I think you’re extrapolating too much here from the FPTP system. In two of the major Commonwealth countries that still use FPTP (Canada and the UK), there are a variety of third parties, and members of the major parties have to contend with strong party discipline.
The first point is triggered by the existence of regional parties (e.g. Scottish National Party in Scotland, Bloc québécois in Canada (until recently; replaced by the NDP, which has now pulls more than half of its MPs from Quebec)). There are also strong third parties which are ideologically based (e.g. - NDP in Canada; Liberal Democrats in the UK). FPTP does not prevent strong third parties in parliamentary systems.
The second point is the nature of parliamentary government - governments have to maintain a majority to stay in power, and that means strong party discipline. That factor is absent from the US congressional system, and is not necessarily a feature of FPTP.
This is difficult to reconcile with the fact that, in the US at least, it’s the more conservative party which has a significantly greater degree of party loyalty than the more liberal party. Or are you trying to claim that the Republicans are the leftists in America?
This isn’t necesarily a positive. Often opposition or going against your party isn’t some principled stance against the proposed law (although sometimes it is), often it’s something you feel you can milk for bribes. That’s essentially why all of our laws end up being a hodgepodge of riders and giveaways - you can buy people’s votes for giving a million dollars to fund some bullshit project in their home district to buy their votes, or you can sneak in a regulatory tweak for their favorite giant corporation.
Take the PPACA - even if you oppose it in principle, it’s probably a better thing if it were implemented as a clean, targeted proposal rather than the mess it eventually became - with huge giveaways to pharmaceutical companies, killing many of the provisions that really would’ve made it work smoothly, etc. Now you might be saying “I’d prefer it not to pass at all” but that’s not an option in this case - it still passed, it just passed with more giveaways, waste, ineffective rules, etc. It was a shell of what it could’ve been, and probably cost us more in the process, because everyone had to have their own little rider and bribe.
Party discipline can avert situations like that - you can get something done without bribing everyone involved to do it. Legislators rarely act as individuals in the sort of principled stands you see in stories - what they break ranks over is how much they get to screw the rest of the country to benefit their tiny slice of constituents.
This is, quite frankly, ridiculous, and I don’t know where you came up with it, except as some stereotypes you have in your head about leftists.
The reality is that the republicans have far greater party discipline than the democrats do. They will rarely break ranks on the party platform. They tend to be far more fanatical and absolutist than compromisng and pragmatic. There’s a signfiicant amount of dissent on every issue amongst democrats, and very rarely among republicans. I mean, republican leaders can’t even criticize some outlandish thing that Rush Limbaugh says, and he’s a joke of a commentator with no real power, because they won’t do anything that could be interpreted as even disagreement within the party.
The irony of all this is that the republicans are far more diverse. You have everything from theocrats who want to make homosexuality illegal to libertarians who want to privatize the roads to statists who are essentially lobbyists for giant corporations in the legislature. Their interests differ so much that it’s sort of absurd that they’re all under one giant party. And yet the party that has all of these divergent groups with completely different and often contradictory goals has been indoctrinated with the idea that only absolute faith and adherence to the party is acceptable. Meanwhile the less diverse democrats dissent far more freely.
Your “leftists hate individualism” fantasies might apply somewhere, but it certainly isn’t in US federal politics.
I need to read up on it more, but my studies indicate PR for America wouldn’t make much of a difference, as the presidential system itself encourages two parties. Most other presidential states, even with PR, seem to be two-party.
I don’t see how approval voting has much bearing on discussions about proportional representation. Approval voting is for selecting a single winner from a vote, such as in a presidential election. PR is about selecting multiple winners in a single vote. True, you could use approval voting for each sub-vote in a parliamentary election, but that has nothing to do with proportionality.
Personally, I waver about PR. Right now, my feeling is that it would enshrine parties into the electoral system too much. I like the fact that our laws, as they stand, hardly even mention political parties. PR appeals to political wonks, who see things very much along party lines. A Liberal wonk regards someone who votes Conservative as a total loss, because their party didn’t get that vote. But in fact that person is likely not entirely Conservative in their views, and probably agrees with the Liberal party on some issues. It is inaccurate to think of them as 100% Conservative.
The question is, do voters vote for a party, or for a person? I suspect it’s about two thirds party vs. one third person. That makes me uncomfortable with the idea of allocating seats entirely according to a party’s share of the vote.
It doesn’t really matter because a vote in FPTP is such lossy compression that the outcome is the same. It doesn’t matter how nuanced and informed of a voter you are when you fill in a dot.
So your concern about switching from first past the post, which totally marginalizes third parties, to proportional representation, which doesn’t, is that it would marginalize really marginal candidates?
No, approval voting is a variation on instant-runoff voting, i.e., a method for filling a single office. Either, applied to legislative races, probably would produce more third-party legislators than we have now, but nowhere near in proportion to their parties’ general public support.
Again: Suppose, in your state’s next legislative election, 20% of the voters decide to vote Green (or substitute your fave) this year. How many Greens get into the state legislature? Almost certainly none – because there are not enough Green voters in any one district to form a majority or plurality there. There are many forms of PR, but the point of all of them is that if the Greens get 20% of the votes, they should get (very, very roughly) 20% of the seats.
Well, what’s wrong with any of that? When it comes to actual policy-outcomes, ideologies (broadly defined as political views, systematic or not) count for a lot more than personalities – always, even in “nonpartisan” systems.
I also dislike voting along party lines–I want to vote for people not parties. And the problem with proportional representation is that voters would lose the ability to vote for a person. While in our current system, voters can vote for a person or a party as they like.
Changing to a proportional system reduces voter choice and increases the power of parties. Those are both changes for the worse, in my opinion.
I would like to see a change in how voting works, though. I think we should move to approval voting for all elections. Voters can vote for as many or as few candidates as they like for each office. The candidate with the most votes wins. Little change would be required to ballots or counting equipment. And there’s no complicated rankings to confuse voters or to complicate results.
Small parties would gain because they’d pass minimum requirements for official standing. And they’d gain momentum among voters because of their greater visibility.
This is completely false. All of the large presidential democracies (Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan, Nigeria) have more than two viable political parties.
It always sounds like sour grapes to me. “We can’t win elections because not enough people agree with us. So the system should be changed so we’re awarded political offices even when people don’t agree with us and we don’t win elections.”
No, my concern is that the whole idea of neatly dividing ideologies along party lines may not be valid. People criticise two-party systems as if they exclude “third party” points of view, but they don’t, they simply encompass those points of view in a bigger “tent”.
If you have more than two major parties, you tend to get coalition governments. If you have only two major parties, you still get coalitions, but they are coalitions under a the banner of a single party (so-called “big tent” politics). I don’t see much difference, and I don’t see much benefit to the ordinary person in having actual multi-party coalitions. They tend to be fractious and indecisive.
My impression is that party loyalty is far more important in PR systems in general. At this point I’d need to see numbers to evaluate how true my impression is, not just claims.
“We can’t win elections because people like us aren’t allowed to vote. So the system should be changed so we can vote.” Sounds like sour grapes to me.
There’s nothing wrong with changing the definition of “winning elections” so long as the change brings the result nearer in line with the public will, all of it including that of ideological minorities. Now, if we had PR, and the 10 or so Greens in Congress demanded the floor-vote rules be changed so they can pass Green bills even when a majority of the House opposes them, you might have a point.
I’m not the one who quoted Duverger’s Law in this thread. It’s a non sequitur to refute the argument that FPTP systems don’t exist in which there are a variety of third parties, because I don’t think anyone claimed there couldn’t be third parties in FPTP.
I do think what I said stands though–FPTP tends towards two parties that isn’t synonymous with “always results in only two parties ever, in every example of FPTP in the history of the world.”
I think FPTP with a parliamentary system will allow more than three parties nationally, but I think the basic trend in FPTP towards two parties will still be observed on a district by district level. I imagine most swing districts probably swing between two different parties, outside of “grand realignments” where one party devours another or one party collapses.
Did you mean to say not necessarily a feature of PR? Anyway, in a scenario in which the U.S. House used PR, you would need to form coalition governments in order to name a Speaker of the House and other House officers. This would bring with it the same party-loyalty concerns as in any parliamentary system, but it would also cause a structural fault because the U.S. system has no means to resolve an election in which the winners can’t form a coalition–we’d essentially be unable to pass legislation for 24 months.
I’m not sure how you’re quantifying which party in America has more party loyalty, but historically both haven’t had very strong party loyalty. The traditionally liberal New England Republicans have often voted against party wishes, and the traditionally socially conservative Southern Democrats have typically voted against mainstream party wishes.
Democrats from Rocky Mountain states and farm states often vote with Republicans from those same states on many issues.
I do think in the last 5 years we’ve seen a little less of this, as major camps in the “big tents” have lost national prominence (there are few Southern Democrats or New England Republicans holding Federal office these days.)
I think the role of a representative is to represent his tiny slice of constituents. If that wasn’t the case we’d have 435 at large seats in the House with each member representing the country at large.
I think you’re totally off the mark on your analysis of party discipline in the United States; and are projecting absolute statements based on a relatively new situation (staunch opposition to President Obama.) The Republicans were involved in lots of bipartisan legislation in the last 25 years.
Hogwash, most major Democratic initiatives are anathema to individualism.
On that point, consider this quotation from John Adams:
“[A legislature]…should be an exact portrait, in miniature, of the people at large, as it should feel, reason and act like them.”
The SMD/FPTP system tends to produce a legislature more like your image in a funhouse mirror, with some elements of your appearance blown out of proportion and others shrunk to invisibility.
