Amanda Knox and Double Jeopardy

[Bricker]

@Do_Not_Taunt

Because the second level court is the higher court. Their ruling trumps the lower court’s, especially in a system where they act as finder of fact.

Unfortunately, there’s not really an analogous concept in double jeopardy jurisprudence. In our system, jeopardy attaches to a case when the finder of fact begins its role. Literally: jeopardy attaches to a case the instant the jury is sworn in. At a bench trial, jeopardy attaches the moment the judge begins hearing evidence (as opposed to argument). Our notion of double jeopardy does not contemplate any subsequent finder of fact trumping the first.

@Do_Not_Taunt

@Bricker

In our system, imagine a jury that votes to convict, but the trial judge sets aside their verdict and enters an acquittal. The prosecution can appeal that ruling, and the appellate court could order a retrial without offending the double jeopardy clause. So it’s perfectly possible to go from a judgement of acquittal to a retrial in the United States.

Really? Help me understand this. Why would a trial judge do this in the first place? Assuming he’s making a competent statement that the state failed to prove their case, why does the state get to try the accused again?

The trial judge would do that because he believes that, as a matter of law, the trial record did not reflect evidence that, if believed by the jury, could support a “beyond a reasonable doubt” verdict.

Let’s examine some specific scenarios.

Craig is charged with armed robbery. A store clerk testifies that a masked man, wearing blue jeans and a red hoodie, pointed a gun at her and demanded the money from the cash drawer. On cross-examination, the clerk admits she cannot identity Craig as the man, because she never saw his face, although his height and weight are consistent with the robber’s.

A police officer testifies that they responded to an alarm from the store and searched the area. In a nearby alley, they found Craig, wearing blue jeans and a dark T-shirt. He told police a man had rushed by him from the direction of the store, dumped something in a nearby trash container, and fled. The trash container was searched, says the officer, and contained a gun, the stolen money, and a red hoodie. On cross-examination, he admits that there was no physical evidence tying Craig to any of the items. He also blurts out, unasked, that he arrested Craig anyway because he knew Craig was a bad actor: he had previously arrested Craig for child molestation, although he concedes that that prior arrest did not result in a conviction.

Craig testifies at trial consistently with the story he told the officers.

The jury returns a finding of guilty.

The judge sets that verdict aside and orders an acquittal. Even though the jury found guilt, the evidence on which they relied was not sufficient to do so. No physical evidence or testimonial evidence tied Craig to the robbery. The proximity of the gun and money to where Craig was arrested in suspicious, of course, but not enough to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the jury should never have heard about the child molestation arrest – it was highly prejudicial and unrelated to the matter on trial.

Now let’s change the facts a bit.

In our second scenario, the officer testifies that he arrested Craig because he had twice previously arrested Craig for armed robbery. In each case, Craig had shed a garment to change his description and claimed that he saw another robber abandon the property and go running away.

The judge sets that verdict aside and orders an acquittal, saying that the jury should never have heard about the prior arrests – it was highly prejudicial.

The prosecution should appeal that ruling, however. Prior bad acts are admissible when offered to prove a common plan, scheme, or motive, or as absence of mistake. The jury was allowed to consider that evidence along with the rest, and to infer guilt. The trial judge’s ruling was flawed as a matter of law. The appellate court can reverse the judge’s ruling of acquittal without offending the principle of double jeopardy, because the original jury verdict was “guilty.”

[Do_Not_Taunt]

@Bricker

Unfortunately, there’s not really an analogous concept in double jeopardy jurisprudence. In our system, jeopardy attaches to a case when the finder of fact begins its role. Literally: jeopardy attaches to a case the instant the jury is sworn in. At a bench trial, jeopardy attaches the moment the judge begins hearing evidence (as opposed to argument). Our notion of double jeopardy does not contemplate any subsequent finder of fact trumping the first.

The trial judge would do that because he believes that, as a matter of law, the trial record did not reflect evidence that, if believed by the jury, could support a “beyond a reasonable doubt” verdict.

Let’s examine some specific scenarios.

Craig is charged with armed robbery. A store clerk testifies that a masked man, wearing blue jeans and a red hoodie, pointed a gun at her and demanded the money from the cash drawer. On cross-examination, the clerk admits she cannot identity Craig as the man, because she never saw his face, although his height and weight are consistent with the robber’s.

A police officer testifies that they responded to an alarm from the store and searched the area. In a nearby alley, they found Craig, wearing blue jeans and a dark T-shirt. He told police a man had rushed by him from the direction of the store, dumped something in a nearby trash container, and fled. The trash container was searched, says the officer, and contained a gun, the stolen money, and a red hoodie. On cross-examination, he admits that there was no physical evidence tying Craig to any of the items. He also blurts out, unasked, that he arrested Craig anyway because he knew Craig was a bad actor: he had previously arrested Craig for child molestation, although he concedes that that prior arrest did not result in a conviction.

Craig testifies at trial consistently with the story he told the officers.

The jury returns a finding of guilty.

The judge sets that verdict aside and orders an acquittal. Even though the jury found guilt, the evidence on which they relied was not sufficient to do so. No physical evidence or testimonial evidence tied Craig to the robbery. The proximity of the gun and money to where Craig was arrested in suspicious, of course, but not enough to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the jury should never have heard about the child molestation arrest – it was highly prejudicial and unrelated to the matter on trial.

Now let’s change the facts a bit.

In our second scenario, the officer testifies that he arrested Craig because he had twice previously arrested Craig for armed robbery. In each case, Craig had shed a garment to change his description and claimed that he saw another robber abandon the property and go running away.

The judge sets that verdict aside and orders an acquittal, saying that the jury should never have heard about the prior arrests – it was highly prejudicial.

The prosecution should appeal that ruling, however. Prior bad acts are admissible when offered to prove a common plan, scheme, or motive, or as absence of mistake. The jury was allowed to consider that evidence along with the rest, and to infer guilt. The trial judge’s ruling was flawed as a matter of law. The appellate court can reverse the judge’s ruling of acquittal without offending the principle of double jeopardy, because the original jury verdict was “guilty.”

Thanks, for the detailed example, Bricker. Would the appellate court order a retrial? Or would the jury’s conviction stand in your latter example?

[Bricker]

@Do_Not_Taunt

Thanks, for the detailed example, Bricker. Would the appellate court order a retrial? Or would the jury’s conviction stand in your latter example?

In the second example, absent some other assignment of error, the jury’s verdict would stand, and the case would be remanded to the trial court level for sentencing – typically not to the same judge, by the way!

Of course, we can tweak the hypothetical facts further to require a retrial. Let’s imagine that the cop said BOTH: he had arrested Craig for child molestation and previous armed robbery.

In defense on appeal, Craig says (of course) that the trial judge’s acquittal should stand. But even if it doesn’t, the jury was impermissibly tainted by the revelation of the prior arrests, and that contributed to their guilty verdict.

The appellate court can say, “OK, the trial judge was wrong: the prior arrest for armed robbery was relevant and admissible, and therefore the jury had in front of it enough evidence to convict. BUT – the jury also had improper evidence in the form of the child molestation accusation, which was highly prejudicial and undermines our confidence that the jury convicted for the correct reasons.” In that case, they would remand for a new trial, with the rules being clear: the prior robbery can be mentioned, but not the child molestation stuff.

[Do_Not_Taunt]

@Bricker

In the second example, absent some other assignment of error, the jury’s verdict would stand, and the case would be remanded to the trial court level for sentencing – typically not to the same judge, by the way!

Of course, we can tweak the hypothetical facts further to require a retrial. Let’s imagine that the cop said BOTH: he had arrested Craig for child molestation and previous armed robbery.

In defense on appeal, Craig says (of course) that the trial judge’s acquittal should stand. But even if it doesn’t, the jury was impermissibly tainted by the revelation of the prior arrests, and that contributed to their guilty verdict.

The appellate court can say, “OK, the trial judge was wrong: the prior arrest for armed robbery was relevant and admissible, and therefore the jury had in front of it enough evidence to convict. BUT – the jury also had improper evidence in the form of the child molestation accusation, which was highly prejudicial and undermines our confidence that the jury convicted for the correct reasons.” In that case, they would remand for a new trial, with the rules being clear: the prior robbery can be mentioned, but not the child molestation stuff.

As I peel back the layers of this hypothetical, it still seems materially different from the Knox case. Here, you’re saying the appellate court would throw out the judge’s acquittal and reinstate the conviction. But then the defense successfully demands a retrial because of the prejudicial comments. But I’m not contesting the fact that the defense can request a retrial in that case. Of course double jeopardy doesn’t (necessarily) apply when the defense is requesting the retrial. What I am saying is that the state cannot force a retrial once a competent finder of fact has acquitted without falling afoul of double jeopardy. Which is what happened in the Knox trial.

[Cheesesteak]

@Do_Not_Taunt

What I am saying is that the state cannot force a retrial once a competent finder of fact has acquitted without falling afoul of double jeopardy. Which is what happened in the Knox trial.

you’re saying the appellate court would throw out the judge’s acquittal and reinstate the conviction.

Are you suggesting that forcing a retrial violates double jeopardy, but reinstating the conviction doesn’t?

[Bricker]

@Do_Not_Taunt

What I am saying is that the state cannot force a retrial once a competent finder of fact has acquitted without falling afoul of double jeopardy. Which is what happened in the Knox trial.

But that’s not the rule in the United States, because we have only one court sitting as a finder of fact. You seem to want to generalize the rule to ANY court sitting as a finder of fact. We don’t have that rule, and that’s not how double jeopardy claims are analyzed.

[Desert_Dumpster]

The facts have nothing to do with this case. I have been appalled at the basic flaws in the Italian justice system that have come to light since this case began. Their justice system is medieval–or worse. Double jeopardy? Hell, they have quintuple jeopardy.

That said, Knox will be rounded up and sent to Italy, where she will be tried over and over again, however many times it takes, until she is found guilty. The US isn’t about to violate an extradition treaty with a semi-important kinda big country. She’ll be thrown under the Italian legal bus with an “oh well.”

The Italian people will get what they want–a rich bitch American will get her comeuppance. The Italian government will get what it wants, by reaching out and tweaking the nose of the US.