Let’s compare and contrast the fact surrounding Reid and al-Awlaki:
Reid: wife of a US servicemember; al-Awlaki: member of a designated terrorist organization
R: taken into police custody after murdering her husband; aA: traveling in a convoy with Al Qaeda leaders in a remote country
R: the government sought to prosecute her under the Uniform Code of Military Justice; aA: the government sought to attack him as a combatant in accordance with the laws of war and the AUMF
R: was in Britain, a country with a status of forces agreement with the US; aA: in an ungoverned part of Yemen
These situations are as similar as chalk and cheese. Had there been a raid which resulted in the capture of al-Awlaki by the FBI or something, then the question of what rights he may have would be completely different. But trying to apply a ruling which deals with a person in US custody facing charges of murdering her husband in a time of peace on a US military installation has no value whatsoever in drawing conclusions with what the government may do to a combatant in a barely-governed country half a world away during a time of war. It’s just stupid to pretend that the cases are in any way analogous.
I agree. Quirin is not a glass slipper that fits perfectly on al-Awlaki’s foot. However, unlike Reid, Quirin actually deals with the issue of US citizens who are combatants… the main difference being, as you state, that the Nazi saboteurs were inside the United States and apprehended, aA was on the loose and outside the country.
The instructive part of Quirin is also that, after all is said and done, even though Herbert Haupt was a US citizen, the Court did not rule that as a citizen he was entitled to more judicial protections than the other saboteurs. His execution was not stayed or a new trial reordered separate from the Germans. In essence, the court said that even though he was a citizen, he had thrown his lot in with the enemy, and he wasn’t entitled to special treatment.
If foreign combatants may be attacked by the military under a type of “due process” that is non-judicial in nature (i.e., military authorities must be acting under legal orders, complying with the laws of war, attacking the targets in a reasonable and lawful manner, etc.), I think Quirin would indicate that US citizens who have thrown in with the enemy are afforded identical “due process.”
After all, if US and foreign citizens who are enemy combatants may be subjected to identical legal procedures while in US custody inside the US, why would US citizens be given MORE protections than their foreign enemy compatriots while overseas and in a zone of hostilities? That makes no sense at all.