Abortion is interrupting an imminent life, right?

Because the union of the sperm and egg is an event. An event that leads, intends to lead, barring some natural intervention, to a human life. Interrupting the delivery of the sperm or the cycle of the egg is in no way the same as terminating the already united pair that take the form of the zygote.

Where along your path does the “lump of tissue” suddenly become a precious human life?

To me, its sort of like pulling a freshly sprouted seed out of the garden. Sure, it doesnt have the charateristics of a full grown fruit bearing plant, but it will if given the chance. Barring a natural event (insects, rabbits, weather), the seed will become a fruit producing plant. If you come along and rip it out of the ground, it has NO chance.
We all know what the zygote will turn into, just as we know what the seed will become. Its happened billions and billions of times before on this planet, and it will happen billions and billions of times again. No surprise here. You can all pretend that its not a human that is developing in the womb, but I think we all know better.

I agree, and its good to see another pro-lifer on these boards who isnt afraid to lay it out there.

While I can’t speak for Apos, I’ll give you my answer. The distinguishing characteristic between “lump of tissue” and “precious human life” is the existence of brain activity. For those of us who do not hold with the concept of a soul, things like awareness and a sense of self are all derivative of brain activity.

Therein lies one of the major questions when dealing with abortions. Does all life deserve a chance? If a freshly-sprouted seed is extending its roots into the tree from whence it came, should the tree (if trees were capable of doing such) be able to spray some weed killer on the seedling? What if the seedling is spreading roots into Mr. Jones’ prize lawn? Should he be allowed to kill off the seedling?

Clearly, these is a very poor examples. However, the main point is applicable. Under what circumstances should one living organism be allowed to terminate the existence of another living organism? Humans have laws (and moral systems) which restrict the circumstances under which we can terminate each other, so when should a fetus fall under the umbrella of such laws (and systems of morality)?

If the fetus has no brain activity, then it has no mind . . . no “self”. Laws (and, usually, systems of morality) protect individuals, but is there an individual here to protect?

No one’s arguing that it’s not a human; Just that it’s not a person.

I just don’t buy that. Not all life is worth protecting. How many times have you snuffed out a life for your own convenience? Ever squished a bug? Ever pulled a weed? Where was your “It’s life, it’s special, leave it alone” then? Obviously, even to you, some lives is more “special” than others.

Generally, those who support a woman’s right to choose tend to see a fetus as being a lot less “special” than a full-fledged person. In my, personal, view, a pre-brain-activity fetus is no more special than any other living being that lacks brain activity (i.e. trees or bacteria), and deserves a comparable level of protection, with one exception: If the mother plans to being the child to term, then she should strive to prevent from doing it harm in the pre-brain-activity phase of development, solely because such harm would likely carry over into the brain-activity phase, and thus cause harm to an actual person.

Is this a question? You need to spend more time phrasing your language so that it isn’t so ambiguous and, at times, unintelligible.

If it is a question that you are asking me to answer, then my response is that both have the same consequence, and thus the same moral status, IMO. Even if you take a more Kantian stance, I would argue that they are still essentially the same thing, just different methods to the same pre-conceptualized end. In one case, there is an interest in something being born.

The “but this is what happens if nature takes it course” argument just doesn’t fly. Nature is not inherently moral or immoral. Lots of natural events are bad, lots are good, and sometimes they can be bad or good depending on the context.

Further, the causality argument is strained at best. Fertilization is an event: but it’s just one in an entire progression of events, ALL of which are necessary. Prior to the fertilization, there must be ejaculation. If there isn’t as there sometimes isn’t, no dice. After the fertilization, the zygote must successfully attach to the uterine wall. If it doesn’t (and it more often DOESN’T than does), no dice, again. The fact that it “naturally” happens to succeed sometimes is as morally neutral as the fact that it “naturally” doesn’t succeed. Where morality comes into play is when we can say for sure that there is a BEING with INTERESTS that are being violated. Anything before that is just a bunch of branching causal possibilities, none more or less important than the others, because there will be no “person” if ANY of them do not happen (no person if you never have sex, no person if you never impregnate, no person if the zygote doesn’t attach properly), no person if there is an early miscarriage, etc.)

The problem is, we’ve developed our concepts of why it is wrong to hurt or kill someone within a particular context: things like having empathy with the DESIRE of another being (which we have ourselves felt, so we understand) not to be killed or hurt. Or things like accounts of rights based on natural wills.

Fetuses, and especially zygotes, do not fit into the context for which those concepts of morality were originally developed, because until about the third trimester/end of the second, the being has no interests to speak of, and no will. So the old justifications for which our intuitions of “its wrong to kill” simply don’t apply in the same way.

You may want to argue that we should extend the concepts, and that’s well and good, provided you can reformulate the moral argument in this NEW CONTEXT. But you can’t just extend a moral argument willy-nilly to any being you decide without explaining how you fixed the argument for the new context.

The idea that a fertilised ovum will in all probability turn into a living, breathing human seems really important to some of the pro-life folks on here.

What if this were a very rare event?

What if the majority of fertilised ova were likely to fail to implant, or to implant and then misscarry? Would your argument still stand?

If so, why keep emphasising the odds?

Cheers

Tom

In the absence of any interest from Beagledave, I’ll continue my earlier argument.

Recall that ethical folks believe

  1. It is wrong to kill another human
  2. If a conceptus is another human, destroying it is murder and therefore wrong.

And that prolife folks believe

  1. A conceptus is morally equivalent to / has the same basic right to life as / should be treated with the same respect as a living, breathing human

or put more simply

  1. Conceptus = human

Now recall that between around 0-12 days, a conceptus is just a bunch of undifferentiated cells* and that there exists a test for cystic fibrosis, in which one cell from the conceptus is removed and dissolved in solution.

Given that the mother intends to have the baby in any event, the Catholic Church, for example, has no objection to the procedure, since the loss of one cell will not interrupt the normal development of the conceptus.

But the reality is that that undifferentiated cell could be successfully reimplanted, to create a twin of the original conceptus, and by destroying it, the scientists have denied it its chance for a life independent of its sibling. By 2, this is an act of murder.

Doesn’t this begin to suggest that that = sign in 3 is just a little bit suspect?

Cheers

Tom

*Embryology simplified slightly, but not in any relevant way.

Tomsalinsky, are you saying that only unethical people would destroy a conceptus, if they believed it was human ?
Are you also saying that killing a human = murder ? I was always under the impression that the definition of murder was illegal (or unlawful) killing, so would you mind defining what murder is to you ?
Can you think of any possibilities where destroying the conceptus, while acknowledging its humanity, could be ethically sound ?

I’ll ask a question that has come up before in these threads. Do you believe that an adult whose brain activity has ceased is no longer a person? Would your answer change if the loss of all brain activity were temporary?

Victims of severe hypothermia, as one example, have been documented to have lost all brain activity–flat-lined, so to speak–then in certain instances regained their consciousness. During the period where this victim was no longer sentient, was he a person? Could you have morally killed him with impunity, or does the fact that his consciousness would emerge in the future keep you from doing so? Why or why not?

Your answer may help you to understand whether or not the current existence of brain activity truly defines “personhood” or if it is something of a convenience to rationalize abortion.

Right, and what level of brain acitvity are you willing to except?
A newborn has much less brain activity compared to a two year old. An early term fetus less than a late term fetus.
Where can someone draw the line between substantial brain activity and non-activity?

Im more comfortable with a pregnancy test. Either youre pregnant or you`re not. End of story.

If the loss were temporary, then the person who previously existed (before losing brain activity) has a right to continue to exist once brain activity resumes. Compare this to a fetus, which has never had brain activity, and thus there is no previously existing person to protect.

Basically, everyone has a right to continue to exist, but no one has a right to begin to exist (mainly because there is no person before the onset of existence to have any rights).

It’s not the level of activity that is important. Rather, it’s the type of activity. It is only after approximately the 30[sup]th[/sup] week that the fetus shows organized brain activity, consistent with that of an adult brain. Prior to that, the neurons are not linked together, so the fetus has no ability to think. It has no “self”.

Unfortunately, things of this nature are rarely black and white. I wish it were that simple. I really do. But there are too many other factors involved for it to be a simple, binary situation.

Excellent questions.

What I’m keen to explore with Beagledave and other prolifers is the idea that a conceptus and a living breathing human have the same moral status. So it would therefore be as wrong to destroy a conceptus as to destroy a human.

Few people would deny that it is ethically indefensible to kill a new born baby. It is extremely difficult to conceive of any situation in which the destruction of a new-born baby could be anything other than murder, since it could hardly be self-defense. Equally, it is moreorless impossible to abort a conceptus as a crime of passion - it has to be a premeditated act.

Now, it happens that my personal view is that the equality between a conceptus and a living human is not only ethically flawed, but actually incoherent. However, I would certainly accord a new born baby every human right. I don’t believe that “personhood” (horrible word) poofs into being at some magic moment, but it emerges gradually. Drawing the line is therefore very difficult, and a combination of ethics and pragmatism must be used by legislators who are faced with the grim task of drawing it somewhere.

Your second question therefore does not really apply, since I have no problem whatsoever with legal abortions.

No longer a person. Dead meat.

If the resumption of all brain activity were to be like the rebooting of my computer, i.e., a tabula rasa brain with no memory, experiences, historically formed personality, etc., then the original person is still dead.

Even if I knew there was a 99% chance that brain activity would start up again if I left this person’s body plugged into life support equipment long enough, I see no morally compelling argument for doing so. Original person is dead; body, if left to its own devices plus the assistance of life support devices, will eventually house another person, but that other person isn’t here yet. I don’t feel like keeping my life support equipment tied up in this manner.

I definitely have the right to unplug.

A “conceptus” is part of a woman’s body, since it cannot survive by itself, is fed and nurtured by her, etc. It has no independent existance. Up until the very earliest point that the sprat could asurvive on its own- what, 5 mo.?- it is certainly not a person, and a woman should be able to remove it just as she can legally pierce her ears or cut her toenails.

This whole “imminent person inside a person” argument is a slippery slope fallacy that, in its ultimate expression, equates almost everything with murder- condoms, flyswatting, the “jump back!” technique… Also, it is a tragic perversion of the teachings of Jesus, allowing “Christians” to pretend to help others without actually having to be nice to anyone or associate with those awful smelly poor people. IMO. Carry on! :slight_smile:

**You previously defined the existence of brain activity as a condition that assigns the right to exist. A brain dead person has no brain activity, by definition. None. That these situations occur is undeniable. So, has he ceased to “exist” (as you’ve defined it) or not? And if not, what is the condition that makes it so, if not the potential for future sentience?

Let me ask you this question. A brain-dead patient has no brain activity (let’s say he’s your loved one), and doctors convince you that there is no reasonable expectation that brain activity will ever come back. Would you demand that the patient be put on life support, that extraordinary means be used to keep the patient’s heart beating, since this person was once conscious? If you answer “No,” then the fact that he once had sentience is no longer relevant for you, or you could not answer thusly. The operative facts are that he is no longer sentient, and he never again will be.

If your answer is different if he will have brain activity in the future (and you’ve already answered this), then there is one key: does this unique person have a sentient future? Indeed this person would, as would a fetus. To destroy that outcome before it occurs is to destroy something real, as real as it is to kill anyone and steal the future they would otherwise have had.

That’s what we take when we kill someone: we steal their future. That’s what abortion does. “But a fetus will never even know.” Neither would a sleeping child if you put a bullet in his head.

**You’re misunderstanding. This is not a hypothetical. There are brain-dead people who regain brain activity, rare though that may be (e.g., victims of severe hypothermia). When they regain consciousness, they have their memories, personalities, etc. They simply were brain dead at one point.

You have the right to unplug a person who will regain his brain activity? Why do you say that, other than the strong desire not to answer in a manner that might suggest abortion rights are not inviolable? Say you shot someone who currently had no brain activity, but who would have otherwise recovered consciousness. Have you murdered someone?

I look forward to your answer, which I’m sure will be sincere and not simply crafted in a manner that avoids having your pro-choice beliefs challenged.

I don’t see why anyone finds this argument compelling at all. Whether something has moral interests has nothing at all to do with whether it depends upon another person for life. A conceptus might have a strong moral status, or it might not, but its viability away from someone else is irrelevant to whether its acceptable to kill it.

Here we go with a lesson in communication. Not everyone has your frame of reference, so not everyone is going to write things exactly the way you would. In fact, especially on this board with the burden of making posts short and to the point, things will always be abrevaited. Now, in case you didn’t know, my post was COMPLETELY sensical, if of course you READ the quote I was responding to AND the fact that I italicized the word “different”. Then my next sentence was a perfect wrap up to an intelligable, but cleverly shortened, written thought. End of story.

No, Utilitarianism concerns itself with consequences, morality is ALL ABOUT the action. Sorry to break this to you, bud.

You didn’t understand my post, so I will not bother to read the rest of yours.

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Here we go with a lesson in communication, free of charge.

Not everyone has your frame of reference, so not everyone is going to write things exactly the way you would. In fact, especially on this board (with the burden of making posts short and to the point), things will always be abbrevaited. Now, in case you didn’t know, my post was COMPLETELY sensical, if of course you READ the quote I was responding to AND noticed the fact that I italicized the word “different”. Then my next sentence was a perfect wrap up to an intelligable, but cleverly shortened, written thought. End of story.

No, Utilitarianism concerns itself with consequences, morality is ALL ABOUT the action. Sorry to break this to you, bud.

You didn’t understand my post, so I will not bother to read the rest of yours.

[/QUOTE]

No. Your meaning was ambiguous, thereby forcing me to guess what you were getting at. This has nothing to do with anyone’s frame of reference, but simply the plain meaning of words. Just because an idea is clear in your head does not mean you’ve succesfully expressed it on the page in a way that is clear.

Er, utilitarianism IS a system of morality.
But the principle applies to all other moral systems as well, because inaction is just not any morally different from knowing inaction. You can’t beg off a moral duty saying that you’re in the clear as long as you don’t do anything. Killing a child via neglect, for instance, isn’t acceptable in any moral system, nor is simply letting a person die in front of you when you could have very simply helped them avoid death.

You seem a little confused. As far as I can tell, I did guess correctly what you might be getting at, and indeed presented quite a cogent refutation of the points you subsequently explained later in the thread.