# A-bombs vs. firebombing of Tokyo **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [May 28, 2016, 3:22pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-bombs-vs-firebombing-of-tokyo/755893 "2016-05-28T15:22:43Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 5
**Author:** ![asahi](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/asahi/32/8693_2.png) [@asahi](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/asahi)\ **Post date:** [June 4, 2016, 2:19am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-bombs-vs-firebombing-of-tokyo/755893/81 "2016-06-04T02:19:13Z")
> [@Dissonance](#): > > The emperor’s role in government was entirely removed, and Hirohito was forced to [renounce](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Humanity_Declaration) his divine status and that of the imperial institution. You don’t get it – he never was ‘divine’ in the Western sense of the word. Even during the Meiji “restoration” the emperor was never truly administering the government. He was a figurehead. The Japanese aren’t religious, so they never believed he was ‘divine.’ The emperor was used by the military and ministers to rubberstamp their policies because he was a symbol of Japanese continuity. He wasn’t some divine dictator like Kim Jung Un. The emperor hasn’t had real power since about the end of the Heian period (1000 or so years ago). > [@Dissonance](#): > > Prior to the Soviet entry into the war, Japan looked to the USSR to broker a surrender through and was quite stunned when the Soviet Union joined in the war against them as well. American eyes were on the Soviet Union because the US had _requested_ Soviet entry into the war, which Stalin agreed to do within three months of the defeat of Germany. You and I are most definitely **not** in agreement that the Japanese military was hellbent on an honorable surrender; the terms that they wanted and were trying to broker through the Soviets was one that would allow them to not only remain unoccupied and with their government intact, but would allow them to retain their pre-war empire and conquests so that at an absolute minimum Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan would remain under Japanese rule. The Japanese militarists running the government were quite prepared to sacrifice the entire Japanese people and commit national suicide before accepting surrender. _Ichioku gyokusai_ (100 million die together) had been the propaganda slogan drummed into the heads of the Japanese people since 1944. There was nothing honorable about it, and it wasn’t surrender. The Japanese were looking to save face. Some of the more extreme elements wanted to maintain the empire but they were realistic and most likely understood that they weren’t going to keep their possessions. They continued fighting in part because they weren’t sure what unconditional surrender would mean. > [@Dissonance](#): > > Utter nonsense. Japan didn’t retain any of it’s core government structure, much less most of it. The Japanese government was dissolved, much of it was [put on trial for war crimes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Military_Tribunal_for_the_Far_East) and Japan had to write a new constitution - one that not only forbade the military from running the government but forbade Japan from having a military at all. You need to study up, mate. Japan has quite a sophisticated military and has for quite some time. That’s for starters. ---
**Author:** ![Monty](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/monty/32/47_2.png) [@Monty](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Monty)\ **Post date:** [June 4, 2016, 3:05am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-bombs-vs-firebombing-of-tokyo/755893/82 "2016-06-04T03:05:17Z")
> [@Velocity](#): > > "The Japanese deserved it Friend, when you encounter someone with this as their base of operation, then you have already lost any effort to change their mind. They are not willing to debate because they are irrational. It should be worth noting that there is no “they deserve it” in the conventions relating to conduct of armed conflict. ---
**Author:** ![Magiver](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/4491bb/32.png) [@Magiver](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Magiver)\ **Post date:** [June 4, 2016, 4:00am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-bombs-vs-firebombing-of-tokyo/755893/83 "2016-06-04T04:00:10Z")
> [@asahi](#): > > I’m not suggesting that it was the Russians who won the war without any help. Obviously the American attacks bludgeoned and weakened Japan. The offensive capabilities to wage war was crippled, which is not insignificant. The atomic bombings were indeed significant, but other than the timing, the facts don’t necessarily support the idea that two atomic bombings in and of themselves ended the war. That’s devoid of any common sense. Japan would literally have been incinerated if they hadn’t complied. Complete annihilation. There was plans for 7 more bombs in the space of a couple of months dropped on a country smaller than the state of California. Every 10 days another city would disappear requiring emergency assets that had no way of coping with the destruction. Russian troops meant nothing in this context. ---
**Author:** ![Sitnam](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/6a8cbe/32.png) [@Sitnam](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Sitnam)\ **Post date:** [June 4, 2016, 4:18am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-bombs-vs-firebombing-of-tokyo/755893/84 "2016-06-04T04:18:03Z")
> [@DrDeth](#): > > They did surrender “unconditionally”. Retaining the Emperor was not a term. > > “\*We hereby proclaim the unconditional surrender to the Allied Powers of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and of all Japanese Armed Forces and all Armed Forces under Japanese control wherever situated.” > \* > > We let them have the Emperor. It wasn’t a term. Mind you, it served American interests in good stead. For years MacArthur drove from his house to his headquarters with no armed guards as he formed the terms in which the Japanese government would henceforth function. The God-Emperor submitted to the Americans, to disobey the Emperor was unthinkable in Japanese culture. ---
**Author:** ![asahi](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/asahi/32/8693_2.png) [@asahi](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/asahi)\ **Post date:** [June 4, 2016, 1:11pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-bombs-vs-firebombing-of-tokyo/755893/85 "2016-06-04T13:11:34Z")
> [@Magiver](#): > > That’s devoid of any common sense. Japan would literally have been incinerated if they hadn’t complied. Complete annihilation. There was plans for 7 more bombs in the space of a couple of months dropped on a country smaller than the state of California. Every 10 days another city would disappear requiring emergency assets that had no way of coping with the destruction. > > Russian troops meant nothing in this context. Japanese cities were already incinerated, even before the bombs. The bombs were impressive, but there’s no direct evidence that the Japanese surrendered so immediately because of the bombs. The Russians were indeed significant because unlike the Americans and British up to that point, there were actually beginning to take control of Japanese territories, some of which is close to present day Hokkaido. ---
**Author:** ![Monty](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/monty/32/47_2.png) [@Monty](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Monty)\ **Post date:** [June 4, 2016, 2:57pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-bombs-vs-firebombing-of-tokyo/755893/86 "2016-06-04T14:57:20Z")
> [@Sitnam](#): > > The God-Emperor submitted to the Americans, to disobey the Emperor was unthinkable in Japanese culture. First: at the end of the war, that war criminal, Hirohito, admitted that he was not a god-emperor. Second, it’s demonstrably not the case that it was unthinkable in Japanese culture to disobey the emperor; the latter proven, at the very least, by a plot to assassinate the man. ---
**Author:** ![Dissonance](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/85f322/32.png) [@Dissonance](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dissonance)\ **Post date:** [June 4, 2016, 5:30pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-bombs-vs-firebombing-of-tokyo/755893/87 "2016-06-04T17:30:59Z")
> [@asahi](#): > > You don’t get it – he never was ‘divine’ in the Western sense of the word. Even during the Meiji “restoration” the emperor was never truly administering the government. He was a figurehead. The Japanese aren’t religious, so they never believed he was ‘divine.’ The emperor was used by the military and ministers to rubberstamp their policies because he was a symbol of Japanese continuity. He wasn’t some divine dictator like Kim Jung Un. The emperor hasn’t had real power since about the end of the Heian period (1000 or so years ago). You clearly have very little if any understanding of Japanese culture or of the role of the emperor in the government of Japan if you can make such patently absurd statements as “[t]he Japanese aren’t religious, so they never believed he was ‘divine’” or that the emperor’s role during the time period in question, much less that of the last 1000 years as being no more than a rubber stamp. You might want to read up a bit on [Shinto](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shinto) before making ridiculous statements like the Japanese aren’t religious. > [@asahi](#): > > The Japanese were looking to save face. Some of the more extreme elements wanted to maintain the empire but they were realistic and most likely understood that they weren’t going to keep their possessions. They continued fighting in part because they weren’t sure what unconditional surrender would mean. Complete horseshit. The ultranationalists running Japan were anything but realistic; merely starting a war with the United States was more than ample evidence of this. They were quite serious in thinking they could retain their empire in negotiations, and they continued fighting because they did not care if it led to national suicide. As I said earlier, the three military members of the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War remained uniformly opposed to surrender _even after both atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war_, and it was only the personal appearance of Hirohito before the council expressing his wish to surrender that made the military cave and accept surrender (so much for the emperor being a puppet and a rubberstamp). Without the unanimous consent of all three military members of the council any desires to surrender by the other three members was irrelevant. By their constitution, all that the Army or Navy had to do was withdraw their member from the cabinet, refuse to name a replacement and the government would have to resign. This is the core government structure that you seem to think Japan was allowed to retain after its unconditional surrender. They were also quite sure of what unconditional surrender would mean; the idea that they kept fighting because they weren’t sure what it would mean or they were merely looking to ‘save face’ is absurd. From Richard B. Frank’s[Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire](http://www.amazon.com/Downfall-End-Imperial-Japanese-Empire/dp/0141001461/ref=pd_sim_14_1?ie=UTF8&dpID=51SNkp9ODwL&dpSrc=sims&preST=_AC_UL160_SR99,160_&refRID=1SF6FKTN1ERVBYN9BBKZ&tag=viglink20265-20): > [@](#): > > The most often repeated condemnation of American diplomacy in the summer of 1945 is that policy makers understood that a promise to retain the Imperial institution was essential to end the war, and that had the United states communicated such a promise, the Suzuki cabinet would likely have promptly surrendered. The answer to this assertion is enshrined in black and white in the July 22 edition of the Magic Diplomatic Summary. There, American policy makers could read for themselves that Ambassador Sato had advised Foreign Minister Togo that the best terms Japan could hope to secure were unconditional surrender, modified only to the extent that the Imperial institution could be retained. Presented by his own ambassador with this offer, Togo expressly rejected it. > [@asahi](#): > > You need to study up, mate. Japan has quite a sophisticated military and has for quite some time. That’s for starters. I’m not the one who needs to study up to get a basic grasp on Japan, its culture, its governmental forms, the Pacific War, the lead up to it and the aftermath of it. You might want to read up on [Article 9](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_9_of_the_Japanese_Constitution) of the Japanese constitution: > [@](#): > > ARTICLE 9. (1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. > (2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. By law the [Japanese Self-Defense Forces](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japan_Self-Defense_Forces) are a branch of the police, and the very legitimacy of the SDF has been a very contentious issue. ---
**Author:** ![Chihuahua](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/c/dec6dc/32.png) [@Chihuahua](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Chihuahua)\ **Post date:** [June 4, 2016, 5:46pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-bombs-vs-firebombing-of-tokyo/755893/88 "2016-06-04T17:46:20Z")
> [@DrDeth](#): > > None of those were war crimes- but only just barely. All had military significance, none were _undefended._ Legally the Allies had every right. Morally and ethically?- well we \*were \*in a war for our very survival. > > At that time, the A Bomb was “just another weapon”. No qualms at all. It was only later, after the whole world realized that all human civilization could be wiped out by a nuclear war that using Nukes became unthinkable. And, that’s a Good Thing. > > But _at the time,_ it was justified. I’m agreed with this. The A-bomb was, at the time, perceived as just as exceedingly large bomb. The nuclear weapons taboo did not evolve until later, when we better understood the long-term effects of radiation and the potentially apocalyptic result of a massive nuclear weapons exchange. The people of that age believed that any sufficiently large or powerful weapon would end war forever. And in a way, they were correct: The atom bomb DID end major conventional wars between nuclear states. The trend in violence has overwhelmingly been towards smaller, shorter, proxy wars. Our conflicts in places like Iraq and Afghanistan would be considered a joke compared to some of the major battles of WW1 and WW2. As for the morality of bombing the Japanese, fuck 'em. This was a war that had killed literally tens of millions of human beings all over the world. The Japanese were militaristic, fanatical, and brought unprovoked death and destruction all over southeast Asia. If they didn’t want to get the shit bombed out of them, they shouldn’t have started a war to begin with. As for the overall concept of bombing civilians, the US now devotes more effort towards avoiding civilian casualties and exercises greater restraint than any other nation on Earth. What the US does by accident or collaterally, most other countries do as a deliberate matter of policy. ---
**Author:** ![Dissonance](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/85f322/32.png) [@Dissonance](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dissonance)\ **Post date:** [June 4, 2016, 5:48pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-bombs-vs-firebombing-of-tokyo/755893/89 "2016-06-04T17:48:44Z")
> [@Monty](#): > > First: at the end of the war, that war criminal, Hirohito, admitted that he was not a god-emperor. Second, it’s demonstrably not the case that it was unthinkable in Japanese culture to disobey the emperor; the latter proven, at the very least, by a plot to assassinate the man. Strictly speaking they were only going to place him under house arrest; they did plan on killing the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. Acting against the expressed wishes of the emperor in the name of his ‘true’ wishes and ‘patriotic disobedience’ by junior officers has a very long history in Japan, there’s even a word for it, [_Gekokujō_](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gekokuj%C5%8D). On the advice of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Hirohito told the Army Minister that he did not want the Kwangtung Army to take any provocative actions in Manchuria just before the Manchurian Incident. Rather than flying to Manchuria to deliver the message, the minister went by ship and made sure the Kwangtung Army knew what the message he was going to deliver was, so they’d better take provocative action before he could arrive and tell them not to. ---
**Author:** ![asahi](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/asahi/32/8693_2.png) [@asahi](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/asahi)\ **Post date:** [June 4, 2016, 7:07pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-bombs-vs-firebombing-of-tokyo/755893/90 "2016-06-04T19:07:00Z")
> [@Dissonance](#): > > You clearly have very little if any understanding of Japanese culture or of the role of the emperor in the government of Japan if you can make such patently absurd statements as “[t]he Japanese aren’t religious, so they never believed he was ‘divine’” or that the emperor’s role during the time period in question, much less that of the last 1000 years as being no more than a rubber stamp. You might want to read up a bit on [Shinto](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shinto) before making ridiculous statements like the Japanese aren’t religious. The Japanese generally don’t believe in a God of any kind. It’s true that you find scatterings of spirituality throughout their culture, with some Shinto and also some Buddhism. And yes, you’ll find Shinto shrines and Buddhist temples, and yes ordinary citizens visit both on holidays and weekends. They have a few superstitions and traditions of various origins as well. But when it comes to matters of life and death, they have always been and are still now largely an atheistic people who are deeply skeptical of religion in any form and have been known to show outright hostility toward cults and proselytizing. So the idea that a human, even the Emperor, is somehow a God in their eyes is far fetched. ---
**Author:** ![obbn](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/d6d6ee/32.png) [@obbn](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/obbn)\ **Post date:** [June 4, 2016, 7:10pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-bombs-vs-firebombing-of-tokyo/755893/91 "2016-06-04T19:10:44Z")
> [@Stranger\_On\_A\_Train](#): > > We firebombed more than just Tokyo. In fact, we destroyed the vast majority of Japanese cities and deliberately averred from destructively firebombing Hiroshima, and limited the bombing of Nagasaki to port regions specifically to make them good targets for demonstrating the singular destructiveness of atomic weapons. Qualitatively, there is little difference between firebombing of, say, Tokyo, and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima–dead is dead, and being in the middle of an incendiary firestorm being roasted alive while the breath is sucked from your lungs is no better than the thermal pulse and radiation of a nuclear weapon–but from a strategic standpoint, being able to launch a single weapon that can immolate an entire city (versus flying an entire wing of bombers) is a new magnitude of warmaking capability, and one that dramatically influenced strategic planning and militarization in peacetime for the next fifty years, e.g. the construction of ICBMs, the fleet ballistic missile program, and the general assumptions into strategic deterrence that themselves rest on a somewhat shaky foundation. > > “War crimes” may be in the eye of the victorious beholder, but an objective review of the situation is that by the late spring of 1945, and especially after the bloody US invasion of Okinawa, the Japanese military had lost so much military power that they were no longer an effective threat beyond occasional harassment by submarines, and were logistically so constrained that the war could have been “won” just by starving out the population with a blockade. By June 1945, the IJN no longer even had the means or capability to effect a forward air defense, and cities on the Home Islands were so defenseless that the bombings and overflights were regarded as almost milk runs, especially compared to the brutal losses suffered over Germany and France earlier in the war. At that point, the attacks were kind of just sticking a mortally wounded pig over and over. Although the Operation Olympic invasion was contemplated as threatening high losses to invaders, it was never seriously planned. The larger looming concern is that Japan might surrender to and be occupied by the Soviets who the Allied leadership were already viewing (correctly) as a post-war opponent and likely influenced the decision to end the war decisively with an exclusive US and British presence in Japan to avoid the clustefuck that became the Iron Curtain in central Europe. General LeMay as much as admitted (albeit boastfully) that if the US had lost the war, he and his command would be tried and convicted of committing war crimes. > > Stranger While I agree with what you’ve said, let’s keep in mind that the “wounded pig” had the portion to surrender. They chose not to. ---
**Author:** ![asahi](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/asahi/32/8693_2.png) [@asahi](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/asahi)\ **Post date:** [June 4, 2016, 7:26pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-bombs-vs-firebombing-of-tokyo/755893/92 "2016-06-04T19:26:18Z")
> [@Dissonance](#): > > Complete horseshit. The ultranationalists running Japan were anything but realistic; merely starting a war with the United States was more than ample evidence of this. It was indeed a serious miscalculation, but the decision to attack the United States in December 1941 probably didn’t seem like sheer lunacy the way that it does now. What they miscalculated was America’s nationalism and its desire to fight for a protracted period of time in a global struggle. After all, they had observed a country with mostly isolationist sentiments. What Japan wanted, though, was oil and natural resources to sustain their growing empire in Asia, and the Americans had cut them off. Without American oil, they needed it from another source, which is why they immediately attacked SE Asia after bombing Pearl Harbor. It’s a miscalculation, but Japan wasn’t insane for making some of those assumptions any more than we were detached from reality for intervening in Vietnam. American gunships had already threatened Japan in the 1850s, which was the catalyst of Japanese modernization and imperialism to begin with. The Americans and Europe had empires in Asia, which were viewed as a constant threat to Japan’s sovereignty as long as they were there. And indeed, the American decision to cut off oil in an attempt to force the Japanese out of China was considered an aggressive act of economic warfare. There are very rational reasons why Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and why the military continued fighting to the bitter end, even if there are examples of irrational thinking and behavior among some of the generals (it’s worth noting that other generals did support Hirohito’s decision to surrender). ---
**Author:** ![Magiver](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/4491bb/32.png) [@Magiver](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Magiver)\ **Post date:** [June 4, 2016, 8:51pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-bombs-vs-firebombing-of-tokyo/755893/93 "2016-06-04T20:51:21Z")
> [@asahi](#): > > Japanese cities were already incinerated, even before the bombs. The scale of destruction is so exponential in comparison as to make the previous bombings nothing but a warm up act. > [@asahi](#): > > The bombs were impressive, but there’s no direct evidence that the Japanese surrendered so immediately because of the bombs. Yes, there is direct evidence. The time frame involved and the obvious choice that had to be made. Total destruction or unconditional surrender. > [@asahi](#): > > The Russians were indeed significant because unlike the Americans and British up to that point, there were actually beginning to take control of Japanese territories, some of which is close to present day Hokkaido. The Russians lost 15% of their entire population. The percentage of fighting age men would of course be much higher. They were not at war with Japan and the total destruction of Japan with A-bombs made their entry into war with them a moot point. I’m really not sure how you think Russia was supposed to attack a country under attack by nuclear weapons. It would be like running into a burring building to shoot the occupants. ---
**Author:** ![Dissonance](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/85f322/32.png) [@Dissonance](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dissonance)\ **Post date:** [June 4, 2016, 11:42pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-bombs-vs-firebombing-of-tokyo/755893/94 "2016-06-04T23:42:09Z")
> [@asahi](#): > > The Japanese generally don’t believe in a God of any kind. It’s true that you find scatterings of spirituality throughout their culture, with some Shinto and also some Buddhism. And yes, you’ll find Shinto shrines and Buddhist temples, and yes ordinary citizens visit both on holidays and weekends. They have a few superstitions and traditions of various origins as well. But when it comes to matters of life and death, they have always been and are still now largely an atheistic people who are deeply skeptical of religion in any form and have been known to show outright hostility toward cults and proselytizing. So the idea that a human, even the Emperor, is somehow a God in their eyes is far fetched. Backpedal much? You’re doing it so hard that you’re making statements even more absurd than your original one that “[t]he Japanese aren’t religious”. The divinity of the emperor and Hirohito’s rejection of it are a matter of [public record](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hirohito#Imperial_status): > [@](#): > > Hirohito was not put on trial, but he was forced[54] to explicitly reject the quasi-official claim that the Emperor of Japan was an _arahitogami_, i.e., an incarnate divinity. This was motivated by the fact that, according to the Japanese constitution of 1889, the Emperor had a divine power over his country, which was derived from the Shinto belief that the Japanese Imperial Family was the offspring of the sun goddess Amaterasu. Hirohito was however persistent in the idea that the Emperor of Japan should be considered a descendant of the gods. In December 1945, he told his vice-grand chamberlain Michio Kinoshita: “It is permissible to say that the idea that the Japanese are descendants of the gods is a false conception; but it is absolutely impermissible to call chimerical the idea that the Emperor is a descendant of the gods.” ---
**Author:** ![asahi](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/asahi/32/8693_2.png) [@asahi](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/asahi)\ **Post date:** [June 5, 2016, 12:12am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-bombs-vs-firebombing-of-tokyo/755893/95 "2016-06-05T00:12:05Z")
> [@Dissonance](#): > > Backpedal much? You’re doing it so hard that you’re making statements even more absurd than your original one that “[t]he Japanese aren’t religious”. The divinity of the emperor and Hirohito’s rejection of it are a matter of [public record](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hirohito#Imperial_status): So Hirohito made a speech to humor ignorant Western administrators who demanded that he do it – you’ve still not proven that the Emperor was ‘divine’ in the eyes of the Japanese people or the people who used him to rubber stamp their agenda. You really, really know very little about Japan. ---
**Author:** ![asahi](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/asahi/32/8693_2.png) [@asahi](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/asahi)\ **Post date:** [June 5, 2016, 11:31am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-bombs-vs-firebombing-of-tokyo/755893/96 "2016-06-05T11:31:44Z")
> [@Magiver](#): > > The scale of destruction is so exponential in comparison as to make the previous bombings nothing but a warm up act. > > Yes, there is direct evidence. The time frame involved and the obvious choice that had to be made. Total destruction or unconditional surrender. Again, relative to the damage at Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, Kobe, and other cities, the bombs, while undoubtedly shocking and impressive, were a continuation of already massive campaigns of destruction that had been taking place for months. The Japanese ideally wanted to retain parts of their empire, but they knew that might not happen. Without knowing what would happen under an occupation, the Japanese were much more determined to fight to the end, even after massive bombing, until they could have a better idea of what surrender would mean for them personally and for Japan as a whole. There were differences of opinion about what to do among Japanese high officials and the high brass of the military, just as there were differences among American leaders. > [@Magiver](#): > > The Russians lost 15% of their entire population. The percentage of fighting age men would of course be much higher. They were not at war with Japan and the total destruction of Japan with A-bombs made their entry into war with them a moot point. > > I’m really not sure how you think Russia was supposed to attack a country under attack by nuclear weapons. It would be like running into a burring building to shoot the occupants. It’s utterly ridiculous to say that Russia’s entry was moot – why then did Russia invade if it was moot? If Russia’s army had been so impotent as you seem to suggest than why were they so successful at overtaking a fairly large swath of Japanese-held territory in a matter of days? Why were Truman and the Allies so concerned about Stalin? I think the answers are obvious. Russia was a budding global empire and competitor to the United States. When Russia entered the war, Japan knew it was over for good. There was no way they were going to keep their empire because Russia was already taking it from them, just as the Allies had taken most of SE Asia back already. Worse still, the Japanese were not sure just how far Russia was willing to go. But they might have had at least some idea of Russia’s intentions when they saw that Stalin was staying in Eastern Europe. They probably had a better idea once Russia started retaking territory that Japan had taken from them in 1905 – again there was a history between these two nations just like there was a history between Russia and Germany. For a multitude of reasons, Russian encroachment, more than the bombs themselves, truly marked the end of the Japanese empire and war effort. I’m not saying that the bombs weren’t a factor, just not the decisive knockout blow that we’re led to believe through the eyes of American historians who have presented a view of the war with a heavy American bias. ---
**Author:** ![Magiver](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/4491bb/32.png) [@Magiver](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Magiver)\ **Post date:** [June 5, 2016, 2:18pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-bombs-vs-firebombing-of-tokyo/755893/97 "2016-06-05T14:18:51Z")
> [@asahi](#): > > Again, relative to the damage at Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, Kobe, and other cities, the bombs, while undoubtedly shocking and impressive, were a continuation of already massive campaigns of destruction that had been taking place for months. The Japanese ideally wanted to retain parts of their empire, but they knew that might not happen. Without knowing what would happen under an occupation, the Japanese were much more determined to fight to the end, even after massive bombing, until they could have a better idea of what surrender would mean for them personally and for Japan as a whole. There were differences of opinion about what to do among Japanese high officials and the high brass of the military, just as there were differences among American leaders. You can’t surrender if you’re a pile of ashes. Firebombing is an attack and can be fought against. Nuclear weapons are a button someone pushes and a city disappears. Even if you shot down a lone bomber with a nuke it still detonates when it hits the per-set altitude. If we spread out the first planned bombs it would be 1 city disappearing every 10 days. That means the surviving military assets are diverted into recovery efforts. The Russians mean nothing under these conditions. Nothing. > [@asahi](#): > > It’s utterly ridiculous to say that Russia’s entry was moot – why then did Russia invade if it was moot? If Russia’s army had been so impotent as you seem to suggest than why were they so successful at overtaking a fairly large swath of Japanese-held territory in a matter of days? Why were Truman and the Allies so concerned about Stalin? I think the answers are obvious. Russia was a budding global empire and competitor to the United States. When Russia entered the war, Japan knew it was over for good. There was no way they were going to keep their empire because Russia was already taking it from them, just as the Allies had taken most of SE Asia back already. Worse still, the Japanese were not sure just how far Russia was willing to go. But they might have had at least some idea of Russia’s intentions when they saw that Stalin was staying in Eastern Europe. They probably had a better idea once Russia started retaking territory that Japan had taken from them in 1905 – again there was a history between these two nations just like there was a history between Russia and Germany. For a multitude of reasons, Russian encroachment, more than the bombs themselves, truly marked the end of the Japanese empire and war effort. I’m not saying that the bombs weren’t a factor, just not the decisive knockout blow that we’re led to believe through the eyes of American historians who have presented a view of the war with a heavy American bias. You’re confusing the US’s concern with Russia with Japan’s. You haven’t come up with a rational explanation for why Japan would fear a slug fest with Russian troops against complete annihilation. Were they afraid the Russians were going to pee on their ashes? ---
**Author:** ![GIGObuster](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/gigobuster/32/421_2.png) [@GIGObuster](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/GIGObuster)\ **Post date:** [June 5, 2016, 4:28pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-bombs-vs-firebombing-of-tokyo/755893/98 "2016-06-05T16:28:36Z")
> [@Magiver](#): > > You can’t surrender if you’re a pile of ashes. Firebombing is an attack and can be fought against. Nuclear weapons are a button someone pushes and a city disappears. Even if you shot down a lone bomber with a nuke it still detonates when it hits the per-set altitude. If we spread out the first planned bombs it would be 1 city disappearing every 10 days. That means the surviving military assets are diverted into recovery efforts. The Russians mean nothing under these conditions. Nothing. > > You’re confusing the US’s concern with Russia with Japan’s. > > You haven’t come up with a rational explanation for why Japan would fear a slug fest with Russian troops against complete annihilation. Were they afraid the Russians were going to pee on their ashes? Not **asahi** here, but I have to mention here that historians are getting a more nuanced view, the Japanese were afraid that the Soviet Union was going to be much more punitive with the leadership of Japan, so seeing the Russians coming it was a big incentive to surrender with the Americans poised to invade first rather than let the Russians take more Japanese territory or control of the occupation. > **[The Boston Globe](https://www.bostonglobe.com)** > > New England’s best source for news, sports, opinion and entertainment. The Globe brings you breaking news, Spotlight Team investigations, year-round coverage of the Red Sox, Patriots, Celtics and Bruins, sharp editorials, stunning photography, and... > [@](#): > > In recent years, however, a new interpretation of events has emerged. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa - a highly respected historian at the University of California, Santa Barbara - has marshaled compelling evidence that it was the Soviet entry into the Pacific conflict, not Hiroshima and Nagasaki, that forced Japan’s surrender. His interpretation could force a new accounting of the moral meaning of the atomic attack. It also raises provocative questions about nuclear deterrence, a foundation stone of military strategy in the postwar period. And it suggests that we could be headed towards an utterly different understanding of how, and why, the Second World War came to its conclusion. > > “Hasegawa has changed my mind,” says Richard Rhodes, the Pulitzer Prize-winning author of “The Making of the Atomic Bomb.” “The Japanese decision to surrender was not driven by the two bombings.” > > President Truman’s decision to go nuclear has long been a source of controversy. Many, of course, have argued that attacking civilians can never be justified. Then, in the 1960s, a “revisionist school” of historians suggested that Japan was in fact close to surrendering before Hiroshima - that the bombing was not necessary, and that Truman gave the go-ahead primarily to intimidate the Soviet Union with our new power. > > Hasegawa - who was born in Japan and has taught in the United States since 1990, and who reads English, Japanese, and Russian - rejects both the traditional and revisionist positions. According to his close examination of the evidence, Japan was not poised to surrender before Hiroshima, as the revisionists argued, nor was it ready to give in immediately after the atomic bomb, as traditionalists have always seen it. Instead, it took the Soviet declaration of war on Japan, several days after Hiroshima, to bring the capitulation. > [@](#): > > As Hasegawa writes in his book “Racing the Enemy,” the Japanese leadership reacted with concern, but not panic. On Aug. 7, Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo sent an urgent coded telegram to his ambassador in Moscow, asking him to press for a response to the Japanese request for mediation, which the Soviets had yet to provide. The bombing added a “sense of urgency,” Hasegawa says, but the plan remained the same. > > Very late the next night, however, something happened that did change the plan. The Soviet Union declared war and launched a broad surprise attack on Japanese forces in Manchuria. In that instant, Japan’s strategy was ruined. Stalin would not be extracting concessions from the Americans. And the approaching Red Army brought new concerns: The military position was more dire, and it was hard to imagine occupying communists allowing Japan’s traditional imperial system to continue. Better to surrender to Washington than to Moscow. > > By the morning of Aug. 9, the Japanese Supreme War Council was meeting to discuss the terms of surrender. (During the meeting, the second atomic bomb killed tens of thousands at Nagasaki.) On Aug. 15, the Japanese surrendered unconditionally. > > How is it possible that the Japanese leadership did not react more strongly to many tens of thousands of its citizens being obliterated? > > One answer is that the Japanese leaders were not greatly troubled by civilian causalities. As the Allies loomed, the Japanese people were instructed to sharpen bamboo sticks and prepare to meet the Marines at the beach. > > Yet it was more than callousness. The bomb - horrific as it was - was not as special as Americans have always imagined. In early March, several hundred B-29 Super Fortress bombers dropped incendiary bombs on downtown Tokyo. The historian does not deny that the bomb was a factor, it is just that there was another reason the Japanese looked at being more important. ---
**Author:** ![asahi](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/asahi/32/8693_2.png) [@asahi](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/asahi)\ **Post date:** [June 5, 2016, 5:03pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-bombs-vs-firebombing-of-tokyo/755893/99 "2016-06-05T17:03:37Z")
> [@GIGObuster](#): > > The historian does not deny that the bomb was a factor, it is just that there was another reason the Japanese looked at being more important. This is pretty much my point. Yes, the bomb was a factor, as were the megatons of conventional ordnance, the crushing string of naval defeats, routes of army divisions on the islands of Okinawa and Iwo Jima, retaking the Phils, their crippling losses in SE Asia, which effectively nullified one of the huge gains in resources that they been attempting to achieve during the early stages of the war – all of those were factors. But despite all of that, they kept fighting. They probably would have continued doing so until the dropping of several more powerful and more accurately located bombs, and perhaps even until a massive land assault by the Allies. Also, not only were the Japanese concerned about the possibility of Russian vengeance for the Russo-Japanese war of 1905, they had other concerns as well and they had reasons to believe that negotiating with Americans and British would be easier than dealing with Russians. The Japanese had established a market economy, with global corporations. They had also established a fledgling parliamentary democracy. The economy and political system eventually became more fascist in line with their Axis allies, but the point is, that those systems were chosen by pre-war Japan. The people who ruled Japan felt that post-war Japan would be more recognizable and more prosperous if they could negotiate with the Americans and Allies, despite very real concerns about losing their national identity and national cultural symbols such as the Emperor. It’s doubtful that they feared the emperor’s loss of political status, so much as the possibility of having the institution being put on trial for war crimes – that would have been an insufferable insult. I digress – the point is, Americans and even supposedly well-educated American historians, while right to point out the bomb as a new development in the war, tend to overplay its significant somewhat and they underplay the role of the Russians. The Japanese feared that the Russians would turn them into communists, which the leadership did not want. There were some communist sentiments in Japan – still are. But the leadership saw to it that those strains didn’t grow. ---
**Author:** ![asahi](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/asahi/32/8693_2.png) [@asahi](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/asahi)\ **Post date:** [June 5, 2016, 5:58pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-bombs-vs-firebombing-of-tokyo/755893/100 "2016-06-05T17:58:16Z")
> [@Magiver](#): > > You can’t surrender if you’re a pile of ashes. Firebombing is an attack and can be fought against. Nuclear weapons are a button someone pushes and a city disappears. Even if you shot down a lone bomber with a nuke it still detonates when it hits the per-set altitude. If we spread out the first planned bombs it would be 1 city disappearing every 10 days. That means the surviving military assets are diverted into recovery efforts. The Russians mean nothing under these conditions. Nothing. You’re simply speculating and you’re approaching the aftermath of the atomic bombs as if the Japanese knew then in the 2nd week of August 1945 all that we now know about nuclear weapons. In the days – days here not years, months, or even weeks but days – that followed the immediate aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese knew very little about atomic weapons other than the fact that the Americans had dropped a devastating new weapon that destroyed more than half of a two small to mid-sized cities more quickly than the Allies had destroyed much larger cities like Tokyo, Nagoya, and Osaka. Again, it took the Japanese government leadership about 2-3 days to discuss the aftermath of Hiroshima. That’s the response of a nation that suffered a defeat like, say, the Confederates at Gettysburg – perceived as a problematic loss but not the final nail in the movement’s coffin. Russia’s entry, however, was most likely Japan’s Appomattox. Sword-in-the-belly time. > [@Magiver](#): > > You’re confusing the US’s concern with Russia with Japan’s. > > You haven’t come up with a rational explanation for why Japan would fear a slug fest with Russian troops against complete annihilation. Were they afraid the Russians were going to pee on their ashes? I already explained it pretty clearly in the previous posts. GIGO also posted some insights from another historian who has researched the subject. Look, the bomb was powerful – we get that. But lots of powerful weaponry had already been dumped on Japan, and it didn’t convince the Japanese to give up. Had Japan actually sustained 5 or 10 more bombings, or even two, three or four bigger ones in well-placed areas…maybe you have a point and maybe they do surrender. But there’s no evidence that this is the reason they actually did give it up. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-bombs-vs-firebombing-of-tokyo/755893.md?page=4) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-bombs-vs-firebombing-of-tokyo/755893.md?page=6)