# A modern symbological assessment of the ontological argument for the existence of God **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [May 13, 2002, 5:31pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-modern-symbological-assessment-of-the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/108845 "2002-05-13T17:31:09Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 14
**Author:** ![FriendRob](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/f/ecc23a/32.png) [@FriendRob](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/FriendRob)\ **Post date:** [June 5, 2002, 1:09pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-modern-symbological-assessment-of-the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/108845/261 "2002-06-05T13:09:53Z")
I think people have been ignoring the fact that the Greatest Possible Being (GPB), defined as the being that exists in the most possible worlds, is very **limited** by this definition. Suppose one of our possible worlds is one that includes a single geometric point _and nothing else_. (I tried making this argument in the other thread but I think people missed the, er, point.) Then the GPB for any set of worlds that includes this one is, at most, a single geometric point. **Newton Meter** has already made the point (sorry) that the whole discussion depends on what we take to be our set of “possible worlds”. I think the “one-point world” (1PW) shows this very clearly. The GPB is a _function_ of the set of worlds we choose as our “possible worlds”. The more worlds we include, the more limited is the GPB. ---
**Author:** ![TVAA](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/c57346/32.png) [@TVAA](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TVAA)\ **Post date:** [June 5, 2002, 5:13pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-modern-symbological-assessment-of-the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/108845/262 "2002-06-05T17:13:59Z")
[The Voice of Reason]: "Having examined and re-examined every argument put forward in this thread, I am now ready to state my conclusions. "If we accept as a premise that a being (let’s call it Q) exists in a possible universe, then Q _must_ exist in that particular universe. If we state that Q doesn’t exist in that universe, a contradiction arises. "However, we’re taking for granted that Q _does_ actually exist. We have no way of logically proving that Q must always exist in every possible universe given only these assumptions. "If it is possible for Q to possess the property of existing in all possible universes, and Q exists in at least one universe, then logically Q must exist in them all. However, the assumption here is that a being which possesses that property exists. We can’t conclude that Q exists while having the property given only these assumptions. "If there is at least one possible universe, and there is at least one being which exists in at least one possible universe, then there will be at least one being that possesses the highest greatness, where greatness measures the number of possible universes the being that has the property exists in. (It’s possible for multiple beings to tie.) However, these ‘Greatest Possible Beings’ don’t necessarily exist in all possible universes. "I think there has been some confusion about what ‘necessary existence’ means. In English, the phrase can be used to reference several different conditions, and it’s not always clear which one is meant. "If a being must exist in a particular possible universe, then its existence is necessary _within that possible universe_. It doesn’t necessarily exist in any other possible universe. A ‘Greatest Possible’ being or beings necessarily exist in at least one universe, given our premises. But, we cannot conclude that it exists in all possible universes. The Ontological Argument remains invalid (as it has been known to be invalid for hundreds of years). "Given its premises, a logically valid conclusion never states anything beyond what is implied in the premises. If the premises and the conclusion are combined in a single statement, that statement is always a tautology. The only reason we consider conclusions to be important is because we’re not smart enough to perceive immediately that they follow from the premises. Logic does not create meaning where it did not already exist. “Lastly, the original poster of this thread doesn’t seem to use language carefully and precisely. He doesn’t like to reflect on the differences between his intuitive sense of a word’s meaning and its formal definition, and uses the same words and phrases to refer to concepts that are actually distinct. This is why he has fallen into error in his reasoning. His manipulation of symbols is correct, but his mapping of meaning onto those symbols is deficient.” ---
**Author:** ![jab1](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/ee7513/32.png) [@jab1](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/jab1)\ **Post date:** [June 5, 2002, 7:29pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-modern-symbological-assessment-of-the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/108845/263 "2002-06-05T19:29:01Z")
Gee, I wish I had said that. Maybe **Lib** will return and tell us how he can logically prove the existence of God when he cannnot logically prove his own existence (something he has stated many times on this board). ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [June 5, 2002, 9:08pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-modern-symbological-assessment-of-the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/108845/264 "2002-06-05T21:08:04Z")
Friend > [@](#): > > Suppose one of our possible worlds is one that includes a single geometric point and nothing else. (I tried making this argument in the other thread but I think people missed the, er, point.) Then the GPB for any set of worlds that includes this one is, at most, a single geometric point. The point you’re making belies a basic misunderstanding of what’s going on here. You seem to be saying that the GPB can be no greater than the equivalent of its lowest common denominator. You’re mistaking the _being itself_ for the manifestation of the being. It’s like saying that blue paint, because it has no color when it is poured into a world without light, has no color. That’s wrong. It has color in worlds that have light. The GPB knows all there is to know about the point in One Point world. But that world is not the only world the GPB knows. Because the GPB exists necessarily, it exists in all worlds, not just in One Point world. * * * Vorlon > [@](#): > > [The Voice of Reason]: 😃 > [@](#): > > Having examined and re-examined every argument put forward in this thread, I am now ready to state my conclusions. Does this mean we may now exhale? > [@](#): > > If we accept as a premise that a being (let’s call it Q) exists in a possible universe, then Q must exist in that particular universe. If we state that Q doesn’t exist in that universe, a contradiction arises. ~~Q, Tisthammer’s Axiom 2, means \<\>Q, or it is _possible_ that Q exists. It is not a premise stating that Q exists. In fact, Q exists is the argument’s _conclusion_ — 10 steps after the first premise. > [@](#): > > However, we’re taking for granted that Q does actually exist. We have no way of logically proving that Q must always exist in every possible universe given only these assumptions. No one is taking for granted that Q exists. Once again, there are nine precedent premises that establish that Q exists. And there are exactly 3 assumptions, none of which you deal with in this post. > [@](#): > > If it is possible for Q to possess the property of existing in all possible universes, and Q exists in at least one universe, then logically Q must exist in them all. However, the assumption here is that a being which possesses that property exists. We can’t conclude that Q exists while having the property given only these assumptions. _What_ assumptions? The ones made by Tistahammer in his argument or the ones you’ve invented here? Look at the assumptions actually made. They are (1) **IF** God exists, then He exists necessarily, (2) It is **possible** that God exists, and (3) If God necessarily does not exist, then it is necessary that He necessarily doesn’t exist. Where has the “Voice of Reason” dealt with any one of these? Strawmen are poor representatives of reason. > [@](#): > > If there is at least one possible universe, and there is at least one being which exists in at least one possible universe, then there will be at least one being that possesses the highest greatness, where greatness measures the number of possible universes the being that has the property exists in. (It’s possible for multiple beings to tie.) However, these ‘Greatest Possible Beings’ don’t necessarily exist in all possible universes. I have no idea what any of that means. I think it sounds like nonsense — mere random assertions seemingly intended to obfuscate the debate. Can you give a site or state the modal principle for any of them? > [@](#): > > I think there has been some confusion about what ‘necessary existence’ means. In English, the phrase can be used to reference several different conditions, and it’s not always clear which one is meant. In modal logic, it means existence in all possible worlds. And that’s what it means in Tisthammer’s argument. No one is confused. > [@](#): > > If a being must exist in a particular possible universe, then its existence is necessary within that possible universe. It doesn’t necessarily exist in any other possible universe. A ‘Greatest Possible’ being or beings necessarily exist in at least one universe, given our premises. But, we cannot conclude that it exists in all possible universes. The Ontological Argument remains invalid (as it has been known to be invalid for hundreds of years). We don’t “conclude”; that’s _how the word is defined_. Just like evil is defined as causing harm. Futhermore, not one — _not one_ — philosopher who raises objections to the modern modal ontological argument calls it invalid. Not one. Not even one. Have you researched this at all? > [@](#): > > Given its premises, a logically valid conclusion never states anything beyond what is implied in the premises. If the premises and the conclusion are combined in a single statement, that statement is always a tautology. The only reason we consider conclusions to be important is because we’re not smart enough to perceive immediately that they follow from the premises. Logic does not create meaning where it did not already exist. There are _eight statements_ between the original premise (Axiom 1) and the conclusion (Statement following 9). Did you read the opening post? > [@](#): > > Lastly, the original poster of this thread doesn’t seem to use language carefully and precisely. He doesn’t like to reflect on the differences between his intuitive sense of a word’s meaning and its formal definition, and uses the same words and phrases to refer to concepts that are actually distinct. This is why he has fallen into error in his reasoning. His manipulation of symbols is correct, but his mapping of meaning onto those symbols is deficient. I must say that I’m awed. I have never witnessed hubris of that magnitude. You haven’t addressed the argument whatsoever. I’ve gone around with you already, giving you dictionary definitions of words that you then ignore with the pomposity of Mussolini standing on a balcony. When you’re prepared to deal with the topic of the thread, please begin contributing. * * * Jab > [@](#): > > Gee, I wish I had said that. I gladly allow that you both said it. > [@](#): > > Maybe Lib will return and tell us how he can logically prove the existence of God when he cannnot logically prove his own existence (something he has stated many times on this board). And I’ve stated it already in this thread, as anyone who had read it would know, and who, by reading it, can find his answer. ---
**Author:** ![jab1](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/ee7513/32.png) [@jab1](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/jab1)\ **Post date:** [June 5, 2002, 9:23pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-modern-symbological-assessment-of-the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/108845/265 "2002-06-05T21:23:28Z")
Besides, so what if you construct a logically sound “proof” for the existence of God? Without empirical evidence, what good is it? A person could construct a logically sound argument that Santa claus exists, but that, by itself, would not demonstrate that Santa Claus exists, would it? ---
**Author:** ![Newton\_meter](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/n/57b2e6/32.png) [@Newton\_meter](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Newton_meter)\ **Post date:** [June 5, 2002, 9:27pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-modern-symbological-assessment-of-the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/108845/266 "2002-06-05T21:27:39Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by jab1 \* > **A person could construct a logically sound argument that Santa claus exists, but that, by itself, would not demonstrate that Santa Claus exists, would it?** Certainly not. But if you accepted the premises of the argument (and you valued logical and consistent thought), you really ought to accept the conclusion. Likewise, if you _didn’t_ want to accept the conclusion (and you valued logical and consistent thought), then you really ought to be able to explain at least one thing that you found offensive about the premises. ---
**Author:** ![jab1](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/ee7513/32.png) [@jab1](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/jab1)\ **Post date:** [June 5, 2002, 10:45pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-modern-symbological-assessment-of-the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/108845/267 "2002-06-05T22:45:12Z")
I value logical thought. But I also know that beautifully-constructed logical proofs are just mental masturbation without some empirical evidence to back them up. All he has is a hypothesis. The next logical step is to test it to see if it’s true. Until he’s successfully completed that step, he has nothing but a lot of pretty words that make him feel good. ---
**Author:** ![Nightime](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/n/e9c0ed/32.png) [@Nightime](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Nightime)\ **Post date:** [June 6, 2002, 5:29am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-modern-symbological-assessment-of-the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/108845/268 "2002-06-06T05:29:20Z")
Looking back at Tisthammer’s page, I see he now has admitted that the argument I made that existence does not make god greater is reasonable. It seems obvious to me that if you have a concept of god as a being of maximal perfection, it is impossible for any existing god to be greater than that conceptual god that does not exist. Therefore existence does not make god greater, and the ontological argument collapses. If only Lib could admit as much. I have still not seen anyone explain why existence makes a being greater, but it is even more absurd to state that necessary existence makes a being greater. Let’s remember what we are talking about here. Possible worlds are a logical device. Possible worlds are NOT other worlds that we know exist somewhere. God either exists, or does not exist. End of story. Necessary existence is a logical device. It can be useful, but it is not meaningful in and of itself. Things do NOT actually have a physical property of necessary existence. They either exist, or they don’t. It seems clear that existence is not a “great-making” predicate. But it is infinitely more obvious that necessary existence is not a “great-making” predicate. I don’t see how you can argue that it is, because necessary existence is only a logical device! Basically, when you say that god exists necessarily, you are saying that god must comply with a meaningless logical device created by man. This is really getting beyond absurd by this point. It is evidently very difficult for some people to understand that just because you do not decide to treat a logical device, such as possible worlds, as if it were an actual meaningful fact in and of itself does NOT mean that you are rejecting logic or reason. In fact I am tying my brain in a KNOT trying to see how it is reasonable to treat logical devices as meaningful by themselves. ---
**Author:** ![TVAA](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/c57346/32.png) [@TVAA](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TVAA)\ **Post date:** [June 6, 2002, 6:26am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-modern-symbological-assessment-of-the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/108845/269 "2002-06-06T06:26:42Z")
All right, let’s look back at the logical argument presented in the original post. The first premise is that if Q exists in at least one possible world, it possesses the property of necessary existence. The second premise is that it is not impossible for Q to exist (there is at least one possible world in which Q exists). Since we have taken for granted that Q exists in one possible world, it follows that it must exist in every possible world. Well, so what? This is a valid logical construction, but it’s not very significant. Unlike St. Anselm’s Argument, it doesn’t even make any claims about the actuality of its subject matter. Many of the posts in this thread, both mine and others’, examine whether there is a justification for accepting the original premises of Tisthammer’s Argument. There isn’t. We have no reason to assume that it is possible for any being to possess the property of necessary existence. We can’t assume that it’s _im_possible, either. Your logic is correct. Your argument is invalid. We are not impressed. [The Voice of Reason]: "My analysis indicates that the entity known as Libertarian does not always consider the full meanings of the definitions he offers. "For example, he fails to note that the greatest element of a set can sometimes also be the least. The greatest being is also the greatest possible being, but the greastest possible being is not necessarily one that exists in all possibilities. "He defines evil as that which causes harm, but fails to recognize the implications of that definition. A sculptor that carves a block of marble into a statue has created the statue but destroyed the block. Is his act good or evil? Is his act both good and evil? “All acts of creation are necessarily acts of destruction, and all acts of destruction are necessarily acts of creation. Should we consider that all good is evil and all evil good? What is the distinction between these concepts?” ---
**Author:** ![TVAA](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/c57346/32.png) [@TVAA](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TVAA)\ **Post date:** [June 6, 2002, 7:11am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-modern-symbological-assessment-of-the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/108845/270 "2002-06-06T07:11:05Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Libertarian \* > **What cannot be introduced with perfect mercy is perfect mercilessness. What cannot be introduced with perfect justice is perfect injustice. Mercy might itself be just, and justice might itself be merciful. These are concepts that we cannot analyze.** We can analyze the concepts perfectly well, thank you. Mercy is not merely showing compassion and kindness, although these are attributes of mercy. To be considered merciful, one must be more compassionate and kind than one is required to be. For example, forgiving a transgression is a merciful act. (It is implied that the consequence of the violation of a rule is somehow negative or unpleasant, and that forgiving the violation leads to a lack of unpleasantness.) In the sense in which God is said to be merciful, He is forgiving. However, the very concept of forgiveness is that a law or principle is being set aside. This is incompatible with justice. If the principles were being set aside in favor of being cruel or inhumane, then it would still not be merciful, by the way. If God vigorously applies His law, then He cannot be merciful, as being merciful requires that He be kinder than his law mandates. If God is merciful, then He cannot be just (arguably, He would be better than just, but that’s not the point). Finally, God’s laws cannot contain an imperative to be merciful (in the sense I have used) because that would be contradictory. ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [June 6, 2002, 10:52am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-modern-symbological-assessment-of-the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/108845/271 "2002-06-06T10:52:53Z")
Jab > [@](#): > > I value logical thought. But I also know that beautifully-constructed logical proofs are just mental masturbation without some empirical evidence to back them up. Is that right? I’d love to see your empirical evidence that two plus two always equals four. * * * Night > [@](#): > > Looking back at Tisthammer’s page, I see he now has admitted that the argument I made that existence does not make god greater is reasonable. It seems obvious to me that if you have a concept of god as a being of maximal perfection, it is impossible for any existing god to be greater than that conceptual god that does not exist. Therefore existence does not make god greater, and the ontological argument collapses. If only Lib could admit as much. Apparently, you mean this. From Tisthammer’s page: > [@](#): > > Is existence really a great-making property? Or to nitty gritty: Is an existing God greater than one that does not exist? If the answers are yes, then the objection fails and premise #1 is true. If the answer is no, then the objection stands and the ontological argument collapses. Please don’t overlook the little words like **IF**. In my opinion, you should apologize to Tisthammer for misrepresenting his position. I would like to hear your reasoning for why a nonexistent god is greater than one that exists. Why is it, exactly, that when a man squints and grunts real hard to conceive a being that can make rational square roots of two, the _idea_ that he has made as a consequence of a neural transmitter dumping its contents into a chemical bath is greater than something that can have made his brain? * * * > [@](#): > > Your logic is correct. Your argument is invalid. We are not impressed. Your “we” is dubious. [From Peter Suber](http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/courses/re/onto-arg.htm), professor of Philosophy at Earlham College: “Together with the conclusion, it is almost as if Anselm had argued that possibility implies actuality, and actuality implies necessity. But while such an argument would be invalid, the argument above **is valid**.” [From Gary Mar](http://www.sunysb.edu/philosophy/faculty/gmar/anselm.htm), department of Philosophy at Stony Brook: “A logically elegant result of our reconstruction is that the facets of Anselm’s argument **are validated** by standard modal axioms drawn from contemporary modal logic.” [From Paul E. Oppenheimer, director of the National Science Foundation Engineering Research Center, and Edward N. Zalta](http://mally.stanford.edu/abstracts/ontological.html), editor of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: “St. Anselm’s ontological argument in Proslogium ii **is logically valid** (the premises entail the conclusion)… To deny the conclusion, one must deny one of the premises.” From [Ed. Stoebenau](http://www.eskimo.com/~cwj2/atheism/onto.html), renowned atheist and critic of the argument: “This [Hartshorne’s version of the] argument **is valid**.” Emphases mine. These are all very recent comments from people with the background, knowledge, and wherewithall to know what they’re talking about. So put away any appeals to argumentum ad verecundiam. As someone who accuses others of ignoring meaning, you might do well to learn the difference between “valid” and “sound”. > [@](#): > > We have no reason to assume that it is possible for any being to possess the property of necessary existence. The being IS the existence. Dictionaries are available online. Look up “be”. > [@](#): > > He defines evil as that which causes harm, but fails to recognize the implications of that definition. A sculptor that carves a block of marble into a statue has created the statue but destroyed the block. Is his act good or evil? Is his act both good and evil? If you struggle with this, I expect to see you tying your horse to the back of your cart and wondering why the cart won’t pull the horse. Destruction is an effect of causing harm, but causing harm is not necessarily an effect of destruction. > [@](#): > > If God vigorously applies His law, then He cannot be merciful, as being merciful requires that He be kinder than his law mandates. If God is merciful, then He cannot be just (arguably, He would be better than just, but that’s not the point). Random. Suppose God’s law requires mercy. Suppose a price (say, repentance) is required for forgiveness. You protest against limitations being applied to God when they are not limitations at all, yet you make up arbitrary limitations and assign them to Him. ---
**Author:** ![Justhink](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/edb3f5/32.png) [@Justhink](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Justhink)\ **Post date:** [June 6, 2002, 1:45pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-modern-symbological-assessment-of-the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/108845/272 "2002-06-06T13:45:14Z")
I’ll have to reveiw what has been discussed since absence! I love reading this stuff! (still having trouble discerning what is real from what is not – as asked earlier … though I have other ways to address the topic of ‘religious ideations’ creating the necessary state for trust violation mechanisms - maybe I’ll offer some of those in the thread I abandoned earlier) As for this: > [@](#): > > The being IS the existence. Dictionaries are available online. Look up “be”. Simulations exist Covert logical systems exist Non-transparent systems exist Logical corruptions exist Does that necessitate ‘tangible’ being though? Does this _being_ that exists, rely _solely_ on covert logic to possess meaning of existence? I believe I posted earlier in this same thread, that the axioms remind me of a more efficient one; one that decompiles this one even further… “God must exist, because something cannot come from nothing. Since the term ‘God’ exists, it is impossible for God not to exist; because every idea needs precedence in form. (this can be argued for _anything_)” I’ll state it as this: Something cannot come from nothing Every idea needs a precidence in form (tr.)The concept of God requires an equal precidence in form in order to exist as a concept (otherwise, it would have come from “nothing”, violating the axiom: Something cannot come from nothing). This proves for the existence of a tangible manifestation of God (eternal in archetype). If this does not prove for the tangible manifestation of God, then we can conclude that something _can_ and _does_ come from nothing, in which case all logical systems collapse within zero-point solpisism (lawless simulations, if you will); rendering the discussion moot. Have you ever been snipe hunting? Have you ever been snipe hunting with a schizophrenic? Another point of contention here is that since this axiom is more fundamental than the one created, we can decompile his axiom for the greatest possible being; being existent - yet remove the condition he forced to make it valuable. One can postulate (for example), that human beings need ideas like God (indefinable terms - particularly self-recursive ones) to allow sentience the elasticity to flow. Gods value would be placed in his capacity to allow humans to possess sentient thought, not by his _actual_ existence. ‘His’ creation of the universe (us and what we percieve by thought) is the passive quality of a state inseperable from a thinking being. “the greatest possible being” (being indefined as such) then becomes a matter of the axiom: It is better to live (think) than to not be living (thinking): (Which happens to be the core logical corruption responsible for the behavior of violating the trust of another being) In this sense; ‘God’ has violated our trust by creating us in a covert manner against our own wills to necessitate ‘his’ existence. The axioms are behaviorally projected from our anthropromorpism of this necessity; modelling the behavior of that projection. We need God to live God makes us live God needs us to exist We need god to exist We need to help God God needs to help us Gods existence is meaningful Our existence is meaningful The greatness of Gods being is a projection of the greatness of the individuals and collective gathered behind the axiom; since the two are necessarily entwined; even if the mechanism has no _actual_ bearing, but rather a superfluous contigency of self-explanitory meaning, required for sentient beings to live. -Justhink ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [June 6, 2002, 3:25pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-modern-symbological-assessment-of-the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/108845/273 "2002-06-06T15:25:56Z")
> [@](#): > > Since the term ‘God’ exists, it is impossible for God not to exist; because every idea needs precedence in form. I have an idea about the tetrahedral essence of purple doubt. Where may I find its form? ---
**Author:** ![TVAA](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/c57346/32.png) [@TVAA](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TVAA)\ **Post date:** [June 6, 2002, 4:57pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-modern-symbological-assessment-of-the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/108845/274 "2002-06-06T16:57:16Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Libertarian \* > **Your “we” is dubious.** There is nothing dubious about us. > [@](#): > > **As someone who accuses others of ignoring meaning, you might do well to learn the difference between “valid” and “sound”.** The logical argument is valid but not sound. Your use of that argument to support a position is invalid. > [@](#): > > **The being IS the existence. Dictionaries are available online. Look up “be”.** Mine gives the definition of “to exist in actuality”. You haven’t shown that necessary existence is actual instead of merely imaginable. > [@](#): > > **Destruction is an effect of causing harm, but causing harm is not necessarily an effect of destruction.** When I look up ‘harm’, I see that it has two meanings: ‘1: Physiological or psychological damage. 2: Wrong; evil.’ How willing are you to tie these two meanings together? > [@](#): > > \*\*Suppose God’s law requires mercy. Suppose a price (say, repentance) is required for forgiveness. You protest against limitations being applied to God when they are not limitations at all, yet you make up arbitrary limitations and assign them to Him. \*\* Forgiveness requires that a law or principle be set aside in favor of compassion. Mercy always involves giving someone better than they deserve. Your argument is invalid: you might as well say ‘suppose God’s law requires self-contradiction’. ---
**Author:** ![Nightime](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/n/e9c0ed/32.png) [@Nightime](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Nightime)\ **Post date:** [June 6, 2002, 6:06pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-modern-symbological-assessment-of-the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/108845/275 "2002-06-06T18:06:37Z")
> [@](#): > > Please don’t overlook the little words like IF. In my opinion, you should apologize to Tisthammer for misrepresenting his position. Actually I mean this. From Tisthammer’s page: > [@](#): > > Existence is not a “great-making” predicate. > > I find this objection to be much more reasonable. This one says that the reason “the greatest possible island,” and “the greatest possible chicken” don’t work as arguments to prove their respective existences is because “existence” doesn’t actually make something greater. To use another example, is the existence of Stalin, the Devil, Hitler, and maniacal mass murderers (say that three times fast) greater than their failure to exist? Obviously not. This is because existence is not a “great-making” property. Tisthammer: “I find this objection to be much more reasonable.” Lib, it really hurts your credibility when you make statements that can be so easily proven false. In my opinion, you should apologize to Tisthammer for misrepresenting his position. Because if you actually read his page you would see that he does find many objections reasonable and is not nearly as convinced as you are by the proof. > [@](#): > > I would like to hear your reasoning for why a nonexistent god is greater than one that exists. Why is it, exactly, that when a man squints and grunts real hard to conceive a being that can make rational square roots of two, the idea that he has made as a consequence of a neural transmitter dumping its contents into a chemical bath is greater than something that can have made his brain? I didn’t say that a nonexistent god is necessarily greater, and your descriptions of squinting and grunting and chemical baths are all off topic, as you hopefully know. The fact is, existence just isn’t a “great-making” predicate. If Santa Claus existed, he wouldn’t be any greater, he would just exist. It would not make sense to say “Wow, Santa Claus is greater now!” It would only make sense to say “Wow, Santa Claus exists now!” You either exist, or you don’t. You can’t become greater by existing. You still haven’t come up with any reason why existing makes you greater, but at least you got to talk about squinting and grunting, so don’t feel too bad. Of course you didn’t even mention the fact that possible worlds are a logical device. They are not actual worlds that exist somewhere. Necessary existence is also only a logical device. Things do not have an actual physical property of “necessary existence.” How could they, when possible worlds are only a logical device? Things either exist or they don’t. When you say god exists “necessarily” you are treating a logical device, possible worlds, as if it is meaningful all by itself, and you are saying that god has to comply with your meaningless logical device! Do you not see that this is absurd? You can use logical devices, for instance you could say that black holes exist in a possible world, and therefore it is logical to believe in them IF they explain things in our world. What you cannot do, if you wish to be reasonable, is act as though a possible world is real and meaningful by itself, and use the properties of things in that possible world to determine the properties of things in our world, without any evidence that such a thing exists in our world! Possible worlds are not real; they are concepts, logical devices, and anything that exists in them is equally a concept. ---
**Author:** ![Justhink](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/edb3f5/32.png) [@Justhink](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Justhink)\ **Post date:** [June 6, 2002, 8:45pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-modern-symbological-assessment-of-the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/108845/276 "2002-06-06T20:45:45Z")
“”""""""""""""""""""""""“I have an idea about the tetrahedral essence of purple doubt. Where may I find its form?”""""""""""""""" This is the old Platonic sense of idealized form. It takes the realm of idea and virtualizes it into a single dimension of memory. Not only would idea be a structure of memory, but process (communication / interaction between these structures) would be a structure of memory as well. In this world veiw; _everything_ ultimately reduces to memory structures ‘interacting’ with ‘other’ memory structures creating virtual states as emergent properties that act as ‘optical’ illusions of sorts; yet ultimately unable to escape the confines of the underlying system. Examples of static memory structures: Change Virtualization Essence Form Communication Non-virtualized existence Infinity It is ultimately the veiw that states: If you can think of it, it must exist. If it does not exist, you cannot think of it. All ideas are equally existent and equally valuable (as in: there is no inherent meaning except local virtualization) I find it interesting that you didn’t address this point, subsiquently made by Nightime as well: Another point of contention here is that since this axiom is more fundamental than the one created, we can decompile his axiom for the greatest possible being; being existent - yet remove the condition he forced to make it valuable. One can postulate (for example), that human beings need ideas like God (indefinable terms - particularly self-recursive ones) to allow sentience the elasticity to flow. Gods value would be placed in his capacity to allow humans to possess sentient thought, not by his _actual_ existence. ‘His’ creation of the universe (us and what we percieve by thought) is the passive quality of a state inseperable from a thinking being. “the greatest possible being” (being indefined as such) then becomes a matter of the axiom: It is better to live (think) than to not be living (thinking): (Which happens to be the core logical corruption responsible for the behavior of violating the trust of another being) In this sense; ‘God’ has violated our trust by creating us in a covert manner against our own wills to necessitate ‘his’ existence. The axioms are behaviorally projected from our anthropromorpism of this necessity; modelling the behavior of that projection. We need God to live God makes us live God needs us to exist We need god to exist We need to help God God needs to help us Gods existence is meaningful Our existence is meaningful The greatness of Gods being is a projection of the greatness of the individuals and collective gathered behind the axiom; since the two are necessarily entwined; even if the mechanism has no _actual_ bearing, but rather a superfluous contigency of self-explanitory meaning, required for sentient beings to live. -Justhink ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [June 6, 2002, 9:33pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-modern-symbological-assessment-of-the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/108845/277 "2002-06-06T21:33:45Z")
Night > [@](#): > > Lib, it really hurts your credibility when you make statements that can be so easily proven false. In my opinion, you should apologize to Tisthammer for misrepresenting his position. Because if you actually read his page you would see that he does find many objections reasonable and is not nearly as convinced as you are by the proof. I’ll ignore your insults, as they obviously derive from a soreness. Every philosopher who has looked at the argument is convinced of its validity, but not every philosopher is convinced of its soundness. The conclusion follows from the premises. There is nothing more to be said about that. The matter of controversy is in whether one accepts the premises. The great makingness of existence is a red herring, and Tisthammer should know this. The proof does not speak to the greatness of one property of existence over another; rather, it speaks to the greatness of the existence itself. It is great simply because it exists in every possible world as opposed to a lesser existence in fewer than all possible worlds. It isn’t dealing with the greatness of observation, but with the greatness of ubiquity or scope. The assignment of synthetic properties is outside the scope of the proof. I challenge you to find the assignment of any properties other than possibility and necessity in the tableau. > [@](#): > > I didn’t say that a nonexistent god is necessarily greater, and your descriptions of squinting and grunting and chemical baths are all off topic, as you hopefully know. The fact is, existence just isn’t a “great-making” predicate. If Santa Claus existed, he wouldn’t be any greater, he would just exist. It would not make sense to say “Wow, Santa Claus is greater now!” It would only make sense to say “Wow, Santa Claus exists now!” You either exist, or you don’t. You can’t become greater by existing. You still haven’t come up with any reason why existing makes you greater, but at least you got to talk about squinting and grunting, so don’t feel too bad. Yes, Brutus says he was ambitious, and Brutus is an honorable man, eh? 😉 In the plain English sense of greatness, perhaps if poor children could get a tree full of presents from a real philanthropist it would be a greater thing than the fact that they don’t. But who knows? > [@](#): > > Necessary existence is also only a logical device. Okay. Then what does this say about your own impassioned argument? Are logical devices irrelevant for this proof but somehow imbued with significance when you use them yourself? > [@](#): > > Things do not have an actual physical property of “necessary existence.” How could they, when possible worlds are only a logical device? Things either exist or they don’t. When you say god exists “necessarily” you are treating a logical device, possible worlds, as if it is meaningful all by itself, and you are saying that god has to comply with your meaningless logical device! Do you not see that this is absurd? Indeed I do! > [@](#): > > You can use logical devices, for instance you could say that black holes exist in a possible world, and therefore it is logical to believe in them IF they explain things in our world. What you cannot do, if you wish to be reasonable, is act as though a possible world is real and meaningful by itself, and use the properties of things in that possible world to determine the properties of things in our world, without any evidence that such a thing exists in our world! Possible worlds are not real; they are concepts, logical devices, and anything that exists in them is equally a concept. Logical symbols attain significance when we assign consistent values to variables and use the symbols to manipulate them in accordance with valid principles of logic. Really, Night, attempting to discredit logic is hardly the way to go here. The reason possible worlds and necessary existence are significant to this proof is that our world is possible. Therefore, God exists in it. You’re entitled to opine that the argument is not sound. But if you do, then, as Newton said, you should say which of the premises you will not accept. None of your impassioned musings about reality and the invalidity of logic make any dent in the proof. Reject one or more of the axioms or else accept the conclusion. ---
**Author:** ![TVAA](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/c57346/32.png) [@TVAA](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TVAA)\ **Post date:** [June 6, 2002, 10:32pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-modern-symbological-assessment-of-the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/108845/278 "2002-06-06T22:32:23Z")
Neither Nightime nor myself have questioned the validity of the logical proof, just what Libertarian seems to believe the proof indicates. The proof in the OP makes no conclusions about the ultimate nature of reality of existence, and there is no valid way of interpreting its premises in such a way that it does. It does NOT state that there must be some sort of existence. It does NOT state that there must be a form of necessary existence. All it says is that if a being must exist in all possible worlds if it exists in one, and it exists in one, it must exist in all possible worlds. This is neither a particularly dramatic nor a particularly interesting statement, as it is so obvious that our minds are capable of taking in the entire argument at once. Libertarian’s mind simply seems to kluge around the fact that the proof says virtually nothing about the nature of God and absolutely nothing about whether God exists. There’s no point in arguing with him further: he’s just not capable of perceiving his own psychological blind spot. There are thousands of threads on this board, after all. There must be interesting, reasonable people posting in _some_ of them. ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [June 7, 2002, 9:59am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-modern-symbological-assessment-of-the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/108845/279 "2002-06-07T09:59:49Z")
> [@](#): > > It does NOT state that there must be a form of necessary existence. […blank stare…] Um, yes it does. Premise number 1: G [symbol]É[/symbol] G. QED ---
**Author:** ![FriendRob](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/f/ecc23a/32.png) [@FriendRob](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/FriendRob)\ **Post date:** [June 7, 2002, 11:55am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-modern-symbological-assessment-of-the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/108845/280 "2002-06-07T11:55:12Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Libertarian \* > \*\*Friend > > The point you’re making belies a basic misunderstanding of what’s going on here. You seem to be saying that the GPB can be no greater than the equivalent of its lowest common denominator. You’re mistaking the _being itself_ for the manifestation of the being. It’s like saying that blue paint, because it has no color when it is poured into a world without light, has no color. That’s wrong. It has color in worlds that have light. The GPB knows all there is to know about the point in One Point world. But that world is not the only world the GPB knows. Because the GPB exists necessarily, it exists in all worlds, not just in One Point world. > > \*\* It seems to me that for your viewpoint to work you have to be looking at the collection of all possible worlds from some meta-world that encompasses all of them. Then a being that exists in this meta-world can have “manifestations” in the individual worlds. But that’s not what the proof says. It talks about a being that exists _in_ all possible worlds. The _only_ being in the 1PW is the point. So the GPB in the 1PW is the point, and if the GPB is the _same_ in all the worlds (it is, by definition), then the GPB for any set of worlds including the 1PW _is_ the geometric point. Let me say it another way. You have been saying the GPB has the greatest knowledge, power, etc. in the particular world under consideration. But by this definition, the GPB is _different_ in each possible world: has different knowledge, powers, etc. That’s contradictory to the definition of the GPB, tho: a (single) being that exists in _all_ possible worlds. This “intersection” understanding of the GPB is the only one that seems to me to be consistent with the original definitions. I admit I haven’t understood what you mean by “convergence”: perhaps you could expand on that? I have to second **Newton** in expressing my admiration for your able defense of your position. Thanks again for starting this thread. I also agree with **Night’s** point about existence in hypothetical imaginary worlds being of dubious “greatness”. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-modern-symbological-assessment-of-the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/108845.md?page=13) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/a-modern-symbological-assessment-of-the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/108845.md?page=15)