Hm…but you define a person (being) as “potential sentience”. A fetus is not “a good bit more than potential [sentience]” until it is actually sentient. An egg has potential sentience (easliy achieved and within its lifetime, too), so why isn’t it a being? Sure, an egg takes a physical act to realize its potential sentience, but then again, so do most brain-dead people.
A fetus has potential sentience. A brain-dead person has potential sentience. Assuming that both the fetus and brain-dead person would acquire sentience if they are not interfered with, you would consider it immoral to impede their achieving or reawakening sentience. Very well. Now say we have a brain-dead person, with potential sentience, but he will not just resume conscious thought “naturally”, we have to take a physical act to get this person to resume sentience (nothing too expensive or unpleasant). You would consider us morally obligated to take that physical act. Why am I not equally required to take a physical act to realize the sentience of an egg of mine? I don’t understand why, if “potential sentience” is the determinant of personhood, we are required to take action to resuscitate a brain-dead person, but are not required to take action to fertilize an egg and carry the fetus to term. Even if we remove sex from the equation out of a wish to avoid making women morally obligated to have sex, let’s say we have an egg in a petrie dish and an eyedropper full of sperm. If we can fertilize and implant the egg (i.e., taking a physical act to allow potential sentience to be realized) with a minor amount of cost, why aren’t we required to do so?
And what the heck happened to Ray, anyhow?