65th Anniversary of bombing Hiroshima

[Bryan_Ekers]

Oh, were they, and was it unanimous?

[DragonAsh]

@mlees

[QUOTE=DragonAsh]
Clearly, these people believed there were moral and pragmatic reasons for not bombing Japan. They were dead-on balls accurate WRT how the arms race would develop.

Do you believe that an arms race would NOT have happened without Hiroshima and Nagasaki?
[/QUOTE]
Well, who knows? You’re clearing dealing in hypotheticals now. But clearly the signers of that report thought there was a better chance of avoiding an arms race.

Bryan Ekers - my grandfather-in-law and other relatives that fought in the war (Philippines, other various islands) all agree that if invaded, they would have fought to the death - and it would have been mostly the Japanese dying, not the invaders. My GIL in particular thinks the military probably would have surrendered if they had been given a guarantee for the Emperor’s position.

[Kent_Clark]

@Diogenes_the_Cynic

They wouldn’t have needed an invasion. The Japanese were already suing for peace.

No, SOME Japanese were suing for peace. THE Japanese had already rejected the Potsdam declaration as late as July 26.

[QUOTE=Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki]
“I believe the Joint Proclamation by the three countries is nothing but a rehash of the Cairo Declaration. As for the Government, it does not find any imporant value in it and there is no other recourse but to ignore [mokusatsu] it entirely and resolutely fight for the successful conclusion of the war.”
[/QUOTE]

And what terms would the Japanese agreeto for surrender?

Instructions to the Japanese ambassador in Moscow from the Japanese Foreign Ministry insisted on minimum terms of no occupation of Japan and Japanese control of any war crimes trials, in addition to preservation of the Chrysanthemum Throne. These terms were remarkably similar to those given Germany at the end of the First World War, and the Americans would have rejected them out of hand.

THE Japanese didn’t surrender until Hirohito ordered them to. Hirohito didn’t take action until after two atomic bombs (“The enemy, moreover, has begun to employ a new most cruel bomb. . .”) and a declaration of war by the Soviet Union (“the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan’s advantage.”)

And Hirohito didn’t act until Suzuki, in essence, begged him to.

[bump]

@DragonAsh

I believe 100% (but have no proof) that the second bomb was 90% because the military wanted to test out another new type of bomb.

Actually, that’s backwards… the first bomb (“Little Boy”) was an untested gun-type weapon. The physics were understood well enough, and the engineering was relatively simple compared with the plutonium implosion type devices tested as the “Gadget” in July 1945 (Trinity Test) and used as the second bomb at Nagasaki on Aug 9, 1945.
Personally, I think the horrific fighting and casualties on Okinawa and Iwo Jima (most recent two battles) had the US commanders spooked; 12,000 US dead and 38,000 wounded, and roughly 110,000 Japanese killed at Okinawa for a 463 sq mile island, and almost 7000 US dead and 20,000 wounded and 18,000 Japanese killed for an 8 sq mile island are something like 4 TIMES the killed in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past 9 years.

After seeing that type of carnage in the last two battles, I think that to some degree, they didn’t want to chance wading into that on a larger scale by invading the home islands.

The official estimates of casualties ranged from 100,000 on the low end to upwards of a million

[ul]
[li]Joint Chiefs of Staff Study, April 1945: 1,200,000 casualties, 267,000 KIA (Operations Olympic and Coronet)[/li][li]Adm. Nimitz’ staff: 49,000 casualties in the first 30 days.[/li][li]Gen. McArthur’s staff: 125,000 casualties for both operations[/li][li]Gen. Marshall: 70,000 casualties[/li][li]Adm. Leahy: 268,000 casualties[/li][li]Adm. King: 31-41,000 casualties in first 30 days.[/li][/ul]

A point of note of the magnitude of expected casualties; the Department of Defense had 500,000 Purple Heart medals struck for Operations Olympic and Coronet. No more have been struck since, and despite Korea, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, there are STILL 120,000 available.

[Deeg]

@DragonAsh

Well, who knows? You’re clearing dealing in hypotheticals now. But clearly the signers of that report thought there was a better chance of avoiding an arms race.

This is also clearly dealing in hypotheticals.

[Kent_Clark]

@DragonAsh

It should be noted that there were others that advised against using the bomb on Japan. The Franck Reportopposed the nuclear bombing of Japan, both on moral grounds and because of the concerns over a possible arms race.

Although important tactical results undoubtedly can be achieved by a sudden introduction of nuclear weapons, we nevertheless think that the question of the use of the very first available atomic bombs in the Japanese war should be weighed very carefully, not only by military authorities, but by the highest political leadership of this country.

Russia, and even allied countries which bear less mistrust of our ways and intentions, as well as neutral countries may be deeply shocked by this step. It may be very difficult to persuade the world that a nation which was capable of secretly preparing and suddenly releasing a new weapon, as indiscriminately as the rocket bomb and a thousand times more destructive, is to be trusted in its proclaimed desire of having such weapons abolished by international agreement. We have large accumulations of poison gas, but do not use them, and recent polls have shown that public opinion in this country would disapprove of such a use even if it would accelerate the winning of the Far Eastern war. It is true that some irrational element in mass psychology makes gas poison more revolting than blasting by explosives, even though gas warfare is in no way more “inhuman” than the war of bombs and bullets. Nevertheless, it is not at all certain that American public opinion, if it could be enlightened as to the effect of atomic explosives, would approve of our own country being the first to introduce such an indiscriminate method of wholesale destruction of civilian life.

Thus, from the “optimistic” point of view – looking forward to an international agreement on the prevention of nuclear warfare – the military advantages and the saving of American lives achieved by the sudden use of atomic bombs against Japan may be outweighed by the ensuing loss of confidence and by a wave of horror and repulsion sweeping over the rest of the world and perhaps even dividing public opinion at home.

<snip>

We believe that these considerations make the use of nuclear bombs for an early unannounced attack against Japan inadvisable. If the United States were to be the first to release this new means of indiscriminate destruction upon mankind, she would sacrifice public support throughout the world, precipitate the race for armaments and prejudice the possibility of reaching an international agreement on the future control of such weapons.

Much more favorable conditions for the eventual achievement of such an agreement could be created if nuclear bombs were first revealed to the world by a demonstration in an appropriately selected uninhabited area.

Clearly, these people believed there were moral and pragmatic reasons for not bombing Japan. They were dead-on balls accurate WRT how the arms race would develop.

I’m going to be completely and totally cynical here. Three of the six people on the Franck committee, including Franck himself, had fled the Nazis. One of them, Leo Szilard, prodded Einstein into writing the letter that got the Manhattan Project started. Another, Eugene Rabinowitz, wrote most of the above-cited report.

The report was prepared in June 1945 – three weeks after Germany surrendered. Could it be the closer the bomb came to completion the greater their reservations became? Maybe, but the cynic in me wonders if the committee would have had the same moral and pragmatic reasons if the issue was using the bomb against the Nazis.

[New_Deal_Democrat]

@spifflog

@New_Deal_Democrat

SUMMARY REPORT
(Pacific War)

WASHINGTON, D.C.
1 JULY 1946

Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey’s opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.

United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report (Pacific War)

Informed Dopers should stop referencing the United States Strategic Bombing Survey as if it’s a non-biased stand alone reference. It’s not.

It was written by the Army Air Forces to support and justify the creation of a separate military department for the Air Force, (which was created in 1947) by touting the effects of strategic bombing.

Because the survey was a tool used by supporters of the Air Force to justify their existence, it’s not at all surprising that it states that strategic bombing won the war.

The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey was corroborated by the judgment of generals Eisenhower, MacArthur, and others.

[theR]

@Buck_Godot

The US had been engaged in a total war for several years in which the destruction of cities was a common practice. They had just spent massive amounts of money on developing a super weapon which they hoped to use to end the war. At this time concepts such as fallout and residual radiation were not clearly understood, basically the A-bomb was thought to be just like any other bomb except much much bigger. Sure they could have continued the firebomb raids, but the single high altitude bomber was easier, safer, and more effective.

To say at this point, “Well, we could end the war today using the weapon designed specifically for that purpose that we spent massive capital to develop, but have decided instead to let the war drag on a another few months because we feel sorry for the poor Japanese” would be politically insane. It is only in retrospect with MADD that we view use nuclear weapons as an unthinkable act.

Residual radiation may not have been perfectly understood, but the scientists and leaders developing the atomic bomb certainly understood that radiation was dangerous and would help kill a large number of people. Saying the atomic bomb “was thought to be just like any other bomb except much bigger” is completely wrong. Additionally, the political implications and political fall-out (ha!) of using the bomb were certainly discussed among scientists and leaders, both within the Manhattan Project and among others not directly involved, such as Niels Bohr. Many people fully realized the atomic bomb was different and would change international relations.