Ahmad Chalabi: Best Hope for Iraq or Shady Expat Puppet?

Chalabi

I find it … bizarre and irritating this is cast as political issue, that the political cast of pundits enters into the argument, rather than looking at the facts surrounding Chalabi. I suppose this is a textbook case of attacking the messenger.

First, I believe the Guardian articles I have linked provide substantive information. Their story matches what I have heard about the Petra scandal from local banking sources.

Let me note that I had given little thought to the Chalabi connexion with Petra Bank before the recent crisis. However, I had some introduction to Petra Bank before this crisis, in a non-political context.

First, summarizing the scandal since many seem to be too busy to read. Chalabi begins the banking issue in 1977 with royal support. To go beyond the Guardian’s information, from AllRefer.com - Jordan - Banking And Finance | Jordanian Information Resource which gives a fine history of Jordanian banking & finance sector up to 1989. Of note, you will find an explanation of the foreign currency issues that provoked the Petra Bank collapse. You will note that the foreign exchange crisis rose independently from any “Iraq” connection.

Note from the Guardian story:

As noted, I have heard nothing in the banking community here to question this, or to conclude that the call was targeting Petra Bank or Chalabi. My experience tells me if this was truly the case, I would have at least heard something supporting the Chalabi defense. Complaints about the exchange regime and bad policy of the time, yes. The idea that Chalabi was targeted for not being ‘pro-Iraq’ / Sadaam c. 1989 is simply a ‘just so’ story for the gullible.

Now, let me highlight the following:

Now, first the story outlined here is not terribly atypical. Captive banks held by family magnates or wanna be magnates with official connections making tied loans to family controlled or tied firms is a typical story regionally. It strikes me as rather … typical of a bank of the Petra Bank profile of that era.

Second, I find it hard to credit that Andersen c. 1989 would fabricate a bank audit. That is, is seems to be me quite likely, given the nature of business in the region, the poor regulatory environment of the era (it is better now, not good but better) and unstable monetary policies that the Chalabi kieretsu were playing games, floating loans to connected companies and engaging in fraud in regards to its asset position.

The second Guardian article “New bank scandal evidence against family of leader in waiting”

For those who may doubt the Jordanian connexion and convictions, I submit that the correlation with the Swiss accusations, and conviction in Swiss courts is rather damning, at least insofar as painting a picture of the Chalabi network of companies – for all that they have ‘convenient’ explanations for it all.

Now, taking the above as the baseline, where might politics enter? The connexion which might be political, and which I can credit is that the Chalabi group was doing this with some ‘understandings’ in the Palace of the day, and that political reasons played in the Jordanian government not cutting Petra Bank slack – that is overlooking their reserve shortage or giving them leeway in responding to the capital call from the Central Bank. That is credible, although there is no evidence to support it.

However, the fact remains there is good evidence that Petra Bank was indeed engaged in fraud, that even by regional standards (ex-Lebanon, let me give advice here, don’t put your money in a Leb. bank. It is an opaque world and the things I have heard of in re their practices are decidedly un-kosher.) were aggressive.

I submit that in conjunction with CIA and State Department feelings that Chalabi et al were skimming money on INC funding from USG, that we see a disturbing pattern of behaviour, and I see no reason to give credence to the Chalabi political story – other than in a very limited way that perhaps some political carte blanche for dirty activities was pulled.

This is decidedly not the sort of person I want to see heading Iraq. I do not want to see Egypt on the Euphrates. I find it stunning that December… no actually I find it typical, but I find it stunning that others are willing to turn a blind eye, for an argument from ignorance, that is ‘we’ don’t have other good leaders lined up, so…

Now I am the first to tell you, there are no fucking virgin births in this region, and if you want to have the hands of a saint, go do business elsewhere. I am not happy about a number of things I have seen in my career here, and perhaps should have said more about. I have a party in one of our transactions that I frankly think is involved in money laundering for nasty people. I am not happy about it, but it comes with the territory, and so long as our side is clean… However, at the same time, the image I take away from the Guardian report and from conversations I have had (not re Chalabi) about Petra Bank is one of the worst end of things.

Regarding the issues of INC misappropriation of funds, the following story indicates some of the problems, “Iraqi opposition leader suspected of misusing U.S. funds, but may get more” Knight Ridder Washington Bureau, Feb 19, 2002

Quoted in part:
“Earlier this year, the State Department threatened to cut off the INC’s funding for information programs and other nonmilitary activities after an audit turned up expenditures that were deemed questionable or were unaccounted for. The inspector general’s audit of $4.3 million in grants mostly criticized the group’s accounting and payroll procedures. But it also found questionable expenses, including $2,070 for a gym membership, $5,541 for legal fees related to a rental dispute and other money used for first-class plane tickets. The audit also suggests the INC may have used taxpayers’ money to lobby in Washington, which is illegal. In a section that is partly blacked out, the public version of the audit cites a person paid “in excess of the budgeted amount” and suggests the unnamed person had a relationship with the Iraq Liberation Action Committee, a nonprofit group that uses private donations to pay for lobbying. “We could not ascertain whether any violations of the general restrictions on lobbying occurred, because INCSF (the INC Support Foundation) lacked a transparent agreement that documented” the person’s duties, the audit says.”

In the final analysis, this should not be an issue of ideology but good practices.

Liberal, conservative, I fail to see the fucking point. The point is objective evidence suggests Chalabi is corrupt. I know my amigos in the agency think so. So uninformed pundits can make snide remarks about ‘Jordanian justice’ and Molly whomever but the facts are not good. Pretending otherwise or turning a blind eye to this because some of the critics are from the ‘wrong’ end of the political spectrum strikes me as exhibiting the worst of ideology over rational thought.

Now, as to the issue of who else, well again, arguments from ignorance are not fucking arguments. Primo, the need for an interim adminstration, an international one to take away the sting of occupation, is clear to allow some indigenous leadership to emerge. Second, Pachachi and others like him strike me as having cleaner backgrounds that Chalabi.

Perhaps our usual suspects can now come forward to argue that this is all simply some political plot by ‘liberals’ or some such bloody nonsense.

As for the image of the INC inside Iraq: I have never heard anything positive about them from Iraqis. In Arabic source writing, I see two main critiques – Chalabi’s corruption w/ INC incomptence, and the CIA background.

Neither is helpful, together it is not a helpful brew.

BTW a new article:
http://www.menareport.com/story/TheNews.php3?sid=247857&lang=e&dir=mena
Not particularly well-written and a bit… too much, but for what it is worth in re the Jordanian dossier.

Excellent point. Turning a blind eye to things said by people at the wrong end of the political spectrum is putting ideology over rational thought. I like that.

Though it isn’t a “blind eye” to await more objective evidence of the claims of all those pundits (not here, you know, the ones who get paid) that Chalabi will be appointed the leader of the Iraqi interim government in Iraq. He’s “favored to”, he’s “preferred”, or “Pentagon endorsed”, whatever, that’s journalistic hedging. It’s not news, it’s political haymaking…by definition very un-objective. Blind acceptance is no better.

The MENA article is as useful as the Guardian link for provoking questions and not answering them. The bank was seized under martial law apparently, then "after two and a half years of police investigation and trial, the Jordanian courts issued a verdict indicting Chalabi and another 47 people for their involvement in the scandal", then he’s convicted in absentia by a military court. And the other 47 - are they a secret? Unusual way to handle a public finance debacle. Here’s an opposing view:

http://www.emjournal.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk/ap03041.html

A google search did provide news of a public meeting between King Hussein and Chalabi in 98 regarding support for the INC. (I’m interested in seeing what year the Arthur Andersen report was actually done. It doesn’t say.)

So I’m just going to go ahead and wonder about the political football-itude of the INC, aloud or not, if that’s alright with you. And here’s more about the uneasy relationship between State/CIA and the INC, if anyone is interested: http://www.meib.org/articles/0104_ir1.htm

Interestingly, Lt. Gen. Jay Gardner, the civil administrator of Iraq, has publicly stated that Chalabi is not the U.S. pick to be a future President, though I can’t find a link to that statement (it was published on Friday, I believe).

God I hope they’re not backing him. It will be a disaster. The man is corrupt, he has no popular support in Iraq, he is perceived by Iraqis and the wider community as a total US puppet, the whole idea is just a joke.

I hope that people will pay attention and stop the excuse making:

At the time it was Jordanian law. Black marketering etc. Not unusual, regrettably, at the time. Jordan operated under ‘emergency’ law measures until the peace accords with Israel. See http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/jotoc.html and the martial courts for a contemporaneous review.

Nor regrettably is the handling of public finance issues in security courts all that unusual in this neighborhood – the civil courts regionally are fucking dysfunctional. Makes it all the more interesting being an investor here. It sure ain’t fucking Kansas. When benchmarking your judgment, do it against the relevant benchmarks.

Of note of course is the emergency law’s breadth at the time is that there was no need for the government to induce a full-fledged banking crisis that provoked widespread system risk in order to get Chalabi for political reasons – it could have easily been done quietly and politically. For those willing to think about this logically, we already have a problem, but let me return to this.

Well, it’s some poorly informed hand-waving is what it fucking is, asserting rather anachronistically and absurdly some barely relevant points.

[quote]

http://www.emjournal.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk/ap03041.html

Bull fucking shit. This is quite simply a gross distortion verging on outright misrepresentation. First of course, we have a currency or rather foreign exchange crisis, due it must be recognized to stupid government policies at the time, and an inability of the bank to respond to a general Central Bank call to increase reserves and deposit with it. We further have, if one is paying attention to the business facts and not to the political whinging on, a subsequent series of failures, not just in Jordan but in Lebanon and Switzerland with similar sets of facts being brought forth, in regards to inappropriate lending and fraudulent asset booking. Unless the Lebanese and Swiss authorities were also in on the motherfucking deal too, this is possibly the stupidest rejoinder one can fabricate, except of course one can count on most people just buying it w/o thinking.

What people familiar with the facts other than Chalabi’s fucking coterie ‘familiar’ with the ‘facts’? I know people familiar with the facts, that is Jordanian bankers – fucking personally – and I have never met anyone who gives credit to this bullshit stupid-ass explanation of a Sadaam connexion. I’ve spoken with people in the community – indeed before this all came up (and not re Chalabi but in re banking system), and no one raised a political angle, not even on the sly. Informed sources in the banking community that I know all see it as a rather banal and unfortunately typical to the region bank fraud. Banal family controlled lending fraud.

The story being advanced is so absurd as to be stunning in its audacity, I suppose it counts on the naïve, and the mendacious to give it credit. Using his international connexions to obstruct financing the war with Iran. As if either the Gulf Emirates or the US or any other major financier would have been making decisions on financing the Iranian war based on Chalabi, running a second rate bank in a second rate insignificant country. The Gulf states * alone*extended credit to Iraq during this period to the tune of 40-60 billion dollars, with a total running into the three digits. Billions. Sovereign to sovereign debt. Commercial credit played a minute role in this (there’s perhaps 8-20 billion outstanding for commercial bank debt, estimates run to the lower side), although obviously trade financing, short term l/c facilities were important – however again it makes no sense.

This is pure ‘just so’ for the ideologues, the innocent, the naïve, the uninformed and the mendacious. Iraq’s financing of the war was, as noted, largely sovereign-sovereign lending, and it is extraordinarily disingenuous to assert that one pissant little Jordanian Bank would matter, nor a second rate Iraqi exile – trade finance, the Gulf banks, the Leb banks, plenty of fucking people whose “wasta” far exceeds Chalabi’s even now had an interest there. It is wildly anachronistic, verging on purely fantastical to give credit that this second rate bank and its Chair in any way threatened the financing of a war that was supported by the entire Gulf and most of the West for pure power politics reasons. Never mind of course that there is no sign that Jordanian banks were engaged in this kind of lending in the period, presuming they’re claiming that Jordanian banks were financing Iraq directly via sov lending. If one reads the banking overview, again for comprehension, one finds that the Banks, for risk aversion reasons, tended to make short term loans and directed their financing to trade financing rather excessively. There was over-financing in this area, and not enough in investments – this remains the case today, although the situation is improved. Insofar as much of the commercial & industrial sectors in Jordan were geared to serving Iraq in largely low quality light industrial and consumer goods areas, and in finishing industries. Again, this remains largely the case today, excluding the newly emerging QIZ and FTA driven industries aimed at US markets.

What does match the facts that are verifiable is that Chalabi got caught with his little pants down during the exchange controls crisis of 1989 as he was clearly playing fast and loose with the rules, and engaging in connected lending (if not, his Leb and Swiss companies would not have gotten fucked, now would they?) and gaming the black/grey currency market.

The only political angle that makes sense here is that he thought his ‘wasta’ through Prince Hassan would carry him through. It did not. Certainly, I may add that it is possible Sadaam might have had it out for him out of pure peevishness, and that this played a role in his Prince Hassan ‘wasta’ not carrying him through, however the concept that to please Sadaam in re one minor player in the overall MENA finance scene, the Jordanians would engage in a maneuver that very nearly brought down their financial system is to engage in pure, unadulterated credulity. As I noted above, removing Chalabi from the scene through the extent ‘state of emergency’ laws while leaving the bank untouched would have made sense – and would have been far more preferable. There is but one reason why the thing blew up, Chalabi indeed was engaged in exactly what he is accused of (and nota bene similar pattern of behaviour in re USG funding flowing through his organization.)

(a) I’ve never heard of this Jordanian officer’s report ever before.
(b) I have never heard that Hassan ‘drove’ him to the border, and if it’s true it’s got nothing to do with the underlying facts, but does go to a record of bad judgment on Hassan’s part.
© Most of the money was not Chalabi’s but the depositors – unless he’s counting his little circle of bad debts to controlled companies, in contravention of banking regs as part of ‘his’ money.

Produce something that is not mere political hand waving and shows some glimmer of an acquaintance with the financial system and specifically with the MENA and Jordanian financial systems c. 1990 and I may be inclined to revise my utter and complete disregard for this idiotic story.

If you read carefully you will note that the 1990 official report was subsequent to the Andersen report. The crisis exploded in August or so, 1989, my understanding is the report was completed in early 1990, but that can be checked, regardless subsequent to rather implies a certain time frame, does it not? Bloody hell, no wonder this guy has pulled it off so far. Credulity.

You’ve decided that Chalabi actually is in charge of the INC now?
From the link that you provided:
http://www.emjournal.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk/ap03041.html

From other links previously provided:

What sort of more objective evidence are you waiting for exactly?

Sure, and yet entirely credible that this second rate bank and its Chair threatened the financial subsistence of Jordan its own fucking self by its dubious practices, and what evidence is offered at the outset - overstated holdings, connected lending…and of course loans for purposes of underwear, and chartering planes to fly dead parents home. Why, who would think twice?

So that’s an expert opinion, that Jordan was not directly lending to Iraq?

Mind you I was delighted to learn that in order to understand the federalist politics of a relatively benign Brandeis professor in the INC, it’s necessary to analyze the founder of the INC and his role in a Jordanian bank collapse in 1990. Naturally I’m fucking overjoyed that in order to understand that, we need to understand ME exchange controls of the time and the family connections to Geneva and Lebanon. No I don’t want to know the business end of it. I’d rather hear from those who do that the idea of political influence on the bank failure is unfounded, and that the integrity of the investigation and subsequent charges is not in question. (Now someone explain why the King of Jordan met publicly with Chalabi in 1998 - that’s just terribly incongruous.)

And the sad thing is it’s barely relevant to my original point that within the INC there seems to be a sincere effort to promote a federalist, pluralist government - which doesn’t seem to be supported by certain parts of the US administration. And it all hinges on Chalabi being a crook. Rather simplistic I think.

He could theoretically be controlling the Iraqi army now, mixed with whatever INC troops they had. Originally he was “in charge” of bringing the opposition groups into one cohesive group with a somewhat unified stance against the Ba’ath regime. That’s not in charge of much of anything but the job he took on, much less the country because there is hardly any authority attached to that role. Even now the question is what role does he have there, is he a leader or is he a facilitator being blown out of proportion.

You could use all that streaw to make a nice tick mattress instead of building a man to argue against.

The claim is not that Chalabi’s bank endangered Jordan.
Rather, Jordan was already in trouble because of the screwy currency exchange issues and sought a contribution of reserves from each independent bank to the central bank’s reserves in order to stabilize the situation. Chalabi’s bank was unable to do so–and was the only Jordanian bank unable to do so–despite having a ledger that claimed they had the money. When the reason for their inability was sought, it was discovered that the books had been cooked.

Well, what do we have here.

My dear, dear interlocutor, if I may grace you with that name, what the bloody hell are you blithering on about?

Well, it appears that as you lack anything more than the faintest acquaintance with the region and its economies, you seem to be making some kind of almost charmingly naïve, but fundamentally unlearned rejoinder, that as a second rate (by regional standards) bank was not of the weight to effect Iraqi financing of the Iran-Iraq war then this somehow bears on its influence on the Jordanian economy.

Nice try, really. Well, it’s fairly pitiful, but I’ll give you partial points for the effort.

First, it is helpful to have an idea of the relevant weights. I’ll use current figures rather than historical ones since they’re fresh in my head and the ratios have not shifted too dramatically: Iraq est. 30 mil. in pop. Jordan, est. 5 mil. Actually, let me use contemporaneous figures, Jordan’s GDP c. 1989 was around $5 billion. Yes, $5 billion. Note government spending in its annual budget was around $1 billion. Iraq (from again the contemporaneous Lib. Of Congress data at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/iqtoc.html) had a GDP of roughly $35 Billion with oil revenues alone in 1987 estimated at $11 billion. Population, Jordan, in 1989, est. 3 million, population Iraq, in 1989, est. at 16 million.

So, we have, Jordan, second rate phosphates producer, lives mostly off of direct transfers and remittances. Now it might just dawn on one that with a fairly substantial difference in relative sizes of the economies in question (a mere 7 times larger or so) and in the case of a war that was costing on the order of $20 million/day, neither Jordan nor its banks with total commercial bank assets of around $4 billion and total deposits of roughly $3 billion (both at market rates), were significant players in Iraq financing –indeed financing Jordanian trade and government debt was problematic at the time.

Coming hand in hand with this is, well, a fairly clear difference in the size and scope, as well as influence, of companies in each economy. Of further note, above all in this period, few of the economies are very liberal, such that there is little multinational presence – either regional multinational or global firms. Segmented economies. As such, and of course if you bother to read the c. 1989 Library of Congress report you will find support for this, the market is (and was) divided up between, relative to global standards, smaller firms. Big fish in small ponds you know, size is relative. Petra was big relative to its market, top 5. Not terribly significant relative to the financing of the Iran Iraq war, which was tens of billions of dollars yearly and largely sovereign to sovereign, not commercial/private sector funded although looking at the balances one will see a portion of that, on scales larger than Jordanian GDP. I am sure in whatever town you live in you know of some firm big relative to the local market, small relative to the global market. Now if you can imagine that your local market was subject to some fairly significant entry barriers, then you will see that such a firm can have a significant influence.

Well, regardless, we may further add the issue of systematic risk. Collapse of one financial institution, depending on the degree of exposure that other financial institutions have to it even a small one, can provoke collapse of other financial institutions. Further to that, collapse of one bank, when there is not significant public trust in the overall system, can and does provoke bank runs which can threaten to take down even otherwise healthy banks, never mind shaky ones. Now, in Jordan, there was (and is) not much trust in the system – a newly monetized economy that had newly won its citizens deposits does not need a banking crisis of any kind to damage the system. Indeed no country wants any kind of financial institution failure if it can be avoided.

In the case of Petra Bank, it did provoke subsequent failures, although all in the Chalabi empire as things came unraveled, however it rther appears they were too far out on the edge as I draw your attention to the time frames, note, for example, that the Swiss Bank they owned connected to Petra had its license pulled for improper behaviour well before the Jordanian crisis began, in April 1989. April. See http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,938169,00.html

First, you may note Jordanian Banks /= Jordan. There is a difference between the State and private banks, much in the same way there is a difference between Citibank and the United States Government. I share that for clarity purposes, and for your general edification.

As to the question of whether Jordan as a sovereign lent to Iraq, insofar as Jordan was a debtor with rather severe current account problems, on the face of it Jordan simply was not capable of financing Iraq. Period. Jordan was barely able to handle the crisis provoked by the Petra Bank crisis. Now, the question of financing letters of credit – those commercial notes necessary to effect exports – I am sure there were. It is a simple fact, however, that not Jordan nor its institutions c. 1989 were significant players.

As to the debt, the Lib. of Congress helpfully has this contemporaneous analysis:

You can easily note that Jordan is not significant enough even to be mentioned. What you can also easily note is that this matches the prior information and analysis that I provided: the major financiers were primarily Gulf States using Iraq to fight a proxy war against Iran and Western governments doing the same – in the case of the US, indirectly via second parties.
However this has been covered in the past, so it is not staggeringly surprising.
Now this follow on is such a glaring red herring as to amuse me:

Do you have a point here or are you just blithering on to cover up the fact that you don’t really understand the financial issues involved in the scandal nor how the scandal unfolded nor that the explanations advanced by Chalabi make little sense in light of known facts?

Now if you want to understand the bloody politics of the region, the economics and the business standards, than you bloody better lay aside nice little theoretical documents written by professors holed up in ivory towers and begin to understand how things really work around here. They work by families, by blood ties, by lots of things that ‘federalist papers’ do not capture – and those differences have sunk past efforts so abstracting away from them is not too fucking helpful at all. Comforting maybe, allowing one to abstract away from the hard issues, but not too fucking helpful.

The question in the OP was is Chalabi a crook or not. That was the question. It strikes me fairly clearly that we’re scuttling round looking for a way to shift the goal posts to disguise a lack of understanding of the issues, nor of the problems nor of the actual events. Some safe little papers of irrelevancy written by a professor who was not the subject of the thread.

As to why Hussien met with Chalabi in 1998, well who the fuck knows? It’s a murky and dirty region and lots of murky and dirty things go on. It is really irrelevant as the body of evidence rather confirms that Chalabi et al got caught doing shady things in multiple jurisdictions, and apparently quite independently – financial shenanigans that dovetail with accusations in re similar accounting games in the INC. Even accepting some political play in the Jordanian charges – there are always politics in charges here so this is of no surprise at all – the body of evidence confirms shady folks are involved in the INC with long habits of corruption.

Yeah, lot’s of things seem sincere when you are an ignorant foreigner coming to deal in the Souq. They love folks like you, who believe the camel stories and all the nice tales one can spin – it’s beautiful how easy it is to separate a sucker from his or her money when the sucker gets all caught up with the pretty fucking words. Pity the second time round you learn, if you are not irremediably stupid, that the sales pitch is just that, a sales pitch, the pretty words on corporate governance, benchmarking and all that are just that, pretty fucking words.

So, if it makes you feel all warm and fuzzy to believe the sales pitch without checking the tires, without the proper due diligence, well go right ahead. Those of us in the market know way better than to suck down the bloody business plan without checking out the bona fides, and twice at that. Bloody innocents, well a lot of money is going to be made off of such people. A lot of money.

In the final analysis what is simplistic is to think that some bullshit written by a professor in his ivory tower is going to matter in what Iraq looks like, in reality on the ground, in three years. It doesn’t work that way around here – indeed it doesn’t work that way anywhere, which is why one does due diligence the world round and one does not take the pretty words contained in the pretty business plan or the pretty political manifesto at face value, but looks at what’s behind it and who’s going to put these things in place. Crooks can spin nice little tales, they can, and when you believe them you end up bankrupt and discredited.

Now I wonder what december has to say about all this, I wonder if this is all ‘Liberal’ smoke blowing or whether it may have begun to dawn on him that the unsophisticated folks in Defense are getting suckered.

It’s worth noting that the US gov provided transport to the INC and it’s “military wing” only. No other exile opposition group has been aided in such a way. Check www.whitehouse.gov for more info regarding the “non-preferential” preferential treatment that Chalabi and the INC receive from US taxpayers money.
If either you and december weren’t idealistic liberals you’d be concerned with the reality of giving US taxpayers’ money to cheats.

Cite?

O dear, it looks like the GD Spanish Inquisition.

The relevant quote from the post was “however the concept that to please Sadaam in re one minor player in the overall MENA finance scene, the Jordanians would engage in a maneuver that very nearly brought down their financial system is to engage in pure, unadulterated credulity.” Wrestled into brevity and pertinence, that’s what the post boils down to. It’s a very sensible explanation, don’t you agree?

Bullshit, I began with something like the INC being more than just Chalabi, and within it is an honest effort at the founding of a democratic process in Iraq…that is certainly not the prevailing ivory tower view. Personally I try to avoid even accidentally opining on economic matters here or anywhere else. The question is “Best Hope for Iraq or Shady Expat Puppet” and the sum total of your contribution so far is “Shady.” That was a good bet at the start, according to the pundits…but in any case he is there and the process has already begun. See if you can scoot along towards what he can or cannot do for Iraq, or something. Or don’t. Whatever.

It’s not irrelevant as to what kind of support he has. “It’s a murky region”, yes, maybe him being a crook isn’t alarming the key players very much, particular if a King himself didn’t mind meeting with one of his fugitives? Interesting all by itself.

Now how am I supposed to find a cite to prove a negative. I’ll try, later.

No. It is an absurd proposition.

It may make you feel warm and fuzzy to ignore the financial realities of the situation, but given
that Jordan was a minor player in terms of Iraq,
that Jordan was quite capable of falling on its face without any deliberate efforts to do so,
that the crisis that provoked the audit began with internal issues of Jordan that were specifically not directed at Chalabi’s bank,
and
that his shenanigans only coming to light when his bank failed to do what its books said it could do and which every other bank in Jordan was able to do,

then the notion that Iraq was behind any effort to disgrace Chalabi is ludicrous, not sensible.

Thus ignoring that Chalabi is the purported founder and the only member of the INC who has been accorded special aid from the Bush administration. There does not seem to be an INC outside Chalabi’s influence.

And your evidence that any Iraqis inside Iraq actually accept Chalabi or the INC as genuine participants in the process is?

…is the fact that Kanan Makiya seemed to be a genuine participant, see remarks on page 1, and when he’s thrown out I suppose we’ll have our answer. What else is there, at this point - he’s either there or he’s not.

Chalabi doesn’t seem to be participating though. So I don’t see the idea of him being appointed to office by the US having any merit at all, especially after last night’s news that a broad-based conference for an interim gov’t will be held within 4 weeks. It made little sense to begin with, now it’s just absurd.

I’ve no doubt that Chalabi is Rumsfeld’s fair-haired boy and the darling of the neocons, but it looks like he is managing to blow his chances all to pieces. First, the “Mayor of Baghdad” who claimed the office in Chalabi’s name gets arrested. Then Chalabi refuses to take part in a first big state-building meeting that even the SCIRI consented to join…

Another round.

Spanish inquisition? Whatever.

Your ‘resume’ was neither a resume nor bloody pertinent, but a red herring. (a) The currency issue was boiling before the Petra Bank crisis – that emerged from the currency crisis, that is clearly documented. (b) Shutting down Petra Bank provoked a financial crisis, one that briefly threatened the financial system – Petra was small fish in re the regional market in aggregate, but big fish in re Jordan. It is hardly rational to believe that this was done because of Sadaam being threatened or put out by some minor operator, in the grand scheme of things. One can give limited credit to the idea that Chalabi’s Prince Hassan ‘wasta’ (connections) fell through because of Sadaam pressure – although it doesn’t seem necessary – but it is frankly ludicrous to pretend the issue arose because of Sadaam. The fact that Chalabi et al have concocted this anachronistic explanation speaks poorly of them, expect of course to their skills as snake oil salesmen to convince the gullible in the West.

Chalabi heads up and controls the organization, the organization has run into “issues” in its accounts rather similar to those in his personal empire – honest effort to sucker the uninformed into more politics as usual around here. Operationally INC is Chalabi’s game, and it is not encouraging to have more people like Chalabi buzzing about like flies.

What ‘academic’ views exist of the INC I neither know nor care, what I referred to was ivory tower views on some highly theoretical establishment of democracy in Iraq and fancy little ‘federalist’ papers – all quite secondary to the quality of the people involved and to the legitimacy of the process of reestablishing authority, in the eyes of the Iraqis and the region.

That would serve you well. You would also be served well to extend that to Middle Eastern politics.

Already have, my less than nimble friend, already have. I refer you to my thread on Iraq reconstruction and the prior thread on the context of the Iraqi war. I have seen plenty of what parties like the INC have done for other countries in the region, professionals at selling a particular brand of snake oil to the uninformed.

What he and those willing to tolerate being in a party with him, by ignorance or corruption, can do is establish yet another pseudo-democracy, with all the usual corruption and insider dealing among the narrow elite, but professionally collecting foreign support for ‘democratic’ transitions.

Well, given (a) Hussien is pushing up the daisies and (b) we don’t know the context of the meeting (such as personal favor to his brother ex-CP Hassan), I think (i) using the word support is mere hand waving and (ii) King Abdullah has shown no support for Chalabi to date (his CNN interview I am told he put down Chalabi and M. Marouan the FM has openly dismissed Chalabi), indeed Jordan’s position is vocally anti-Chalabi, the presumed support of a King who’s been pushing up the daisies for four years is of highly theoretical value.

I’ll had I have yet to see a positive comment in the Arab press about Chalabi.

As to the ‘legitimacy’ conveyed upon INC by their presence at the meetings, insofar as the Americans are controlling attendance and invites, that is rather bootstrapping the argument.

Duly noted, but luckily this here is US politics. I haven’t read the other threads.

The CIA doesn’t like him, not just because of ‘lacking support’ but he’s also a person of dubious morality and questionable business practices…if that wasn’t such a larf I wouldn’t have thought to question their views, but it’s definite overkill. One expects a bit more than wonky accounting issues to turn them off. The CIA likes people who can do things for the CIA, that’s the be-all and end-all of it, they couldn’t care less about corruption or insider dealing or how much faith the Iraqis have in him or silly things like character. They prefer people on the shady side, for Pete’s sake, it’s part of the job.

So if you start looking at it not as what he can’t do for Iraq but what he can’t - or rather won’t - do for the US, it’s an entirely different picture, and perhaps a more accurate one. Maybe one worth looking at someday minus the who-pissed-in-your-cornflakes style of discussion.

No. The CIA does not like him because he stole money from them and they suspect he is or is planning to steal money from the Defense Department.

(And, of course, it remains true that he has no support in the region past what he has bought (temporarily) with our money.)

If so, then at least he is not guilty of being a “puppet.” :wink:

At least not a cheap puppet ;).