Jonpluc,
<<it was my understanding that the missle attack was near the Saudi border >>
Saudi Arabia’s a big place. Most U.S. troop deployments are around Riyadh and King Khalid Military City, hundreds of miles to the north.
Your argument also flatly ignores the question of time. Battlefield intelligence is extremely perishable. If the U.S. gets information that an Al Qaeda leader is traveling north on a certain highway at a certain hour, obviously, that can change at any moment. Every minute counts.
It’s easy for you to sit in an armchair and say how easy it would have been to load and launch helicopters rather than a predator. But allowing for planning and rehearsal time, it would take hours just to assemble a force on the PZ and get them into the helos. It’s much easier and quicker to launch a predator. And puts fewer servicemen at risk (remember Desert One?) http://www.afa.org/magazine/jan1999/0199desertone_print.html
Also, with a typical cruising speed of 200 knots, the Predator would cover the distance to the target nearly twice as fast as the Black Hawk (cruising airspeed of about 120 knots.)
Again, remember, speed is of the essence. The vehicle could pull off the road or go into hiding at any time, or drop off some of its passengers. If the range to the target is 200 miles (the max a Black Hawk can go and still make it back even without a cargo of troops and combat gear, since their range is 400 miles), the faster vehicle saves you hours.
If any of our troops get hit, they could be hours away from a hospital. (There would probably not be time for prior coordination with a Yemeni hospital to take casualties. If there were, it would risk compromising the operation, thereby further endangering the lives of U.S. servicemen.)
The Predator is also less vulnerable to hostile action (i.e. ground fire.)
Operationally, the decision to launch the predator rather than a ground force was a no-brainer.
<<Hickory6 and lets be honest, the reason they wernt captured is because the U.S. didnt WANT them captured…not that they didnt have the capability.>>
Well, that’s a pretty foolish statement. Captured people yield more intel than dead ones. I don’t think you have any rational basis at all for making that statement. Occam’s razor favors my argument–trying to launch a ground op risks US troops and it risks losing the trail, while providing no guarantee that the targets wouldn’t end up killed anyway. It requires no nefarious bloodlust or a ‘no prisoners’ policy which you can’t prove anyway, and which can be easily disproven by the pointing out the existence of hundreds of Al Qaeda prisoners.
<<Let’s be honest.>>
Well, let’s be honest about your fund of information here, which is sorely lacking. You should make fewer WAGs and do a bit more mission analysis.
<< I resent your implication that im “casual” with troops lives. >>
The best way to avoid the implication would be to not be so casual about advocating the deployment of troops far from reinforcement, fire support, and medical facilities without first going through the steps of a mission analysis.
<<Im simply fairly confident that an army that was capable of killing 100,000 Iraqis and taking tens of thousands more prisoner, while only taking about 100 losses, should be able to handle 6 yahoos in a Ford Taurus or whatever without having our military collapse around us. >>
One of the reasons we were so successful is because US military leaders know how to plan for a mission, because US military leaders are meticulous about rehearsing it, because US military leaders are skilled at employing fire support, because US military leaders leverage superior US logistics and intelligence technology, and because US military leaders employ their units in accordance with their capabilities and limitations.
Your proposal would require the commitment of US troops without adequat planning time, without adequate rehearsal time, far from any indirect fire support, little or no logistical support, and would risk losing the valuable and imminently expiring military intelligence. The mission was not within the reasonable capability of ground troops stationed hundreds of miles away to plan, rehearse, and execute within the amount of time available.