Is this a question? You need to spend more time phrasing your language so that it isn’t so ambiguous and, at times, unintelligible.
If it is a question that you are asking me to answer, then my response is that both have the same consequence, and thus the same moral status, IMO. Even if you take a more Kantian stance, I would argue that they are still essentially the same thing, just different methods to the same pre-conceptualized end. In one case, there is an interest in something being born.
The “but this is what happens if nature takes it course” argument just doesn’t fly. Nature is not inherently moral or immoral. Lots of natural events are bad, lots are good, and sometimes they can be bad or good depending on the context.
Further, the causality argument is strained at best. Fertilization is an event: but it’s just one in an entire progression of events, ALL of which are necessary. Prior to the fertilization, there must be ejaculation. If there isn’t as there sometimes isn’t, no dice. After the fertilization, the zygote must successfully attach to the uterine wall. If it doesn’t (and it more often DOESN’T than does), no dice, again. The fact that it “naturally” happens to succeed sometimes is as morally neutral as the fact that it “naturally” doesn’t succeed. Where morality comes into play is when we can say for sure that there is a BEING with INTERESTS that are being violated. Anything before that is just a bunch of branching causal possibilities, none more or less important than the others, because there will be no “person” if ANY of them do not happen (no person if you never have sex, no person if you never impregnate, no person if the zygote doesn’t attach properly), no person if there is an early miscarriage, etc.)
The problem is, we’ve developed our concepts of why it is wrong to hurt or kill someone within a particular context: things like having empathy with the DESIRE of another being (which we have ourselves felt, so we understand) not to be killed or hurt. Or things like accounts of rights based on natural wills.
Fetuses, and especially zygotes, do not fit into the context for which those concepts of morality were originally developed, because until about the third trimester/end of the second, the being has no interests to speak of, and no will. So the old justifications for which our intuitions of “its wrong to kill” simply don’t apply in the same way.
You may want to argue that we should extend the concepts, and that’s well and good, provided you can reformulate the moral argument in this NEW CONTEXT. But you can’t just extend a moral argument willy-nilly to any being you decide without explaining how you fixed the argument for the new context.