Air France Crash (2009): Investigators homing in on black boxes

OK, watched the episode, will attempt to answer questions. Usual disclaimer that my expertise, such as it is, is in smaller aircraft and any big iron pilots please do feel free to correct any errors I might make or add your own insights. I am strictly an amateur analyst, and conclusions can and probably will change with more information. What follows is speculation and unofficial at that. I can be right and I can be wrong, so here’s a grain of salt in advance.

I remember at the time that there was much mention of big storms reaching to 50,000 feet. That is an extremely high intensity storm, on par with the one that recently spawned all those tornadoes down south and caused so much damage. I hasten to add that such storms don’t always spawn tornadoes, but they are all very dangerous weather events that any pilot with half a brain wants to avoid. My friends who fly airliners have commented in the past about the limitations of on-board radar in a manner consistent with what is described here.

Keep in mind they were over the middle of the ocean – over land there are typically many more observers and sources of weather information. Due to limited communication there is less opportunity for pilots to either ask about severe weather, report severe weather, or be cautioned by air traffic about severe weather.

In short, they explained how equipment limitations can result in competent, alert pilots suddenly finding all hell breaking loose outside the aircraft. If you don’t know the storm is there you can’t avoid it. You need the information before you can act on it.

I thought they explained the problem of pitot icing quite well.

I do have a quibble with the way they continually described the automatic systems as having “failed”. Yes, sometimes they do just quit working, but they never mentioned that an automatic pilot shutdown is not always a failure. They are designed to shut down under certain conditions. If they do so in response to those conditions is it NOT a failure! In other words, I prefer your phrasing of “disengaged” much better.

You see, for routine flying machines actually do a better job than people. We pilots don’t always like to admit that, but it’s true. For routine flying. If something goes really wrong, though, people are better problem solvers than computers. If flight conditions exceed certain parameters the autopilot (and perhaps other systems) shut down because under those circumstances it’s probably a situation a human will handle better than a machine. You shut down the automatic stuff so it won’t interfere with what the human is trying to do, which might be radically different than what you’d do under normal circumstances. There have been a number of incidents where this worked very well, with either a high number of survivors or even everyone reaching the ground unhurt even with a severely damaged airplane.

I can’t say from the information portrayed if all those systems shutting down was a fault or a planned feature for sure. I can describe some possibilities, but it would take flight information from the data recorders to make an accurate assessment.

Explaining stalls can be difficult. I thought they did a reasonable job, but understanding them can be difficult for the non-flyer, and even a substantial number of pilots have less than ideal understanding of them.

The important point is that flight depends upon generating lift, and lift is generated by a particular sort of airflow over the wings. If that airflow is disrupted you lose lift. Lose enough lift you fall out of the sky. The fact that Flight 447 “pancaked” into the ocean (based upon damage to the recovered debris) leads anyone interested in aviation accidents to wonder about a stall.

Now, about those stalls – pilots get training in stalls early and often. I think I started stall training around hour 3 myself. Every pilot learns about stalls and stall recovery. The basic concepts apply to all airplanes. To pilots, they aren’t exotic. In fact, some people even do them for fun.

:eek:

No, really, let me explain. In training, in good weather, you go up to a sufficiently safe altitude and your instructor deliberately stalls the airplane, then recovers so you can see what it looks like. Then you practice doing it yourself. You practice variations and different scenarios until your reactions become automatic. There’s even something called a “falling leaf” stall where you stall the airplane then hold it in that state for a bit, undergoing an interesting rate of descent where, yes the wings have a bit of a “falling leaf” sort of movement. You practice stalls while in turns, while descending and ascending and while turning and changing altitude at the same time. You do all this so you know how to handle the situation, and what it feels like just before you stall. Mind you, that’s just for private pilot level, and stall practice continues forever in aviation. The problem isn’t stall practice, it’s when an unexpected one leaps up and bites you in the ass when you’re dealing with 1,000 other major concerns.

Now, stalls actually aren’t a matter of airspeed (but there’s a reason for the confusion). It’s a matter of the angle at which the wing meets the air, called “angle of attack”. However, angle of attack is also related to airspeed, hence the reason we talk about things like “stall speeds”. The airspeed can give you information about the angle of attack, which makes it a useful reference for avoiding stalls, but it is not perfect. Stalls can be affected by engine power, the shape of the wing, and so on. This is why, absent airspeed information, setting a specific pitch and power setting also works – because pitch and power affects angle of attack, too.

Another thing to know about modern airplanes at pretty much all levels is that they have been engineered to stall in a docile manner (some fighter and stunt planes aside). The wings are constructed so they won’t lose lift along the entire lengthy all at once – you lose some lift, not all of it. Between the rudder and proper training the pilot need not lose ALL control, you can retain some. And airplanes are designed so that if lift is lost the nose will tend to come down all by itself. That is based on weight and balance and shape, it is not dependent on engine power or flight controls. It’s physics that cause the nose to lower and thus reduces the angle of attack so the plane resumes flying. Not that you want to depend wholly on that to save your life, but it makes the task of stall recovery much easier. The important thing to note is that the airplane “wants” to resume flying, it will assist the pilot in recovery, or at least not work against him.

Stalls aren’t inherently fatal. If you don’t make a recovery they can and will kill you, but recovery is possible most of the time, and pilots are trained in stall recovery from the very beginning. It’s not something you want to have happen to an airliner, it could result in a brown underwear event for those aboard, but it’s not inherently fatal. Time was, before simulators, airline pilots would be required to regularly take up an (empty) airliner and deliberately stall it, and recover, to demonstrate they were still proficient at this. I’m told this is now down in simulators mainly due to cost reasons, as flying empty airliners is expensive. So, bottom line, stalls don’t have to be fatal in a big airplane. They aren’t necessarily violent in a big airplane, but it would have to be a pilot familiar with airliners who describes their stall characteristics in more detail, as, to the best of my knowledge, I have never been in a stalling airliner. Yes, I am hinting it might be possible to be in a stall and not know it - there are some small airplanes I fly with such docile stall characteristics that I can, if circumstances are right, put it into a stall and recovery such that a passenger may be entirely unaware that a stall has occurred (well, except for the audible warning). Could a stall be that gentle in an airliner? I don’t know. On the other hand, given the circumstances, if Flight 447 did stall then crash I’m guessing it wasn’t that gentle. People on board would have known something was wrong, even if they didn’t know what. If a stall turns into a spin it would get REALLY unpleasant.

Take away here - stalls need to be dealt with promptly. They can range from gentle non-events to the horrific, depending on circumstances, but all need to be recovered from promptly.

Anyhow, the consensus view is that Flight 447 was making a routine flight at night from Brazil to France. That is, in fact, routine these days. They had some weather up ahead, and I’m sure they had an eye on it. At a certain point they drop off Brazil radar and are out of radio range with land. That is also routine, particularly in bad weather you can get communication problems, and I’m sure they just continued flying.

Then – whoopsie! - turns out there’s a MONSTER thunderstorm past that little storm that just flew through. Now they have to deal with it. Keep in mind, it’s night, it’s overcast, and they’re over the ocean. The windows will be pitch black, except for an occasional lightning-flash and the ONLY information they get about what’s going are is from the various instruments on the airplane. But the are trained to deal with bad weather and zero visibility. There is nothing to do but keep flying to better skies.

Then the automatic systems start shutting down, alarms go off – but the pilots are trained to keep flying no matter what. I’m sure they were tense, perhaps even frightened, but they’re going to keep trying.

Meanwhile… they have no reliable airspeed information. This is not good. Oh, they’re probably thinking (if they have a second to spare) that the pitot tubes have iced up, it’s not an unknown problem. But there’s no doubt a lot going on in the cockpit.

Alright, let’s talk about cruising speeds in aircraft. Airliners don’t fly at the fastest speed, they aim for an efficient speed, the maximum distance for the minimum fuel, with maybe some concern for speed. That’s one reason for flying at 35,000 feet, the air is thinner and it requires less energy to fly through it. Another consequence is that, yes, at cruising altitude you aren’t very much faster than stall speed. Now, airliner pilots are held to extremely precise flying, and this sort of thing is quite routine. It’s not a safety issue. Landings are closer to stall speeds than most people would imagine, too but really, landing faster isn’t any safer, particularly on runways of limited length. Take-offs are “slow” in a sense, too, but that’s because more of the energy is going into lifting you up, not pushing you forward, and you’re safer getting away from the ground faster. There is a comfortable margin above a stall, even if it sounds small to the non-aviator.

Now, a stall warning is a device that alerts the pilot that hey, you are really getting close to a stall, do something about it (usually – I’ll mention an exception shortly). It might be a buzzer or bell or flashing light or, in the case of airliners, it physically shakes the stick in the pilot’s hand. You’re still not stalled when it goes off, it’s a warning, and there’s still a margin between warning an actual stall. I mentioned an exception, right? In a small airplane, if you’re landing in a rough field you might opt to land at a speed at just the point the warning goes off, because in a rought field you want to land at the slowest speed that is safe, that is, controllable. At the point the warning goes off you are STILL in control of the airplane, but any slower your control degrades.

OK, we know that around 2:10 to 2:14 am the automatic pilot and some other systems shut down and the pitot system is not functioning. The airplane has no reliable airspeed information, without which the machine can’t fly itself, so it’s turning everything over to the bald apes in the cockpit. We know there’s a storm, so they almost certainly were in turbulence and getting bumps and jolts, which isn’t any fun and doesn’t help. It’s probably ice on the tubes, but really, for the guys in the front office why doesn’t matter at this point, they need to fly the airplane, and their information is limited. They can’t look outside to confirm anything, it’s pitch black. So they have to rely on the instruments… which they already know aren’t fully functional.

One of two things happened at this point, and we’ll never know which unless we can get the data from the black boxes.

SCENARIO ONE: they fail to take the proper actions in time and lose control of the airplane. This is pilot error, not software error, as the automatic systems are off line (baring the fly-by-wire system malfunctioning, but there is no reason to believe that at this time). If that happened, most likely they stalled the airplane, could not recover in time, and belly-flopped into the sea. As the airplane landed flat, based on the evidence, I’m inclined to think they stalled out of level flight and not in a turn. Level flight stalls you’re more likely to have both wings stall at the same time, resulting in a flat attitude. Stalling out of a turn you’re more likely to wind up in a spin, particularly if you’re having instrument problems, and that tends to go in nose-first at a high rate of speed (possibly exceeding Mach 1 in an airliner). Alternatively, a spin can develop into a flat spin, which would give you another belly-flop as the fuselage is more or less horizontal to the ground in that situation but I have no idea how inclined an Airbus is to get into that state, or how long or how much altitude might be required. Anyhow, they hit hard, and if they belly-flopped I’m not sure you could describe the mode of travel as “flying” any longer. That would be falling, and it’s very rare that airplanes fall out of the sky.

SCENARIO TWO: they do everything right, alter pitch and power for proper angle of attack/airspeed, and it’s not enough. A major storm of that intensity can, at least in theory, overpower an airplane (it can also tear it apart, but that did not happen in this case). In which case… they lose control, stall, and fall out of the sky.

It’s important to aviation to know which scenario is true, and preventing a future occurrence may require better pilot training (for one) or better airplanes (for two). It is possible that there were elements of both at work, which means improvements in both training and airplanes. Arguably, we should be able to get better weather information to pilots en route over the ocean, too. I’m sure someone is working on that, too. Clearly, avoiding these situations would be an excellent strategy.

Now, another point, and this one about icing. They talk a lot about icing on the pitot systems, and it’s true they can ice up. But supercooled water isn’t magnetically or magically attracted to just pitot tubes. It’s going to be hitting the entire airplane, and it’s going to stick on the airplane. This is bad for two reasons. First, it adds weight which is not a good thing for a flying aircraft. Second, and worse, it can change the shape of the wing. It’s the shape of the wing that provide lift. Ice sticking to the wing changes the shape, which can also change the angle of attack depending on how it builds up. That means, for an airplane accumulating ice, the margin between flying and stalling is reduced, and this is normally expressed as “the stall speed goes up”. What that means is that with ice on board the indicated air speed at which it stalls is higher than it would be otherwise at that pitch and power and everything else. You’re not generating lift as efficiently, and with added weight you need more lift to fly. If things get bad enough you can enter a scenario where even maximum power and the most efficient angle of attack won’t be enough to keep flying… and the airplane goes down. It’s pretty rare, as pilots try to avoid such circumstances. Also, in addition to pitot heat, airliners have other systems to avoid ice build up or get rid of ice from critical areas. Like pitot heat, though, these systems can be overwhelmed if conditions are severe enough. “Airframe ice”, as it’s called, may or may not be a factor here, it would depend on how much had accumulated. It’s possible to have the pitot tubes freeze over (as they noted in that list of prior pitot failures) and not get into further trouble. Airplanes can tolerate some ice sticking to them.

So, right now what we have is:

= Routine flight over the ocean
= SOMETHING BAD HAPPENS!
= ???
= Belly-flop

It’s the flight recorders that can replace the question marks. If we can pull the information off those units we might actually know what happened. If we can’t, we’ll never know.

Bodies are being recovered.

I would expect that the bodies are not as well preserved as the recorders, and have less recoverable data useful for determining the cause of the crash. Also, they’re probably not painted bright orange.

No that’s not right. At 5 knots above the stall the wing is very inefficient and requires a lot of engine thrust to overcome excessive drag. Any speed from about 1.3 times the stall speed and slower is said to be on the “back end of the drag curve” which refers to a curve formed when you graph the two types of drag an aeroplane creates. One is induced drag which is caused by the wing producing lift and the other is parasite drag which is caused by things such as friction due to movement through the air. Induced drag is highest at high angles of attack and therefore slow speed (assuming level flight) and parasite drag is highest at high airspeeds. There is a speed for any aeroplane where the combined induced and parasite drag is at a minimum. Go faster and the drag increases due to increasing parasite drag, go slower and the drag increases due to the induced drag. This is typically at about 1.3 x the stall speed and is known as the min drag speed or Vmd (velocity min drag.)

When you fly faster than the min drag speed at a constant power setting the aircraft’s speed will be stable, that is the aircraft will tend to return to its original speed if something causes the speed to change such as a wind gust. If a gust makes the speed increase slightly, the parasite drag increases which slows the aircraft down. If a gust were to slow the aircraft down slightly then the parasite drag decreases which allows the aircraft to speed up to its original speed.

If you fly slower than min drag speed, the aircraft speed is unstable. If the speed increases slightly, the drag decreases and the speed will continue to increase. If the speed decreases slightly then the induced drag increases causing a continual decrease in speed until the aircraft stalls. This flying on the “back end of the drag curve” makes hard work for the pilot because they have to constantly change power settings to maintain the speed. For this reason, apart from when touching down to land, aircraft are always flown at or above the min drag speed.

In a jet engine, fuel flow is directly related to thrust and thrust required for level unaccelerated flight is equal to total drag, therefore the min drag speed results in the minimum fuel flow and is the speed that you get the best endurance.

Another important speed is the maximum range cruise speed (MRC). This is the speed that results in the aircraft getting maximum range. It is typically around 1.32 x Vmd. Cruising at MRC will give the lowest fuel cost for a flight, however airlines need to be conscious of not just keeping costs down but also maintaining their schedule. There often needs to be a trade off between cost and staying on time so faster speeds may need to be flown. You can increase the max range cruise speed by about 5% and only get an increase in specific fuel consumption by about 1%, the resulting speed is known as long range cruise or LRC and it gives a good trade off between speed and specific fuel consumption. There are other cost factors of course such as maintenance, salaries etc which can all be affected by the time the aircraft spend in the air. Airlines will have a cruise speed policy that makes the best compromise between cost and schedule.

Going back to the stall speed. If an airliner is flying at a minimum of 1.3 x the stall speed (and more normally around 1.7 x the stall speed), and a typical flaps up stall speed is around 150 knots indicated, the aircraft will have at least about 50 knots of buffer to the stall.

This is all assuming straight and level flight in smooth conditions. Because the stall is actually associated with the wing’s angle of attack and not the speed it is flying, the wing can stall at significantly faster speeds if the angle of attack is increased due to acceleration (G). This happens when turning, and it can also happen due to turbulence. If you know you’re going to be going through turbulence you will want a bigger speed buffer above the stall speed to account for any increase in g loading caused by turbulence. Unexpected severe turbulence can easily whittle your stall margin away to nothing. It may be this that the NOVA show was referring to. In normal smooth flight the margin above the stall is quite large but it may have been reduced significantly by the turbulence from the thunderstorm.

Something else the NOVA show may have been referring too is that the stick shaker which gives warning of an impending stall will go a little bit before the actual stall occurs, this may translate to around 5 knots depending on aircraft type and the stall warning system installed.

But with the airspeed unknown (all pitot tubes non-functional), how is the stall speed calculated? Wouldn’t that be an unknown too?

You can calculate the stall speed for any particular configuration of thrust, angle of attack, and how the flight controls such as elevator are set. These things are all inter-related. While airspeed is the usual way of managing such things there are alternatives.

Setting a particular pitch and power setting will, in level flight, yield a particular airspeed. Thus, when the airspeed indicator is not reliable or not functioning the pilot can set the controls to where they would be at a desired airspeed. As noted in NOVA, this will yield a result very close to what the pilot wants. It’s not quite as exact, but if the best airspeed for penetrating severe turbulence is, say (WAG) 1.5 stall speed then you set the power and pitch for what would normally yield that airspeed in normal flight and get very close to it.

Think of it another way - when you drive your car at a certain speed you press the accelerator a certain amount. Now, imagine you had a way to know just how much you pressed the pedals towards the floor for every possible speed for your car. So, say, for 30 miles and hour you pressed it down 1.5 inches, and maybe 2 inches for 50. If you knew that, then if the speedometer in your car stopped working you could still drive the proper speed limit my pressing the accelerator a certain number of inches towards the floor, as long as you had worked all that out in advance.

In airplanes, it’s been worked out in advance. If you want to go X airspeed and your airspeed indicator isn’t working, then do 1, 2, and 3 and you’ll be going very close to X.

The stall speed itself can be known in advance, the only important thing for the pilot is knowing what speed they are actually flying at. There are angle of attack vanes that measure the wing’s angle of attack, these are independent of the pitot system but are still susceptible to icing.

Very interesting stuff - thanks, folks.

Broomstick, I must defer to your piloting knowledge which is greater than mine. But it does occur to me that if you don’t know your airspeed, and you have an extreme airflow in an unknown direction due to extreme weather, any estimates based on “seat of the pants flying” might be worthless.

No matter how much you press on an accelerator, if your foot is cancelled by other forces, you might not be getting anywhere near the airspeed (or ground speed) you expect.

To put it in crude terms…if you press on the pedal to fly forward at 100 knots and you are in a 100 knot tailwind, you will be plummeting vertically at free-fall speed but not aware of it unless you can see out the cockpit to a reference point or you keep a sharp eye on the instruments. That’s pretty much the NOVA theory.

The kind of power/attitude flying that Broomstick is talking about is fairly precise (at least it’s not prone to the gross errors you are suggesting.) For a given aircraft weight and atmospheric temperature, a certain power setting and attitude will result in specific performance. The trick is to know what the power settings and attitudes are.

You’re counter example doesn’t work because steady tailwinds and headwinds are of no consequence to an aircraft. If you press on the pedal to fly forward at 100 knots and you are in a 100 knot tailwind, you will fly forward at 100 knots relative to the air around you, you will also happen to be flying at 200 knots over the ground, but that’s not relavent to the aerodynamics.

The difficulty for the Air France pilots would be that in severe turbulence the airspeed will be very unstable and power/attitude settings might average out as expected but short term fluctuations could take the speed either to the stall or mach buffet (aerodynamic problems due to high speed.) The changes in g loading due to turbulence can cause short term increases in the actual stall speed as well which can reduce the margins temporarily.

I’m just watching the NOVA show at the moment on youtube and I think the 5 knots above the stall thing is caused by the show misinterpreting what one of its experts is saying. One of the pilots says that there can be a margin as little as 10 knots around the cruise speed and this figure is then repeated and expanded on incorrectly by the narrator. A 10 knot margin doesn’t mean you stall if you get 5 knots slower or get mach buffet if you go 5 knots faster, it means there is a 10 knot margin of safe speeds, and the minimum safe cruising speeds are well in excess of the stalling speeds.

Ditto.

And I’d just like to thank all you folks for keeping one of my threads active for a whole year, feeding my sense of vanity, in contrast to many of my threads, which seem to drop like stones for lack of interest.

ETA: just realised that wasn’t perhaps the best metaphor…

Well, this has been an informative thread for me anyway. Having flown gliders, stalls are part of the training. But the stall speeds I’ve dealt with were only 45 mph, during bright sunny days with cumulus dotting the sky. No comparison to Air France’s catastrophe.

The first time I’d ever heard about the coffin corner was the U-2 and its variants.

One thing that the learned aviatoin dopers have not yet mentioned but that the NOVA sow stated is that the autopilot has reduced thrust by lowering the throttles, but that when it dis-engaged, the throttles remained set at the lower setting. Problem was that the setting of the throttles was not corresponding to the throttle lever positions, which most pilots look at to determine engine thrust. One of the things the show mentioned that the manufacturer could do is make the auto-pilot actually move the throttle levers when it modifies engine RPM settings, so the position always corresponds to actual settings.

In this case, the pilots may have incorrectly thought that they had more than enough power to avoid the stall because of the position of the throttle levers.

That is a difference in philosophy between Boeings and Airbusses, Boeing autothrust moves the thrust levers but Airbus doesn’t. The show bought up some relevant human factors to do with that but I don’t know how much of a part they had to play. To see what thrust setting you have, you look at the engine gauges, you don’t look at the thrust levers. There have been some accidents where pilots have been strangely reluctant to change power settings. The Colgan Dash 8 crash in Buffalo could have easily been avoided by prompt application of power when the stick shaker activated, and the pilots in the Potomac River crash never applied full power in an attempt to recover some performance, they just tried to fly with the power setting they had, which wasn’t enough.

I disagree that pilots would look at throttle position to gauge engine thrust. I think the point the NOVA show made was that the computer throttled back the engines so it wasn’t apparent as an action taken by the pilots. The supposition was that there were so many things happening at once the pilots were consumed with too much information and too many things to do in a short time and they lost control of the plane because of it.

As a private pilot I’ve been taught to recognize the loss of situational awareness and it very likely saved my life. I can’t imagine every fricking bell and warning light going off in a cascade on a commercial airliner. It’s a 2 person cockpit now so the workload of the engineer has been reassigned to 2 people and a computer system. When the computer system went down in this situation there simply wasn’t any time to consult manuals. The time frame to recognize the need to stabilize airspeed with power and trim settings was extremely narrow (minutes and seconds). Once the window closed the plane ceased to be aerodynamically recoverable.

Thanks for clarifying this guys. As a mere aviation enthusiast, I had assumed that pilots who learn in small aircraft would take the throttle lever position as an indication of actual setting. Those two exmaples** Richard Pearse** cites seem to suggest that forgetting about the throttle is sadly common in the information overload of an emergency.

I’m curious, are there many types of emergencies where “giving it more gas” is a bad idea? Seems like more thrust = more lift would be generally desirable in a sticky situation. Unless you’re trying to land, I guess.

Any type of overspeed situation, such as recovering from a loss of control that has resulted in a low nose and increasing airspeed, you’d want to reduce power, and recovering from a spin you need to reduce power. Ultimately you need to recognise what the problem is and take appropriate action.

There was a Qantas 747 that over-ran the runway somewhere, they were landing on a wet runway and never used full reverse because it was company policy not to. I think sometimes policies such as this become so ingrained in the company culture that the pilots literally forget they have more performance available.

Well, if you’re on fire… :wink:

Hold on a sec… this talk about the plane stalling and / or losing control. From what I’ve seen reported about the extent of debris field and state of the wreckage suggest the plane came down in a controlled manner, no? Is there any indication so far that the plane plummeted down into the ocean?

The plane came down intact and upright, but that doesn’t mean it was under control. The wreckage that was initially found close together included pieces from both the nose and tail as well as both wings, meaning it hit in one piece. Another piece was a large section of the belly that had been buckled inward over its full extent, meaning that’s what hit the water. The fragmented state of the wreckage meant that vertical speed at impact was quite high. And the ACARS data stream made it pretty clear what had gone wrong and how.

So, while recovering the boxes was an amazing accomplishment, even if they still contain data, there may not be major remaining questions that they can answer.