That the use of the A bombs allows Japan to play some kind of victim card now doesn’t really impact the question of whether the attacks should have happened. And, to be honest, however much Japan plays that hand its not really going to be a winner in China, Korea, the Phillipines or any of the other occupied countries, or indeed in any of the Allied countries whose soldiers were such valued guests of the Japanese Empire during the war.
I wish it had been possible to win the war with acceptable projected casualties (both Allied military and Japanese civilian) without bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki but it didn’t at the time seem to be. I wish the bombings of Tokyo, Dresden, Hamburg, Cologne etc hadn’t seemed to be militarily required. But they did seem that way at the time, and probably were - well if not strictly militarily required, at least required when one included the political/PR aspect of war. 65 years on I don’t have many doubts the right choice was made.
I don’t think you are reading very closely. My ‘nasty’ comment was directed at BrainGlutton. There are lots of reasons to support the dropping of the bomb - which I also think was the correct choice given the time, btw; I seriously think some people in this thread have some reading comprehension issues - but the idea that 'it’s good Japan got nuked, ‘cause it meant we didn’t get nuked by Russia during the Cold War’ is not very nice. And it has nothing to do with war.
Let’s not forget the one-sixth or so of the Okinawan population who died hiding in caves or drowned themselves in the ocean lest the “monsters” of the West get them.
I believe that my reading comprehension remains realitively intact.
You said that the Japanese air power was “no longer a threat” (post #7). You said the Army (which actually had the majority of it’s forces in Manchuria and China) was reduced to recruiting unsuitable manpower. You state that the civilian mobs would be armed with nothing more dangerous than bamboo sticks.
The military was beaten. I don’t disagree with that in a broad sense.
My post was intended to show that the Japanese military was more than capable of continuing to cause casualties. I included a link to the most recent battle before the A-bomb. (Note the Soviets didn’t invade Manchuria until the same day the second bomb was dropping.) The link shows that the US Army and Navy (and those of our Allies) continued to suffer heavy casualties by a military in shambles, well into June of '45.
You have twice referred to the Battle of Midway, as if that proves that the Japanese military was finished. It was not. The Battle of Midway marks the high water mark of the Japanese advance across the Pacific, but not it’s death rattle.
To consider that Operation Downfall would be a “mopping up” operation is wholely incorrect, IMO. Operation Downfall - Wikipedia
What was the alternative to the bombs? It’s either wait them out or invade. And keep in mind that the decision makes didn’t have all the information that we have today, in terms of projected casualties, the effects on the bombs, the state of Japan etc.
If we invade, certainly Olympic would have been very bloody, Coronet less so. The Japanese guessed we would invade there first, and were preparing that battlespace. While the estimates of 1 million casualties are overblown and revisionist history by Truman and others, they still would have been extensive. And after the battle for Okinawa, the Americans had assume that there would be significant casualties.
Wait them out? How long was that going to take? Quoting the post war strategic surveys is foolish. They were thinly veiled studies to support the Army Air Corps effort to justify the establishment of the Air Force. Additionally there was a significant morale problem in the Armed Forces. Many soldiers in the European theatre were angry at the thought of being deployed to the Pacific. And the expenditure of material in and around Japan was significant. Were we supposed to blockade for months or years when we might have the opportunity to end the war?
I think the biggest impediment to the end of the war might have been Roosevelt’s insistence for unconditional surrender. That probably prolonged the war, and in the end, we folded on that anyway.
I think many of these discussions are silliness. Were we really going to allow more Japanese and Americans to die because we were squeamish about using this weapon after tens of millions had already died? We were seriously discussing using chemical weapons of goodness sake.
So I think the best course was to use the bombs. And even with them, it wasn’t a guarantee that the Japanese would surrender.
I have grand-parent in laws who were in Japan in 1945. Including some in the military. Yes, the military were sending the final reserves to Kyushu for the expected final invasion - but realistically, the army was beaten. They had nothing left. They had some manpower, but not enough equipment (my grandmother-in-law says pots and pans were being collected, apparently to be melted down for the metal). Plus, the entire country was on the verge of starvation - and the people back home were being told to fight with shovels and whatever tools they had left.
I don’t think the Allied forces really knew just how bad things were on the ground in Japan - just going on the battles at Midway, Iwo Jima and obviously Okinawa told them that Japan would fight to the death. But based just on this, every estimate of possible fatalities in the case of an invasion still had higher estimates for Japan by at least a factor of 10.
As I’ve said repeatedly - Japan as a country would probably not exist today if the invasion had been carried out, because they would have fought to the very end. I don’t think Japan would have recovered from such a prolonged invasion and the much longer occupation that would have resulted from it.
But the idea that Japan was still capable of inflicting massive casualties is simply incorrect, IMO. Would Japan have caused some casualties? Surely, especially in the initial ground invasion in Kyushu. But that would have been over-run fairly quickly, and the rest of the invasion of the mainland would definitely have been purely mop-up.
Funny: as I read this post, I thought of another example of someone who said that the enemy was becoming so obviously desperate, and their tactics so outrageous, that the end was surely nigh.
That was Dick Cheney and his 2005 statement that we were in the “last throes” of the insurgency in Iraq.
Now, just because someone who lacks any credibility made a similar statement doesn’t mean that you’re wrong. However, you posited that the Japanese were near the end of their rope in mid-1942. And yet, in mid-1945, they remained near the end of their rope? I don’t think it is possible to know for sure whether Japan would have continued to be on its last legs in mid-1946, during the midst of an American invasion of the homelands, but it certainly seems very plausible to me.
I just don’t understand. I am not trying to pick a fight. But I wish to know how you reach this conclusion.
Okinawa, which had occured just one to two months before the bombs dropped, involved 182,000 U.S. troops (and most of the heavy portions of the US Pacific Fleet) against 80,000 Japanese troops backed up by 24,000 conscripted civilians.
We outnumbered them two to one in numbers of soldiers alone, without even considering the differences in the firepower of a US Army/Marine division compared to a Japanese one. (And also not counting what the Navy and Army airforce brought to the table.)
Yet, it took the US six weeks to capture an island less than half the size of Rhode Island (by area). The US inflicted a 10 to 1 KIA ratio, but the Allies still lost 12,000 service members, 28 ships sunk, 768 aircraft lost. Wounded numbers were higher.
The Japanese lost a frightening number of folks. (I am going to guess that the ability of the wounded to get their wounds treated quickly makes all the difference in the world.)
So let me ask you, why was Okinawa different from how you imagine Operation Olympic/Coronet would play out? What happened in Japan those two months that turned would change an invasion of Kyushu from a grinding bloodbath like Okinawa into a “mopping up” operation? (The Japanese were estimated to have 900,000 soldiers in Japan, ten times what they had on Okinawa.)
Supporting the suicide angle as it pertained to the invasion of Okinawa.
Hirohito had been spreading propaganda that he was a god, Japan’s victory ordained by the heavens, and that Allied forces were “monsters” who would immediately torture, rape, and/or kill any Japanese–soldier or civilian–they happened across.
Some 80,000 Okinawans preferred to die of self-imposed drowning, dysentery, starvation, etc., rather than let the “monsters” get them. Can you imagine their reaction to Allieds landing on Japan itself?
I think you greatly overestimate the complexity and insight of your original statement. Inasmuch as we can discuss the issue reasonably with the added benefit of hindsight… yes, it was the best possible timing to use nukes on a nearly-defeated Japan, in that it hastened the end of the war. Had Japan been defeated by purely conventional means, I can picture less hesitation to deploy nukes in Korea a few years later, when the overall outcome could have been a lot worse. China could have been okay with losing a hundred thousand men (they had spares) and sent in more and more to overwhelm the U.N. troops, fighting across an irradiated landscape, making the U.S. shift from tactical strikes against military targets to strategic strikes against Chinese infrastructure… interesting times, to be sure.
Of course, with the benefit of hindsight, one can say all kinds of things, like how absorbing the Sept. 11 attacks was the necessary price of arming the Afghans back in the eighties, and was still worth it if it helped hasten the end of the USSR, sparing the U.S. from potential far worse destruction.
Please define your terms. How “fairly quickly” would it take Kyushu to be taken and what’s your idea of “some casualties”? Would 25% of the Japanese fighting force have to be eliminated? 50 percent? 75 percent?
And of the 28 million civilians who were mobilized, how many of them would have died trying to attack a soldier, or simply get killed as collateral damage? Ten percent?
During the battle of Okinawa, more than 100,000 civilians died, a quarter of the island’s population. Kyushu in 1945 had a population of about ten million. Even five percent civilian deaths would have been a bloodbath.
That argument really doesn’t hold water. Look at the other nations on the list. They are extremely diverse, Japan is not notably significantly more suicid-y than half a dozen below it on the scale, and none of the countries have this ancient tradition of suicide. You might argue it is related to prosperity, but several of the nations there are ones I associate with at least a comfortable level of existence, like Hungary and South Korea. And just a bit farther down the list we see nations like France.
I’m sorry, but that list essentially proves my point: japan is not significantly out of line with several other countries. It cannot be assumed that people really do look upon suicide as the art proclaims.
Well if it makes you feel any better, the bombs were supposed to be used on Germany, cept those guys surrendered before the bombs could be deployed. Japan was still fighting , so they won the lottery.
So I would probably say that you have to look at the event from the point of view of the people at that time, rather than our current attitudes towards it.
While the stradgedy guys could have determined that the sov’s probably would have needed an operational pause after hostilities had ceased with Germany, it would have only been a matter of time before they started looking westward.
So while it may not have allowed Japan to save face by surrendering, It may have allowed Stalin to save face by not going further.
Dude, you have no clue what you’re talking about if you think South Korea and Hungary are anywhere near the standard of living of Japan. Japan’s GDP is four times that of South Korea, double that of France, and 20 times that of Hungary. Japan’s unemployment rate is considered to be relatively high for Japan…at 4%. France is at 7.9%, Hungary 7.8% (underemployment is a whole 'nother problem, of course).
Japan’s suicide rate is 40% higher than France, more than double Canada and the US, almost triple that of the UK and Spain.
Suicide in Japan is most definitely out of line with other countries, particularly when looking at the major industrialized nations. It is most definitely seen as a moral way to die. There is no religious or cultural stigmatism attached to suicide, and it has been accepted, if not downright glorified, for centuries. Forgot lone suicide bomber terrorists - can you imagine any other country’s military using suicide bomber pilots as its primary strategy?
One more example: Count Nogi Maresuke was a general in Japan during the Russo-Japanese war. He and his wife committed seppuku and jigai shortly after the Emperor Meiji’s funeral cortege left the palace. The ritual suicide was in accordance with the samurai practice of following one’s master to death. All four members of the Nogi family are buried at Aoyama Cemetery in Tokyo. Under State Shinto, Nogi was revered as a *kami *and a Shinto shrine in his honor still exists on the site of his house in Nogizaka, Tokyo. His memory is also honored in other locations such as the Nogi Shrine in Kyoto.
Just admit that you are out of your area of expertise on this one.
I should probably clarify: I think the land invasion would have been a mop-up for the Allies. I highly doubt the Allies would have suffered major casualties once they had broken through the initial lines in Kyushu.
Yes, Kyushu was heavily defended with men, but they weren’t properly equipped, and they were low on ammunition - note the quote above that indicated only two thirds of the divisions in Kyushu had equipment and less than half had sufficient ammunition. And since some 40% of the remaining military was concentrated in Kyushu, the defense of the bulk of the country was going to be in the hands of the civilian army using shovels and bamboo spears.
The Japanese casualties would have been catastrophic. As I’ve said before - the country as we know it today probably wouldn’t exist.
I don’t think the Allies really knew how bad the situation was on the ground. And even if it was going to be a mop-op operation, there would have been many Allied casualties during the Kyushu invasion, which is hard to justify if you can knock out entire cities and lose nary a man of your own. I don’t think there’s any doubt that the bombs were the right choice, although I sometimes question the reasons that choice was arrived at at the time. I still have my doubts that the US would have dropped the bomb on Germany (no proof, of course).
DragonAsh: Paul Tibbits, who dropped the first bomb, and also designed the plan for dropping the bombs, states quite clearly, the original plan was simultaneous bombing of Germany and Tokyo.
The interview also states there was a third bomb ready to go.
I am sorry it came to that, and I have read some paleo-con arguments that it was not necessary, but I can’t make myself feel that it was some awful disgrace. I am glad it’s never been repeated, tho there are a few places in the MidEast that my darker side thinks may be improved by a green glass covering.