[QUOTE=Brain Wreck]
I don’t think this is true. A large bomb is always more destructive than a small bomb, the trick is just getting it in the right place. If your navigation isn’t very good, then yes, you need to carpet an area with bombs. And carpet-bombing an area with a few dozen 10MT H-Bombs tends not to be good for international relations.
According to an article I read last month , due to advances in navigation and delivery systems, the navy is now upgrading all its warheads from 100kt to 455kt for this exact reason. (“Superiority Complex”, July 2007, The Atlantic) Since they now have very accurate and survivable missiles, they’re putting more powerful warheads in them. This enables a fleet of nuclear subs to destroy most if not all Chinese nuclear weapons on the ground with a casualty rate in the 1,000-10,000 range. (Chinese missiles are liquid-fueled, which for various reasons have to be stored unfueled and require about an hour to fuel and launch).
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Whether wilfully or in ignorance, you are misrepresenting the situation here. First of all, there were never any plans to “[carpet bomb] an area with a few dozen 10MT H-Bombs”; the largest warheads in the United States nuclear arsenal from the mid-Sixties onward were the aforementioned W-53 devices with a 9MT yield, and these were delivered either via the B-52 bomber or the Titan II ICBM singly to hardened targets.
Second, the “accurate and survivable missiles” you cite (the Trident II D5) were deployed operationally starting in 1990, so these are nothing new. They are more capable (range, throw weight, accuracy) than the Trident I C4, but they were all initially intended to carry the W-88 warhead in the Mark 5 RV, and more of them, with a design capacity for (12) RVs as opposed to (8) W-76/Mark 4 RVs on the C4, although budget limits and treaty restrictions scaled it back to the same loadout as the C4, and later down to the current (5). The deployment of W-88s was halted by the shutdown of Rocky Flats in 1989 due to safety and environmental concerns, and it was then estimated that there were enough warheads to fully outfit only 3-4 Trident submarines (500-800 warheads, depending on loadout).
The replacement of W-76 warheads with W-88 devices on the Trident II D5 SLBM is a result of a number of factors. Primary in these factors are restrictions on MIRV loadout of SLBMs and total active stockpile size imposed by the START and SORT treaties. Because the current loadout has been reduced to 1/2-1/3 of what the Trident II can carry, it makes more sense to install modern, high yield devices, and spread them out over more boats. In addition, the W-76 (~100kT) is an older design that is widely regarded as being a flawed and potentially unreliable. The W-88 warhead (~450kT) is a much newer, more compact, and better tested design that is considered signficantly more reliable; in fact, along with the W-87, it is the most modern weapon in the active stockpile (though curiously it lacks some of the safety features in the W-87 and has a “C” safety rating). The W-76 is no longer in manufacture, though there is a reliability and refurbishment program, while there is the intent to maintain manufacturing capability for the W-88 pits (although the lack of plutonium generation capability means we currently can’t produce raw material). Both will eventually be replaced, at least in theory, by the Reliable Replacement Warhead of intermediate or variable yield.
Chinese ICBMs are based in hardened silos located in mountainous regions. Striking at them while in-silo is likely to be very difficult. The older Dongfeng 4 & 5 ICBMs are liquid fueled, and those stored in mountain bunkers have to be fueled and elevated for launch, a process that requires more than an hour. However, striking at these with a ballistic RV while in the housed state is probably very difficult. There are also hardened silo-based DF-5As that are reportedly kept in a ready-to-fire state, and are surrounded by a large number of decoy silos, making an effective pre-emptive strike difficult. The more DF-31 and its naval complement the JL-2 are solid motor three stage missiles of unknown range which can presumably be launched within spare minutes if not seconds of the launch order, similar to Minuteman or Trident.
I don’t know where you get your casulty rate of 1,000 to 10,000, but it’s unmitigated horse manure. You’ll kill that many in military personel alone, and even if the missiles are located in remote regions the large fallout clouds that would result from a low altitude or ground penetrating burst required for destorying missile complexes would effect hundreds of thousands if not millions. The notion of a surgical nuclear strike is a patent absurdity.
[QUOTE=Brain Wreck]
Seen in this light, a defensive shield capable of mopping up just one or two incoming warheads would allow the US to mount a completely effective first strike against China with virtually no risk of large-scale civilian casualties on either side. There is essentially no nuclear threat from China anymore. Needless to say, this has China pissing in its pants, and this is exactly the reason they chose to demonstrate that they can pop GPS satellites if they so choose. If things went bad with the US, you could bet that an anti-GPS strike would be their first move. And to answer the OP, this might be one reason a country would want a larger weapon… if there is a chance that only one warhead from your first strike might survive, you want to make it pretty damned horrific.
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Without getting into a debate about the merits and motiovations for the so-called “missile shield” provided by the Ground Based Midcourse Defense system, I’ll note that despite being declared operational the better part of two years ago the system has never seen a realistic full-up test. It is presumptious, at best, to claim that it would “allow the US to mount a completely effectives first strike against China with virtually no risk of large-scale civilian casulties on either side.” If there is anything that will prevent American casualties its the likelyhood that the relatively primitive Chinese ICBMs are not reliable enough to accurately hit US metropolitan centers at the bleeding edge of their range. An exchange would leave China with tens of thousands dead at a bare minimum, and likely millions dealing with persistant radioactive contamination.
US intercontinental ballistic missiles are in no way dependant upon the GPS system navigation; they use internal guidance with stellar navigation backup. Cruise missiles like the Tomahawk do utilize GPS but not exclusively, and can fully achieve target goals even if GPS capability is lost, albeit possibly with a modest decrease in precision. Knocking out GPS satellites would complicate naval maneuvers, but would have scarce impact upon ICBM/SLBM capabilities.
Stranger
