I got that idea from the fact that while many scientific materialists tell me that there is a materialist explanation for consciousness, none have ever given me the explanation or backed it up with cites.
He possibly considered it obvious. But if it helps, earlier in the thread I demonstrated that information = complexity. Therefore, any object or entity that contains all the information about the universe that there is must be as complex as the universe itself, to be able to encode and contain that information. If god has any other properties as well, like a mind or personality, or additional knowledge (like about the future, say), then he must inevitably be more complex still.
It’s how everyone assesses whether an explanation is a good one, actually. And explanation with no explanatory power is useless.
Ann: “How to planes fly?”
Bob: “Because of those flat bits sticking out of their sides, which are called wings.”
Ann: “I don’t know how wings work, but nonetheless I find your explanation completely satisfying anyway, because explanatory power is irrelevent to me.”
:dubious:
You can just say “scientist.” “Materialist” is a fatuous religionist word for people who don’t believe in magic.
If you got the idea that there are no neurological explanations for consciousness, then you haven’t looked very deeply on the matter or (more likely) have simply shut your ears to the answers.
I find it hilarious, buy the way, that you would demand cites for a “materialist” explanation for consciousness when you steadfastly refuse to supply any for the magical ones you constantly assert.
That Chesterton quote is completely delusional, by the way.
This is why I accuse you of not engaging with other posters in the thread. I and **begbert1 **both offered reasons for thinking God is complex, and **SentientMeat **and I both offered arguments, using the theist’s own premises, for thinking that God’s complexity needs an explanation. I really don’t give two shits if the argument is Dawkins’ or not. If you are interested in the truth of theism, it is an argument you should consider.
I don’t see what this has to do with anything. The point always was, from the very beginning, and continues to be, that ACCORDING TO THE THEIST complexity requires an explanation. It is the theist’s own reasoning that demands an explanation for God’s complexity (which was explained and argued for by at least two posters in this thread).
Whatever. You would rather sling ad hominems at Dawkins then engage with charitably reconstructed and very powerful versions of arguments that are similar to his arguments. If you are interested in getting to the truth of things, you will not care if the arguments we are presenting in this thread are Dawkins’ arguments or not. (I certainly don’t.) You will only care if they are sound.
ETA: If you think I am insulting you, I invite you to report my post, as insults are forbidden in GD. As I said, I don’t have **SentientMeat’s **patience for you. I think **SM’s **attitude is admirable, but I find myself unable to exhibit all traits I admire.
Disclaimer: I’ve read only the first two pages of the thread and the last. If this has already been discussed, I apologize.
ITR, I’d like to discuss personal experience as a basis for belief. Unlike other posters, I have no interest in attributing this to hallucinations, mental illness or anything like that. Wishful thinking, perhaps, or a placebo effect, but I don’t know. What I observe, though, is this.
You are familiar, I assume, with the Mormons (more properly, the Church of Latter Day Saints). As you may know, the ordinary form of Mormon witnessing is to explain to a potential convert the provenance of the Book of Mormon (Joseph Smith, the gold tablets, etc.) and suggest that, rather than taking the witness’ word for it, the potential convert should retire to a quiet place and pray to God for guidance as to whether the story is true. Most, of course, never bother. Some do and get back no answer or a negative answer. A few get the answer that it’s true. Those few become converts, join the church and live happily ever after. I say few, because LDS is still a minority congregation, yet it has several million adherents. So, this is scarcely a rare occurence.
What say you about this personal experience? Does the personal experience of converts prove the Book of Mormon is true? Does the personal experience of non-converts prove it’s not? Is there any objective basis to distinguish between the two? Similarly for the more-than-a-billion who believe Mohammed was the last prophet of Allah? Or the two billion who believe Christ was the Son of God?
That is just not so. Indeed, unless you believe in philosophical zombies, some kind of consciousness must arise in a being whose behaviour depends in part upon what they detect to be happening in the environment. How can I (or an animal, for that matter) tell you what I see if I can’t really visually experience it? (There is a phenomenon called blindsight, but even this has a well-evidenced cognitive scientific explanation.) Cognitive science is all about conscious and unconscious processes.
That is just not so. The “electrochemical processes” involved in synaptic discharge are as irrelevant to explaining consciousness as the rules of chemical valency are to explaining digestion. The brain is a complex arrangement of many different neural networks each suited to a different task, and we can falsifiably experiment on these different networks to understand their function under both normal and pathological conditions. It is your ignorance of cognitive science that is quite literally centuries out of date.
No, I am not aware of this at all. “Epiphenomena” have been a laughing stock in cognitive science for years, and “feigned anaesthesia” is a similarly cowardly way to flee the arena. Cognitive science treats consciousness as a subject for as scientific an investigation as any other, requiring no mystery or denial of plain facts.
Spoken like a true cognitive scientist. (And, incidentally, Hume considered evidence received via the senses to be the most reliable.)
But sometimes the mind does generate what it perceives, as is clearly the case in dreams. Indeed, there is no “processing-free” perception. Even reading these words on your screen, the retina and visual cortex are proving a vast amount of processing to “generate” the final image you consider “real”. We must take each case as it comes and ask whether an external entity is necessary to explain what the mind perceives, or whether the mind’s workings themselves can account for that perception.
“Skepticism” coming from the Greek “[symbol]skepsis[/symbol]” meaning “inquiry”, note . It is the very bedrock of scientific investigation.
I agree that actual citations are often thin on the ground, and I hope you will allow me to remedy this. But you must say why you think said candidate explanations cannot be true. If you think they could be true (you just don’t happen to think they are) you must state this clearly as well. We would then examine which candidate explanations require least assumptions or entities.
YOU brought that paper up when you refused to engage with me in any other way on the subject of the natural origin of religion. Even then, that was a random paper in an Evolutionary Psychology journal which you misunderstood completely: the women didn’t consciously seek out more partners, the study sought to establish whether this was an unconscious effect (and had mixed results even in that regard.) I believe “in a day’s work” that people’s behaviour can be affected in ways they are not consciously aware of because thousands of psychological experiments show it to be true.
What? That paper was about whether disease-ridden areas saw an increase in promiscuity. What has that got to do with “the meaning of consciousness”? If we’re to discuss a paper pertaining to “the meaning of consciousness”, let’s discuss this one. If we’re to discuss a paper summarising some actual cognitive science experiments, try this (numerous different experiments are mentioned in this interview – I’d be happy to expand on any one of them. Or you could listen to or read his lecture).
Ah, but again you are saying you merely prefer this explanation, not that natural explanations are impossible. That’s a very important distinction. I still feel you are fleeing the arena by demanding a single “all or nothing” explanation instead of concentrating on a single aspect like, say, prayer.
That is indeed a telling quote from a man who died in 1936, when cognitive science was in its infancy and being given a rather abusive upbringing by Freud and Jung. If you’d like to actually discuss the evidence for and against it, you’ll see how strong the tide has become in the last 70 years.
The “goodness” and “positivity” of Christianity and the “happiness” of Christians being utterly irrelevant to whether there really is a Heavenly Father or not, of course.
Might this not be confirmation bias on your part?
Then you admit that my explanations could be correct, you’d just prefer them not to be? That you might be talking to yourself when you pray, that your religious experiences might arise without an external divine source, that God is unnecessary?
In summary, ITR, I feel you are deliberately avoiding discussion of specific aspects of religious or mystical experience because you fear that the explanations provided by cognitive science might actually be quite convincing, and the religious explanation an obviously poor second. You thus seek to make the discussion so vague and general that the goalposts can be shifted at will away from any targetted hits cognitive science might score.
You ask for evidence. I ask only that you tell me specifically what you seek evidence of, since no single piece of evidence can explain everything.
Except boobs, which I guess aren’t technically singular.
Oh, and I missed this yesterday:
Nor does he need to if nobody is arguing, as you are not arguing that the complexity of the universe requires a creator or designer. Only when someone does make such an argument is it necessary to reply that the designer would require at least as much complexity as defined by the person making this argument. Again, this is an example of the logical tool called Reductio Ad Absurdum – one takes the argument of someone else and explores its logical consequences. Your first line of argument thus singularly fails to appreciate the very basics of logical analysis.
What?? That is precisely how normal people judge whether entities exist or not. The reason people don’t believe in Odin, faeries, angels pushing the planets around the Earth or any number of entities people once judged extant is because there is no reason to believe in them anymore. This is the very principle behind Ockham’s Razor. Your second line of argument is a brazen admission that your beliefs are emotional, not rational.
I’ve read the Ramachandran interview. The Dennett paper is going to take some time, probably a lot of time, since he seems to be going out of his way to confirm the stereotype of humanities professors concealing any meaning they may have inside impenetrable jungles of prose. So let’s focus on what Ramachandran says.
Lots of fascinating stuff there, but nothing I see that really comes closer to explaining why consciousness exists. Let’s start with the experiment about mirror neurons and pain. We have certain neurons that are part of the pain system in the human brain. When a person actually experiences pain we can see that neuron firing. And sometimes when a person sees another person experiencing pain, that same neuron fires. We’ll assume for the moment that the experimental results actually are correct. But consider, do people actually experience pain when they sees other people in pain? There are obvious cases where they don’t. The teenagers who are lining up to watch Hostel 3 or The Hill have Eyes 5 or Saw 864 are presumably not sharing the mental experience of having their liver ripped out with hedge clippers (or whatever) as they watch it happening. Nor, for that matter, in the numerous historical instances (or current instances) where people inflict torture on others, the torturers do not share in the mental experience of the victims when they see it taking place. So, plainly, even if we are “seeing it a the level of neural circuitry”, it’s something that’s subject ot the decisions of the conscious mind. In other words, each person chooses to experience empathy or not.
And, in fact, Ramachandran seems to more or less agree with this. In the section where he tries to tie this phenomenon to eastern mysticism. Well, people who choose to follow the practices of eastern mysticism are choosing them. There’s no eastern mysticism neuron that can explain that.
(Actually, I think Ramachandran’s understanding of eastern mysticism is wrong, and once one has a right understanding of the topic the connection that he’s trying to make there breaks down. Eastern mysticism is not solely about extreme empathy when we see someone else suffering, as evidenced by the fact that the Brahmin in Hindu culture formed the highest caste and often had utter contempt for those viewed as lower caste. A much better description is diven by Dr. W. T. Stace:
Continuing the discussion of the Ramachandran interview, I suppose his key point is that he doesn’t see any difference between qualia and self. His main argument consists of trying to define down consciousness, to insist based on some metaphor to the fact that biologists never clearly defined “life” that there also isn’t any clearly defined “consciousness”. But of course there is a clearly defined consciousness, which we all know because we experience it whenever we’re conscious. If we didn’t have a definition of consciousness, then we wouldn’t be able to distinguish between conscious and unconscious people. As for his argument about why there can’t be any clearly defined consciousness, I’m having trouble understand just what he’s saying. It would help if he could use complete sentences regularly and organize his thoughts better. But when he says, “So all of these different aspects of self you might be able to tackle quite separately”. All that I can respond to that is, tell we when it actually happens. No experimental evidence whatsoever is offered to back up the claims in that section of the interview.
Well then, correct my ignorance by explaining why the neural networks of the brain produce a conscious mind capable of thought. Nothing in the Ramachandran interview does that.
Actually, you asked me to choose a paper from Evolutionary Psychology and discuss its merits. I did so. Then you got mad at me for doing so. But let’s ignore that for the moment. The point I was making, which you never responded to, was that the paper made a hopeless mockery of the standards that scientific materialists brag about upholding. They did a survey and found that in nations where AIDS was more prevalent, women have sex with more partners. Nowhere did they take data at the individual level. Having found a low correlation, they then concluded that women have a gene or genes which causes them to sleep around more when rates of STDs are high. Now any of my statistics students can easily explain why such reasoning is bogus. The fact that one thing occurs more frequently where another thing occurs does not prove that the one causes the other. The point being that the standards for publishing in a journal that takes such junk are obviously below the ones that scientists brag about upholding. That was the point.
ITR, what say you about Post #266? FWIW, this wasn’t intended as any sort of “gotcha.” Doubt about the value of personal experience as evidence (much less proof) of God’s existence was pretty much the path by which I deconverted from Christianity. I think it’s a legitimate and important issue.
Ah, why consciousness exists is indeed far more in Dennett’s domain than Ramachandran’s. The question you seem to be asking is, “if it is possible that organisms evolved which were able to process sensory information via complex biological neural networks but which crucially didn’t have ‘consciousness’, why should the latter have emerged at all?” I put it to you that this may not, in fact, be logically possible – that some kind of “first person perspective” is a necessary feature of such a neural network – and that experience divorced from the neural network is not logically coherent, as Dennett argues in that essay (and others.) No experiment can explain why eg. solipsism or panpsychism are false. If you think about your question, you might realise that it is like a 19th Century vitalist asking of a modern geneticist “Yes, I can see how DNA and RNA replicate and produce proteins in order to build an organism, but how does that explain the mystery of life?”
These last two sentences bear no logical connection to the preceding sentences: Activity is seen in those neurons of the observer associated with pain, but at a much lower level, such that it is not actually physically painful, merely uncomfortable enough an association that most observers reported that they didn’t like it. Some observers, especially psychopaths, found the observations less unpleasant, and this was reflected in their diminished ‘mirrored’ activity. Why you say this response is consciously chosen I have no idea. Nor do I see why you are focussing on this particular experiment at all, actually – it certainly doesn’t seem relevant to our debate over what phenomena for which gods must be invoked in order to explain.
Nor need there be. Again, promoting cognitive science as seeking explanations at the level of individual neurons is outright strawmanship.
Does he say it is solely about that? To experiment on “nonreferential compassion”- dmigs med snying rje in Tibetan, which IMO seems to conform quite closely to Stace’s description) is not to declare that it is what a given philosophy or worldview solely concerns itself with.
Just as we clearly live our own life – that still doesn’t help biologists define precisely what life is, or what is or is not ‘alive’.
Yes, but then we find that even ‘unconscious’ people still have some level of consciousness, and that some apparently conscious people have much less than it seems. It is this spectrum that requires specific aspects of consciousness to be analysed carefully, like I’m trying to do with your religious and my mystical experiences.
But that’s precisely his point – you can separate aspects of ‘self’ since it is these single, specific aspects which are gravely diminished by brain damage in small, specific regions.
Like I said, that’s more the focus of the Dennett essay. The Ramachandran interview was a summary of experiments which explain numerous different aspects of such experiences.
Actually, I got mad at you for completely ignoring everything other than that attempt of mine to convince you that evolutionary psychology is as scientific an endeavour as other sciences since any hypothesis can be falsified by evidence. I note that you are employing the very same tactic here in your increasingly desperate attempts to avoid talking about what can’t be explained without God.
And they admitted explicitly that the correlation was not significant at 5%, 1%, or whatever level a scientist would put forward a’positive’ result, which is why they said their results were inconclusive. See? They had a hypothesis, it wasn’t well supported by the data, so they said so. That is what science is: falsifiable hypotheses put to the test.
Again, ITR, I put it to you that you have now shifted the goalposts not merely to a different part of the field but to outside the stadium completely. We started off debating whether a God was necessary to explain the universe (which I’m glad you denied), then whether God was necessary for ‘dramatic’ religious experiences (which you then said you weren’t talking about anyway), then whether God was necessary for more ‘subtle’ experiences, at which point you have now refused to discuss specific experiences at all and have instead seemingly disappeared down a rabbit hole in search of philosophical zombies. Read that chapter (Why there is almost certainly no God) of The God Delusion again, and you will see that it is all about explanations and gaps. I feel like an explanation vendor generously offering my wares at discount prices as you flee the arena loudly complaining that a guy just can’t get any kind of explanation round here.
I’ll readily admit that I know very little about Mormonism. I intend to do some reading on all the major religions at some point, but that one I haven’t gotten to yet. I have, however, already suggested some titles for reading about comparisons among the religious experiences that occur among followers of the various religions. One of the best is the book The Idea of the Holy, by Rudolph Otto. He spends a considerable part of the book comparing Christianity and Islam. His basic thesis is that in all religions, as well as cultures which might not practice anything that we’d commonly classify as religion, people experience what he calls the Mysterium Tremendum, or in other words a mystical experience that brings with it overpowering emotions. By studying and comparing reports on the subject from all over the world, he identifies elements within these experiences that are common and widely the same: sense of an overwhelming presence, urgency, fascination, love, terror, and so forth.
Now the argument about Islam is that, like many systems of thought, it obsesses over one thing to the exclusion of all else. In Islam, the obsession is about the extreme power of God and the helplessness of humanity. In other words, the sense of ‘overwhelming presence’ included in the mysterium tremendum in emphasized, more or less to the exclusion of all other things. This can be seen clearly in a lot of aspects of that religion and the culture that it spawned, from the mechanical and repetitious approach to prayer to the culture that squashes individuality. I find it likely that some Muslims have had genuine religious experiences, in terms of approaching a deeper level of reality. However, since everything about their culture and upbringing is centered around the fear of God, that may deny them the ability to reach the same heights as other religions do. After all, there are no cases that I know of in which those at the bottom of the social ladder in an Islamic society have started having visions which the leaders eventually viewed as authoritative. In Christian society, that has happened many times. Why the difference? Because Islam is about hammering people down, while Christianity is about lifting people up towards God.
I am, of course, giving a very hasty outline of a very broad topic, and that’s why I’d encourage you to read Otto’s book, which says in detail and in much better language what I’m trying to say. While Otto does touch on his own defense of Christianity in that book, he does so in more detail in his other writings, and the center of that defense is that in the last analysis, we must judge religious experience based on whether they’re true or not. That is to say, we make rational judgments about the world. When someone comes claiming to have a revelation from a being at a different level of reality, we can’t double-check their experience (or at least we can’t do so completely) but we can check some parts of what they say. We Christians believe that the ultimate revelation from God was through the person of Jesus Christ, as recorded in the Gospels. So we ask whether what Jesus says was true or untrue. Should we love all people including our enemies, or should we not? Is sacrificing oneself for others a positive act, or is it not? Can a reasonable level of self-denial lead to self-improvement, or can it not? If I believe that Jesus Christ was broadly right about important topics, then I find it entirely reasonable to believe that people through the history of Christianity who claim to have been in contact with Him, and to have received some part of His message in a form that seems perfectly designed for them, are telling the truth.
My my, what nicely polished blinkers you have.
ITR, thanks for responding. I’ve taken a little time to review your link (as much as I can afford this evening) and I gather Otto’s term for what we’re discussing is the feeling of the numinous, i.e., the sensing of God’s presense. My point is that this can feel quire real and still be an illusion, a placebo if you will. And, really, Otto’s main point works against him. If most religious people have this feeling, yet the religions themselves are mutually inconsistent, the feeling is coming from us and not outside.
I mentioned the Mormons because it’s usually easier to see something like this when looking at someone else. I don’t doubt the sincerity of Mormon believers, but I’m quite certain they’re mistaken. From this, I deduce personal experience is poor evidence. If you’re interested in pursuing the thought experiment, try Dan Vogel’s Joseph Smith, The Making of a Prophet. Pay particular attention to Martin Hyde, Smith’s first and in some ways most important convert. Remember, the point is “How do we know whether this is true?”
Well, as I said, I think that the philosophical debate about whether God is necessary has dead-ended due to conflicting premises. For instance, on the definition of complexity, begbert insists on using the definition based on information, common in computer science, but which very few people would think of as applying to God. There’s been quite a bit written about whether God must be complex or not based on the properties that theologians ascribe to him, but that debate simply doesn’t intersect with someone who wants to import a definition from computer science. The bottom line is that to have any understanding of what theologians believe, one must be able to expand one’s thinking to not be trapped by the physical laws and material nature that we happen to be born with. In other words, it requires taking the ‘think outside the box’ cliche all the way to ‘think outside the universe’. If we are debating the causes of the laws that we observe, then it seems obvious (at least to me) that we cannot apply those laws to whoever/whatever was responsible for creating the laws, any more than we can apply the rules of Monopoly to say that the game’s creator can put a max of 4 green houses on any street.
That’s why, despite numerous claims that Dawkins’ argument “uses the theists’ own beliefs”, it’s not convincing. In fact it’s pretty spare on any addressing of points made by supporters of the argument from design, and certainly steers far clear of the strongest versions of that argument. (And the same could be said for a lot of posts in this thread.) Those making the argument from design have addressed, at length, why they believe that a creator is a better explanation for the properties of the universe than an uncreated universe. They have addressed why they don’t find the old ‘where did the creator come from’ line convincing. Dawkins simply doesn’t address their addresses in most cases. For instance, he mentions Paul Davies’ The Mind of God by name, yet never mentions the crux of that book. The crux being that the evidence Davies sees for design goes far beyond merely the fine-tuning of physical constants. As Davies says, there’s no reason why a universe that just popped up should be intelligible at all. There’s no reason why there should be consistent physical laws at all, much less physical constants set just right. There’s no reason why the universe should have any matter, or any motion, or any anything. Hence using multiple universes to conquer massive improbability, as Dawkins does, simply doesn’t answer the point. So there’s a lot more that could be said in that direction, but the problem is that Dawkins wants to “use the theists’ own arguments” without apparently knowing what they are.
As for about religious experiences, I’ve already explained what I’d like to see explained, namely why healthy, intelligent, well-gathered and collected people would devote their lives to something that is not real. I even named certain individuals, for what that’s worth. (And looking at people like St. Teresa, Wesley, or Alexandrina da Costa, their experiences were anything but subtle.) Now perhaps some of your links do address that; I’m still at work on the Dennett essay. Still trying to figure out exactly what an intuition pump is. All I’m certain of right now is that it’s not an intuition and not a pump.
Because healthy, intelligent, well-gathered and collected people are just as capable of having a and misinterpreting psychotic experiences as anybody else.
How do you explain the fact that different people can have religious experiences containing revelations utterly at odds with each other?
Is the woman who sees and speaks to Rama deluded while the guy who talks to Jesus is not?
YMMV, of course, but I think it’s pretty straightforward. Why did the Egyptians build pyramids? Because they believed in a certain view of the afterlife, at least for the pharaoh. Why did the ancient Greeks decide battle strategy based on auguery? Because they believed it worked. Why did the Mormons build the Tabernacle and the Cambodians Angkor Wat? Why did Mohammed spend his life preaching what he apparently really believed were divine revelations from Allah? Well, I assume you get my drift. People can believe all sorts of things without them being true.
Or, perhaps you’re asking a different question. Why is religious belief so common, indeed almost universal? Ah, well that’s a complex subject and you may recall from another Dawkins thread that I found his treatment of it weak, even disingenuous. My answer is that religion scratches various itches. It provides ritual and a sense of community. Being social creatures, it’s easy to see how that scratches an itch. All animals have a survival instinct but only humans seem to worry about what happens to them after they die. Most religions supply some sort of answer to that - whether it’s heaven, paradise, reincarnation or just a resting place - so they scratch an itch. We live in an often-times capricious world and would like some control over our destiny. Most religions supply some sort of answer to that - from the magic of a Shaman, to the Oracle of Delphi, to Christian prayer - so they scratch an itch. And so on.
The thing is, again, just because religion scratches an itch doesn’t make it true. So, we are brought back to the question of “What basis do you have to believe your particular religion is true?” When you invoke personal experience, I ask (again) why is your experience any different from and better than that of others who cleave to very different religions? I will mention, by the way, that we atheists feel the same itches. We just scratch them in other ways.
On what basis, then, do theists say that the universe is complex, and why cannot the same basis be applied to a designer of it?
Excellent, so the laws of the universe do not require an explanatory entity of any complexity. Thanks for that admission - please share it with your theistic bretheren.
Ah, it seems you’re retreating from what you just said about the universe not requiring an explanatory entity of any complexity. Just for the record, could you tell us explicitly if you are positing a Gap here or not, and why only an Intelligent Designer fits that Gap?
If you could just tell us what they are again, perhaps pointing to the specific number of a post of yours in this thread which summarises them, that would be very helpful. You have repeatedly said that you are not positing God as being required to explain the complexity of the universe.
I have started this thread in the hope that these goalposts might actually stay where they are long enough to target them.