I don’t think it they could have fed the entire population either. But I still think that the rural communities would be OK.
In the starve or bomb question, you have to ask “what is the end game of the blockade and starve tactic?” Starve them out of existence? - it won’t happen. Starve them until they surrender and come begging for assistance? - not gonna happen either.
In a nutshell- We were scared shitless that the Germans were gonna beat us to the bomb. After the German surrender we kept the love alive. Japan fucked up bigtime and paid the price.
This argument basically boils down to why we ended the war by using the atomic bomb to kill two hundred thousand Japanese when we could have blockaded Japan instead and killed several million Japanese. And as a bonus they would have suffered a lot before they died.
What defense would you offer for an American decision to kill millions of Japanese people when it didn’t have to?
That still is along the lines of my point, which is that the latter-day mythology of the unspeakableness of using a nuke is something largely inapplicable in the context of decisionmaking as of August 1945, when indeed only one side had it and it was one of many applications being tried out.
And the nuke also gets tamed if both sides that have the Bomb are reasonably civilized polities who have actual tactical objectives and strategic goals and want there to actually BE a world to conquer and rule after the war, and do not think they are backed against the wall of survival. e.g. NATO v.Warsaw Pact, for 40 years. Knowledge that using a particular application of technology casually will guarantee you end up as dead as the other bunch (Mutual Assured Destruction) tends to make you think twice: there is no need IMO to “cultivate” a mythology around something that actually CAN be a doomsday weapon and kill us all.
…well, yes, you can’t depend on that situation holding – 1940s-1990s was just a blink of an eye in terms of the whole of history and probably anomalous in the power arrangement.
Still I’m not too sure about basing my policies on some sort of “cultivated” psychological dread, when the tangible, real threat is already quite worthy of being very worried about. Proliferation must be avoided not because the Bomb is TeH EvIL but because its wide availability increases the probability of use which increases the probability of escalation which can wipe us out, nastily, in a way that proliferating, say, napalm, can’t.
Like I said, and DrDeth just put it more succintly, it’s no use to try and judge Aug. 1945 by that standard.