personally, i don’t think anyone has a clue what they mean when they say “absolute truth”. i think it’s like “infinity”, where we can define it, but that doesn’t mean we can truly imagine it.
consider, if you will, what happens when the very concept of truth is not absolute. we can say nothing about such a state of affairs, for who will be able to say that our statements are “true”?
Absolute truth is a ruler; its ideal state is that we consider it so. It has no more significance, metaphysically, than the standard meter in Paris, which is the only thing in the whole universe that is not less than one meter long, nor longer than one meter, nor exactly one meter. But this is not to apply some special property to it. It is, however, absolutely one meter.
Grr, that sounds all wrong.
Thanks.
I was wondering.
Ramanujan wrote:
Heat is only usefull energy if there are temperture differences. To do work heat must “flow” from the higher state to the lower. If the universe is at a constant 1,000,000 degrees everywhere no work can be done by all that heat.
If we cannot know anything other then mental things, can mental things be absolute?
Or
Are mental things absolute, if that is all we know?
If that which knows is not itself a mental construct then mental things or knowing is not absolute.
Therefore there can be no absolute truth for all knowing excludes the knower.
Unless the knower or consciousness is absolute.
if there are no temperature differences in the universe, everything would have to have exactly the same kinetic energy. when two particles collide, their kinetic energy changes. so in order for everything to have the same kinetic energy, the universe would have to move in such a manner that no particles ever collide.
the concept of heat is just a simpler way of noting change in kinetic energy. it seems to me that nature’s fundamental forces prevent kinetic energy from ever being uniform in the universe.
Why would you suppose this?
"There are harmless self-observers who believe ‘immediate certainties’ exist, for example ‘I think’ or . as was Schonpenhauer’s supersittion , ‘I will’ : as though knowledge here got hold of it’s object pure and naked, as ‘thing in itself’, and no falsification occurred either on the side of the subject or on the that of the object. But I shall reiterate a hundred times that ‘immediate certainty’, like ‘absolute knowledge’ and ;thing in itself’ contains a contradictio in adjecto : we really ought to get free from the seduction of words! Let th epople belive that knowledge is total knowledge, but the philosopher must say to himself : when I analyse the event expressed in the sentence “I think’, I acquire a series of rash assertions which are diffacult, pherhaps immpossible , to prove - for example , that it is “I” who think, that it has to be something at all which thinks, that thinking is an activity an doperation on the part of an entity thought of as a cause, that an “I” exists , finally that what is designated by “thinking” has already been determined - that I “know” what thinking is. For if I had not already decided that matter within myself, by what standard could I determine that what is happening i snot pherhaps “willing” or “feeling”? Enough : this " I think” presupposes that I compare my present state with other known states of myself in order to determine what it is : on account of this retrospective connection with other ‘knowledge’ at any rate it possesses no immediate certainty for me.- In place of that “immediate certainty” in which the people may believe in th epresent case , the philosopher acquires in this way a series of metaphysical questions, true questions of conscience fo rthe intellect, namely : “Whence do I take the concept thinking? Why do I believein cause and effect ?What gives me the right to speak of an “I”, and even of an “I” as cause , and finally of an “I” as cause of thought?” Whoever feels able to answer these metaphysical questions straight away with an appeal to a sort of intuitive knowledge, as he does who says : “I think , and know that at least is true, actual and certain” - will find a philsopher today ready with a smile and two question-marks. “My dear sir,” the philosopher will pherhaps give him to understand,“it is improbable you are not mistaken : but why do want the truth at all?”
This too, shall pass.
Slight problem: its possible (though unlikely), that literally anything can happen. Including the wholescale creation of matter and energy. Theoretically, this happens in infantesimally small amounts across the Big U.
Ramanujan wrote:
I’m not sure that’s correct. Kinetic energy is KE=(M*v^2)/2. The velocity referenced in the equation is “Translational Velocity,” that is the velocity we normally think of as velocity (moving from one place to another).
The velocity associated with temperature (and here I can say with no fear of being proven wrong that we are moving into areas where I don’t know shit from siccum) is “Vibrational Velocity.”
The change in Kinetic energy of a particle after a collision may effect its “Translational Velocity” to almost any degree. But it has no effect on its “Vibrational Velocity.”
the temperature of something is just the average kinetic energy of the particles associated with it. the more kinetic energy particles have, the faster they move, the more they collide, and the harder they collide, so the “hotter” they get. i think by “vibrational velocity”, you just mean the velocity of the colliding particles.
I would suggest that the belief in anything as “true” of “false” is by definition religious.