A Rationale for the Bush Administration's North Korea Policy

[Squink]

*Originally posted by Shodan *
Keeping in mind that no one claims a link between al-Queda and NK

That’s not quite accurate:

“North Korea and Al Qaeda are combining to pack a lethal threat to the United States but the country isn’t close to making the kinds of preparations that are needed to defend against those threats. The ideological opposition to making the kinds of investments needed to secure our ports and borders is endangering America and cannot be allowed to continue.”
-Sen. Charles Schumer (D- N.Y.) Mar 6, 2003

[CyberPundit]

Shodan,
Congratulations on being the first on this thread to throw a whining,partisan.content-free hissy-fit.

Anyway there are many reasons why North Korea is much more dangerous than Iraq. It’s a lot closer to acquiring nukes. it’s a lot more desparate for money. It’s a lot more isolated from the rest of the world so more likely to miscalculate. Finally it’s more likely to give WMD to terrorists like Alqueda for the simple reason that they aren’t a threat to it the way they are to Saddam Hussein.

Actually I don’t disagree that Saddam is a threat as well. The question is whether invading him in the present circumstances enhances US security. As I have argued in many threads it doesn’t. For one thing it’s MORE likely to make him pass his bio/chem weapons to terrorists simply because he has nothing to lose.

Oh and I am not on the left.

[RTFirefly]

I agree that a multilateral approach is not just a good idea in the case of North Korea, but is absolutely necessary. Only if the countries NK economically depends on - China, South Korea, Japan - are part of the deal, will KJI have reason to capitulate.

Any military solution must at least be tolerated by China, which understandably regards itself as the big dog on that particular block.

So what could get China into the picture? Arming South Korea and Japan with nukes has been suggested. An option that shouldn’t be discussed publicly, but would be good for the appropriate US policymakers to whisper in the ear of the appropriate Chinese honcho, is that of arming Taiwan with nukes.

Because to say that China does not want to see that happen is something of an understatement: if Taiwan has nukes of its own, and missiles to lob them to the mainland with, then China can kiss goodbye any attempts to bully Taiwan into reunification - which of course is their current approach. And they really really really want Taiwan.

We should quietly but unequivocally make clear to them that our primary interest, by far, is restricting nukes to the smallest possible number of countries, and that we’d overwhelmingly prefer that China be the only nuclear power in the Far East (aside from Russia). But if they won’t cooperate with us in keeping their North Korean neighbor non-nuclear, they might wake up to find that they’re one of several nuclear powers on the Pacific Rim. And Taiwan would be one of them.

[ElvisL1ves]

Doesn’t anyone want to mention that the North Korea situation, like Iraq, was reasonably stable and reasonably contained until Bush decided to unilaterally break off relations and switch to condemnation instead? Obligatory cite

North Korea’s nuclear initiative has exposed a crisis in the Bush Administration’s Korea policy dating back to February of 2001, shortly after President Bush had taken office. Then-South Korean president Kim Dae Jung came to Washington six weeks after the Bush inauguration to urge the new administration to quickly resume the dialogue with North Korea launched by the Clinton Administration. Secretary of State Powell had said the new Administration would continue the Clinton policy, but when President Bush met President Kim, he put the kibosh on South Korea’s hopes, warning that North Korea could not be trusted to keep its agreements. Bush’s remarks were viewed as a slap-down of the South Korean president’s “Sunshine” policy of engagement with the North, which infuriated Seoul and saw Pyongyang respond by chilling relations with the South.

It also created a policy vacuum in Washington. Although the Administration had plenty of reason to doubt North Korea’s compliance and to demand stronger verification principles in the 1994 agreement, modification of the agreement through dialogue was not prioritized. The Bush Administration said its North Korea policy was under review. And the Administration’s most public declaration of intent on North Korea came a year later, when Pyongyang was named as the third point on the President’s “axis of evil” — a rhetorical signal of the Administration’s desire for “regime-change” in Pyongyang, which set off alarm bells among U.S. allies throughout East Asia.

Bush doesn’t have a “policy” much less a “strategy”, just an attitude, and an adolescent one at that, despite the polarizing filters on the rose glasses the OP wears. For the North Korea war, Bush won’t even have South Korea on his side.

“This foreign policy stuff is a little frustrating.” - GWB.