lion-crash/3350372002/)**
>
> Pilots of the doomed Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737 MAX followed emergency procedures specified by the maker, the Wall Street Journal reports.

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**Author:** ![GreenWyvern](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/greenwyvern/32/2834_2.png) [@GreenWyvern](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/GreenWyvern)\
**Post date:** [April 4, 2019, 7:15am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/157-dead-ethipian-airlines-crash-in-new-boeing-737-max/830885/155 "2019-04-04T07:15:54Z")

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> [@wolfpup](#):
>
> It seems hard to believe that physical switches cutting off both primary and backup power to the electric stabilizer trim could fail to disable the MCAS. Something seems wrong with the set of facts being reported here.

Perhaps switching off the stabilizer did disable the MCAS, but they still couldn’t pull out the dive with the stabilizer switched off, so they had to try switching it on again.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![eschrodinger](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/eschrodinger/32/122_2.png) [@eschrodinger](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/eschrodinger)\
**Post date:** [April 6, 2019, 6:12pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/157-dead-ethipian-airlines-crash-in-new-boeing-737-max/830885/156 "2019-04-06T18:12:39Z")

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From the preliminary report, you can see that after they flipped the stabilizer cutout switches, the MCAS sent an AND (aircraft nose down) signal, but the stabilizer did not move. So it looks like the switches worked to disable MCAS control of the stabilizer. But those switches cut all electric control of the stabilizer.

According to the cockpit voice recording (CVR), the copilot tried to adjust the stabilizer manually, but was unable to move it using the manual wheel. It is possible that the forces on the stabilizer were too great for one person to be able to move it by hand. After that, there are powered stabilizer movements in the ANU direction from the switches on the control yoke. One explanation is that the cutout switches were flipped back on so that powered adjustments could be made. 5 seconds later, MCAS activated again and moved the stabilizer in the AND direction again for the final time.

At that point the control yoke forces may have been too much to hold back, because the airplane was going 500 knots, and wound up hitting the ground at 40° nose down.

It looks like the pilots carried out the “correct” procedure, but could not recover control of the aircraft in the time and altitude that they had to work with. If they had been much higher, they might have had room to reduce the forces on the stabilizer by letting the plane pitch down, and then manually crank the stabilizer back up. But it was not a procedure that could work with the problem happening so close to takeoff.

The preliminary report also has some odd additional data, like the fact that there was a roll oscillation, which had occurred before. And the AoA sensor data looks different from the problem in the Lion Air crash. This one looks more like an electrical problem. The Lion Air one was consistently off by 20°, almost like a calibration error. This one jumps around and also pegs at 75° with no variation for awhile, and then jumps around again.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Magiver](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/4491bb/32.png) [@Magiver](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Magiver)\
**Post date:** [April 6, 2019, 6:44pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/157-dead-ethipian-airlines-crash-in-new-boeing-737-max/830885/157 "2019-04-06T18:44:59Z")

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> [@eschrodinger](#):
>
> It looks like the pilots carried out the “correct” procedure, but could not recover control of the aircraft in the time and altitude that they had to work with.

The correct procedure for what problem?

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![GreenWyvern](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/greenwyvern/32/2834_2.png) [@GreenWyvern](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/GreenWyvern)\
**Post date:** [April 6, 2019, 7:04pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/157-dead-ethipian-airlines-crash-in-new-boeing-737-max/830885/158 "2019-04-06T19:04:02Z")

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> [@Magiver](#):
>
> The correct procedure for what problem?

I suggest you actually read the Preliminary Report, then you’ll be in a better position to comment.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![wolfpup](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/wolfpup/32/10618_2.png) [@wolfpup](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/wolfpup)\
**Post date:** [April 6, 2019, 7:05pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/157-dead-ethipian-airlines-crash-in-new-boeing-737-max/830885/159 "2019-04-06T19:05:51Z")

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> [@eschrodinger](#):
>
> At that point the control yoke forces may have been too much to hold back, because the airplane was going 500 knots, and wound up hitting the ground at 40° nose down.
> 
> It looks like the pilots carried out the “correct” procedure, but could not recover control of the aircraft in the time and altitude that they had to work with. If they had been much higher, they might have had room to reduce the forces on the stabilizer by letting the plane pitch down, and then manually crank the stabilizer back up. But it was not a procedure that could work with the problem happening so close to takeoff.

Also being discussed [in this GQ thread](https://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=873100).

The issue appears to have been not so much yoke forces as the inability to operate the manual trim wheels in that overspeed situation due to the aerodynamic forces on the horizontal stabilizer trim. It didn’t reach 500 kts until near the end but the overspeed warnings were already sounding during most of the time they were trying to correct the problem (I believe maximum indicated airspeed (IAS) is about 340 kts). You’re right that more altitude would have given them an opportunity to electrically move the stabilizer to a more neutral position before activating the STAB CUT-OFF switches, and in fact there is a “yo-yo” procedure to achieve this, but they had no opportunity. The fact that the pilots appeared to follow the exact procedure set out in the Boeing flight operations bulletin after the Lion Air accident was absolutely damning for Boeing.

The emerging picture here is that Boeing’s single-minded quest to push the 737 MAX as virtually identical to previous generations and requiring essentially no pilot retraining led to some design decisions that in hindsight seem extremely irresponsible, to an extent that is now implicating the FAA as well, and the whole question of regulatory oversight. One was to design the MCAS software to use the input from only one angle of attack sensor even though two are present (ostensibly to avoid procedures for dealing with disagreement), another was to make AOA readings or even a warning about disagreement between the sensors optional extras, and a third was a failure to thoroughly document contingencies for dealing with MCAS problems, or indeed to document the MCAS at all. One flight manual for the 737 MAX obtained by the media has the term “MCAS” in the glossary, but no mention of it anywhere else in the manual, suggesting it had once been mentioned or described but the reference had subsequently been edited out.

Boeing in fact boasted about how quickly the 737 MAX was brought to market and how identical it was to previous generations so that essentially no pilot retraining was required. Now, as it were, the chickens have come home to roost. After the Ethiopian preliminary report, the Boeing CEO had no alternative but to admit to a design fault, saying simply “we own [this problem], and we know how to fix it”. I have no doubt that the fix will be robust, but as far as the original design decisions are concerned, the word that comes to mind is “unconscionable”.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![AK84](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/85e7bf/32.png) [@AK84](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/AK84)\
**Post date:** [April 6, 2019, 8:05pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/157-dead-ethipian-airlines-crash-in-new-boeing-737-max/830885/160 "2019-04-06T20:05:12Z")

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The insuinuatioms that Boeing happily placed in the web post crashes that non-white crews were somehow too stupid to fly the planes did not help either.

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