# Airbus A330 control system/ Air France flight 447 **URL:** \ **Category:** Factual Questions\ **Created:** [December 10, 2011, 10:09pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/airbus-a330-control-system-air-france-flight-447/605770 "2011-12-10T22:09:43Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 5
**Author:** ![Robot\_Arm](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/robot_arm/32/18280_2.png) [@Robot\_Arm](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Robot_Arm)\ **Post date:** [December 21, 2011, 5:11pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/airbus-a330-control-system-air-france-flight-447/605770/81 "2011-12-21T17:11:33Z")
> [@Xema](#): > > I’d say the answer to this might be thorough training (in a simulator), so, unlike with AF447, pilots are very aware of the current state of “law”, and fully understand the capabilities and limitations of each. I’d be surprised if Air France is not already making plans for such training. Before they do that, I’d be curious to know if they’ve reproduced the conditions of this accident in a sim. I don’t know if it’s common practice for all accident investigations, but I have heard of it in some. Try a few flight crews and see if they can correctly diagnose the problem and get it under control without crashing. Maybe even have the co-pilot “panic” and pull back on his stick to see if the other pilot notices. Ideally, you’d want to do this with crews who haven’t read the transcript and don’t know what to expect. ---
**Author:** ![Orpheus701](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/b5a626/32.png) [@Orpheus701](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Orpheus701)\ **Post date:** [December 21, 2011, 9:53pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/airbus-a330-control-system-air-france-flight-447/605770/82 "2011-12-21T21:53:58Z")
> [@Xema](#): > > Very good analysis. > I’d say the answer to this might be thorough training (in a simulator), so, unlike with AF447, pilots are very aware of the current state of “law”, and fully understand the capabilities and limitations of each. I’d be surprised if Air France is not already making plans for such training. Thank you for your feedback, I am glad you found it to be a good analysis. I sincerely hope that these kind of measures are being put in place as it would seem remiss of any carrier not to train their pilots for all reasonable cofigurations of the aircraft. Surely icing of the pitot tubes in cruise cannot be considered so remote as to not train for it? But perhaps I betray my position as a non-pilot with this lack of knowledge. I will await the actual crash report with interest. One hopes the lessons that will be learned from this terrible tragedy will be heeded. Regards. ---
**Author:** ![Rick](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/9f8e36/32.png) [@Rick](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Rick)\ **Post date:** [December 28, 2011, 4:50am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/airbus-a330-control-system-air-france-flight-447/605770/83 "2011-12-28T04:50:26Z")
I got an email forward about flying and piloting today. A couple of them reminded me of this thread. Speed is life. Altitude is life insurance. And Aircraft Identification: If it’s ugly, it’s British. If it’s weird, it’s French. If it’s ugly and weird, it’s Russian. 🙂 ---
**Author:** ![Ximenean](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/x/aca169/32.png) [@Ximenean](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Ximenean)\ **Post date:** [December 28, 2011, 11:21am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/airbus-a330-control-system-air-france-flight-447/605770/84 "2011-12-28T11:21:33Z")
> [@Rick](#): > > Aircraft Identification: > If it’s ugly, it’s British. > If it’s weird, it’s French. > If it’s ugly and weird, it’s Russian. What about Concorde? By that logic, it would be both ugly and weird, and yet it is not Russian. Maybe its ugly weirdness is what prompted the Russians to copy it with the Tu-144, though. ---
**Author:** ![Hbns](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/h/8edcca/32.png) [@Hbns](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Hbns)\ **Post date:** [December 28, 2011, 5:40pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/airbus-a330-control-system-air-france-flight-447/605770/85 "2011-12-28T17:40:25Z")
> [@Ximenean](#): > > What about Concorde? By that logic, it would be both ugly and weird, and yet it is not Russian. Maybe its ugly weirdness is what prompted the Russians to copy it with the Tu-144, though. [Here they are together](http://www.travelcentre.com.au/Puddingshop/Images/Concorde_german_museum.jpg) in Germany at the [Auto & Technik Museum Sinsheim](http://sinsheim.technik-museum.de/en). Couldn’t find a better picture, but seeing them both sided by side it is quite easy to tell which is [del]weird[/del] French and which is [del]ugly and weird[/del] Russian. ---
**Author:** ![Fish\_Cheer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/fish_cheer/32/17179_2.png) [@Fish\_Cheer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Fish_Cheer)\ **Post date:** [December 28, 2011, 10:04pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/airbus-a330-control-system-air-france-flight-447/605770/86 "2011-12-28T22:04:44Z")
> [@Hbns](#): > > Couldn’t find a better picture, but seeing them both sided by side it is quite easy to tell which is [del]weird[/del] French and which is [del]ugly and weird[/del] Russian. Did they tack on the Dumbo ears to make it fly better? ---
**Author:** ![Robot\_Arm](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/robot_arm/32/18280_2.png) [@Robot\_Arm](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Robot_Arm)\ **Post date:** [December 28, 2011, 11:06pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/airbus-a330-control-system-air-france-flight-447/605770/87 "2011-12-28T23:06:27Z")
> [@Fish\_Cheer](#): > > Did they tack on the Dumbo ears to make it fly better? They’re called “canards”. According to [Wikipedia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tupolev_Tu-144): > [@](#): > > Alexei A. Tupolev[1] continued to work to improve the Tu-144 with upgrades and changes were made on the Tu-144 prototype. While both the Concorde and the Tu-144 prototype had ogival delta wings, the Tu-144’s wing lacked Concorde’s conical camber. Production Tu-144s replaced this wing with a double-delta wing including conical camber,[citation needed] and they added a simple but practical device: two small retractable canard surfaces, one on either side of the forward section on the aircraft, to increase lift at low speeds. > > Moving the elevons downward in a delta-wing aircraft increases the lift, but also pitches its nose downward. The canard cancels out this nose-downwards moment, thus reducing the landing speed of the production Tu-144s to 315–333 km/h (170–180 kn, 196–207 mph) – still faster than that of the Concorde.[2] ---
**Author:** ![Hbns](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/h/8edcca/32.png) [@Hbns](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Hbns)\ **Post date:** [December 30, 2011, 10:52pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/airbus-a330-control-system-air-france-flight-447/605770/88 "2011-12-30T22:52:54Z")
> [@Fish\_Cheer](#): > > Did they tack on the Dumbo ears to make it fly better? Basically yes as **Robot Arm** linked. 😃 Something you can’t see in the picture, but is very obvious in person is the shape of the wing. My understanding is that the difference in shape is a significant factor in the need for cannards on the Tupolev. From above the wing shape is very similar on the two aircraft, however viewing them from behind there is a noticeable difference. The Tupolev wing is straight, while the Concorde wing is curved downward at the ends. You can kind of see the [curvature in this image](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/ae/A%C3%A9rospatiale-BAC_Concorde_taking_off_evening.jpg). ---
**Author:** ![Fish\_Cheer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/fish_cheer/32/17179_2.png) [@Fish\_Cheer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Fish_Cheer)\ **Post date:** [January 1, 2012, 9:10pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/airbus-a330-control-system-air-france-flight-447/605770/89 "2012-01-01T21:10:36Z")
> [@Hbns](#): > > Basically yes as **Robot Arm** linked. 😃 > Something you can’t see in the picture, but is very obvious in person is the shape of the wing. My understanding is that the difference in shape is a significant factor in the need for cannards on the Tupolev. From above the wing shape is very similar on the two aircraft, however viewing them from behind there is a noticeable difference. The Tupolev wing is straight, while the Concorde wing is curved downward at the ends. You can kind of see the [curvature in this image](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/ae/A%C3%A9rospatiale-BAC_Concorde_taking_off_evening.jpg). Thanks for the explanations and the picture, **Robot Arm** and **Hbns**. The Concorde really is a beautiful and amazing piece of engineering! ---
**Author:** ![isaiahrobinson](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/85e7bf/32.png) [@isaiahrobinson](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/isaiahrobinson)\ **Post date:** [January 1, 2012, 11:56pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/airbus-a330-control-system-air-france-flight-447/605770/90 "2012-01-01T23:56:28Z")
> [@Orpheus701](#): > > Hello from London! First post here. Be gentle. 🙂 > > As a mechanical engineer who now works in travel (go figure) I have always had an interest in crash investigation and have read every fatal NTSB crash report published since 1967. Not for the morbid fascination of it I might add, but more for a fuller understanding of the processes that go on before, during and after accidents and the continued path of improvement beaten by investigators to try and ensure that they do not happen again. > > I have to say that the CVR transcript on this particular accident (or the parts of which that have been released thus far by BEA) is one of the singularly most chilling that I have ever read. The sense of confusion, panic and despair (“We’re going to crash, this can’t be happening”) paint a vivid picture of a cockpit in disarray at the situation these three men found themselves in. > > However, having read [this report](http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601e3/pdf/f-cp090601e3.pdf)in full (in French, ah google translate you are my mistress), it readily becomes apparent that a significant contributing factor to the accident sequence is indeed the design of the stall warning system/disconnect in alternate law. > > If one looks at the air data from the FDR traces, you can see that from a varying combination of invalid data readings at different times (including airspeed & AoA) the stall warning goes through ‘valid data-connect/invalid data-disconnect’ sequence a staggering 12 times, with the majority of the time the warning being in an ‘invalid data-disconnect’ mode (see pg 114 Alarme de Decrocharge, brown line). The fact the lowering the nose to correct the stall (as the PNF tried) actually validated data (either through increased airspeed or decreased AoA) and so in turn activated the Stall warning is completely counter intuitive, and surely must be considered a significant contributing factor. > > In addition to this is the relegation of the primary flight control in alternate law, the sidestick, to a position that is not readily visible to the other pilot, in addition to insufficient (albeit provided) warning of dual input. One only has to look at other dual-input accidents to see that mechanical linkage is not the only answer (Egypt Air flight 990 – Atlantic suicide crash - where mechanical linkage meant that one pilot was not able to override the other, though this is contested by the suicide pilot’s family). > > As previously mentioned in the thread a modern airliners cockpit is already visually busy “Too much information through one channel”, so perhaps an aural “Dual Input!” warning would be more appropriate than a light on a visually busy panel, rahter than any other kind of sensors on top of sensors to make sure that the sensor’s sensor is working, all the while leaving a genuinely mistaken, and possibly terrified, PF to continue in his fatal error. > > Finally a clear Attitude instrument rather than an inferred value from another display seems to the lay-man to be of utmost importance. Let me be clear, I am not a pilot, and do not understand the unique pressures of a cockpit emergency, nor the inherent knowledge gained during years in training and flight service. However, this seems to be a pretty fundamental value, as critical as airspeed or altitude. Sullenberger has been mentioned a few times in this thread, and he says of AoA Indicators “For more than half a century, we’ve had the capability to display AoA [in the cockpits of most jet transports], one of the most critical parameters, yet we choose not to do it”. [See here.](http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=bca&id=news/bca0711p2.xml) > > Given the facts (as presented) in the document, and assuming that no mechanical factors emerge such as constant uncommanded nose-up PF sidestick input (which is unlikely given the remark “But I’ve been pulling back the whole the time” ref: CVR trans 2hr13min.40 PF (bonin) “Mais je suis à fond à cabrer depuis tout à l’heure”), then if I were to issue a crash report based on the information currently available I would conclude as follows: > > Primary cause of AF447 crash: > > 1. Pilot error due to constant, incorrect, high value nose-up input on the sidestick by PF, after the disconnect of autopilot due to icing of the Pitot tubes and loss of accurate airspeed data, leading to a climb above REC MAX altitude, followed by high altitude stall > > 2. Failure of CRM by PF&PNF to effectively communicate actions in the period before the Captain’s return, manage available data, and designate tasks during the initial phase of the emergency > > 3. Failure of CRM by captain to effectively take control of the situation upon his return, or to identify condition of aircraft as stalled, despite high decent rate (-10,000vft/m), high thrust (106% n1) and excessive AoA (\>41deg at max), and thus take appropriate measure directly, or be delegation to recover the aircraft > > Significant contributing factors > > 1. The design of the Stall Warning data validation system leading to a disconnect/connect sequence that confused the pilots, was counter intuitive and created a situation where the corrective action was penalised by a prominent, high urgency warning (Stall Stall) > > 2. The demotion of a key control interface (sidestick) from a prominent, visible position to one that is secondary. > > 3. The lack of provision of significant warning cues of dual input. > > 4. The lack of training by AF in high altitude stalls, corrective action, and appropriate troubleshooting when significant time is available (accident sequence was over 4 minutes) > > 5. The significant operational differences between normal and alternate law in the A330, insomuch that in normal law an A330 aircraft “cannot” be stalled due to computer safeguards, whereas in alternate law these safeguards so not exist. This leads naturally to a reduction in flight control awareness (ie anything I do cannot crash this plane at altitude) in normal law. > (I feel this this is significant because the vast majority of time spent is in normal law, so it is reasonable to expect a pilot to revert to “what he knows” in a situation of extreme stress such as this accident. but this is my own subjective opinion) > > Sorry for the essay, I hope you found it interesting. I would value any comments on my thoughts, or indeed any thoughts my comments provoke! Interesting analysis. It’s scary that something as simple as “pilot pushing stick the wrong way for a few minutes” is what caused a major commercial airliner to plummet into open ocean in the middle of the night. ---
**Author:** ![Rick](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/9f8e36/32.png) [@Rick](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Rick)\ **Post date:** [January 2, 2012, 12:33am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/airbus-a330-control-system-air-france-flight-447/605770/91 "2012-01-02T00:33:00Z")
> [@isaiahrobinson](#): > > Interesting analysis. It’s scary that something as simple as “pilot pushing stick the wrong way for a few minutes” is what caused a major commercial airliner to plummet into open ocean in the middle of the night. Push the stick the wrong way on any airplane long enough and the same result will occur. What is scary about this is that the other two pilots did not recognize the problem and that the control design did not give them the feedback needed to recognize the problem in time to correct it. ---
**Author:** ![Xema](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/x/9de053/32.png) [@Xema](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Xema)\ **Post date:** [January 2, 2012, 1:38am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/airbus-a330-control-system-air-france-flight-447/605770/92 "2012-01-02T01:38:06Z")
At a holiday party I had an interesting conversation with a man who is an A330 pilot. He had not had a chance to read the details of the AF447 crash. When I told him that Bonin appears to have held the controller back through the whole event, he mentioned that there is a mode known (IIRC) as “Alpha Floor”: if you hold the controller aft, the plane will climb to the maximum altitude it can maintain, and stay there, at a low but fully controllable airspeed (or so I gathered). The catch is that this is true only under Normal Law, which was not in effect after the pitot problem. But if we assume that Bonin was not aware of this difference, or did not properly note the shift from Normal to Alternate Law, this could be an explanation for his (otherwise rather strange) action. ---
**Author:** ![Magiver](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/4491bb/32.png) [@Magiver](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Magiver)\ **Post date:** [January 2, 2012, 3:48am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/airbus-a330-control-system-air-france-flight-447/605770/93 "2012-01-02T03:48:39Z")
> [@Rick](#): > > I think one huge part of the problem is when the plane is is normal law mode it is unstallable. > However with the lost of air speed data the computer switched to alternate law where the plane was able to stall. > Thee should be huge fucking warnings and horns and whatever that the plane is in alternate law. > I see nothing in this report that any such warning was given by the plane. > Piss poor design IMHO. How does the plane know when all the pitot tube inputs are in error? There was certainly a cascade effect of bad information fed to the computers that should never happen and has been addressed with pitot heat upgrades. As I understand it, there is a narrow window that the pilots have to correct such a situation and they need to know what is going on for that to happen. This isn’t like the crash in Buffalo where the crew was given correct information and basically did the opposite of what needed to be done. And yes, piss poor design seems to be how I’d describe it. ---
**Author:** ![iamnotbatman](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/858c86/32.png) [@iamnotbatman](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/iamnotbatman)\ **Post date:** [July 6, 2012, 8:43am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/airbus-a330-control-system-air-france-flight-447/605770/94 "2012-07-06T08:43:56Z")
So… now that the [final report](http://www.bea.aero/en/enquetes/flight.af.447/rapport.final.en.php) is out, can any experts glean any added insight? Does the final report add anything new? The message I get from the report is gross pilot error (obviously in an incredibly difficult situation, I’m not judging). ---
**Author:** ![md2000](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/73ab20/32.png) [@md2000](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/md2000)\ **Post date:** [July 6, 2012, 2:40pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/airbus-a330-control-system-air-france-flight-447/605770/95 "2012-07-06T14:40:10Z")
First, the copilot’s action in holding back the stick was not totally illogical. You are flying along, the stall warning is off, the engines are close to full throttle, a climb is standard procedure and will probably take you above some of this bucking and shaking which probably is the storm you are in. In fact, when the captain pushes the nose down a bit, the stall warning comes on. Nose down does not seem to be right. Climbing seems right. Of course, if you stop and think (in the middle of what must have been wild shaking and a cockpit full of noises and contradictory instruments) nose down should NOT cause a stall. However “if I do A it stalls, stop doing it” is not an unexpected response. IMHO they don’t need completely mechanically linked sticks, but some sort of “force feedback” system, higher resistance, maybe a bit of shaking, when pushing against a contrary stick would go some way toward avoiding the “single channel of input” issue. They did it 15 years ago for a cheap joystick, surely they can do it reliably to two sticks considering what an airbus cost. Also, the stall warning was a problem; \*\*\*the \*\*\*problem. Even if they had a different stall warning - two-toned or whatever (thinks french police sirens) for “I think you are stalling but I’m not sure” that would have been better than “you are not stalling”. Absent the stall warning, it’s not completely surprising what the copilot did and it’s sad that this thread especially seems to be heaping the blame on his action. I had my instructor once demonstrate the reliability of seat-of-pants flying. He took me into a cloud, no visual cues, and said “just fly what feels right”. After 30 seconds, he says “now check the instruments”. What felt 'straight and level" to my inner ear had turned into a spiral downward, a slow turn while descending. And that was soft, bump-free flying. All the discussion of multiple modes, failsafe auto-climb options, etc. imply means the machine has become so complex that it is difficult to remember all the picky details in times of imminent panic. I suppose the best legacy these fatalities give us is that all pilots now have a slap-in-the-face refresher course on what could possibly go wrong in this situation, and all the odd trivia associated with the fly-by-wire system. That makes all aircraft that much safer until the next serious but different unusual situation comes along. Of course, the altimeter should be your most reliable instrument. It does not need a pitot, it can take input from any unpressurized area of the plane. ---
**Author:** ![Xema](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/x/9de053/32.png) [@Xema](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Xema)\ **Post date:** [July 6, 2012, 4:21pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/airbus-a330-control-system-air-france-flight-447/605770/96 "2012-07-06T16:21:22Z")
> [@md2000](#): > > … it’s not completely surprising what the copilot did and it’s sad that this thread especially seems to be heaping the blame on his action. What the copilot did isn’t completely surprising - but it was far outside what should be expected of anyone competent to fly this aircraft. His failure to understand that the plane was in Alternate Law, or that his action - acceptable under Normal Law - was now not appropriate was an essential part of the process that led to this crash. IOW, the evidence strongly suggests that this action is fully deserving of blame. ---
**Author:** ![iamnotbatman](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/858c86/32.png) [@iamnotbatman](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/iamnotbatman)\ **Post date:** [July 6, 2012, 4:22pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/airbus-a330-control-system-air-france-flight-447/605770/97 "2012-07-06T16:22:45Z")
My understanding is that the only instrument that wasn’t working was the airspeed, correct? The artificial horizon, the altitude, that was all working, right? Shouldn’t they have been able to see that they were pointing too far above the horizon in a situation where they were worried about stalling? ---
**Author:** ![md2000](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/73ab20/32.png) [@md2000](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/md2000)\ **Post date:** [July 6, 2012, 6:24pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/airbus-a330-control-system-air-france-flight-447/605770/98 "2012-07-06T18:24:03Z")
> [@iamnotbatman](#): > > My understanding is that the only instrument that wasn’t working was the airspeed, correct? The artificial horizon, the altitude, that was all working, right? Shouldn’t they have been able to see that they were pointing too far above the horizon in a situation where they were worried about stalling? As someone suggested in a much earlier thread, once the plane stalled, odds are it was bouncing like crazy - it would not be a smooth, soft ride, more like it was being shaken and rocked at the same time. Add to that the turbulence of the top end of a thunderstorm and the problem might have been compounded by no steady indicators to read. Everyone says “nose up 40 degrees” but that’s the extreme, it was about 15-20 and with a lot of shaking, and no horizon reference, odds are it was hard to get an idea without instruments exactly what the attitude of the plane was. Maybe the copilot remembers the “autoclimb” rule but forgot it did not apply in Alternate Law mode… \*“Shake me like a British nanny!” \*- Stewie, Family Guy When you are being shaken all over, it’s difficult to stop and do some introspection on what may be happening or what does and does not make sense. Is there anything in the report about how turbulent their aircraft was during the problem? ---
**Author:** ![isaiahrobinson](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/85e7bf/32.png) [@isaiahrobinson](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/isaiahrobinson)\ **Post date:** [July 6, 2012, 9:49pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/airbus-a330-control-system-air-france-flight-447/605770/99 "2012-07-06T21:49:58Z")
> [@iamnotbatman](#): > > My understanding is that the only instrument that wasn’t working was the airspeed, correct? The artificial horizon, the altitude, that was all working, right? Shouldn’t they have been able to see that they were pointing too far above the horizon in a situation where they were worried about stalling? Even the airspeed indicators were only displaying incorrect information for about 180 seconds in total. Every instrument in the cockpit was functioning accurately again before the plane even started to descend. The problem was that brief disconnection caused the plane to change into “alternate law” and the pilots to fail to trust the instruments from then on. [QUOTE=md2000] As someone suggested in a much earlier thread, once the plane stalled, odds are it was bouncing like crazy - it would not be a smooth, soft ride, more like it was being shaken and rocked at the same time. Add to that the turbulence of the top end of a thunderstorm and the problem might have been compounded by no steady indicators to read. Everyone says “nose up 40 degrees” but that’s the extreme, it was about 15-20 and with a lot of shaking, and no horizon reference, odds are it was hard to get an idea without instruments exactly what the attitude of the plane was. Maybe the copilot remembers the “autoclimb” rule but forgot it did not apply in Alternate Law mode… “Shake me like a British nanny!” - Stewie, Family Guy When you are being shaken all over, it’s difficult to stop and do some introspection on what may be happening or what does and does not make sense. Is there anything in the report about how turbulent their aircraft was during the problem? [/QUOTE] The captain managed to walk back to the cockpit from his sleeping quarters during the stall descent. So the plane may well have been shaking but it surely can’t have been “bouncing like crazy”. They would have been able to read the instruments; in fact the final sentence the Captain uttered before the plane hit the water was a reading from the pitch indicator (“15 degrees of pitch…”). ---
**Author:** ![PastTense](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/pasttense/32/14550_2.png) [@PastTense](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/PastTense)\ **Post date:** [October 11, 2022, 6:32am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/airbus-a330-control-system-air-france-flight-447/605770/100 "2022-10-11T06:32:48Z")
Anyone following this? > **[Final minutes of Air France flight AF447 to be examined as trial opens](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/10/air-france-flight-af477-2009-crash-trial-airbus)** > > Air France and Airbus are being tried on charges of involuntary manslaughter after 228 people died in the 2009 crash > **[Manslaughter trial over 2009 Air France crash begins with cries of ‘shame’](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/10/manslaughter-trial-2009-air-france-crash-opens-airbus-flight-af-447)** > > Anger as airline and Airbus plead not guilty to charge 13 years after flight AF447 crashed, killing 228 people I don’t think manslaughter is appropriate. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/airbus-a330-control-system-air-france-flight-447/605770.md?page=4) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/airbus-a330-control-system-air-france-flight-447/605770.md?page=6)