I did read it. It was rhetorical question. What it shows is that they were able to use electric trim to correct it and chose to shut it off after repeated nose-down trim by the computer.
The question remains. what where they responding to? It appears they reacted as if it was a runaway trim scenario but they were still able to trim it themselves with the yoke mounted trim switch. They shut down the system but it doesn’t appear they did it in a neutral position.
All this happened in a few minutes time and they were at something like 7000 feet above ground. They knew something was up almost immediately because they called for runway heading on climb out to give themselves a better chance to figure it out. They wanted to work it out at a higher altitude.
Just an interesting incidental further note about the engine placement of the 737 MAX.
There was a recent story about a 737 (not a MAX) hitting a runway sign during takeoff from JFK and having to return. The article includes a picture which shows the notoriously low clearance beneath the engine nacelles. That happens to be a 737 MAX which of course were grounded at the time and remain so, but the engine ground clearance I believe is the same as the previous generation – just 17 inches in both cases.
There’s a good comparison of the NG and the MAX engine placement here. The split picture shows how the MAX engine is much larger and is therefore mounted higher to maintain the same ground clearance, and therein lies the main reason for the handling differences that the MCAS was supposed to compensate for. In addition, the drawing below shows how the MAX engines are also slightly further forward.
“As a quality manager at Boeing, you’re the last line of defense before a defect makes it out to the flying public,” Mr. Barnett said. “And I haven’t seen a plane out of Charleston yet that I’d put my name on saying it’s safe and airworthy.”
Well, what do you expect from a non-union workforce?
They went to North Carolina to hire cheap, non-union, non-experienced workers – that’s what they got.
It is more of an indictment of a corporate culture that has become ruled by the vision of “OMG if this afternoon Airbus sells one plane more than us the stock price will go down”.
And having become the sole remaining US maker of mainline commercial airliners, with a near assurance on top of it that if the military wants to buy airplanes in that class the Congress will make them buy from you, seems to me a bit of a negative motivator.
In any case a company’s commitment to quality going dowhill is something I can see happening even in an organized workforce, sadly – the Big 3’s cars turned to crap while they were still union shops.
90 percent of Americans don’t build complex high-precision tech equipment with extremely demanding safety requirements. If you try do that with cheap, inexperienced labor you’re asking for trouble.
Unions provide proper apprenticeship and training for skilled, specialized technicians.
Edited to add: Are things not pretty dire for workers in the US, then?
One of things that hit me in reading through it; all the Boeing spokesperson quotes seem like they were created from some corporate fluff-speak generator.
Bumping this just to cite this very informative article about the dysfunctional culture at Boeing that led to the MCAS problems, and for those who haven’t been following the story, a good summary of how and why MCAS came to be:
Had that article been in a reputable newspaper it would have been in the editorial section with the word “opinion” below the title. Beyond the stellar achievement of using the words “aughts” and " estimable" in the same sentence it’s factually wrong.
The MCAS system was not designed to override all pilot input. It specifically allowed for pilot input with the trim system. It was also an easy problem to identify with the indexed trim wheel displayed prominently in front of both pilots along with the switch to disable it in the event of mechanical failure of the MCAS.
The op-ed then went on to blame capitalism with this statement: “It is understood, now more than ever, that capitalism does half-assed things like that…” :rolleyes: As if airliners built in non-capitalist countries are racking up achievement awards. What a stupid thing to say.
This was not journalism - it was an adjective laced opinion piece using someone else’s opinion to support it. While it’s fine to quote a source, that source should include facts in their opinion. Otherwise it’s an editorial.
there was nothing wrong with the assembly of the plane in question. There was a lack of redundancy on the part of Boeing and a lack of training with the individual airlines.
As cockpit emergency situations go, this was an easy one to identify and fix. There’s a giant trim wheel spinning excessively. DO SOMETHING. Step1: Does the trim switch work? Yes. Retrim. Step 2: if the problem persists, retrim again and turn off the auto trim using the switch directly in front of you next to the trim wheel. That’s it. It was a simple problem to recognize along with a simple a solution.
I’ve been following this whole saga closely and I found nothing technically incorrect in the article. I’m astounded that anyone would argue about it. What surprised and shocked me was the account of how badly Boeing’s engineering and management culture had deteriorated in recent decades. I can’t vouch for the accuracy of the article in its account of Boeing’s management woes but it seems very well documented and credible.
The MCAS system killed 346 people before the MAX was, quite properly, grounded as not airworthy. That’s a fact. It’s also a fact – stunning and unconscionable, but true – that almost no one was aware that the MCAS system even existed. Furthermore, Boeing’s “runaway stabilizer trim” procedure was followed exactly by the Ethiopian pilots, but it’s impossible to physically operate the manual trim wheel beyond certain speeds because of aerodynamic forces on the control surfaces.
In short, Boeing created an airplane with a software system that could generate dangerous flight behavior, tied that system to a single unreliable angle-of-attack sensor vane, failed to document that system or even tell anyone about it, and then provided an emergency fallback for runaway stabilizer trim that was impossible to execute!
Wow! Unless I’m misunderstanding you, you’re doing exactly what the article accused two corrupt Republican politicians of doing initially: blame the pilots! (“Daniel Elwell and Sam Graves, respectively the then-acting FAA chief and the ranking Republican on the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, led a coordinated campaign to blame the dead pilots for crashing the planes.”) This despite all the evidence about the plane’s now-known dangerous deficiencies and the dysfunctional management at Boeing that allowed it to happen!
This article from The New York Times Sunday Magazine today (paywall warning) blames the crash, in part, on inexperienced pilots while this earlier article (also paywall warning) talks about lax oversight by the FAA.
If you’re implying" professional" means well trained you would be in error.
As an example, The Asiana crash at SFO was done on a clear day with a CHECK RIDE PILOT in the cockpit. They drove a completely functional plane into the ground. I say “they” because they were all professional pilots and one of them was there to certify that.
If you care to scroll up here, you’ll see that we were not talking about the crashes at all. We were discussing serious systemic problems at the Charleston Dreamliner factory, due to failures of Boeing management culture.
If you care to read the earlier discussions, or the excellent article wolfpup posted today, you’ll find that it wasn’t so simple at all.
In a complex situation like this, blame can be found on all sides. But the facts I cited in my previous post are correct, and an armchair evaluation in hindsight that the MCAS behavior could have been mitigated if only the pilots had done something different and done it early enough may be theoretically correct but isn’t particularly helpful, nor does it detract from the fact that they were flying a dangerously unsafe airplane. Even that first article, which focuses (unreasonably, in my view) on the actions of the pilots (mostly in the Lion Air case) acknowledges the serious problems that Boeing created. If the accidents were largely the result of pilot error, the focus would be on pilot training. Instead, the entire 737 MAX fleet has been grounded worldwide, at enormous expense, and will likely not fly again until sometime next year, after a grounding that will have lasted nearly a year. There’s a very good reason that this was done.
I agree with this part:
… the mistakes [Boeing engineers] made were honest ones, or stupid ones, or maybe careless ones, but not a result of an intentional sacrifice of safety for gain. As always, there was a problem with like-mindedness and a reluctance by team players to stand out from the crowd. Even more pernicious was the F.A.A.’s longstanding delegation of regulatory authority to Boeing employees — a worry that is perennially available to chew on if you like and may indeed be related to the configuration of the troublesome system as it was installed.
Later the same article goes on to say, quite plainly, “The MCAS as it was designed and implemented was a big mistake. It remains unclear exactly what went wrong at Boeing — who decided what, and why — but a small collective breakdown had obviously occurred, and the F.A.A. had gone along for the ride.”
The point of the article I cited isn’t that Boeing is evil, it’s that its culture has become dysfunctional and important items of safety sometimes fall through the cracks. Instead of musing that “it remains unclear exactly what went wrong at Boeing”, the article I cited seeks to explain it.