# Alaska Div. of Elections refuses to disclose Diebold electronic voting files **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [January 26, 2006, 9:49pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/alaska-div-of-elections-refuses-to-disclose-diebold-electronic-voting-files/341761 "2006-01-26T21:49:22Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 3
**Author:** ![UncleBeer](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/u/977dab/32.png) [@UncleBeer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/UncleBeer)\ **Post date:** [January 27, 2006, 5:32pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/alaska-div-of-elections-refuses-to-disclose-diebold-electronic-voting-files/341761/41 "2006-01-27T17:32:03Z")
> [@DMC](#): > > Do you want those sort of things to be protected via contract at all in regards to the election process? If this keeps up, George Soros should create an electronic voting machine company and undercut Diebold on prices. I’m betting we’d have laws to open up pretty fucking fast at that point. What I _want_ matters not at all. What does matter is the law governing the current contract. I’d _like_ the whole process to be as open as possible, too, just like you. But right now we gotta work with what’s in place. Other than that, the rest of your statement is just speculation. > [@DMC](#): > > Based on this, my understanding is that in the voting world of Diebold, we get no paper trail, no source code verification, and now we can’t even see the actual electronic trail that was supposed to be the reason we didn’t need a paper trail? Bullshit. Someone either has something to hide, or wants to preserve the right to hide it in the future and get away with it. Diebold now makes voting machines in which a paper trail is integral; paper trails were required as part the implementation of HAVA. These new Diebold machines were used in Ohio recently and the first generation machines (which didn’t have a paper trail) have been decertified here. One would also assume the Secretary of State has implemented a certification plan which would eliminate most avenues open to fraud and abuse. ---
**Author:** ![DMC](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/dmc/32/18049_2.png) [@DMC](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DMC)\ **Post date:** [January 27, 2006, 5:41pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/alaska-div-of-elections-refuses-to-disclose-diebold-electronic-voting-files/341761/42 "2006-01-27T17:41:30Z")
> [@Evil Captor](#): > > We’ve kinda switched from, “Was there vote fraud in Alaska and why won’t Diebold let us find out?” to “Let’s not use propriety databases any more in election machinery.” I think the second sentiment is fine, but it sounds like everyone has pretty much conceded the point that Alaska voters don’t have the right to know if their elections were conducted honestly or not. I haven’t conceded that at all. 🙂 ---
**Author:** ![DMC](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/dmc/32/18049_2.png) [@DMC](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DMC)\ **Post date:** [January 27, 2006, 5:45pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/alaska-div-of-elections-refuses-to-disclose-diebold-electronic-voting-files/341761/43 "2006-01-27T17:45:41Z")
> [@UncleBeer](#): > > What I _want_ matters not at all. What does matter is the law governing the current contract. I’d _like_ the whole process to be as open as possible, too, just like you. But right now we gotta work with what’s in place. Other than that, the rest of your statement is just speculation. What is speculation? That they’d open up if Soros’ machines started showing up everywhere? I guess that’s speculative, but I’m pretty confident that it would happen. Note that I don’t consider that a bad thing. > [@](#): > > Diebold now makes voting machines in which a paper trail is integral; paper trails were required as part the implementation of HAVA. These new Diebold machines were used in Ohio recently and the first generation machines (which didn’t have a paper trail) have been decertified here. One would also assume the Secretary of State has implemented a certification plan which would eliminate most avenues open to fraud and abuse. If this is a “Voter-verified” paper trail, then I’m a lot happier with it. If it’s not that kind, then I’d like to know more about it. ---
**Author:** ![UncleBeer](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/u/977dab/32.png) [@UncleBeer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/UncleBeer)\ **Post date:** [January 27, 2006, 6:08pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/alaska-div-of-elections-refuses-to-disclose-diebold-electronic-voting-files/341761/44 "2006-01-27T18:08:02Z")
> [@DMC](#): > > What is speculation? That they’d open up if Soros’ machines started showing up everywhere? I guess that’s speculative, but I’m pretty confident that it would happen. Note that I don’t consider that a bad thing. I guess I don’t really have too much of an issue with your opinion. But if were gonna speculate, we might also reasonably believe that Soros would put up the same fight that Diebold is having before releasing his data. > [@](#): > > If this is a “Voter-verified” paper trail, then I’m a lot happier with it. If it’s not that kind, then I’d like to know more about it. Indeed it is. And hard copies of every screen can be printed by election officials to help with their audits. And looking at the Diebold website, it seems to indicate that ballots are encrypted immediately on submission. Perhaps this encryption process would be exposed if raw data is released. Again, I’m not necessarily comfortable with that, but this might be a legitimate trade secret Diebold wishes to protect. > [@Diebold Website](#): > > _ **Q: How do I know my cast ballot is safe and secure?** _ > > A: When a voter casts their ballot using the Diebold touch screen system, the ballot selections are immediately encrypted and stored in multiple locations within the voting station. When stored, the order of cast ballots is scrambled to further insure ballot anonymity. The image of each and every ballot cast on the voting station is captured, and can be anonymously reproduced on standard paper should a hard copy of ballots be required for recount purposes. Once voting concludes at a precinct, a printed election results report is printed as a permanent record of all activity at each voting station. This printed record is used to audit the electronic tabulation of votes conducted during the election canvas process, when final, official election results are reported. Also at the Diebold website, available are a couple statements (.pdf format) issued by the company regarding many of the allegations levied against Diebold. [http://www.diebold.com/dieboldes/pdf/rebuttal.pdf](http://www.diebold.com/dieboldes/pdf/rebuttal.pdf) [http://www.diebold.com/dieboldes/pdf/activistletter.pdf](http://www.diebold.com/dieboldes/pdf/activistletter.pdf) ---
**Author:** ![Gorsnak](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/gorsnak/32/7587_2.png) [@Gorsnak](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Gorsnak)\ **Post date:** [January 27, 2006, 6:11pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/alaska-div-of-elections-refuses-to-disclose-diebold-electronic-voting-files/341761/45 "2006-01-27T18:11:43Z")
Man, reading this thread makes me grateful for our wonderfully archaic voting technology - a paper ballot with an X pencilled in one of the circles. ---
**Author:** ![BrainGlutton](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/82dd89/32.png) [@BrainGlutton](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/BrainGlutton)\ **Post date:** [January 27, 2006, 6:17pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/alaska-div-of-elections-refuses-to-disclose-diebold-electronic-voting-files/341761/46 "2006-01-27T18:17:44Z")
> [@UncleBeer](#): > > Diebold now makes voting machines in which a paper trail is integral; paper trails were required as part the implementation of HAVA. Are you sure? I don’t thing HAVA requires that. (Or are you referring to Alaska’s implementation legislation?) There is a bill (the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2003 – [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voter\_Confidence\_and\_Increased\_Accessibility\_Act\_of\_2003](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voter_Confidence_and_Increased_Accessibility_Act_of_2003)) which has been proposed by Congressman Rush Holt (D-NJ) and Senator Bob Graham (D-FL), which would require paper trails, but Congress has not yet passed it. ---
**Author:** ![DMC](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/dmc/32/18049_2.png) [@DMC](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DMC)\ **Post date:** [January 27, 2006, 6:21pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/alaska-div-of-elections-refuses-to-disclose-diebold-electronic-voting-files/341761/47 "2006-01-27T18:21:38Z")
> [@UncleBeer](#): > > Diebold now makes voting machines in which a paper trail is integral; paper trails were required as part the implementation of HAVA. I did some checking and there is no requirement in HAVA that this be voter-verified. Having some printer in some back room spitting out numbers isn’t going to do anything to eliminate the possibility of fraud. ---
**Author:** ![BrainGlutton](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/82dd89/32.png) [@BrainGlutton](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/BrainGlutton)\ **Post date:** [January 27, 2006, 6:22pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/alaska-div-of-elections-refuses-to-disclose-diebold-electronic-voting-files/341761/48 "2006-01-27T18:22:09Z")
> [@UncleBeer](#): > > I guess I don’t really have too much of an issue with your opinion. But if were gonna speculate, we might also reasonably believe that Soros would put up the same fight that Diebold is having before releasing his data. I doubt it. Soros appears to be an honest and civic-minded fellow, despite Dennis Hastert’s laughable efforts to smear him. [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George\_soros#Critics](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_soros#Critics) ---
**Author:** ![DMC](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/dmc/32/18049_2.png) [@DMC](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DMC)\ **Post date:** [January 27, 2006, 6:33pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/alaska-div-of-elections-refuses-to-disclose-diebold-electronic-voting-files/341761/49 "2006-01-27T18:33:25Z")
> [@UncleBeer](#): > > I guess I don’t really have too much of an issue with your opinion. But if were gonna speculate, we might also reasonably believe that Soros would put up the same fight that Diebold is having before releasing his data. I don’t think he would, but if he did I’d be here saying that he’s dead wrong and that we need to fight him to open it up. This isn’t a partisan issue. I want all votes to be counted and accurate, no matter who wins. It’s quite easy to find many posts in my history here where I make the statement that I’d much rather lose elections than be wrong. > [@](#): > > Indeed it is. And hard copies of every screen can be printed by election officials to help with their audits. That’s not what we mean by voter-verified. A voter needs to get a printout that details every single one of his votes, as well as some method of verfiying that the system and his receipt do in fact synch up. It should also have some form of unique identifier so that it could be validated against the tallied data in case of a recount. Having an election official be able to capture a screen shot when requested doesn’t really cut it, as it has no identifying information to tie it back to the actual data itself. > [@](#): > > And looking at the Diebold website, it seems to indicate that ballots are encrypted immediately on submission. Perhaps this encryption process would be exposed if raw data is released. Again, I’m not necessarily comfortable with that, but this might be a legitimate trade secret Diebold wishes to protect. They use DES encryption, which is publicly documented, and was actually broken a long time ago. The only secretive part of it is the key code used, and as noted, that is attainable for those with the knowledge to do so. On a side note, Diebold uses the exact same code in all machines, and it’s embedded in the source code. Heck, I have the key itself, and will happily post it here if the mods allow. 🙂 ---
**Author:** ![UncleBeer](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/u/977dab/32.png) [@UncleBeer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/UncleBeer)\ **Post date:** [January 27, 2006, 6:46pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/alaska-div-of-elections-refuses-to-disclose-diebold-electronic-voting-files/341761/50 "2006-01-27T18:46:18Z")
> [@DMC](#): > > I did some checking and there is no requirement in HAVA that this be voter-verified. Having some printer in some back room spitting out numbers isn’t going to do anything to eliminate the possibility of fraud. See page 25 of this .pdf. It’s the Ohio Sec State’s plan for implementing HAVA. HAVA required the Sec State to submit a plan for approval to the federal authorities. [http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/hava/statePlan011205.pdf](http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/hava/statePlan011205.pdf) > [@](#): > > On May 7, 2004, Governor Taft signed into law Substitute House Bill 262. The Act requires all direct recording electronic voting machines used in Ohio to include a voter verified paper audit trail and changes the process for counties to acquire voting systems using funds made available pursuant to the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002. I have no idea how Alaska implemented HAVA, but I assure you here in Ohio a voter verified paper trail is now required. Also from the Ohio Sec State’s HAVA plan regarding the “backroom counting” (on page 28 of the same .pdf): > [@](#): > > Audit Capacity: > > • While the system allows the vote to be counted and tabulated electronically, the system also must be capable of producing a permanent paper record that can be audited manually. The paper record must be produced in such a way as to function as an official record for any potential recount or any question that might arise subsequent to the election. ---
**Author:** ![DMC](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/dmc/32/18049_2.png) [@DMC](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DMC)\ **Post date:** [January 27, 2006, 6:49pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/alaska-div-of-elections-refuses-to-disclose-diebold-electronic-voting-files/341761/51 "2006-01-27T18:49:50Z")
> [@UncleBeer](#): > > See page 25 of this .pdf. It’s the Ohio Sec State’s plan for implementing HAVA. HAVA required the Sec State to submit a plan for approval to the federal authorities. Those are two different things. It does look like Ohio is requiring a voter-verified trail, but the second quote bubble in your post doesn’t make the same requirement. HAVA doesn’t require a voter-verified paper trail, but I am glad that Ohio is going to start requiring one going forward. ---
**Author:** ![DMC](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/dmc/32/18049_2.png) [@DMC](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DMC)\ **Post date:** [January 27, 2006, 6:51pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/alaska-div-of-elections-refuses-to-disclose-diebold-electronic-voting-files/341761/52 "2006-01-27T18:51:00Z")
Note that I mean the second of **your** quote bubbles, not counting where you quote me. 🙂 ---
**Author:** ![Sam\_Stone](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/ecccb3/32.png) [@Sam\_Stone](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Sam_Stone)\ **Post date:** [January 27, 2006, 6:55pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/alaska-div-of-elections-refuses-to-disclose-diebold-electronic-voting-files/341761/53 "2006-01-27T18:55:57Z")
What the hell is wrong with just using paper ballots? I’m totally baffled by the complex array of punch cards, electronic voting machines, and all the other Rube Goldberg ways of voting you Americans seem to have. Here in Canada, we get a card. It has candidates names on it, with a big circle or square beside each name. The instructions says, “Put an X in the box beside the person you wish to vote for”. We do so. We take it up to the counter, and they run the card into a computer tabulator. If it can’t read the card, it rejects it on the spot and you are sent back to fill out another one. If it accepts the card, a worker checks your name off the voters list, and you leave. No hanging chads, no butterfly ballots, no Diebold machines, NO COMPLAINTS. My technophobe mother can figure out how to fill out the ballot. The electronic tabulation is instant, and vote counts are sent in minutes after the polls close. And we have paper ballots as backup to check the electronic totals. What is so hard about that? If you must use the Diebold machines, how hard would it be for the machine to spit out a paper slip at the end, so there’s an instant record? Let the voter review it to verify that it recorded his vote correctly. This isn’t rocket science. It baffles me that you guys have so much trouble coming up with workable voting systems. ---
**Author:** ![Sam\_Stone](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/ecccb3/32.png) [@Sam\_Stone](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Sam_Stone)\ **Post date:** [January 27, 2006, 6:58pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/alaska-div-of-elections-refuses-to-disclose-diebold-electronic-voting-files/341761/54 "2006-01-27T18:58:56Z")
Oh, and let me add my voice to those who think that storing voter records in an unsecured Access database is completely frickin’ insane. This is why government should not be trusted to run society. It can’t do anything right. ---
**Author:** ![BrainGlutton](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/82dd89/32.png) [@BrainGlutton](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/BrainGlutton)\ **Post date:** [January 27, 2006, 7:07pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/alaska-div-of-elections-refuses-to-disclose-diebold-electronic-voting-files/341761/55 "2006-01-27T19:07:26Z")
> [@Sam Stone](#): > > What the hell is wrong with just using paper ballots? I’m totally baffled by the complex array of punch cards, electronic voting machines, and all the other Rube Goldberg ways of voting you Americans seem to have. But technology is **cool!** 🙂 I remember from several Thomas Nast cartoons – in the late 19th Century, apparently a “ballot box” was a glass globe in a wooden frame. So everyone could watch every ballot as it was dropped in the slot. Any pre-election stuffing would be obvious, and you had to break the globe to count the votes. I wonder why we dropped that? > [@Sam Stone](#): > > This is why government should not be trusted to run society. It can’t do anything right. To be fair, in this particular instance the problem is that the government contracted out certain public functions to a private corporation. ---
**Author:** ![BrainGlutton](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/82dd89/32.png) [@BrainGlutton](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/BrainGlutton)\ **Post date:** [January 27, 2006, 7:09pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/alaska-div-of-elections-refuses-to-disclose-diebold-electronic-voting-files/341761/56 "2006-01-27T19:09:38Z")
> [@UncleBeer](#): > > I have no idea how Alaska implemented HAVA, but I assure you here in Ohio a voter verified paper trail is now required. _sigh_ . . . Progress always comes too late . . . ---
**Author:** ![UncleBeer](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/u/977dab/32.png) [@UncleBeer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/UncleBeer)\ **Post date:** [January 27, 2006, 7:12pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/alaska-div-of-elections-refuses-to-disclose-diebold-electronic-voting-files/341761/57 "2006-01-27T19:12:01Z")
> [@DMC](#): > > That’s not what we mean by voter-verified. A voter needs to get a printout that details every single one of his votes, as well as some method of verfiying that the system and his receipt do in fact synch up. It should also have some form of unique identifier so that it could be validated against the tallied data in case of a recount. Having an election official be able to capture a screen shot when requested doesn’t really cut it, as it has no identifying information to tie it back to the actual data itself. I know what it means - VVPAT - Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail. It’s an integral part of the Ohio plan. > [@](#): > > They use DES encryption, which is publicly documented, and was actually broken a long time ago. The only secretive part of it is the key code used, and as noted, that is attainable for those with the knowledge to do so. On a side note, Diebold uses the exact same code in all machines, and it’s embedded in the source code. Heck, I have the key itself, and will happily post it here if the mods allow. 🙂 That’s okay. I’ll take your word for it. If you say the key to the encryption system is public, I’ll accept that. ---
**Author:** ![UncleBeer](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/u/977dab/32.png) [@UncleBeer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/UncleBeer)\ **Post date:** [January 27, 2006, 7:14pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/alaska-div-of-elections-refuses-to-disclose-diebold-electronic-voting-files/341761/58 "2006-01-27T19:14:17Z")
And stop posting while I’m composing. Damn you, DMC. 😃 ---
**Author:** ![DMC](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/dmc/32/18049_2.png) [@DMC](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DMC)\ **Post date:** [January 27, 2006, 7:14pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/alaska-div-of-elections-refuses-to-disclose-diebold-electronic-voting-files/341761/59 "2006-01-27T19:14:18Z")
> [@UncleBeer](#): > > I know what it means - VVPAT - Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail. It’s an integral part of the Ohio plan. I agree that Ohio is now going that route. I’m merely stating that it’s **not** a requirement of HAVA. ---
**Author:** ![Sam\_Stone](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/ecccb3/32.png) [@Sam\_Stone](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Sam_Stone)\ **Post date:** [January 27, 2006, 7:14pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/alaska-div-of-elections-refuses-to-disclose-diebold-electronic-voting-files/341761/60 "2006-01-27T19:14:25Z")
> [@BrainGlutton](#): > > To be fair, in this particular instance the problem is that the government contracted out certain public functions to a private corporation. Which only means they are lousy at outsourcing, too. Was there no oversight? Couldn’t the government have hired, say, a 3rd year computing science student to help decide if the private company was totally nuts? No, and the reason was probably because Diebold got the contract due to some backroom deal between a couple of senators trading favors. Like everything else in the government is done. Like those 16,000 plus ‘earmarks’ that get added to the budget. Government is incompetent. It should do as little as possible. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/alaska-div-of-elections-refuses-to-disclose-diebold-electronic-voting-files/341761.md?page=2) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/alaska-div-of-elections-refuses-to-disclose-diebold-electronic-voting-files/341761.md?page=4)