Before we can judge, we need to know what you suggest the Germans do not build in order to afford this huge investment. U-boats? Tanks? Fighters?
It could have happened if the decision had been made to do it. If the Allies had decided on a 1943 cross-channel invasion in 1942, the material was there. The landing craft that actually existed in 1943 would have been enough to land several divisions if it had been brought to England.
The big problem was that the cross-channel invasion was going to be one of the biggest operations of the war and needed a year to be put together. And nobody in 1942 knew how the war was going to go and what the strategic situation would be in 1943. So while a cross-channel invasion could have been made in 1943, nobody had known that in 1942 and the preparations hadn’t been made. So an Italian invasion was chosen because it was doable.
And several people seem to feel I suggested pulling every soldier out of North Africa and every sailor out of the Med. Obviously that would have been a stupid idea. I would leave forces necessary for the defense of both areas present. But a realistic appraisal of the Axis’ ability to launch any serious attack in those areas would indicate that the forces needed wouldn’t have been large.
I think it was mainly me making that assumption. And I made it because I just can’t see where the Allies would get the fleets and troops for a 43 French invasion without doing this.
You now say that for a '43 invasion, it would take a year of planning so the decision would have to be made in '42, and there were plenty of supplies in Britain in '43 to do so. I am quite skeptical that any reasonable planning for a '43 invasion could be done in '42 given that the US had only been in the war for a few months and had no idea how their troops would perform. I am also skeptical that there would be enough supplies to do N Africa in '42/'43 AND France in '43.
I would be inclined to agree that trying to jump the channel in summer 1943 would have been a bit too ambitious. It might have been achievable but would have been too high-risk given the lack of force buildup and preparation.
As for the discussion about ‘abandoning’ the med and letting the germans free up troops from Italy, I would have thought keeping a reasonably substantial air and naval force in Malta/Sicily and raiding the coasts would have kept them occupied, since they would never know whether a naval landing in Italy/Southern France was on the cards. Given the availability of intelligence from Ultra, any Axis attempt to reinvade Africa in 1943 would have resulted in the entire force ending up on the bottom of the Med.
On the other side of the coin, a german invasion of south-east england in 1940 would have a reasonable chance of success if air superiority was available, but would probably have been costly. Even with limited sealift capability, if the Luftwaffe could keep the RN away and offer CAS, putting well-trained and reasonably equipped Wermacht troops up against BEF and Home Guard units armed with shotguns, muskets and pikes(!) would have had a reasonable chance of victory. In the early stages of the war the Germans usually displayed much better command and articulation than their opponents, which would have helped offset the disadvantages of unknown terrain and the ‘Operation Pigpile’ landing.
The calculation would change even more if the german Para units hadn’t been squandered in the Netherlands and Crete, but I would think that if the ‘invincible’ Wermacht of 1940 had achieved a toehold on the English mainland, resistance would crumble rapidly.
How about a multi V2 & sarin attack on London in early 1945. If Hitler would be just a litttle wee more crazy and despaired it would ceartenly be possible. What would Britain do?
Well, depending on how well the Nazis had mastered the airburst technology necessary to cause mass casualties, they would either ignore the pin-prick or retailiate to the atrocity by carpet-bombing germany with mustard gas and Lewisite. Net effect ranges from nil to losing the war even more horribly than they did.
I think an interesting alternative strategy would be for the U.S. to take a more direct route to Japan in the Pacific. Rather than dividing forces between MacArthur and Nimitz, place everything under Nimitz and after July 1942 cut straight across the Pacific, cutting Japan off from its southern conquests and maybe invading Japan in 1944 or 1945.
No sideshow campaigns in the Solomons, New Guinea, the Phillipines… it would be interesting to see if that would shorten the war: cutting Japan off at the head rather than dealing with some of the tentacles first.
One problem with July 1942 is that while the US would have had three fleet carriers (four when the Saratoga returned to duty), they would have been up against a Japanese navy which still had a good part of its air arm intact.
Yes, I’m aware that Midway was a staggering setback to the IJN’s air arm; but it can certainly be argued that the real death blow came in the Solomons, which was a campaign of attrition that cost Japan heavily, not only in ships and planes, but in veteran pilots. By the time the USN began its Central Pacific drive in late 1943, they were mostly gone.
Medium bombers.
I’m at work and don’t have my references here but IIRC Goering told Hitler that the Luftwaffe could build 3 medium bombers for every 2 heavy bombers.
Adolf went for quantity.
They didn’t really dodge that by fighting in the Solomons. My thoughts are that the Japanese would be able to move a lot of their naval strength around, but need to keep at least minimal air and ground strength fighting the Australians in New Guinea, and occupying various lands such as Indonesia, the Phillipines, and Indochina.
By driving straight west across the Pacific with the resources America devoted to both the South and the Central Pacific, cutting naval supply lines, but not engaging in protracted land campaigns like the Solomons or New Guinea, the U.S. would have defeated a lot of those Japanese troops without engaging them in combat.
I don’t honestly know whether it would have shortened the war or not, but as a general principle, you’re stronger with your forces concentrated rather than divided, and it’s only the gargantuan advantage American industry had over Japanese production that allowed the U.S. to fight two almost independent wars in the Pacific and get away with it.
I think the death blow would still have come to the Japanese Navy, even if it hadn’t come in the Solomons.
The Luftwaffe couldn’t build anything, having no factories. Maybe you are talking about having the trained personnel to operate them?
Alright, so we scrap all the Do17s, He111s and Ju88s and build 2/3 as many heavy bombers instead. We have to know to do this sometime in maybe 1938, as we will need them to subdue England in two years’ time. Meanwhile they are essentially useless and our army goes without bomber support, apart from Ju87s. Are you really sure this is a war-winning strategy?
The Luftwaffe had too few planes as it was, hence the retention of obsolescent Do17s and other types. Having even fewer heavy bombers instead would not help. If the focus were on winning the battle of britain, then switching all medium bomber capability to Ju88s (the best plane the germans had) would have been sufficient - I have never really understood why they didn’t, apart from the usual propensity for politicking in the face of adversity.
Heavy bombers were always a bit overrated for european warfare IMHO. Compare the Lancaster and the Mosquito. All could carry a roughly similar bomb load to Berlin, but the Lancaster had twice as many engines (of the same type), a crew four times as large, and even at night was easy prey for fighters. The comparison also holds for the B17, except it had an even larger crew. I find it hard to believe that 666 Lancasters could be built using the same resources as 1000 mosquitos, and the Mosquitos would be much more useful (again, all IMHO).
I know the comparison holds for the B17, but Lancs could tote the Grand Slam, a ten-ton monster, and tho’ I’m not dead sure about how much they could shlepp all the way to Berlin, I think you’re understating them slightly. A quick look on Google suggest a more typical load of 18,000lb of bad news.
Sure, for short-range strikes the lancaster could carry up to 22,000 lb if modified, which was very handy indeed (particularly since it had a big open bomb bay allowing large munitions) but it couldn’t carry a full load to maximum range. The berlin comparison is the one commonly quoted, but looking at the RAF site it looks to be an exaggeration. I’d still be inclined to go with smaller, cheaper, more surviveable aircraft given the choice.