# A few reasons why I'm an atheist **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [August 10, 2000, 8:21pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-few-reasons-why-im-an-atheist/28882 "2000-08-10T20:21:20Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 19\ **Page:** 2
**Author:** ![JeffB](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/jeffb/32/188_2.png) [@JeffB](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/JeffB)\ **Post date:** [August 11, 2000, 6:15pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-few-reasons-why-im-an-atheist/28882/21 "2000-08-11T18:15:48Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by pldennison \* > \*\*I just wanted to note in the midst of this thread that the reason I am an atheist is because I am unconvinced that any deities exist. All the rest is commentary. 😃 \*\* Now, now, pl, let’s avoid the tautologies! 😃 ---
**Author:** ![CheapBastid](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/c/8baadc/32.png) [@CheapBastid](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/CheapBastid)\ **Post date:** [August 11, 2000, 7:09pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-few-reasons-why-im-an-atheist/28882/22 "2000-08-11T19:09:08Z")
You were designing an engaging game. Would you leave out ‘suffering’? ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [August 11, 2000, 7:19pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-few-reasons-why-im-an-atheist/28882/23 "2000-08-11T19:19:38Z")
**Counter-argument** > [@](#): > > I believe that this traditional [God] has at least the following attributes: > > omnipotence - anything that can be done, this being can do > omniscience - anything that can be known, this being can know > omnibenevolent - any good that this being is able to do will be done > > When I say God in this post, I am refering to a being with these attributes. An excellent list! Those indeed are qualities of the God Whom I worship. > [@](#): > > Here are some reasons why I don’t believe in this god. Because of what I believe are non sequiturs, I’ll have to chop your post up pretty badly. Forgive me. > [@](#): > > The existence of suffering As with all undefined terms used in arguments, this one (“suffering”), is probably unnecessarily loaded. Knowing what little I do of the atheist mindset (I was one, but not a good one like most of the ones here), I will assume that by suffering, you mean physical or emotional pain. > [@](#): > > If God exists, then he wants to stop all suffering. But that is gratuitous. Some suffering is “good” on its face. If you could not feel pain, how would you know that your ass is pressed against a hot woodstove? Emotional pain can also be good. If you had no conscience (and I understand that atheists believe in a conscience, as we do, as a part of the brain), how would you develop a system of ethics? > [@](#): > > If God exists, then he knows how to stop all suffering. Agreed. > [@](#): > > If God exists, then he is able to stop all suffering. Agreed. > [@](#): > > (These are simply from the three attributes assigned to God) Well, two of them are. The bit about His _wanting_ to stop suffering fails to be implied for a number of reasons, including: (1) as already stated, suffering is not intrinsically evil, (2) you are not considering whether your reference frame (space-time) has given you incomplete data (perhaps suffering _has_ been ended, but you have not yet arrived at that time-line), and (3) perhaps there is suffering of a kind for which you have not accounted, namely, spiritual suffering, which is good in the same way that physical suffering can be. > [@](#): > > Therefore, if God exists, suffering cannot exist. > However, suffering does exist. > Therefore, God does not exist. Because you have failed to distribute your middle, you cannot conclude (on the basis cited) that God does not exist. > [@](#): > > There are several objections to this. One, possibly the least common, is that suffering does not exist, and that it is merely an illusion. Personally, I find such an opinion highly [delusional]. Whether something, like suffering, exists or not is not subject to proof, and therefore is an acceptable axiom despite whether you find it delusional. Suffering might exist (or not) on multiple levels in manifold dimensions, and for purposes of which you are unaware. Unfortunately, you did not address the validity of the “suffering does not exist” argument except by citing its unpopularity and your subjective opinion. Neither suffices. > [@](#): > > More common objections involve freewill and some form of “greater good”. > > Greater good: > Suffering exists because it is necessary to create a good that is greater than the bad of the suffering. For instance, a parent might punish a child (making the child suffer) in order to teach the child a valuable lesson. Treading thin ice, but I will indulge you. > [@](#): > > Response: > #1: Since God would be omnipotent, why would he be forced to create a small amount of suffering in order to create a large “good”? Why not create the large good right away? Who says He was forced? In violation of Ockham’s Razor, you have introduced an entity that you have not demonstrated as being necessary. And in fact, who says He created it? Do you mean conceptually? If you put a ship in the ocean, have you created water displacement? Perhaps it is the nature of free agency that a context of suffering comes part and parcel. > [@](#): > > #2: Since God would be omnibenevolent, why not simply ask someone if they want to suffer through a small amount of suffering in order to get some good? Would that not be much more “good” than merely doing so against their will? The undefined term is now meandering its way through new connotations. You are now assigning _agency_ to suffering, and attributing its source to God. You are also assigning it degrees and quantifying it (you speak of a small amount) without defining your scale. In addition, you are simultaneously qualifying and obfuscating it by contrasting it with goodness as both an opposite and a consequence (i.e., God can’t be good if He allows suffering, but a consequence of suffering might be “some good”). Incidentally, you have not defined what is good. > [@](#): > > #3: There may be examples of some small suffering leading to a greater good. However, if God exists, then all suffering must lead to a greater good. Non sequitur. As you yourself point out in the following text, you cannot make the leap from a few examples to a general principle. So far, your argument has been deductive in nature, and now you introduce an induction, without having cited any induction axiom. > [@](#): > > This does not at all appear to be the case. To use a much overused example: What good did the Holocaust lead to that was greater than the suffering it caused? This good must also not be obtainable in any other fashion than by the suffering of the Holocaust. I can’t see any resolution to this other than to accept that God does not exist. Or that your comprehension of Him does not exist. You have already said that suffering does not necessarily lead to anything you would call good (remember that your reference frame is entirely subjective). You can’t have it both ways. If suffering does not always lead to something good, then you simply have made a mistake in your linkages among God, suffering, and goodness. You defined God as good in your omnibenevolence axiom. > [@](#): > > Freewill: > God gave humans freewill. Humans’ use of their freewill leads to suffering. Uh oh, looks like suffering will morph again. > [@](#): > > Response: > #1: This does not explain how suffering arises from natural disasters, which are not due to human freewill. Some claim that such disasters are the results of demons. There is not only no evidence for this (as well as plenty of evidence of natural causes of natural disasters) but it fails as an explanation because God is omnipotent. Why couldn’t God stop the demons? Yikes, how loaded! Now, you are assigning arbitrarily a morality to suffering of every kind, despite that you acknowledge there are no demons. Surely, you discern a difference between being slapped in the face by a wind-tossed piece of wood and being slapped in the face by your lover who is angry with you. There is suffering and there is suffering. Failing to differentiate them leads to equivocation of the kind found in your argument. If nature is amoral (and I agree with you that it is), then you cannot attribute any evil to it, nor can you associate it with any act of God. > [@](#): > > #2: It is possible to have freewill without any suffering. For example, I can choose to kill someone, but if I’m restrained from doing so (by, perhaps, being locked in a jail cell at the time) no murder occurs. I have freely chosen to do something, so my freewill is preserved. However, any suffering my actions would have caused did not come about because I was not allowed to act on my freewill. Why couldn’t God create a world where everyone is free to choose whatever they want, but everyone was unable to act on any actions they chose if those actions would cause suffering? If Gaudere were dead, she would be turning over in her grave. If you are sitting in your jail cell (isolated, we will presume) you cannot choose **to kill** someone. Rather, you can choose **to think about** killing someone. Or you can wish you could kill someone. Or you can make a decision that you will kill someone if someone becomes available to be killed. But you cannot choose to kill. That option is not open to you. You might (or might not) be equating intent with praxis, but if you are, then I would be more inclined to agree with your point so long as you modified it to recognize a _separate reference frame_ within which an intention is immoral. > [@](#): > > The existence of non-believers Again, matters of existence are metaphysical, but I’ll give you some leeway. > [@](#): > > If someone does not believe in God, they go to Hell. (or are in some way punished or given a fate less kind than that of believers). That is an arbitrary assignment of agency, even if we assume it for the sake of argument. If you are given a choice of whether to believe, and your fate is tied to that choice, then your fate is in _your own_ hands. I certainly hope you won’t then turn around and say that God is not benevolent enough unless He gives you no choice. > [@](#): > > God, being omnibenevolent, wants everyone to believe in him and therefore avoid Hell. > God, being omnipotent, has the ability to persuade everyone to believe in him. > God, being omniscient, knows how to make everyone believe in him. Drat! You did it anyway! 😉 First, you assumed that belief is what God wants (perhaps He wants more than belief; perhaps He wants love). Then you assumed that His being benevolent is tied to His desire that you believe in Him, which came about because you linked all those things together: His omnibenevolence, your belief, and sandwiched in the middle, mysteriously, His desire. In other words, He is not benevolent if He lets you choose, but He is benevolent if He forces you to make the choice He _wants_ you to make. What kind of benevolence is that? It is reminescent of “benevolent government”, a Nanny State that knows what’s good for you. I do agree with your assertion that He could persuade everyone to believe. (And in fact, I would go you one better and assert that He could have created man as an entity that will _always_ believe.) Woulda coulda shoulda, but He didn’t. Good is God by your own axiom. Therefore, whatever He does must be good. You cannot use your own definition as proof that He does not exist. Never in your arguments do you consider that you might not _comprehend_ so many of the metaphysical and ethical questions you raise. Of course, the whole futile effort of proving the existence of anything at all means that we’re just having fun here, and aren’t proving or disproving anything at all. > [@](#): > > Therefore, if God exists, then everyone believes in him. > However, there are many people who do not believe in God. > Therefore, God does not exist. No, no, no, no, no. Because you left belief undefined, the way you did with suffering, it is entirely possible that God is not interested in an intellectual acknowledgement from you that He exists. It is safe to say that, if He exists, then He _knows_ that He exists, and there is nothing about His nature (at least, nothing that you’ve postulated) that ties to Him a need for any _confirmation_ of His existence. What He might prefer instead is the kind of belief you tell your son you have in him when he runs in a race. It would be of scant value to your son if you said, “Son, I believe you exist.” But if you said, “Son, I believe in you! I believe you are the greatest racer I’ve ever known,” your son might be inspired to his greatest effort. That is quite a different kind of belief. * * * I’m not sure where this new software cuts off message size, so I’m going to finish this in a separate post. If other posts intervene, just pick up the one I will label “Counter-argument continued.” ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [August 11, 2000, 8:16pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-few-reasons-why-im-an-atheist/28882/24 "2000-08-11T20:16:25Z")
**Counter-argument continued** > [@](#): > > Freewill is again often used as a defense. Two other objections (that it is the work of Satan, and that God works in mysterious ways) I will address near the end of my post. > > Freewill: > God gave freewill to humans. They can decide not to believe in him if they wish. To prove himself to everyone, God would have to take away their freewill, because they would no longer have a choice whether or not to believe in him. Another rubbery term, I’m afraid. The God that I worship would rather you exercise a free will to love your neighbor rather than a free will to believe in Him if you had to choose between the two. > [@](#): > > Response: > #1: Showing up on someone’s doorstep (or otherwise providing strong evidence) to prove that I exist does not remove their freewill. Even if it did, why is this a bad thing compared to an eternity of suffering in Hell? Wouldn’t such a thing be an example of a small amount of suffering for a greater good? Whoa, Nellie! I’ve never seen _that_ before! You raised your own red herring! 😃 Does-it-or-doesn’t-it matters because your argument is now about free will / belief and not about suffering / goodness. First of all, your showing up at my doorstep doesn’t prove anything about _your_ existence, but about _mine_. It proves that my senses have perceived something. Whether that thing is real is a matter of definition, i.e., it is real if I define that what I see is real. If it _did_ prove your existence, though, then you _have_ removed my freedom to believe in your existence unless you define freedom in some really weird way, because now we wouldn’t be arguing about your existence, but about my obstinance. > [@](#): > > #2: I don’t think that a sound deductive argument removes people’s freewill. It simply gives them a darned good reason to believe in the conclusion. Why, then, wouldn’t God provide a nice deductive argument for his existence? Because there is no nice deductive argument for _anyone’s_ existence. If you don’t believe me, try proving _your own_ existence deductively. Before you can do anything at all, including prove that you exist, you must first exist. (By definition, an entity that does not exist cannot prove his existence.) That makes your existence axiomatic. Because your axiom (that you exist) is the same as your eventual conclusion (that you exist), you will have run around in a circle and come back to whence you began. And you will have to answer to JeffB for your tautology. > [@](#): > > #3: Why couldn’t God create a universe where people are born knowing him, as some sort of instinct that can’t be changed? Why does this violate freewill more than any other instinct or inate drive that humans have? In other words: we don’t have perfect freewill as it is. But wherein have you postulated that He _hasn’t_ done that? What if He is identified as one of the instincts we have? Like love, for instance? > [@](#): > > Lack of complete, obvious, and objective moral rules Just a minute. I’m going to go take an aspirin for this one… > [@](#): > > Objective morality exists. > If God exists, then he would do everything he can to promote good. > If humans are given a clear set of objective moral rules, then more humans would do good than if no such rules were known. > Therefore, God would want to give everyone knowledge of such a set of moral rules. > However, not everyone has such knowledge. > Therefore, God does not exist. This is easily discountable by examining smaller scales of well-defined “objective moral rules”. Law, for instance. It seems reasonable to say that government wishes you would behave, and most governments give you literally hundreds of thousands of rules to live by. But you have presumed that knowledge of the rules will extrapolate into obedience to the rules. Clearly, they do not, else we wouldn’t have prisons bulging at the seams. Even atheists know and understand the core attribute upon which all of morality rests: empathy. And love, expressed empathetically, is an absolute moral good. > [@](#): > > Common objections are that there are indeed well known objective moral rules and that such a thing would violate freewill. I don’t think it violates free will, but I will hear you out. > [@](#): > > Such rules exist: > There are some moral rules that nearly every culture (if not every culture) agrees on. For instance, most culutures have a form of the “Golden Rule”: do not do to others what you would not want done to you. Or, more specifically, “Don’t murder”. Well, I like Jesus’ categorical imperative better than the Golden Rule. The Golden Rule fails because of the many subjective reference frames, but Be Perfect never fails, as it is measured against the Absolute Reference Frame. > [@](#): > > Response: > #1: Even if every culture on the planet has agreed upon all moral rules, that doesn’t solve the problem. If there exists any person who does not know of those rules, the problem still stands. Have there been, through the course of human history, people who did not have knowledge of a system of objective moral rules? I think the answer is undoubtedly “yes”. Y’know, it’s sorta like the old addage, if you have to ask how much it costs, you can’t afford it. By the same token, if you don’t know that love itself is good, then you won’t understand any “rule” that requires it. > [@](#): > > #2: There are many rules that are not agreed upon. These rules merely muddy the moral waters, so to speak. Why would God allow such a thing to occur? And why would He not? You have not established (or even postulated) that consensus makes something good. > [@](#): > > The Existence of Freewill > > If God exists, he knows for certain what will happen in the future. > Therefore, the future can be known for certain. > If the future can be known for certain, then the future is predetermined. > If the future is predetermined, then freewill does not exist. > However, freewill exists. > Therefore, God does not exist. Remarkably, the God you described before as omnipotent now is restricted by the chronosynclasticinfundibulum. It is possible that there are multiple futures spanning manifold realities and that God, though knowing them all, allows you to select which one you have chosen. Does He know which one you have chosen? Why, of course, but so do _you!_ Therefore, He knows no more than you do. That makes you omniscient, too, with respect to your own will. Since He is omnipotent, there is nothing to prevent Him from allowing your will to trump His. And that makes you omnipotent with respect to your own will. But are you omnibenevolent? > [@](#): > > I have not heard many objections to this type of argument, although some undoubtedly exist. I know that freewill hasn’t exactly been “proven”, but I think it’s a safe assumption in the current topic. Anyone who wants to respond with a critique, please do! Actually, there was a fairly recent debate on free will versus determinism. I participated until it occured to me that there was no real difference. Ships were passing each other in the night; arguments were reductions to absurdity; and in the end, it was a stalemate. (As are nearly all arguments about metaphysics.) > [@](#): > > Standard Objections: > Satan is responsible. > This would mean that God is not able to stop Satan if he wants to. This would mean an omnipotent God doesn’t exist. Nope. It would simply mean that God chooses not to stop Satan, not that He can’t. > [@](#): > > God works in mysterious ways > This is merely a cop out, not an explanation. Sure, there might be an explanation that we don’t know of, but why on earth should we just assume that there is? Though that phrase is often used to explain God’s ways, it was not originally used that way. Originally, it was used as a way to praise Him. > [@](#): > > Okay, this turned out much longer than I expected. Everyone feel free to comment and critique. Thanks. It was great exercise. ---
**Author:** ![BlackKnight](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/eb8c5e/32.png) [@BlackKnight](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/BlackKnight)\ **Post date:** [August 12, 2000, 7:14am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-few-reasons-why-im-an-atheist/28882/25 "2000-08-12T07:14:47Z")
I’ve chopped up your chopped response to make something that is hopefully intelligble but probably more like alphabet soup! 🙂 [QUOTE] _Originally posted by Libertarian \*\*\* As with all undefined terms used in arguments, this one (“suffering”), is probably unnecessarily loaded. Knowing what little I do of the atheist mindset (I was one, but not a good one like most of the ones here), I will assume that by suffering, you mean physical or emotional pain._\* That’s pretty much what I meant by “suffering”. > [@](#): > > **Some suffering is “good” on its face. If you could not feel pain, how would you know that your ass is pressed against a hot woodstove?** Surely there are other sensations besides pain that can inform us of such things. The feeling of heat is different than the feeling of pain caused by heat. This pain might have an interesting use, but it’s still not what I’d call “good”. > [@](#): > > **Emotional pain can also be good. If you had no conscience (and I understand that atheists believe in a conscience, as we do, as a part of the brain), how would you develop a system of ethics?** I have no idea how one would develop a system of ethics. That is an undertaking that I have never attempted. > [@](#): > > **The bit about His _wanting_ to stop suffering fails to be implied for a number of reasons, including: (1) as already stated, suffering is not intrinsically evil,** If it is good to stop or prevent suffering, then it is not good to allow or promote suffering. I did not mention evil (or at least, I did not intend to!). > [@](#): > > **(2) you are not considering whether your reference frame (space-time) has given you incomplete data (perhaps suffering _has_ been ended, but you have not yet arrived at that time-line),** How would the ending of suffering elsewhere (er, elsewhen) affect the existence of suffering here and now? > [@](#): > > **and (3) perhaps there is suffering of a kind for which you have not accounted, namely, spiritual suffering, which is good in the same way that physical suffering can be.** What is spiritual suffering? > [@](#): > > \*\* > > > [@](#): > > > > Therefore, if God exists, suffering cannot exist. > > However, suffering does exist. > > Therefore, God does not exist. > > Because you have failed to distribute your middle, you cannot conclude (on the basis cited) that God does not exist.\*\* Can you please explain yourself more clearly? I am unfamiliar with much of your terminology. > [@](#): > > **Whether something, like suffering, exists or not is not subject to proof, and therefore is an acceptable axiom despite whether you find it delusional. Suffering might exist (or not) on multiple levels in manifold dimensions, and for purposes of which you are unaware.** In other words, the Lord might work in mysterious ways. Besides, I know very well that suffering exists, because I have experienced suffering firsthand. > [@](#): > > **Unfortunately, you did not address the validity of the “suffering does not exist” argument except by citing its unpopularity and your subjective opinion. > Neither suffices.** I was hoping to keep this thread more on a “common sense” level. Besides, you saw how long my post was as it is! 🙂 And how is my experience of suffering an opinion? > [@](#): > > \*\* > > > [@](#): > > > > Response: > > #1: Since God would be omnipotent, why would he be forced to create a small amount of suffering in order to create a large “good”? Why not create the large good right away? > > Who says He was forced? In violation of Ockham’s Razor, you have introduced an entity that you have not demonstrated as being necessary.\*\* I’m asking, “How could it possibly be the case that it is neccessary for some suffering to exist in order for certain good to exist?” I’m sorry if I was unclear. > [@](#): > > **And in fact, who says He created it? Do you mean conceptually? If you put a ship in the ocean, have you created water displacement? Perhaps it is the nature of free agency that a context of suffering comes part and parcel.** What I’m asking is why I should believe that is the case. Perhaps it is the case that God can’t create free agency without a “context of suffering”. However, why should I believe that free agency cannot exist without a context of suffering? > [@](#): > > **The undefined term is now meandering its way through new connotations. You are now assigning _agency_ to suffering, and attributing its source to God.** What do you mean by saying I am assigning agency to suffering? > [@](#): > > **You are also assigning it degrees and quantifying it (you speak of a small amount) without defining your scale. In addition, you are simultaneously qualifying and obfuscating it by contrasting it with goodness as both an opposite and a consequence (i.e., God can’t be good if He allows suffering, but a consequence of suffering might be “some good”).** Can you clarify what you mean please? I am having trouble understanding you here. I never said that God can’t be good, only that an omnibenevolent God is not compatible with suffering. > [@](#): > > **Incidentally, you have not defined what is good.** I haven’t defined the meaning of the word “is” either, because I did not think it would be neccessary. > [@](#): > > \*\* > > > [@](#): > > > > #3: There may be examples of some small suffering leading to a greater good. However, if God exists, then all suffering must lead to a greater good. > > Non sequitur.\*\* If the existence of suffering is justified by that suffering’s leading to good, then how is suffering that does not lead to good justified? > [@](#): > > **As you yourself point out in the following text, you cannot make the leap from a few examples to a general principle. So far, your argument has been deductive in nature, and now you introduce an induction, without having cited any induction axiom.** Again, I beseech you to explain yourself more clearly. What, for example, is an “induction axiom”? > [@](#): > > \*\* > > > [@](#): > > > > This does not at all appear to be the case. To use a much overused example: What good did the Holocaust lead to that was greater than the suffering it caused? This good must also not be obtainable in any other fashion than by the suffering of the Holocaust. I can’t see any resolution to this other than to accept that God does not exist. > > Or that your comprehension of Him does not exist.\*\* What on earth do you mean by this? Are you saying that I may be wrong because I just can’t understand God? If so, how is this different from “The Lord works in mysterious ways”? If you are saying that my particularly defined God does not exist, I would tend to agree with you. > [@](#): > > **You have already said that suffering does not necessarily lead to anything you would call good (remember that your reference frame is entirely subjective). You can’t have it both ways. If suffering does not always lead to something good, then you simply have made a mistake in your linkages among God, suffering, and goodness.** Again, I have no idea what you are saying. What do you mean about me having it both ways? > [@](#): > > **You defined God as good in your omnibenevolence axiom.** I assume you mean that I defined him as doing good, not that he is the same as some abstract “good”. In other words, I hope you’re not saying god is good in the sense that some people say god is love. > [@](#): > > **Now, you are assigning arbitrarily a morality to suffering of every kind, despite that you acknowledge there are no demons.** I don’t recall acknowledging that there are no demons, but I may be wrong. > [@](#): > > **Surely, you discern a difference between being slapped in the face by a wind-tossed piece of wood and being slapped in the face by your lover who is angry with you. There is suffering and there is suffering. Failing to differentiate them leads to equivocation of the kind found in your argument.** And yet both are suffering. > [@](#): > > **If nature is amoral (and I agree with you that it is), then you cannot attribute any evil to it, nor can you associate it with any act of God.** Why can’t I associate nature with an act of God? And, again, where is this “evil” comming from? If I have used this by mistake, please let me know. > [@](#): > > **If you are sitting in your jail cell (isolated, we will presume) you cannot choose to kill someone. Rather, you can choose to think about killing someone. Or you can wish you could kill someone. Or you can make a decision that you will kill someone if someone becomes available to be killed. But you cannot choose to kill. That option is not open to you.** Why on earth not? I can choose to kill someone right now, if I wanted to. I can choose to kill someone in, say, Norway. I choose to kill them, plan out the hit, and get on a plane. Suddenly, the plane crashes and I die. How is this not an example (albeit a violent one) of someone choosing something yet not being able to do it? Choosing to think of killing someone is different from choosing to kill them. Wishing to kill someone is different as well. Wishing to kill someone would be along the lines of, “I want to kill this person.” Choosing to kill someone is: “I am going to kill this person.” Now, a conscious decision has been made. Whether or not the deed is carried out is a subject to more than the person’s will. > [@](#): > > **You might (or might not) be equating intent with praxis, but if you are, then I would be more inclined to agree with your point so long as you modified it to recognize a _separate reference frame_ within which an intention is immoral.** What is praxis? > [@](#): > > \*\* > > > [@](#): > > > > The existence of non-believers > > Again, matters of existence are metaphysical, but I’ll give you some leeway.\*\* I know that non-believers exist, because I know I exist and that I am a non-believer. > [@](#): > > **That is an arbitrary assignment of agency, even if we assume it for the sake of argument. If you are given a choice of whether to believe, and your fate is tied to that choice, then your fate is in _your own_ hands.** If I know that one path leads to suffering, and another to happiness, and I let others make the decision of which path to take, then they are indeed in control of their fate but I have just avoided doing something good (i.e. assuring their happiness). God, as I defined him, has the property of omnibenevolence. Why would an omnibenevolant God choose a course of action (assuming here, for the moment, that he doens’t know the future) that could potentially lead to suffering instead of the action sure to lead to happiness? > [@](#): > > **I certainly hope you won’t then turn around and say that God is not benevolent enough unless He gives you no choice.** Darn tootin’. (Sorry, my Minnesota showing) > [@](#): > > **First, you assumed that belief is what God wants (perhaps He wants more than belief; perhaps He wants love).** I made no assumption about what else God wanted, only that he wanted belief. Actually, I didn’t assume this, I attempted to show why this was the case due to his attributes. > [@](#): > > **Then you assumed that His being benevolent is tied to His desire that you believe in Him, which came about because you linked all those things together: His omnibenevolence, your belief, and sandwiched in the middle, mysteriously, His desire. In other words, He is not benevolent if He lets you choose, but He is benevolent if He forces you to make the choice He _wants_ you to make.** Again, I don’t think this was an assumption at all. The only added assumption I think I made here was that not believing in God would cause you suffering. The rest was an attempted derivation from that. > [@](#): > > **What kind of benevolence is that? It is reminescent of “benevolent government”, a Nanny State that knows what’s good for you.** A human government is not omnibenevolent. If it was, I most certainly would allow it to make all the decisions. > [@](#): > > **Good is God by your own axiom.** Um, no. God does any good thing that he can by my axiom. > [@](#): > > **Therefore, whatever He does must be good. You cannot use your own definition as proof that He does not exist.** _blink_ What do you mean? Am I not allowed to use the definition that I used? If not, why not? I’m completely baffled by your statement. > [@](#): > > **Never in your arguments do you consider that you might not _comprehend_ so many of the metaphysical and ethical questions you raise. Of course, the whole futile effort of proving the existence of anything at all means that we’re just having fun here, and aren’t proving or disproving anything at all.** I never raise the possibility that I’m a fish either. I think that has about the same relevance. Sure, I might not be able to comprehend those questions … but what of that? Am I supposed to just assume that the questions and answers fit together in such a way to show that God exists, or at least allow the possibility? I have never claimed to understand or comprehend everything, and I will state now quite forcefully that there are _many_ things which I do not and probably will not ever understand. That being said, I am not going to just take the position that since I don’t know and understand everything that I can’t attempt to figure out what, with what I do understand, I should believe. > [@](#): > > **Because you left belief undefined, the way you did with suffering, it is entirely possible that God is not interested in an intellectual acknowledgement from you that He exists. It is safe to say that, if He exists, then He _knows_ that He exists, and there is nothing about His nature (at least, nothing that you’ve postulated) that ties to Him a need for any _confirmation_ of His existence.** Why does belief need to be defined? Or should I first define “define”? (Crap, wish I knew how to make the rolling eyes smiley 🙂 ) I have not claimed that God as I defined him needed confirmation of his existence. I have claimed that to allow non-belief is to avoid doing a good thing which an omnibenevolant being would not avoid. I hate to say it, but I think you missed the entire point of that argument. Of course, if this is the case I can’t blame you because I’m notorious for being unclear. I appologize. > [@](#): > > **What He might prefer instead is the kind of belief you tell your son you have in him when he runs in a race. It would be of scant value to your son if you said, “Son, I believe you exist.” But if you said, “Son, I believe in you! I believe you are the greatest racer I’ve ever known,” your son might be inspired to his greatest effort. That is quite a different kind of belief.** Yes, and also an irrelevant one as I set things up. (Or attempted to, at any rate.) ---
**Author:** ![BlackKnight](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/eb8c5e/32.png) [@BlackKnight](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/BlackKnight)\ **Post date:** [August 12, 2000, 8:52am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-few-reasons-why-im-an-atheist/28882/26 "2000-08-12T08:52:42Z")
Again, this is a bit chopped, due to both my striving to be understandable, and space considerations. > [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Libertarian \* > **The God that I worship would rather you exercise a free will to love your neighbor rather than a free will to believe in Him if you had to choose between the two.** Then your god doesn’t appear to be the one we are discussing. Certainly, loving one’s neighbors is a good thing. But so is avoiding the suffering of Hell. If a lack of a belief in God would send you to Hell, then an omnibenevolant being would do whatever it could to prevent someone from going to Hell (unless such actions would produce suffering greater than that in Hell). Believing in God’s existence then, even if it was forced belief, seems very preferable to Hell. I, at least, would much rather be forced by God to believe in him than go to Hell. > [@](#): > > **Does-it-or-doesn’t-it matters because your argument is now about free will / belief and not about suffering / goodness. First of all, your showing up at my doorstep doesn’t prove anything about _your_ existence, but about _mine_. It proves that my senses have perceived something. Whether that thing is real is a matter of definition, i.e., it is real if I define that what I see is real.** And if we define up as left then I’m ass-backwards. 🙂 If it is possible to prove God’s existence to someone, then God can do it (omnipotent). If he can’t, then that means it simply can’t be done. If that is the case, then I am perfectly justified in being an atheist. > [@](#): > > **If it _did_ prove your existence, though, then you _have_ removed my freedom to believe in your existence unless you define freedom in some really weird way, because now we wouldn’t be arguing about your existence, but about my obstinance.** I agree with you here. However, I believe that the lack of freewill in this particular instance would be justified by avoidance of Hell. In other words, I think an omnibenevolent being would force me to believe in him in order to keep me from Hell. > [@](#): > > \*\* > > > [@](#): > > > > #2: I don’t think that a sound deductive argument removes people’s freewill. It simply gives them a darned good reason to believe in the conclusion. Why, then, wouldn’t God provide a nice deductive argument for his existence? > > Because there is no nice deductive argument for _anyone’s_ existence. If you don’t believe me, try proving _your own_ existence deductively.\*\* I concede this point. > [@](#): > > \*\* > > > [@](#): > > > > #3: Why couldn’t God create a universe where people are born knowing him, as some sort of instinct that can’t be changed? Why does this violate freewill more than any other instinct or inate drive that humans have? In other words: we don’t have perfect freewill as it is. > > But wherein have you postulated that He _hasn’t_ done that? What if He is identified as one of the instincts we have? Like love, for instance?\*\* Love is an emotion. I glean no knowledge of God from an emotion. I, at least, have no knowledge of God. Is it impossible to create an instict that is significantly different and more powerful than the ones we currently have? If not, then why wouldn’t God give us such an instict, one that would be instantly recognizable and distint? > [@](#): > > **This is easily discountable by examining smaller scales of well-defined “objective moral rules”. Law, for instance. It seems reasonable to say that government wishes you would behave, and most governments give you literally hundreds of thousands of rules to live by. But you have presumed that knowledge of the rules will extrapolate into obedience to the rules. Clearly, they do not, else we wouldn’t have prisons bulging at the seams.** I think you missed the point. God would want us to have clear knowledge of moral rules so that we can freely make choices about right and wrong (or do you deny that an omnibenevolant being would want such a thing?). Whether those rules are followed or not is not the point. The point I was trying to make is that it would be a good thing for us to know clear rules of morality . Therefore, an omnibenevolant being would, if it could, give us these rules. Unless such a thing is impossible, an omnipotent being could give us these rules. Since I see no reason at all why such a thing is impossible, and since, as you mentioned, people do bad stuff irregardless of rules (and, therefore, the rules wouldn’t create more suffering than already existed), an omnipotent and omnibenevolent being would give us these rules if such a being existed. However, we do not have these rules. Therefore, such a being does not exist. That was the general point I was trying to make. > [@](#): > > **Even atheists know and understand the core attribute upon which all of morality rests: empathy. And love, expressed empathetically, is an absolute moral good.** Although I don’t want to get bogged down on a tangent, I’m quite curious why you believe love, expressed empathetically, is an absolute moral good. > [@](#): > > **Well, I like Jesus’ categorical imperative better than the Golden Rule. The Golden Rule fails because of the many subjective reference frames, but Be Perfect never fails, as it is measured against the Absolute Reference Frame.** Be Perfect? Who’s idea of perfect? (Yes, that’s a rhetorical question, but feel free to answer it if you want to.) And what’s this Absolute Reference Frame? > [@](#): > > **Y’know, it’s sorta like the old addage, if you have to ask how much it costs, you can’t afford it. By the same token, if you don’t know that love itself is good, then you won’t understand any “rule” that requires it.** Fine. But how does this affect the argument presented? > [@](#): > > **You have not established (or even postulated) that consensus makes something good.** Nor do I need to. I think my clarification of my point above will clear things up a bit. > [@](#): > > **Remarkably, the God you described before as omnipotent now is restricted by the chronosynclasticinfundibulum.** Unremarkably, my dictionary does not contain that word. What does it mean? > [@](#): > > **It is possible that there are multiple futures spanning manifold realities and that God, though knowing them all, allows you to select which one you have chosen.** How does one select the one they have chosen? Isn’t choosing something the same as selecting it? Irregardless, if God knows which path I will take, then my path is predetermined. Of course, it is possible that God does not know this, because such a thing cannot be known. But why would such a thing be unknowable? If my choice is the result of my internal states, then why can’t God know these and therefore know what I am about to choose? If my choice is not the result of my internal states … then what the heck is it based on? I’ll try to respond to this better once I have more time to think it over. > [@](#): > > **Does He know which one you have chosen? Why, of course, but so do _you!_ Therefore, He knows no more than you do. That makes you omniscient, too, with respect to your own will. Since He is omnipotent, there is nothing to prevent Him from allowing your will to trump His. And that makes you omnipotent with respect to your own will.** He knows which one I have chosen? Well then, he _does_ know my future then, unless you mean he knows at exactly the same time I know. Unless you mean that, then the problem remains. If you do mean that, then I think you have a good point. > [@](#): > > \*\* > > > [@](#): > > > > Standard Objections: > > Satan is responsible. > > This would mean that God is not able to stop Satan if he wants to. This would mean an omnipotent God doesn’t exist. > > Nope. It would simply mean that God chooses not to stop Satan, not that He can’t.\*\* Whoops! I should have simply said “God” and not “omnipotent God”. The latter is redundant. Since I have defined God as being omnibenevolent, he would choose to stop Satan when Satan attempts to cause suffering, unless such an attempt would cause more suffering than allowing Satan to do as he pleased. How does restricting Satan cause more suffering than allowing Satan to do as he pleases? > [@](#): > > \*\* > > > [@](#): > > > > Okay, this turned out much longer than I expected. Everyone feel free to comment and critique. > > Thanks. It was great exercise.\*\* You’re very welcome. I have enjoyed discussing this with you very much. Unfortunately, due to the sheer length of the posts, I think much of what we’ve said will not get more discussed than it already is. Some final (for now) comments: My OP was an expression of some reasons why I find a particular form of being to be unlikely to exist. It was not meant to persuade or convince anyone else that my particular viewpoint on this matter is for them. While I accept that my views of how the world is may be incorrect, I currently still believe the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent being are inconsistent with the world. I hope that I have at least showed that I am not an atheist just for the sake of being an atheist, and that I have given at least some thought to my lack of a belief in God. ---
**Author:** ![Danielinthewolvesden](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/ce7236/32.png) [@Danielinthewolvesden](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Danielinthewolvesden)\ **Post date:** [August 12, 2000, 9:35am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-few-reasons-why-im-an-atheist/28882/27 "2000-08-12T09:35:59Z")
BK: but your arguements show no reason whatsoever as to why you are an atheist. True, you do have cogent justification of why you do not accept SOME Christian sect’s interpretation of G-d, but that is a reason to not accept THOSE sects, not all religion, or all faith. You are “throwing the baby out with the bathwater”, so to speak. My branch of the Christian church accepts few of those, thus we have fewer “logical contradictions”. Other religions have entirely different ideas of G-d, or gods. Some have NONE of those attributes. Some don’t even HAVE a “God” per se. I personally feel we are all beter persons with some faith in our lives. If that faith is Buddism, fine. Hinduism, fine. Christianity- so much the better. Rather than resisting ALL faith, as the most popular one won’t “fit” your inner need, why don’t you try one that does? You are like the man who went into a jeans store, asked for the most popular size, tried them on, and when they wouldn’t fit said “jeans are no good, they don’t fit me”. Well, maybe you need a different size- or maybe you need chinos, and heck, maybe a kilt is right for you. ---
**Author:** ![super\_head](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/d6d6ee/32.png) [@super\_head](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/super_head)\ **Post date:** [August 12, 2000, 1:02pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-few-reasons-why-im-an-atheist/28882/28 "2000-08-12T13:02:33Z")
**I personally feel we are all beter persons with some faith in our lives. If that faith is Buddism, fine. Hinduism, fine. Christianity- so much the better. Rather than resisting ALL faith, as the most popular one won’t “fit” your inner need, why don’t you try one that does? You are like the man who went into a jeans store, asked for the most popular size, tried them on, and when they wouldn’t fit said “jeans are no good, they don’t fit me”. Well, maybe you need a different size- or maybe you need chinos, and heck, maybe a kilt is right for you.** Aside from your personal feelings on people needing faith, this viewpoint confounds me to no end. It’s as if your point of view is that it doesn’t matter what god you have faith in, so long as you have faith in one. If this is the case, then what purpose does belief in this god serve other than to calm your fears of the inevitable. Sorry, that just doesn’t seem like a rational justification for any sort of belief in a deity. If I have misunderstood, please let me know. ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [August 12, 2000, 2:42pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-few-reasons-why-im-an-atheist/28882/29 "2000-08-12T14:42:44Z")
**BlackKnight** > [@](#): > > Surely there are other sensations besides pain that can inform us of such things. The feeling of heat is different than the feeling of pain caused by heat. This pain might have an interesting use, but it’s still not what I’d call “good”. Though that might be okay for intelligent people like you and me with vast powers of deduction, it seems reasonable that a pleasant sensation of heat might not work toward its intended purpose for certain creatures, including some humans. Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that we are two creatures wired differently. Let us together drop our pants and push our asses against a red hot woodstove. My recoil will be instantaneous. You, on the other hand, might rest your ass there for a bit, in order to savor the pleasant sensation. I will suffer some damage for my foolishness, but you might suffer substantial, even fatal, third degree burns. For the benefit of creatures like monkeys (or human children and infants) who cannot deduce that touching the red hot wood stove will damage their flesh, pain is a very efficient signalling device that they are doing something wrong. Perhaps you are arguing that God should have made nature differently, since natural selection might tend to eliminate from nature creatures that can feel no pain. Perhaps you think nature might be “more good” if red hot wood stoves did not burn flesh at all. But then, in your sufferless metaphysic, you have also removed bliss, since there is no longer a sensation continuum. Everything feels good; therefore nothing does. > [@](#): > > I have no idea how one would develop a system of ethics. That is an undertaking that I have never attempted. Are you an amoral person? > [@](#): > > If it is good to stop or prevent suffering, then it is not good to allow or promote suffering. I did not mention evil (or at least, I did not intend to!). But that’s a big if, devoid of any context. That makes for an ethical equivalence between shooting a man in the head and giving him an aspirin to relieve his headache. If the term evil doesn’t suit you, feel free to substitute not(good). > [@](#): > > How would the ending of suffering elsewhere (er, elsewhen) affect the existence of suffering here and now? Okay, I concede your point in its context. If we are talking about a snapshot of space-time, then the ending of suffering elsewhen does not affect the existence of suffering here and now. But, oops! Both the here and now that you spoke of circa 3:14 AM, and the here and now that I just spoke of are both — gone! I’m afraid our snapshots have been rendered moot. As it happens, space-time is analog, not digital. > [@](#): > > What is spiritual suffering? “Flesh gives birth to flesh, but the Spirit gives birth to spirit… God is spirit, and his worshipers must worship in spirit and in truth… The Spirit gives life; the flesh counts for nothing. The words I have spoken to you are spirit and they are life.” — Jesus of Nazareth [John 3:6, John 4:24, John 6:63] The above quote snippets are to contextualize the spiritual metaphysic for you. Spiritual suffering is suffering in the context of that particular Reference Frame. > [@](#): > > Can you please explain yourself more clearly? I am unfamiliar with much of your terminology. I presume you mean the term [undistributed middle](http://www.infidels.org/news/atheism/logic.html#isatype). > [@](#): > > In other words, the Lord might work in mysterious ways. Besides, I know very well that suffering exists, because I have experienced suffering firsthand. Well, you “know” that it exists in your own subjective reference frame, but that is all you “know”. Unfortunately, that presumes an empirical epistemology. Surely, you will grant me the same epistemological discovery that you grant to yourself. Assuming that is the case, what might be mysterious to you might not be mysterious to me. > [@](#): > > I was hoping to keep this thread more on a “common sense” level. Besides, you saw how long my post was as it is! 🙂 And how is my experience of suffering an opinion? I certainly have nothing against common sense, which I consider to be a most valuable epistemology. But you presented your argument in the context of a deductive system, and so I responded to your definitions, axioms, implications, and conclusions. Common sensely speaking, I do not feel your suffering when you suffer. That’s because your suffering occurs in the closed reference frame of your own consciousness. If you tell me you have suffered, then I must take your word for it. Perhaps I can empathize with your suffering if we share at least a common point of reference, but alas your consciousness is closed to me. > [@](#): > > I’m asking, “How could it possibly be the case that it is [necessary] for some suffering to exist in order for certain good to exist?” I’m sorry if I was unclear. I think you were clear enough. What is possible depends entirely on what you are positing. You cannot know what is able to be without a disclosure of truth. > [@](#): > > What I’m asking is why I should believe that is the case. Perhaps it is the case that God can’t create free agency without a “context of suffering”. However, why should I believe that free agency cannot exist without a context of suffering? Well, because it is common sense. If there is no continuum, what is there to choose? > [@](#): > > What do you mean by saying I am assigning agency to suffering? I mean that you have assigned God as the Agent Who _produces **your** _ suffering fiat ex nihilo. You said, “Since God would be omnibenevolent, why not simply ask someone if they want to suffer through a small amount of suffering in order to get some good?” which subsumes that He is its source. > [@](#): > > Can you clarify what you mean please? I am having trouble understanding you here. [You are also assigning it degrees and quantifying it (you speak of a small amount) without defining your scale. In addition, you are simultaneously qualifying and obfuscating it by contrasting it with goodness as both an opposite and a consequence (i.e., God can’t be good if He allows suffering, but a consequence of suffering might be “some good”).] I never said that God can’t be good, only that an omnibenevolent God is not compatible with suffering. In fact, you said that God _must_ be good. You posited one of His attributes as omnibenevolence, which you defined as “any good that this being is able to do will be done” Because of your axiom, if suffering is by God’s agency, then suffering _must_ be good. Yet, throughout your argument, and even now, you go out of your way to contrast suffering and goodness. > [@](#): > > I haven’t defined the meaning of the word “is” either, because I did not think it would be neccessary. Well, it isn’t, but that’s because you weren’t making any conclusions with respect to isness. You used goodness, however, in a number of your implications, making goodness a key concept in your argument (c.f., your “greater good” argument, for example.) Leaving it undefined made it impossible to determine when you might have been equivocating. > [@](#): > > If the existence of suffering is justified by that suffering’s leading to good, then how is suffering that does not lead to good justified? Well, it wouldn’t be! 😃 But how can we know whether you’ve made a [mistake in causality](http://www.intrepidsoftware.com/fallacy/causal.htm)? In the Truth Table, if A is False and B is True, then A implies B is True. Thus, “if the earth is less than 10,000 years old, then evolution cannot have happened” is true, but so what? > [@](#): > > Again, I beseech you to explain yourself more clearly. What, for example, is an “induction axiom”? An induction axiom is an assertion that, given a specific truth, or a set of specific truths, generalizations can be made about other truths. The most famous example is that of Augustus de Morgan, which was used by Giuseppe Peano when he proved that 1 + 1 = 2. It states that “any property that belongs to zero, and also to the immediate successor of any natural number to which it belongs, belongs to all natural numbers.” In other words, if something is true of 0, and of N, and of N + 1, then it is true of all natural numbers. > [@](#): > > What on earth do you mean by this? Are you saying that I may be wrong because I just can’t understand God? If so, how is this different from “The Lord works in mysterious ways”? If you are saying that my particularly defined God does not exist, I would tend to agree with you. I am saying that your own miscomprehension is a possiblity for which you did not allow. Not everything that you miscomprehend is necessarily objectively mysterious. > [@](#): > > Again, I have no idea what you are saying. What do you mean about me having it both ways? I mean that you want both A and Not(A) to be true. God cannot be good if He is an agent of suffering and suffering is not good. You would need to employ an epistemology other than reason to make that point. > [@](#): > > I assume you mean that I defined him as doing good, not that he is the same as some abstract “good”. In other words, I hope you’re not saying god is good in the sense that some people say god is love. Your reference to an “abstract” good is gratuitous. There might be an Absolute Good that is not in the least abstract. You cannot assign abstraction to what you do not perceive, unless you want to employ some atheist version of the mysterious ways argument. > [@](#): > > I don’t recall acknowledging that there are no demons, but I may be wrong. You said, “Some claim that such disasters are the results of demons. There is not only no evidence for this…” Was “this” not an antecedent of claims about demons? […to be continued…] ---
**Author:** ![APB9999](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/8e8cbc/32.png) [@APB9999](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/APB9999)\ **Post date:** [August 12, 2000, 8:20pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-few-reasons-why-im-an-atheist/28882/30 "2000-08-12T20:20:53Z")
As a point of logic, an existence proof: 1. God is all powerful: he can potentially do anything. 2. God either created the world/universe/way-things-are, or he can potentially alter it to give it ANY other nature (by #1). 3. It follows that God _could potentially_ alter the universe to allow for both an end to suffering and the existence of free will. I don’t have to explain how, it’s an existence proof; neither is it dependent on the particular definition of suffering or of free will. If we now add in 4)God is omnibenevolent, in that he wants to minimize human suffering (however defined) it follows that God WOULD make the requisite changes. Any arguments about the necessary relationship between free will and suffering simply sidestep the assertion that God is omnipotent since they assume he cannot change this relation. Arguments about God’s frame of mind are more common. BlackKnight, the assertion that God is omnibenevolent is new to me, too. I think a far more common description of the Judeo-Christian God is that he is _inscrutable_. That is, it is axiomatic that his frame of mind is unknowable. This precludes assertions of omnibenevolence or any other knowledge of God’s attitudes. [Coda, anticipating Lib] One way around the above is to challenge the part where I said “Any arguments about the necessary relationship between free will and suffering simply sidestep the assertion that God is omnipotent since they assume he cannot change this relation.” If the definitions of free will and suffering are mutually exclusive in and of themselves, this will not be true. However, to show this exclusion you would have to show that EVERY instance of suffering is directly necessary to the existence of free will (or else the same argument as above leads to the conclusion that God would change the universe to eliminate the _subset_ of suffering that does not prohibit free will). This would be a difficult demonstration, IMO. Also, Lib, I think you missed another point here, too. Suffering now to prevent suffering in the future (like the getting-burned-by-a-stove example) presumes the existence of possible future suffering, which is counter to the conditions of the argument that God could eliminate ALL suffering. ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [August 12, 2000, 9:28pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-few-reasons-why-im-an-atheist/28882/31 "2000-08-12T21:28:04Z")
**BlackKnight (continued…)** > [@](#): > > And yet both [being slapped in the face by a wind-tossed piece of wood and being slapped in the face by your lover who is angry with you] are suffering. Well, yes, they are. But that’s one of the problems with equivocation: it leaves your middles undistributed. For example, without context or definition, tell me what I mean by this assertion: “Bob’s thesis was sanctioned by the National Thesis Association.” > [@](#): > > Why can’t I associate nature with an act of God? Well, you can if you posit a pantheistic god, but you didn’t. > [@](#): > > And, again, where is this “evil” [coming] from? If I have used this by mistake, please let me know. Again, if you are uncomfortable with the term “evil”, you may substitute the term “not(good)”. > [@](#): > > Why on earth [is the option to choose to kill while I am in solitary confinement not open to me]? I can choose to kill someone right now, if I wanted to. I can choose to kill someone in, say, Norway. I choose to kill them, plan out the hit, and get on a plane. Suddenly, the plane crashes and I die. How is this not an example (albeit a violent one) of someone choosing something yet not being able to do it? > > Choosing to think of killing someone is different from choosing to kill them. Wishing to kill someone is different as well. Wishing to kill someone would be along the lines of, “I want to kill this person.” Choosing to kill someone is: “I am going to kill this person.” Now, a conscious decision has been made. Whether or not the deed is carried out is a subject to more than the person’s will. You cannot have chosen to kill until you have killed. As Jesus said (paraphrased) “Talk is cheap.” Until you have killed, you might have chosen to _want_ to kill, or you might have chosen to _intend_ to kill, but if you are given a circumstance wherein you choose to kill but are impotent to implement your choice, then you have no choice but to wish for something that cannot happen. You might as well “choose” to fly like a bird. A choice is not a matter of ethics until it is acted out in the context of the Big Bang shrapnel. > [@](#): > > What is praxis? I use the term in the Austrian School sense: a praxis is a free and volition action or inaction. For example, smoking is a praxis; breathing is not. Likewise, not feeding a starving man is a praxis; not seeing him under a pile of snow is not. > [@](#): > > I know that non-believers exist, because I know I exist and that I am a non-believer. I’m afraid you don’t know any of that, not in any real sense. Suppose, for example, you were using an existential epistemology. You might reasonably believe that you alone exist, and that the rest of us are bit players in your movie. There is absolutely nothing that validates one world-view over another, unless, of course, there is an Absolute Reference Frame that is Itself objectively valid. > [@](#): > > If I know that one path leads to suffering, and another to happiness, and I let others make the decision of which path to take, then they are indeed in control of their fate but I have just avoided doing something good (i.e. assuring their happiness). God, as I defined him, has the property of omnibenevolence. Why would an omnibenevolant God choose a course of action (assuming here, for the moment, that he [doesn’t] know the future) that could potentially lead to suffering instead of the action sure to lead to happiness? Reference frames. Reference frames. Reference frames. Suffering is positively blissful to the masochist. To the sadist, suffering is a means to fulfill his own happiness. The solipsist will believe that he is the only being who suffers. And the existentialist will not even recognize that suffering exists. Are all these people crazy? Who’s to say? I suppose whoever is objectively not crazy. Of course, maybe we’re all crazy, and so none of us is. I’m not saying that God is a masochist or a sadist or crazy. I’m saying that whatever suffering is, and in whatever way it relates to Him or His doings, then **it matters only within the context of His reference frame, because His reference frame is Absolutely Objective** , unless you mean a god that is not omniscient and omnipotent. > [@](#): > > Darn tootin’. (Sorry, my Minnesota showing) 🙂 My wife is from Minnesota! > [@](#): > > I made no assumption about what else God wanted, only that he wanted belief. Actually, I didn’t assume this, I attempted to show why this was the case due to his attributes. Then you failed. > [@](#): > > Again, I don’t think this was an assumption at all. The only added assumption I think I made here was that not believing in God would cause you suffering. The rest was an attempted derivation from that. Yes, I know. You postulated that not believing in God causes you to suffer. But how is not believing in God an act of God? Assuming you are free to believe in whatever you please, that is your praxis, is it not? Is He standing beside you as you read and rub your cat, holding a gun to your head and saying, “Theists are morons. You are intelligent. Do not believe in me.”? > [@](#): > > A human government is not omnibenevolent. If it [were], I most certainly would allow it to make all the decisions. But what you will allow is irrelevant, unless you are the omnibenevolent one. Again, the frame of reference (i.e., the context) matters. > [@](#): > > Um, no [, “Good is God by your own axiom” is false]. God does any good thing that he can by my axiom. Is a Being Who always does any good thing that He can not, by definition, good? If a tree produces nothing but healthy fruit always and forever, can the tree conceivably be sick? > [@](#): > > _blink_ What do you mean? Am I not allowed to use the definition that I used? If not, why not? I’m completely baffled by your statement [that I cannot use my own definition as proof that He does not exist]. Yes, you are allowed to define God as nonexistent, but then you cannot avoid a tautology if you attempt a proof of what you’ve defined. Assertions must be either axiomatic or proved. Definitions are not proved. They are identities. > [@](#): > > I never raise the possibility that I’m a fish either. I think that has about the same relevance. Sure, I might not be able to comprehend those questions … but what of that? Am I supposed to just assume that the questions and answers fit together in such a way to show that God exists, or at least allow the possibility? I have never claimed to understand or comprehend everything, and I will state now quite forcefully that there are _many_ things which I do not and probably will not ever understand. That being said, I am not going to just take the position that since I don’t know and understand everything that I can’t attempt to figure out what, with what I do understand, I should believe. Nor should you. I am merely making sure we both understand (as you clearly do) that this mental love-making we are doing is a closed set. We won’t settle anything here, because we are arguing about metaphysics. In the end, what we each must do is select those epistemologies that we trust the most based on our own subjective ethics set, and make our own subjective decisions about the nature of reality. > [@](#): > > I have not claimed that God as I defined him needed confirmation of his existence. I have claimed that to allow non-belief is to avoid doing a good thing which an omnibenevolant being would not avoid. I hate to say it, but I think you missed the entire point of that argument. Of course, if this is the case I can’t blame you because I’m notorious for being unclear. I [apologize]. Your apology is unnecessary. But notwithstanding whatever point you might have intended to make, if God needs no confirmation of His existence (which point you do not challenge), then it does not follow that He requires you to believe He exists. One of your key deductions was that the existence of God is challenged by the existence of nonbelievers. But if God is omnipotent, and He wants you to believe, then there is nothing a priori to impede the manifestation of His desire. Unlike a man confined to a cell, God is unbound by any chains. The only way His will would not trump yours (unless you too, are omnipotent) is if you have a will of your own that is _separate_ from His (in an ablative sense). […to be continued…] ---
**Author:** ![Danielinthewolvesden](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/ce7236/32.png) [@Danielinthewolvesden](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Danielinthewolvesden)\ **Post date:** [August 12, 2000, 10:15pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-few-reasons-why-im-an-atheist/28882/32 "2000-08-12T22:15:37Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by super\_head \* > It’s as if your point of view is that it doesn’t matter what god you have faith in, so long as you have faith in one. If this is the case, then what purpose does belief in this god serve other than to calm your fears of the inevitable. \*\* Well, it matters to SOME extent, ie being a thuggee worshiper of kali, and killing in her name, or sacrificing babies to the 'smoking mirror" meso-american religion, is evil. But yes, belief and faith will “calm your fears”, and help you gain inner strength. And, of course, perhaps a better afterlife. All this for very little outlay on your part. Of course i am biased in favor of the Celtic Christian Church (which is SO liberal, some argue that it is not even a “Christian” Church, but more of a Unitarian Church), but I just feel it is the best way for me and many others, just like I feel a Saturn is a great car for many. Does not mean it fits everyones need for transportation. BK, take that “religion test” over in IMHO, and see what is says. I am curious. ---
**Author:** ![super\_head](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/d6d6ee/32.png) [@super\_head](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/super_head)\ **Post date:** [August 13, 2000, 12:57am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-few-reasons-why-im-an-atheist/28882/33 "2000-08-13T00:57:53Z")
\*\*But yes, belief and faith will “calm your fears”, and help you gain inner strength. \*\* I would say we should qualify that with “may” calm your fears and help you gain inner strength. I am an atheist, yet I don’t fear the end of my life and I have more drive, determination, and resilience than I see in most of my Christian friends. I agree with the sentiment that it’s not what happens to you that matters, it’s how you deal with it. \*\*And, of course, perhaps a better afterlife. All this for very little outlay on your part. \*\* Then we wind up in the middle of Pascal’s wager and how one knows they’ve chosen the right god to follow. Obviously, if you’re following, say, Vishnu, then Jesus isn’t going to invite you in to his private party. So you’ve wasted your life more than anything. I was Christian for 18 years, a waffling doubter for 4 more, and then an atheist since. I’ve also never been happier, more fulfilled, and more optimistic about life and this world than I am now. Anecdotal, yes… but a counter to the claim that theistic belief is always a better alternative than non-belief. I personally can’t simply choose a belief because it makes me feel good. If it made me feel better to believe I could fly, it certainly wouldn’t change the truth of the matter when I plummet off a 50-story building. I would rather seek the truth than comfort. But, hey, to each their own. 🙂 ---
**Author:** ![lambda](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/5f9b8f/32.png) [@lambda](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/lambda)\ **Post date:** [August 13, 2000, 1:41am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-few-reasons-why-im-an-atheist/28882/34 "2000-08-13T01:41:35Z")
I don’t understand why people who don’t believe in God’s existence say that, in order to believe it, they need an irrefutable deductive argument, and since they haven’t seen such an argument, they can’t believe. People hold many beliefs (if not most beliefs) without relying on deductive reasoning, and even base their every day life decisions on some of these beliefs. For instance: Atoms exist. Men landed on the Moon. Tap water is safe to drink. You can’t predict the stock market. You can predict the stock market. … Most beliefs, either inconsequential, or fundamentally affecting the life of the owner, are held, or acted upon, without being supported by valid deductive reasoning. Why, then, do people demand to be convinced deductively of the existence of God, in order for that belief to be reasonable? If people will eat food bought at the supermarket because “it is safe”, without a formal proof that it is so, why do they claim that it’s un-reasonable to believe God exists without a formal proof? Logical arguments trying to prove or disprove God’s existence rely on notions like freedom, good, and evil, which different people define in different ways. Depending on your perspective on these notions, you can prove anything. Example argument 1: Good is what God defines as being Good. His notion of Good might differ from ours. Therefore, we might very well live in the best possible world, even if we don’t think so. Example argument 2: Innocent babies suffering cannot possibly be Good. Since innocent babies suffer, God is either not omnibenevolent, or is not omnipotent. Both arguments are valid deductive arguments (with many hidden assumptions), but their conclusions depend on different definitions of Good. I believe it is reasonable (meaning: it can be concluded by valid reasoning) to say that God exists, as it is to say that He doesn’t exist. I believe it is un-reasonable to say that a rational person needs formal proof in order to believe God exists. Most people agree that it is certain that they will die someday. Yet, to my knowledge, nobody put forward a valid deductive argument to support this. Our greatest certainty of all is based merely on an inductive argument. ---
**Author:** ![jb\_farley](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/9d8465/32.png) [@jb\_farley](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/jb_farley)\ **Post date:** [August 13, 2000, 3:38am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-few-reasons-why-im-an-atheist/28882/35 "2000-08-13T03:38:47Z")
real quick, i think it was lib who said something along the lines of “If you take away suffering, then you can have no bliss”. I have heard that argument many times, and I fail to see the merit in it. Pleasure and pain are two totally different animals. Absence of pain does not equal pleasure, and vice versa. I can very easily determine if I am happy using as a baseline the lack of pleasure. Pain is unneccesary. Those born without pain receptors (the name is failing me at the moment- like Mario in “Infinite Jest”) definitely still feel physical pleasure. ---
**Author:** ![Max\_the\_Immortal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/6de8d8/32.png) [@Max\_the\_Immortal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Max_the_Immortal)\ **Post date:** [August 13, 2000, 3:45am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-few-reasons-why-im-an-atheist/28882/36 "2000-08-13T03:45:05Z")
BlackKnight: By “all or nothing”, I meant that you implied that God is either omnibenevolent or non-existent. You furnished reasonable proof that God is not omnibenevolent, but I see that as little reason to be an atheist. You say you are an atheist in the thread title, so don’t use the “I don’t believe in that particlar God” argument. As for free will, I have little to say about this. Even if we do have free will, then God, being omnipotent, could use his unlimited intelligence to extrapolate knowledge of the future from the past. Besides, would knowing whether or not you have free will REALLY matter? It’s not like you’d know what you’d be predestined to do. Actually, I heard some physicists came up with a plausible model of the universe in which everything is predestined. I don’t have a cite on that, though. You didn’t answer my question, though. Let me rephrase it. Why don’t you believe in an omnipotent and omniscient, but non-omnibenevolent God (regardless of the existence of free will)? ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [August 14, 2000, 11:21am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-few-reasons-why-im-an-atheist/28882/37 "2000-08-14T11:21:56Z")
**BlackKnight (final)** > [@](#): > > Then your [God] doesn’t appear to be the [One] we are discussing. Certainly, loving one’s neighbors is a good thing. But so is avoiding the suffering of Hell. If a lack of a belief in God would send you to Hell, then an omnibenevolant being would do whatever it could to prevent someone from going to Hell (unless such actions would produce suffering greater than that in Hell). Believing in God’s existence then, even if it was forced belief, seems very preferable to Hell. I, at least, would much rather be forced by God to believe in him than go to Hell. And yet you would rather “go to Hell” than believe voluntarily? Perhaps making you believe is impossible. Once you have led a horse to water, how will you make it drink? Should God force-feed faith to you? What _then_ of your free moral agency? > [@](#): > > And if we define up as left then I’m ass-backwards. 🙂 > If it is possible to prove God’s existence to someone, then God can do it (omnipotent). If he can’t, then that means it simply can’t be done. If that is the case, then I am perfectly justified in being an atheist. Is reason your only epistemology? You cannot even deduce that _you_ exist. Does experience count for nothing? If you have never experienced God, then I can understand your disbelief. But then, what of my own experience? Is it less valid than yours? I submit that the validity of experience depends on your reference frame. > [@](#): > > I agree with you here. However, I believe that the lack of freewill in this particular instance would be justified by avoidance of Hell. In other words, I think an omnibenevolent being would force me to believe in him in order to keep me from Hell. It may be reasonably argued that the omnibenevolent Being would allow you your choice. If you do not prefer Hell, and you think not believing will “send” you there, then why not believe? It seems that allowing you to believe is the benevolent moral act, whereas forcing you either way — to believe or not believe — would be a malevolent moral act. > [@](#): > > Love is an emotion. I glean no knowledge of God from an emotion. I, at least, have no knowledge of God. Is it impossible to create an instict that is significantly different and more powerful than the ones we currently have? If not, then why wouldn’t God give us such an instict, one that would be instantly recognizable and distint? Perhaps there is a Love that you are not considering. Perhaps there is a gestalt, unaccountable by your emotions. Perhaps there has been an experience of this in some reference frame other than your own consciousness. > [@](#): > > I think you missed the point. God would want us to have clear knowledge of moral rules so that we can freely make choices about right and wrong (or do you deny that an omnibenevolant being would want such a thing?). Now you want to “freely make choices”? Watch out! You’ll strip out the gears in your transmission here. You have already complained that God leaves you free to choose. Why then this sudden reversal. Perhaps I’ve again missed the point. > [@](#): > > Whether those rules are followed or not is not the point. The point I was trying to make is that it would be a good thing for us to know clear rules of morality . Therefore, an omnibenevolant being would, if it could, give us these rules. Unless such a thing is impossible, an omnipotent being could give us these rules. Since I see no reason at all why such a thing is impossible, and since, as you mentioned, people do bad stuff irregardless of rules (and, therefore, the rules wouldn’t create more suffering than already existed), an omnipotent and omnibenevolent being would give us these rules if such a being existed. However, we do not have these rules. Therefore, such a being does not exist. That was the general point I was trying to make. You have failed to consider the possibility that there might not _be_ any rules. Perhaps a part of your spiritual growth is your own discovery of what is good and evil. > [@](#): > > Although I don’t want to get bogged down on a tangent, I’m quite curious why you believe love, expressed empathetically, is an absolute moral good. Because if you love empathetically, you are God. > [@](#): > > Be Perfect? Who’s idea of perfect? (Yes, that’s a rhetorical question, but feel free to answer it if you want to.) God’s, of course. > [@](#): > > And what’s this Absolute Reference Frame? God’s. For the sake of argument, assume that He exists. He, then, is the ultimate reality. That makes His reference frame absolute. If you build a watch, what must you prove to it? Certainly, nothing. Yet it must prove to you that it works. If you cannot make it work, will you not discard it or dismantle it and replace it with another? If you step out of the reference frame of the watchmaker, you might cry, “Foul!”, claiming that the watchmaker is not benevolent. Yet if you were a watch that had the _choice_ of whether or not to work, and you choose not to, what sort of benevolence would the Watchmaker display if He were to wear you rather than a watch that _had_ chosen to work? You are looking at benevolence from a single reference frame, that of your own consciousness. Those watches who do choose to work see things very differently than you do. > [@](#): > > Fine. But how does this [By the same token, if you don’t know that love itself is good, then you won’t understand any “rule” that requires it] affect the argument presented? Because maybe actions are beside the point. Maybe actions are amoral in and of themselves. > [@](#): > > Unremarkably, my dictionary does not contain that word [chronosynclasticinfundibulum]. What does it mean? Parse the word. Chrono: time. Synclastic: space. Infundibulum: cone. It is the space-time continuum. > [@](#): > > How does one select the one they have chosen? Isn’t choosing something the same as selecting it? [Regardless], if God knows which path I will take, then my path is predetermined. You misunderstand. He doesn’t “know” what you _will_ do. He “knows” what you _have_ done. > [@](#): > > . Of course, it is possible that God does not know this, because such a thing cannot be known. But why would such a thing be unknowable? If my choice is the result of my internal states, then why can’t God know these and therefore know what I am about to choose? If my choice is not the result of my internal states … then what the heck is it based on? I’ll try to respond to this better once I have more time to think it over. Take your time. But remember that you are dealing with an Absolute Reference Frame that is eternal in nature. Everything here is already finished from that reference frame. Consider a circle in Flatland. You can see both the inside and outside of the circle at once. Mr. Flatlander can see only one or the other. For argument’s sake, consider a dimension in hyperspace undetectable by you, except indirectly, (as up-down is undetectable, except indirectly, by Mr. Flatlander) that is ana-kata. As Mr. Hyperland, you can see both the inside and outside of a sphere (or a human body) at the same time. Consider now an infinitely dimensional being. He would see all things at once. > [@](#): > > He knows which one I have chosen? Well then, he does know my future then, unless you mean he knows at exactly the same time I know. Unless you mean that, then the problem remains. If you do mean that, then I think you have a good point. Like Mr. Flatlander climbing up a hill on his plane, feeling a force something like gravity, you sense something you call “time”. But just as you can see Mr. Flatlander’s hill, God can see your past, present, and future at once. He doesn’t know your future in the way that you mean. He only knows your future because it is also your past. > [@](#): > > Whoops! I should have simply said “God” and not “omnipotent God”. The latter is redundant. Since I have defined God as being omnibenevolent, he would choose to stop Satan when Satan attempts to cause suffering, unless such an attempt would cause more suffering than allowing Satan to do as he pleased. How does restricting Satan cause more suffering than allowing Satan to do as he pleases? You have not established that suffering is not good. Even with your example of the Holocaust, you have discounted, for example, the changed world-view of those who remember the victims and whether the victims are now eternally blissful thanks to their suffering. It is your general failure to consider all reference frames that most undermines your argument. > [@](#): > > I hope that I have at least showed that I am not an atheist just for the sake of being an atheist, and that I have given at least some thought to my lack of a belief in God. Likewise, I hope you come away from this with the understanding that those of us who love God are not necessarily devoid of reason. You are a thinking man or woman, and I believe that you and I can at least agree that _that_ is a good thing. 🙂 ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [August 14, 2000, 11:33am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-few-reasons-why-im-an-atheist/28882/38 "2000-08-14T11:33:28Z")
> [@](#): > > [Coda, anticipating Lib] > One way around the above is to challenge the part where I said “Any arguments about the necessary relationship between free will and suffering simply sidestep the assertion that God is omnipotent since they assume he cannot change this relation.” > If the definitions of free will and suffering are mutually exclusive in and of themselves, this will not be true. However, to show this exclusion you would have to show that EVERY instance of suffering is directly necessary to the existence of free will (or else the same argument as above leads to the conclusion that God would change the universe to eliminate the subset of suffering that does not prohibit free will). This would be a difficult demonstration, IMO. > > Also, Lib, I think you missed another point here, too. Suffering now to prevent suffering in the future (like the getting-burned-by-a-stove example) presumes the existence of possible future suffering, which is counter to the conditions of the argument that God could eliminate ALL suffering. If you are God, then your argument is sound. ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [August 14, 2000, 12:20pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-few-reasons-why-im-an-atheist/28882/39 "2000-08-14T12:20:12Z")
> [@](#): > > real quick, i think it was lib who said something along the lines of “If you take away suffering, then you can have no bliss”. I have heard that argument many times, and I fail to see the merit in it. If the universe were a singularity, where would be here and where would be there? When would be now and when would be then? If everyone had the exact same property, who would be rich and who would be poor? Likewise, if everyone experienced identical sensations, who would be happy and who would be sad? When you say you feel good, good compared to what? Perhaps you share my annoyance with products that say, “Improved!” or “Less fat!” Improved over what? Less fat than what? If all reference frames are identical, then there is only one. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-few-reasons-why-im-an-atheist/28882.md?page=1)