One of the independent events that may have contributed to this crash was that the plane was too close to the ground to glide and give the crew time to troubleshoot the problem. That kind of thing probably happens about twice every eight flight hours or so.
To be a bit less facetious, whatever caused this crash might have been fine if it happened mid-flight. They might have figured out the problem, or glided to a landing at an airport, or even a level patch of ground. It may be just bad luck that something happened at the worst possible time.
That was my first thought as well. Automation sounds great, but sometimes the consequences of automation can be even more catastrophic than relying on humans. The 737 MAX catastrophes are a case in point.
But that would be a massive failure on the system safety assessments and compliance to regulations (primarily but not only 25.1309).
You must establish and mitigate/design around all possible functional hazards and failure modes through all phases of flight. The regulation uses the phrase “prevent continued safe flight and landing”. There are very explicit regulations for systems during takeoff, etc.
I don’t know enough to speculate on what happened here, but the “paper airplane” expectations and reality are intended to align. If the error is a design issue in the aircraft, this is going to have massive repercussions in the airworthiness and certification realms. Or, unfortunately, there may be a cause that’s kind of external, like fuel contamination (can’t burn water), rats chewing through cables (though kind of a design problem too…).
I hate to say I’m eager for the investigation outcome, because I’m so sad this happened at all, but this is the area in which I work and there’s lots to learn from each accident. Sometimes my work really feels performative, a detailed in-the-weeds analysis of a design to prove it’s safe, but shit like this still happens. What can we learn from this? How can we be better?
I know very little on these subjects, so I don’t say much in these threads because I have nothing to contribute besides the odd lay question; nevertheless I read them with interest because I like to learn. And I’ve noticed that you, a professional in the field, haven’t provided any kind of speculation about this incident, in contrast to the media breathlessly chasing theories about flaps and birds and whatever else, and other posters dutifully reproducing them.
Is your position that, even if you might be starting to lean toward a hypothesis, as a professional it would be irresponsible to share it in public because of the undue weight your informed opinion carries? Or is it your position that, knowing how complex these incidents and the subsequent investigations can be, it’s simply disciplined thinking to resist early guesses and wait for legitimately concrete findings and data to emerge? A little of both? Neither?
I’m not @mnemosyne but that’s my take as a retired pro. I can talk about background, what ought to happening, design & attitudes & performance in generalities, etc.
But speculating about what did happen is silly irresponsible right now. Some stuff might be able to be ruled out but very little can be ruled in.
Right now the thread is moving too fast even to provide background. Lots of swirling misinformation, bad conjecture, comments to comments to comments, etc. A mess IOW. Just like a debris field.
Well, on that airline and airplane, it is a bulkhead seat, so more legroom. I understand why it would be a premium seat. Though I don’t like not having a seat in front of mine for underseat storage.
For the question of responsibility, it’s sort of an engineering ethics thing; I don’t want to use my expertise and make it seem like I’m issuing a professional opinion when I do not have the data to substantiate the position.
But I’m also definitely waiting on data. These things are complicated. Whatever I know about the particular details of finding system safety compliance (which is a fair bit), I’m a total noob at it. Whatever the media seems to say is usually only part of the story. Right now, we just don’t know anything at all. And I am not a pilot (which is good for the planet) and not a flight controls or engines specialist. I will scrutinize the seat and survivability data for the survivor to the nth degree, but I cannot speak authoritatively on this accident. Which brings me back to #1.
It’s certainly nothing new that airlines “discovered” this fact. For as long as I recall that doing the 24 hour prior check-in, and also choose a particular seat, if you could get the 11th row (A, B or C on a wide-body) it would cost more. And for the “A” seat (at least) you would have to state you were physically fit enough to operate the door in case of emergency.
So if choosing 12C on the aisle cost $20, anything on 11 would cost more like $30 (and these numbers have probably gone up quite a bit since I last flew). In return you got the extra leg-room and at the same time do not have the little bit of room under the seat in front of you, as Dewey_Finn mentioned.
The “survivability” of occupying this seat may or may not have made a difference in this case. Airplane doors open inwards (and then outwards), and only after turning the large handle (and only when the air pressure is ambient - the strongest man in the world could not open the door above 10,000 feet).
Any “meme” may well have to do with the number 11 being lucky, yet in my recognition, I’d have the same “luck” on the aisle in 13C. You would be a fool to choose a seat based on surviving a catastrophic failure of the aircraft.
ETA: As mentioned, this guy’s brother had 11J all the way on the other side of the plane. I’m just going to assume on a plane carrying this many passengers the jet way will pull up on both sides of the plane, again affording a quicker exit when the plane is on the ground.
The flaps lever is in the center, large, at 6 minutes. The landing gear up is before the 6 min mark (5:50). It is just a button. Nothing similar. https://youtu.be/QWHTdy9y3j4?si=jMEjMYqIwWZgEbR3
I don’t understand how anyone was able to even attempt an emergency evacuation. From everything I’ve seen it looks like it became immediately engulfed in flames.
Dreamliner is a huge plane…I had no idea until I was lifted up the outside to a hidden door for disable embarking. It felt like the side of a cruise ship from the outside.
There was no seats in front of him - just the exit to his left.
He undoes his seat belt and either the emerg door popped open on it’s own after the crash or he grabbed the handle - either way he saw daylight and moved to it and jumped, likely pure instict. Lucky man.
I was surprised to learn the First Officer had 1100 hrs of flying time. In the US the minimum is 1500 hrs. The Captain had over 8,000 hrs which is good.
I am not an expert, and I don’t know how likely this is, but I have heard on some other crash analyses about a category of pilot error where the throttle is turned all the way down instead of up - maybe because of a distraction caused by some other thing happening, but where the pilot’s intention is to increase thrust, but they move the throttle levers the wrong way. It sounds stupid, but I understand it has happened on occasion.
I have not heard of that one, which is not to say it’s never happened. However, auto-throttle complexity was a factor in at least one major accident:
IIRC, one of the pilots was transitioning to the Boeing 777 from an Airbus. He may have had some negative transfer in understanding the auto-throttle and its various settings. Supposedly, he thought it would provide low speed protection during their visual approach when it was not.
IIRC even further, the NTSB interviewed a number of 777 pilots and asked them what the auto-throttle would do in the same mode and some of them got it wrong too. Which led to the auto-throttle’s complexity being listed as a possible contributing factor in the accident.
I’ve been on the wrong side of some auto-throttle issues myself, though not with dire consequences. Once again, sophisticated automation and safeguards come with their own complicating factors.
The morning (here on the east coast of U.S.) after the crash NPR had an interview with a reporter who was at the scene. He claimed to have interviewed numerous people and viewed videos of the crash. I’m pretty sure, although not certain, he said that he saw a video that showed a puff of smoke near the center of the plane before it went down. What I am certain of is that he predicted that this was going to be a security issue rather than a mechanical one. The clear implication was that there was a bomb of some sort. Perhaps the deployment of the RAT convinced someone that there was an explosion? Or simply an eyewitness fabricating (intentionally or not) “facts” that fit what they just saw. Not a peep about this since which is enough to convince me that the reporter was wrong (gasp!) and illustrates early reporting inaccuracies.
P.S. - He may also have said the wings came off but I’m not sure I head that.