A factual Brexit question: Irish border

[bob_2]

The problem with the Irish border has nothing to do with Polish plumbers - they are heading back home anyway since the Polish economy is picking up.

The problem is goods: The EU has high tariffs on many imports to protect the local industry, especially French and Italian farmers, which keeps the cost of food hight here in the UK. It is the prospect of lorry loads of butter and garlic, crossing into the EU via Northern Ireland that scares them.

With the current state of play in the UK parliament, the DUP have pretty much lost their stranglehold on negotiations. There is a suggestion that they are moving towards an “all-island “arrangements” on food standards and animal health, which could partially remove the need for some checks at the land border” whatever that might actually mean.

The Brexiteers, both politicians and the general public have always assumed that ‘minor’ problems like the Irish border will be resolved somehow.

[Wrenching_Spanners]

@Boozahol_Squid_P.I

I’m under the impression that one of the bigger issues the Leave campaign has run on is cutting off the free movement of people into Britain. The Good Friday Agreement includes the free movement of not only goods, but also people, into and out of Ulster. There’s a concern that all of the Polish plumbers that Tommy wants to keep from moving into his neighborhood now will just fly into Dublin, take a train up to Belfast, and then take a ferry across the Irish Sea and wind up living in a flat in Manchester. The only way to prevent that would be to either create a “hard border” between Ulster and the Republic of Ireland or to create a border between NI and the rest of the UK. The loyalists in Northern Ireland won’t accept the latter, and given that the DUP is necessary for Conservative control of Parliament, there wasn’t much chance for that to ever happen. May’s backstop agreement would create a hybrid agreement allowing for mostly free travel back and forth across the border with some checks allowed was predicated on Britain mostly remaining in the customs union with the EU or at least giving up its right to withdraw from that set-up. That surrender of sovereignty was the other big reason Leave voters wanted out of the EU, so was kind of a non-starter for those MPs who actually wanted out of the EU (instead of voting for it because they feel compelled by the referendum.)

The problem with your idea is that it presumes that the UK wants to keep current EU citizens from visiting as tourists. It doesn’t. The UK and EU have already agreed that visa-free travel will be maintained. So if a Polish plumber wants to visit Manchester to watch a football game, no-one’s going to stop him. If he wants to then become a black market worker, that’s a different issue. But there will be no need for him to travel Dublin-Belfast-Liverpool-Manchester when he could just take a flight to Manchester.
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/04/03/visa-free-travel-after-brexit-council-presidency-and-european-parliament-reach-provisional-agreement/

[Baron_Greenback]

@Wrenching_Spanners

However, the EU didn’t go for it. They wanted stronger protections for the Single Market, especially in the case of another EU member deciding to leave in the future. Therefore their “kick the can down the road” solution was to keep Northern Ireland subject to EU import/export rules until a UK/EU free trade agreement could be reached, even if the rest of the UK was no longer subject to EU import/export rules. This is the essence of the much discussed backstop. Note that the EU has never wanted to enforce this backstop. Similar to May’s plan, they want to maintain the status quo until a free trade agreement can be reached. For that reason, May acquiesced to the EU solution.

The backstop was a UK-proposed solution, not the EU’s. The EU agreed to it because there needed to be something to protect ongoing EU member Ireland in the case where no other solution could be agreed in the post-Brexit transition period that formed part of the agreed WA.

[Frankenstein_Monster]

Thanks Baron Greenback that was actually an interesting thread.

Now that we’re in GD I must say that I’m astounded that the Withdrawal Agreement isn’t more popular / that it could not find big support in Parliament.

Seems like a fine agreement to me (albeit speaking as a sworn Europhile).

But I am absolutely gobsmacked that the Backstop specifically is so unpopular!

The Backstop does exactly what the Brexiteers want. It’s an agreement to leave the EU but basically not make too much fuss over the border, FOR NOW. The Parliament could have accepted the Agreement as is, patted themselves on the back and proudly told their voters that we’re now finally out of the clutches of the evil EU and how great it feels. Sovereignty FTW! And see, no big deal with the Irish border! That was all just fear-mongering!

I can’t see how this is not exactly how an unthinking (about the border) Brexit voter would have envisioned Brexit.

The criticism that it might still bind the UK to EU rules forever is just plain false. The protocol itself says that a major purpose of the protocol is to get it superseded quickly, and/or to gradually drop its provisions as they’re no longer needed. The Protocol is self-superseding. Any border situations and issues would be gradually worked out over time and eventually incorporated in new, sovereign agreements between the parties.

[Baron_Greenback]

@bob_2

The problem is goods: The EU has high tariffs on many imports to protect the local industry, especially French and Italian farmers, which keeps the cost of food hight here in the UK.

You’ll need to demonstrate that, I think. The EU’s external tariffs are non-existent for the worlds poorest (50? ish) countries, for example

You’ll be on firmer ground if you address non-tariff barriers eg GM crops, steroid-and antibiotic-riddled meat etc

[Staggerlee]

@Wrenching_Spanners

The factual answer to your question is yes
… as a UK citizen who reads a lot of UK news, I can personally attest that from the moment the referendum was announced as part of the Conservative Party’s 2015 election manifesto, the Ireland/Northern Ireland relationship and the Good Friday Agreement were raised as an issue…

I am also British and reasonably well-read. It just seems inconceivable that some right-wing think-tank hadn’t solved the Irish problem way before the prospect of a vote for Leave. But maybe Brexit’s electoral plausibility before 2015 was just that minimal.

[Baron_Greenback]

@Frankenstein_Monster

Now that we’re in GD I must say that I’m astounded that the Withdrawal Agreement isn’t more popular / that it could not find big support in Parliament.

A talented Prime Minister could probably have got the WA passed, but you can only work with what you have got. To be honest, a talented Prime Minister could probably have finessed an EEA/EFTA type deal, but there you go.

[Wrenching_Spanners]

@PastTense

The customs union/single market in goods was one of the earliest things the EU was engaged in. And before Brexit it was considered one of its major successes. It’s always been true that to sell goods in a market you have to meet all the legal regulations for doing so. And while manufacturers have complaints about these regulations, what is substantially worse is to have to meet one set of regulations in Britain and a different set of regulations in the EU as well as tariffs and border inspections for moving the goods to the EU.

While the general public has complaints about immigration and Britain spending more money in the EU than what it gets back, it very much likes being able to buy lots of consumer goods produced in European countries cheaply.

So May’s emphasis on leaving the customs union/single market in goods was bizarre.

The “single market” is an umbrella term that includes several items and the customs union is one of those items.

The foremost item is a free trade agreement. Theresa May and the soft-Brexiteers, as well as the EU, wanted to maintain the UK-EU free trade agreement, although the actual future UK-EU free trade agreement will probably take years to negotiate if the UK ever actually leaves the EU.

The second item is an agreement that all EU countries will maintain a common set of tariffs. The UK wanted to leave this arrangement, and the EU agreed to let the UK give up this obligation. However, the EU will not let the UK import goods tariff-free and then onsell them to the EU. The converse situation also applies. That’s one of the set of details that goes into a free trade agreement.

The third item is customs protections. Nobody wants to import exploding refrigerators. The UK and EU are pretty much in agreement on refrigerator standards, at least so far as they shouldn’t be exploding. However, there are differences on products such as GMO crops and American made cars and trucks. The Leave argument is that the EU custom protections contain market protections that the UK would do better without. The EU wants the UK to generally maintain the EU level of custom protections. Where the UK doesn’t wish to do so, the EU wants to inspect the products imported from the UK. This is again an item that needs to be worked out, especially under the terms of a free trade agreement.

The fourth, related, items is regulatory recognisance. So if a product is considered to meet Polish regulatory standards, it is also considered to meet Italian regulatory standards. (Notwithstanding that, especially with food and agriculture, there are massive exceptions that allow for local regulation.) This is sometimes referred to as passporting. It basically means that if a company exporting goods to the UK can meet one member country’s regulatory standards, it meets every EU country’s regulatory standards. The UK very much wants its regulatory standards to be recognised by the EU, especially in terms of financial products.

Which leads to the fifth item, that the EU has to ensure that each member country’s regulatory standards are sufficient for all member countries. Which means that there is a body of regulations that all EU member countries have to comply with. The UK wants to exempt itself from this regulation, but agrees that they will have to follow these regulatory standards if they want to export to the UK. May basically surrendered on this point to the EU and agreed that almost all EU regulatory standards would apply unless they were considered by the appropriate governmental body and determined not to apply. Hardline Brexiters hated this concession, but my view is that it was pragmatic.

So it’s a complicated subject and May was trying to achieve a sensible middle position among several complicated issues. She obviously didn’t succeed. But what she was trying to achieve wasn’t bizarre. She wanted to stay in the European Free Trade Agreement while exiting the Customs Union. She also wanted UK regulated products to be accepted in the EU while limiting the constraints of EU regulation. That’s a really tough middle ground to find. Did she come up with an optimal agreement with the EU on settling these issues? No. Was her solution good enough to be acceptable? It was rejected by the UK Parliament three times. But no-one’s so far put forward a better suggestion that a majority of the UK has agreed upon.

[Wrenching_Spanners]

@Staggerlee

I am also British and reasonably well-read. It just seems inconceivable that some right-wing think-tank hadn’t solved the Irish problem way before the prospect of a vote for Leave. But maybe Brexit’s electoral plausibility before 2015 was just that minimal.

Here’s the question I’m answering “yes” to:

Given that the question of the Northern Ireland/Ireland border has proved the biggest ‘technicality’ obstructing the fulfilment of Brexit, had no-one pondered this particular problem and possible solutions before the referendum?

I’m perhaps putting too much interpretation into the question. I read it as “Did no one publicly discuss the implications on the Ireland/Northern Ireland relationship during the proposal of the referendum of the UK leaving the EU?” My answer to that question is, yes it was discussed.

Do I think there was in-depth analysis and debate within Government or listened-to think tanks on how to resolve the difficulties inflicted upon the Ireland/Northern Ireland relationship by a majority vote in favour of the UK leaving the EU? No. I’m inclined to believe the rumours that David Cameron expected Remain to win the referendum and refused to allow preparations for a Leave campaign to go forwards.

[Baron_Greenback]

@Wrenching_Spanners

The UK very much wants its regulatory standards to be recognised by the EU, especially in terms of financial products.

There’s quite a lot to be addressed in the Spanners longer post, but this is just one example of where it is not congruent with what the UK government has actually sought to do. The government’s red lines, primarily the ones that mean that the UK cannot remain in the Single Market, mean that financial services lose all passporting rights. The current stramash is about goods, not services.

Here’s a HoC Research briefing from a month ago:

https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7628

It’s not strictly copyrighted, so I’ll post the summary

Brexit and financial services
Published Tuesday, August 13, 2019
What does Brexit mean for financial services? This briefing reviews progress and possibilities – from the 2018 Political Declaration to preparations for Brexit with no deal.

What’s at stake?
Financial services are an important part of the UK economy, making up 6.9% of total output in 2018 and contributing £29 billion in tax in 2017/18. As a major international financial centre, London (and the UK more generally) has benefited from increasingly integrated commercial and regulatory relationships with the EU.

The vote to leave the EU presents a range of challenges for the sector. Membership of the Single Market has allowed financial businesses authorised in any Member State to operate freely across the European Economic Area (EEA). This system – known as passporting – reflects both the EU’s overall political aspirations and a more practical alignment of regulatory systems in each Member State.

From passporting to equivalence
The logic of Brexit challenges both of those foundations. Once the UK had confirmed its intention to leave the Single Market, the EU explicitly ruled out sector-specific arrangements – such as passporting – that might have maintained existing benefits.

That exclusion led to a focus on the possibilities arising from the existing alignment of regulatory systems – in short, a quest for “equivalence”. This is an approach in which states grant market access in specified activities on the basis that the regulations that underpin these activities are deemed to achieve comparable outcomes.

The UK set out its ambitions for negotiation in the Brexit White Paper in July 2018. This highlighted both the interconnectedness of the financial services market and the possibilities for autonomous decision-making. But that second point reflects one of the major challenges of relying on equivalence decisions – they depend on regulatory outcomes remaining compatible, so are subject to review and unilateral cancellation. In addition, the process of agreeing equivalence frameworks can be slow and subject to wider political considerations. Indeed, the EU recently withdrew equivalence from Switzerland, citing not only frustrations with Swiss “delays” on agreeing wider arrangements with the EU, but also comparisons with Brexit.

The Political Declaration that accompanied the draft Withdrawal Agreement aimed to build a more robust and transparent “equivalence plus” regime. This would be underpinned by new institutional arrangements. But the aspirational nature of the Declaration meant that the details remained to be negotiated during the implementation period that would have followed ratification of the Withdrawal Agreement.

Preparing for a no-deal Brexit
The UK Government, the Treasury and the main financial regulators have continued to incorporate EU financial legislation into UK law and regulatory practice. In the event of no deal, the Financial Services (Implementation of Legislation) Bill 2017-19 would have enabled this to continue for two years after Brexit. However, the Government has not scheduled the remaining stages of the Bill. If it is not passed during the current parliamentary session, it will fall, meaning that maintaining alignment with the EU after Brexit will require new primary legislation.

So a no-deal Brexit makes the quest for equivalence more difficult. Leaving the EU without a deal means that the UK would revert to third-country status. Both parties have made some provision for such a scenario to give some degree of continuity for financial services. For instance, the UK is developing a temporary permissions regime to allow EEA-based businesses to continue to operate in the UK and to seek more permanent authorisation from the Financial Conduct Authority. The UK and the EU have addressed similar risks in the derivatives market (which is heavily concentrated in the UK, even for euro-based business) through agreeing a temporary recognition regime

The full doc is in the the link.

[Wrenching_Spanners]

@Baron_Greenback

The backstop was a UK-proposed solution, not the EU’s. The EU agreed to it because there needed to be something to protect ongoing EU member Ireland in the case where no other solution could be agreed in the post-Brexit transition period that formed part of the agreed WA.

That’s not how I recall it. Theresa May was trying her absolute best to avoid the Ireland/Northern Ireland issue. Obviously it had to be addressed as, as Frankenstein Monster notes, it made up a huge part of the Withdrawal agreement. But May wanted a fudge that would allow for a technical solution to the border issue. The EU negotiators rejected her technical solution as unfeasible. It was. But that wasn’t the point. The technical solution was the subterfuge for “kicking the can down the road”.

I honestly can’t say who proposed the backstop as a plan B. I don’t think I heard about it before the Withdrawal Agreement was published, and have assumed it was a compromise position, but I may very well have missed something. I will say that if it was something the UK government proposed, it was certainly something they presented as a necessary but disliked compromise.

[Baron_Greenback]

@Wrenching_Spanners

I honestly can’t say who proposed the backstop as a plan B.

It wasn’t even a plan B, more like a Plan “aaaargh everything else has failed so this will have to do until stuff gets sorted”. That’s why it’s called a backstop. And it was designed to be a safe mode for a process that hasn’t even fucking started yet.

[kirkrapine]

@PastTense

The Irish border is not a problem as long as the U.K. remains in a customs union/single market for physical goods with the EU or otherwise close relationship in this regard (as in May’s backstop). Before the current Brexit, this is the kind of relationship most commentators supporting leaving the EU assumed would happen.

Unfortunately, the reason a “no-deal Brexit” is now looming is that the Commons, despite putting in a lot of effort, was flatly unable to come up with a deal a majority would support. As is so often the case, the Devil is in the details.

[kirkrapine]

@md2000

So you can enumerate the possibilities - from bad to worse:
-UK abrogates all treaties, puts in a border.
-UK puts a border inspection with some degree of control between Northern Ireland and Britain, in the middle of their country.
-UK leaves an open hole in their backside for anyone to take customary advantage of. (so to speak)
-UK lets go of Northern Ireland, it joins Ireland proper.

Why is the fourth option the worst? I think NI would be better off as part of the Republic, and the UK would be no worse off. So the royals have to take the shamrocks off their uniforms, big deal.

[kirkrapine]

@Frankenstein_Monster

A GREAT DEAL of pondering went into the consideration of the Irish Question in Brexit.

“Gladstone spent his declining years trying to guess the answer to the Irish Question; unfortunately, whenever he was getting warm, the Irish secretly changed the Question…”
— 1066 and All That

[Derleth]

@kirkrapine

So the royals have to take the shamrocks off their uniforms, big deal.

I can see some Troubles with your sunny disposition, but that certainly won’t stop the people who want to Leave from Leaving.

Maybe if the Leavers would go the UK would be able to salvage something.

[glee]

@kirkrapine

Why is the fourth option the worst? I think NI would be better off as part of the Republic, and the UK would be no worse off. So the royals have to take the shamrocks off their uniforms, big deal.

You need to learn about the troubled history of the divided Ireland.
From 1969 - 1998, over 3,500 people were killed by terrorists.
There was an attempt to assassinate the British Prime Minister.
The Northern Ireland parliament has been suspended since 2017.

If anyone casually attempts to re-unite Ireland, there will undoubtedly be a resumption of terrorism.