Dewey, I think you misread what I posted—I am will it accept that the misreading was in good faith. To be charitable, you may have misread what I meant to post or should have posted. In any event, I do not advocate an ad hoc view of the law. I do say that when you get into question where the answer is not compelled by the clear language of the text or the undistinguishable precedent, then you are in an area where the personal judgment of the judge about what the law ought to be, or more commonly what the out come ought to be, is the decisive consideration. I do not advocate that as a universal theory of the law, a general theory of relativity if you would. Rather I tell you that is a description of how this particular brand of sausage is made. It is a general principal in some areas of the law, however. As Dean Vernon (who Minty and Hamlet knew) said, the guiding principle in conflicts of laws questions is that the widow and kiddies prevail.
Clearly, broad Constitutional issues are decided as maters of policy. Were that not true then there would not have been a decision that separate racially segregated facilities passed Constitutional muster and then some 90 years later a decision that they did not pass Constitutional muster. The language of the document did not change, the mind set of the legislators who drafter the Reconstruction Amendments did not change, the opinions of the voters and state legislators who ratified the amendments did not change. What changed was the members of the Court and the opinion of the country. That is the way the machine works. You may deplore and decry the failure to adhere to some guiding principle until you turn blue in the face, you may protest against the stars in their courses, but the makeup and reasoned personal opinions of the Justices of the Supreme Court in debatable cases counts for more than many are willing to recognize. You and I and others as keepers of the secrets of the sacred wisdom need to acknowledge that, even though it is probably not a good idea to broadcast it among the great uninformed masses or at court bashing rallies. We may be sausage makes at heart but we need to maintain the pretence that this Constitution thing is predictable and knowable and springs from the strong loins of the Founders, fully formed and perfect like a Greek goddess from Zeus’s forehead.
Let me also suggest, because I am fond of the analogy, that saying that four lane high speed highways are bad because Hitler built the first ones is not equivalent to saying that because Cuban cigars are a delight and a boon to the frazzled soul Castro’s government is a good thing. It is worth noting that it has been our government’s policy that Cuban cigars are bad, evil, un-patriotic and it is a crime to have them, not because the Surgeon General says so, but because we hate Castro and all his works and the horse he rode in on as a mater of political policy.
As I read over this thread I get the idea that some of us are working with an extremely limited view of the Due Process and Equal Protection clause. Let me pose a silly hypothetical question. If the Congress of the United States, after due consideration, passed and the President upon the advise of the Attorney General, signed a federal statute, claiming authority under the Commerce Clause, clearly and unambiguously making it a felony punishable by at fine of not more than $250,000.00 and up to five years confinement for anyone subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to wear a bow tie, would such a statute be subject to attack as a deprivation of Substantive Due Process. Since view taken by some appears to be that Substantive Due Process is an imposter without foundation in jurisprudence, I take it that it is immaterial that there is no rational connection between the bow tie suppression statute and some objective which the government may accomplish by the exercise of its police power. The position of this particular straw man would be that the Bow Tie Criminalization Act of 2003 is a proper exercise of the government’s police power because it was properly enacted and there is no language in the Constitution that expressly guarantees the liberty to wear a bow tie. A silly and extreme example, I know, but no more silly that Texas’s criminalization of private, consensual, adult buggery.
Of course I read Justice Scalia’s dissent in the Texas sodomy case, all of it. It seems to me that the good Justice’s resort to talking about a homosexual agenda is a good and reliable indication that the basis for his opinion is a visceral adherence to a personal idea of public morals, his personal reaction to the out come of the case, anger that the case did not have the out come he wanted, and that he was looking for an argument that would give rise to a different out come.